mrmoor/cti-corpus-raw · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 1 38.9k
It should be noted that CosmicDuke does not interoperate with the second , embedded malware in any way other than by writing the malware to disk and executing it .
After that , CosmicDuke and the second malware operate entirely independently of each other , including separately contacting their C&C servers .
Sometimes , both malware have used the same C&C server , but in other cases , even the servers have been different .
Finally , it is worth noting that while most of the compilation timestamps for CosmicDuke samples appear to be authentic , we are aware of a few cases of them being forged .
One such case was detailed on page 10 as an apparent evasion attempt .
Another is a loader variant seen during the spring of 2010 in conjunction with both CosmicDuke and PinchDuke .
These loader samples all had compilation timestamps purporting to be from the 24th or the 25th of September , 2001 .
However , many of these loader samples embed CosmicDuke variants that exploit the CVE-2010- 0232 privilege escalation vulnerability thus making it impossible for the compilation timestamps to be authentic .
MINIDUKE : First known activity Loader July 2010 , Backdoor May 2011 Most recent known activity Loader : Spring 2015 , Backdoor : Summer 2014 C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Twitter , Known toolset components Downloader , Backdoor , Loader .
The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components , which are commonly referred to as the MiniDuke “ stage 1 ” , “ stage 2 ” , and “ stage 3 ” components as per Kaspersky ’s original MiniDuke whitepaper .
Additionally , a specific loader is often associated with the MiniDuke toolset and is referred to as the “ MiniDuke loader ” .
While the loader has often been used together with other MiniDuke components , it has also commonly been used in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke .
In fact , the oldest samples of the loader that we have found were used with PinchDuke .
To avoid confusion however , we have decided to continue referring to the loader as the “ MiniDuke loader ” .
Two details about MiniDuke components are worth noting .
Firstly , some of the MiniDuke components were written in Assembly language .
While many malware were written in Assembly during the ‘ old days ‘ of curiosity-driven virus writing , it has since become a rarity .
Secondly , some of the MiniDuke components do not contain a hardcoded C&C server address , but instead obtain the address of a current C&C server via Twitter .
The use of Twitter either to initially obtain the address of a C&C server ( or as a backup if no hardcoded primary C&C server responds ) is a feature also found in OnionDuke , CozyDuke , and HammerDuke .
COZYDUKE : First known activity January 2010 , Most recent known activity : Spring 2015 , Other names CozyBear , CozyCar , Cozer , EuroAPT , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Twitter ( backup ) , Known toolset components Dropper , Modular backdoor , Multiple persistence components , Information gathering module , Screenshot module , Password stealing module , Password hash stealing module .
CozyDuke is not simply a malware toolset ; rather , it is a modular malware platform formed around a core backdoor component .
This component can be instructed by the C&C server to download and execute arbitrary modules , and it is these modules that provide CozyDuke with its vast array of functionality .
Known CozyDuke modules include : Command execution module for executing arbitrary Windows Command Prompt commands , Password stealer module , NT LAN Manager ( NTLM ) hash stealer module , System information gathering module , Screenshot module .
In addition to modules , CozyDuke can also be instructed to download and execute other , independent executables .
In some observed cases , these executables were self-extracting archive files containing common hacking tools , such as PSExec and Mimikatz , combined with script files that execute these tools .
In other cases , CozyDuke has been observed downloading and executing tools from other toolsets used by the Dukes such as OnionDuke , SeaDuke , and HammerDuke .
ONIONDUKE : First known activity February 2013 , Most recent known activity Spring 2015 , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Twitter ( backup ) , Known toolset components Dropper , Loader , Multiple modular core components , Information stealer , Distributed Denial of Service ( DDoS ) module , Password stealing module , Information gathering module , Social network spamming module .
The OnionDuke toolset includes at least a dropper , a loader , an information stealer Trojan and multiple modular variants with associated modules .
OnionDuke first caught our attention because it was being spread via a malicious Tor exit node .
The Tor node would intercept any unencrypted executable files being downloaded and modify those executables by adding a malicious wrapper contained an embedded OnionDuke .
Once the victim finished downloading the file and executed it , the wrapper would infect the victim ’s computer with OnionDuke before executing the original legitimate executable .
The same wrapper has also been used to wrap legitimate executable files , which were then made available for users to download from torrent sites .
Again , if a victim downloaded a torrent containing a wrapped executable , they would get infected with OnionDuke .
Finally , we have also observed victims being infected with OnionDuke after they were already infected with CozyDuke .
In these cases , CozyDuke was instructed by its C&C server to download and execute OnionDuke toolset .
SEADUKE : First known activity October 2014 , Most recent known activity Spring 2015 , Other names SeaDaddy , SeaDask , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Known toolset components Backdoor .
SeaDuke is a simple backdoor that focuses on executing commands retrieved from its C&C server , such as uploading and downloading files , executing system commands and evaluating additional Python code .
SeaDuke is made interesting by the fact that it is written in Python and designed to be cross-platform so that it works on both Windows and Linux .
The only known infection vector for SeaDuke is via an existing CozyDuke infection , wherein CozyDuke downloads and executes the SeaDuke toolset .
Like HammerDuke , SeaDuke appears to be used by the Dukes group primarily as a secondary backdoor left on CozyDuke victims after that toolset has completed the initial infection and stolen any readily available information from them .
HAMMERDUKE : First known activity January 2015 , Most recent known activity Summer 2015 , Other names HAMMERTOSS , Netduke , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Twitter , Known toolset components Backdoor .
HammerDuke is a simple backdoor that is apparently designed for similar use cases as SeaDuke .
Specifically , the only known infection vector for HammerDuke is to be downloaded and executed by CozyDuke onto a victim that has already been compromised by that toolset .
This , together with HammerDuke ’s simplistic backdoor functionality , suggests that it is primarily used by the Dukes group as a secondary backdoor left on CozyDuke victims after CozyDuke performed the initial infection and stole any readily available information from them .
HammerDuke is however interesting because it is written in .NET , and even more so because of its occasional use of Twitter as a C&C communication channel .
Some HammerDuke variants only contain a hardcoded C&C server address from which they will retrieve commands , but other HammerDuke variants will first use a custom algorithm to generate a Twitter account name based on the current date .
If the account exists , HammerDuke will then search for tweets from that account with links to image files that contain embedded commands for the toolset to execute .
HammerDuke ’s use of Twitter and crafted image files is reminiscent of other Duke toolsets .
Both OnionDuke and MiniDuke also use date-based algorithms to generate Twitter account names and then searched for any tweets from those accounts that linked to image files .
In contrast however , for OnionDuke and MiniDuke the linked image files contain embedded malware to be downloaded and executed , rather than instructions .
Similarly , GeminiDuke may also download image files , but these would contain embedded additional configuration information for the toolset itself .
Unlike HammerDuke however , the URLs for the images downloaded by GeminiDuke are hardcoded in its initial configuration , rather than retrieved from Twitter .
CLOUDDUKE : First known activity June 2015 , Most recent known activity Summer 2015 , Other names MiniDionis , CloudLook , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Microsoft OneDrive , Known toolset components Downloader , Loader , Two backdoor variants .
CloudDuke is a malware toolset known to consist of , at least , a downloader , a loader and two backdoor variants .
The CloudDuke downloader will download and execute additional malware from a preconfigured location .
Interestingly , that location may be either a web address or a Microsoft OneDrive account .
Both CloudDuke backdoor variants support simple backdoor functionality , similar to SeaDuke .
While one variant will use a preconfigured C&C server over HTTP or HTTPS , the other variant will use a Microsoft OneDrive account to exchange commands and stolen data with its operators .
THE DUKES 7 YEARS OF RUSSIAN CYBER ESPIONAGE .
The Dukes primarily use spear-phishing emails when attempting to infect victims with their malware .
These spear-phishing emails range from ones purposely designed to look like spam messages used to spread common crimeware and addressed to large numbers of people , to highly targeted emails addressed to only a few recipients ( or even just one person ) and with content that is highly relevant for the intended recipient .
In some cases , the Dukes appear to have used previously compromised victims to send new spear-phishing emails to other targets .
The spear-phishing emails used by the Dukes may contain either specially-crafted malicious attachments or links to URLs hosting the malware .
When malicious attachments are used , they may either be designed to exploit a vulnerability in a popular software assumed to be installed on the victim ’s machine , such as Microsoft Word or Adobe Reader , or the attachment itself may have its icon and filename obfuscated in such a way that the file does not appear to be an executable .
The only instances which we are aware of where the Dukes did not use spear-phishing as the initial infection vector is with certain OnionDuke variants .
These were instead spread using either a malicious Tor node that would trojanize legitimate applications on-the-fly with the OnionDuke toolset , or via torrent files containing previously trojanized versions of legitimate applications .
Finally , it is worth noting that the Dukes are known to sometimes re-infect a victim of one of their malware tools with another one of their tools .
Examples include CozyDuke infecting its victims with SeaDuke , HammerDuke ,or OnionDuke ; and CosmicDuke infecting its victims with PinchDuke ,GeminiDuke or MiniDuke .
The Dukes have employed exploits both in their infection vectors as well as in their malware .
We are however only aware of one instance - the exploitation of CVE-2013-0640 to deploy MiniDuke - where we believe the exploited vulnerability was a zero-day at the time that the group acquired the exploit .
In all known cases where exploits were employed , we believe the Dukes did not themselves discover the vulnerabilities or design the original exploits ; for the exploited zero-day , we believe the Dukes purchased the exploit .
In all other cases , we believe the group simply repurposed publicly available exploits or proofs of concept .
Attribution is always a difficult question , but attempting to answer it is important in understanding these types of threats and how to defend against them .
This paper has already stated that we believe the Dukes to be a Russian state-sponsored cyberespionage operation .
To reach this conclusion , we began by analyzing the apparent objectives and motivations of the group .
Based on what we currently know about the targets chosen by the Dukes over the past 7 years , they appear to have consistently targeted entities that deal with foreign policy and security policy matters .
These targets have included organizations such as ministries of foreign affairs , embassies , senates , parliaments , ministries of defense , defense contractors , and think tanks .
In one of their more intriguing cases , the Dukes have appeared to also target entities involved in the trafficking of illegal drugs .
Even such targets however appear to be consistent with the overarching theme , given the drug trade ’s relevance to security policy .
Based on this , we are confident in our conclusion that the Dukes ’ primary mission is the collection of intelligence to support foreign and security policy decision-making .
Based on the length of the Dukes ’ activity , our estimate of the amount of resources invested in the operation and the fact that their activity only appears to be increasing , we believe the group to have significant and most critically , stable financial backing .
The Dukes have consistently operated large-scale campaigns against high-profile targets while concurrently engaging in smaller , more targeted campaigns with apparent coordination and no evidence of unintentional overlap or operational clashes .
We therefore believe the Dukes to be a single , large , wellcoordinated organization with clear separation of responsibilities and targets .
The Dukes appear to prioritize the continuation of their operations over stealth .
Their 2015 CozyDuke and CloudDuke campaigns take this to the extreme by apparently opting for speed and quantity over stealth and quality .
In the most extreme case , the Dukes continued with their July 2015 CloudDuke campaign even after their activity had been outed by multiple security vendors .
We therefore believe the Dukes ’ primary mission to be so valuable to their benefactors that its continuation outweighs everything else .
This apparent disregard for publicity suggests , in our opinion , that the benefactors of the Dukes is so powerful and so tightly connected to the group that the Dukes are able to operate with no apparent fear of repercussions on getting caught .
We believe the only benefactor with the power to offer such comprehensive protection would be the government of the nation from which the group operates .
We therefore believe the Dukes to work either within or directly for a government , thus ruling out the possibility of a criminal gang or another third party .
Kaspersky Labs has previously noted the presence of Russian-language artefacts in some of the Duke malware samples .
We have also found a Russian-language error message in many PinchDuke samples which translates as , “ There is an error in the module ’s name ! The length of the data section name must be 4 bytes! ” Additionally , Kaspersky noted that based on the compilation timestamps , the authors of the Duke malware appear to primarily work from Monday to Friday between the times of 6am and 4pm UTC+0 .
This corresponds to working hours between 9am and 7pm in the UTC+3 time zone , also known as Moscow Standard Time , which covers , among others , much of western Russia , including Moscow and St. Petersburg .
The Kaspersky Labs analysis of the Duke malware authors ’ working times is supported by our own analysis , as well as that performed by FireEye .
This assertion of time zone is also supported by timestamps found in many GeminiDuke samples , which similarly suggest the group work in the Moscow Standard Time timezone , as further detailed in the section on the technical analysis of GeminiDuke .
Finally , the known targets of the Dukes - Eastern European foreign ministries , western think tanks and governmental organizations , even Russian-speaking drug dealers - conform to publiclyknown Russian foreign policy and security policy interests .
Even though the Dukes appear to have targeted governments all over the world , we are unaware of them ever targeting the Russian government .
While absence of evidence is not evidence of absence , it is an interesting detail to note .
Threat Actor Profile : TA505 , From Dridex to GlobeImposter .
Proofpoint researchers track a wide range of threat actors involved in both financially motivated cybercrime and state-sponsored actions .

It should be noted that CosmicDuke does not interoperate with the second , embedded malware in any way other than by writing the malware to disk and executing it .

After that , CosmicDuke and the second malware operate entirely independently of each other , including separately contacting their C&C servers .

Sometimes , both malware have used the same C&C server , but in other cases , even the servers have been different .

Finally , it is worth noting that while most of the compilation timestamps for CosmicDuke samples appear to be authentic , we are aware of a few cases of them being forged .

One such case was detailed on page 10 as an apparent evasion attempt .

Another is a loader variant seen during the spring of 2010 in conjunction with both CosmicDuke and PinchDuke .

These loader samples all had compilation timestamps purporting to be from the 24th or the 25th of September , 2001 .

However , many of these loader samples embed CosmicDuke variants that exploit the CVE-2010- 0232 privilege escalation vulnerability thus making it impossible for the compilation timestamps to be authentic .

MINIDUKE : First known activity Loader July 2010 , Backdoor May 2011 Most recent known activity Loader : Spring 2015 , Backdoor : Summer 2014 C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Twitter , Known toolset components Downloader , Backdoor , Loader .

The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components , which are commonly referred to as the MiniDuke “ stage 1 ” , “ stage 2 ” , and “ stage 3 ” components as per Kaspersky ’s original MiniDuke whitepaper .

Additionally , a specific loader is often associated with the MiniDuke toolset and is referred to as the “ MiniDuke loader ” .

While the loader has often been used together with other MiniDuke components , it has also commonly been used in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke .

In fact , the oldest samples of the loader that we have found were used with PinchDuke .

To avoid confusion however , we have decided to continue referring to the loader as the “ MiniDuke loader ” .

Two details about MiniDuke components are worth noting .

Firstly , some of the MiniDuke components were written in Assembly language .

While many malware were written in Assembly during the ‘ old days ‘ of curiosity-driven virus writing , it has since become a rarity .

Secondly , some of the MiniDuke components do not contain a hardcoded C&C server address , but instead obtain the address of a current C&C server via Twitter .

The use of Twitter either to initially obtain the address of a C&C server ( or as a backup if no hardcoded primary C&C server responds ) is a feature also found in OnionDuke , CozyDuke , and HammerDuke .

COZYDUKE : First known activity January 2010 , Most recent known activity : Spring 2015 , Other names CozyBear , CozyCar , Cozer , EuroAPT , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Twitter ( backup ) , Known toolset components Dropper , Modular backdoor , Multiple persistence components , Information gathering module , Screenshot module , Password stealing module , Password hash stealing module .

CozyDuke is not simply a malware toolset ; rather , it is a modular malware platform formed around a core backdoor component .

This component can be instructed by the C&C server to download and execute arbitrary modules , and it is these modules that provide CozyDuke with its vast array of functionality .

Known CozyDuke modules include : Command execution module for executing arbitrary Windows Command Prompt commands , Password stealer module , NT LAN Manager ( NTLM ) hash stealer module , System information gathering module , Screenshot module .

In addition to modules , CozyDuke can also be instructed to download and execute other , independent executables .

In some observed cases , these executables were self-extracting archive files containing common hacking tools , such as PSExec and Mimikatz , combined with script files that execute these tools .

In other cases , CozyDuke has been observed downloading and executing tools from other toolsets used by the Dukes such as OnionDuke , SeaDuke , and HammerDuke .

ONIONDUKE : First known activity February 2013 , Most recent known activity Spring 2015 , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Twitter ( backup ) , Known toolset components Dropper , Loader , Multiple modular core components , Information stealer , Distributed Denial of Service ( DDoS ) module , Password stealing module , Information gathering module , Social network spamming module .

The OnionDuke toolset includes at least a dropper , a loader , an information stealer Trojan and multiple modular variants with associated modules .

OnionDuke first caught our attention because it was being spread via a malicious Tor exit node .

The Tor node would intercept any unencrypted executable files being downloaded and modify those executables by adding a malicious wrapper contained an embedded OnionDuke .

Once the victim finished downloading the file and executed it , the wrapper would infect the victim ’s computer with OnionDuke before executing the original legitimate executable .

The same wrapper has also been used to wrap legitimate executable files , which were then made available for users to download from torrent sites .

Again , if a victim downloaded a torrent containing a wrapped executable , they would get infected with OnionDuke .

Finally , we have also observed victims being infected with OnionDuke after they were already infected with CozyDuke .

In these cases , CozyDuke was instructed by its C&C server to download and execute OnionDuke toolset .

SEADUKE : First known activity October 2014 , Most recent known activity Spring 2015 , Other names SeaDaddy , SeaDask , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Known toolset components Backdoor .

SeaDuke is a simple backdoor that focuses on executing commands retrieved from its C&C server , such as uploading and downloading files , executing system commands and evaluating additional Python code .

SeaDuke is made interesting by the fact that it is written in Python and designed to be cross-platform so that it works on both Windows and Linux .

The only known infection vector for SeaDuke is via an existing CozyDuke infection , wherein CozyDuke downloads and executes the SeaDuke toolset .

Like HammerDuke , SeaDuke appears to be used by the Dukes group primarily as a secondary backdoor left on CozyDuke victims after that toolset has completed the initial infection and stolen any readily available information from them .

HAMMERDUKE : First known activity January 2015 , Most recent known activity Summer 2015 , Other names HAMMERTOSS , Netduke , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Twitter , Known toolset components Backdoor .

HammerDuke is a simple backdoor that is apparently designed for similar use cases as SeaDuke .

Specifically , the only known infection vector for HammerDuke is to be downloaded and executed by CozyDuke onto a victim that has already been compromised by that toolset .

This , together with HammerDuke ’s simplistic backdoor functionality , suggests that it is primarily used by the Dukes group as a secondary backdoor left on CozyDuke victims after CozyDuke performed the initial infection and stole any readily available information from them .

HammerDuke is however interesting because it is written in .NET , and even more so because of its occasional use of Twitter as a C&C communication channel .

Some HammerDuke variants only contain a hardcoded C&C server address from which they will retrieve commands , but other HammerDuke variants will first use a custom algorithm to generate a Twitter account name based on the current date .

If the account exists , HammerDuke will then search for tweets from that account with links to image files that contain embedded commands for the toolset to execute .

HammerDuke ’s use of Twitter and crafted image files is reminiscent of other Duke toolsets .

Both OnionDuke and MiniDuke also use date-based algorithms to generate Twitter account names and then searched for any tweets from those accounts that linked to image files .

In contrast however , for OnionDuke and MiniDuke the linked image files contain embedded malware to be downloaded and executed , rather than instructions .

Similarly , GeminiDuke may also download image files , but these would contain embedded additional configuration information for the toolset itself .

Unlike HammerDuke however , the URLs for the images downloaded by GeminiDuke are hardcoded in its initial configuration , rather than retrieved from Twitter .

CLOUDDUKE : First known activity June 2015 , Most recent known activity Summer 2015 , Other names MiniDionis , CloudLook , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Microsoft OneDrive , Known toolset components Downloader , Loader , Two backdoor variants .

CloudDuke is a malware toolset known to consist of , at least , a downloader , a loader and two backdoor variants .

The CloudDuke downloader will download and execute additional malware from a preconfigured location .

Interestingly , that location may be either a web address or a Microsoft OneDrive account .

Both CloudDuke backdoor variants support simple backdoor functionality , similar to SeaDuke .

While one variant will use a preconfigured C&C server over HTTP or HTTPS , the other variant will use a Microsoft OneDrive account to exchange commands and stolen data with its operators .

THE DUKES 7 YEARS OF RUSSIAN CYBER ESPIONAGE .

The Dukes primarily use spear-phishing emails when attempting to infect victims with their malware .

These spear-phishing emails range from ones purposely designed to look like spam messages used to spread common crimeware and addressed to large numbers of people , to highly targeted emails addressed to only a few recipients ( or even just one person ) and with content that is highly relevant for the intended recipient .

In some cases , the Dukes appear to have used previously compromised victims to send new spear-phishing emails to other targets .

The spear-phishing emails used by the Dukes may contain either specially-crafted malicious attachments or links to URLs hosting the malware .

When malicious attachments are used , they may either be designed to exploit a vulnerability in a popular software assumed to be installed on the victim ’s machine , such as Microsoft Word or Adobe Reader , or the attachment itself may have its icon and filename obfuscated in such a way that the file does not appear to be an executable .

The only instances which we are aware of where the Dukes did not use spear-phishing as the initial infection vector is with certain OnionDuke variants .

These were instead spread using either a malicious Tor node that would trojanize legitimate applications on-the-fly with the OnionDuke toolset , or via torrent files containing previously trojanized versions of legitimate applications .

Finally , it is worth noting that the Dukes are known to sometimes re-infect a victim of one of their malware tools with another one of their tools .

Examples include CozyDuke infecting its victims with SeaDuke , HammerDuke ,or OnionDuke ; and CosmicDuke infecting its victims with PinchDuke ,GeminiDuke or MiniDuke .

The Dukes have employed exploits both in their infection vectors as well as in their malware .

We are however only aware of one instance - the exploitation of CVE-2013-0640 to deploy MiniDuke - where we believe the exploited vulnerability was a zero-day at the time that the group acquired the exploit .

In all known cases where exploits were employed , we believe the Dukes did not themselves discover the vulnerabilities or design the original exploits ; for the exploited zero-day , we believe the Dukes purchased the exploit .

In all other cases , we believe the group simply repurposed publicly available exploits or proofs of concept .

Attribution is always a difficult question , but attempting to answer it is important in understanding these types of threats and how to defend against them .

This paper has already stated that we believe the Dukes to be a Russian state-sponsored cyberespionage operation .

To reach this conclusion , we began by analyzing the apparent objectives and motivations of the group .

Based on what we currently know about the targets chosen by the Dukes over the past 7 years , they appear to have consistently targeted entities that deal with foreign policy and security policy matters .

These targets have included organizations such as ministries of foreign affairs , embassies , senates , parliaments , ministries of defense , defense contractors , and think tanks .

In one of their more intriguing cases , the Dukes have appeared to also target entities involved in the trafficking of illegal drugs .

Even such targets however appear to be consistent with the overarching theme , given the drug trade ’s relevance to security policy .

Based on this , we are confident in our conclusion that the Dukes ’ primary mission is the collection of intelligence to support foreign and security policy decision-making .

Based on the length of the Dukes ’ activity , our estimate of the amount of resources invested in the operation and the fact that their activity only appears to be increasing , we believe the group to have significant and most critically , stable financial backing .

The Dukes have consistently operated large-scale campaigns against high-profile targets while concurrently engaging in smaller , more targeted campaigns with apparent coordination and no evidence of unintentional overlap or operational clashes .

We therefore believe the Dukes to be a single , large , wellcoordinated organization with clear separation of responsibilities and targets .

The Dukes appear to prioritize the continuation of their operations over stealth .

Their 2015 CozyDuke and CloudDuke campaigns take this to the extreme by apparently opting for speed and quantity over stealth and quality .

In the most extreme case , the Dukes continued with their July 2015 CloudDuke campaign even after their activity had been outed by multiple security vendors .

We therefore believe the Dukes ’ primary mission to be so valuable to their benefactors that its continuation outweighs everything else .

This apparent disregard for publicity suggests , in our opinion , that the benefactors of the Dukes is so powerful and so tightly connected to the group that the Dukes are able to operate with no apparent fear of repercussions on getting caught .

We believe the only benefactor with the power to offer such comprehensive protection would be the government of the nation from which the group operates .

We therefore believe the Dukes to work either within or directly for a government , thus ruling out the possibility of a criminal gang or another third party .

Kaspersky Labs has previously noted the presence of Russian-language artefacts in some of the Duke malware samples .

We have also found a Russian-language error message in many PinchDuke samples which translates as , “ There is an error in the module ’s name ! The length of the data section name must be 4 bytes! ” Additionally , Kaspersky noted that based on the compilation timestamps , the authors of the Duke malware appear to primarily work from Monday to Friday between the times of 6am and 4pm UTC+0 .

This corresponds to working hours between 9am and 7pm in the UTC+3 time zone , also known as Moscow Standard Time , which covers , among others , much of western Russia , including Moscow and St. Petersburg .

The Kaspersky Labs analysis of the Duke malware authors ’ working times is supported by our own analysis , as well as that performed by FireEye .

This assertion of time zone is also supported by timestamps found in many GeminiDuke samples , which similarly suggest the group work in the Moscow Standard Time timezone , as further detailed in the section on the technical analysis of GeminiDuke .

Finally , the known targets of the Dukes - Eastern European foreign ministries , western think tanks and governmental organizations , even Russian-speaking drug dealers - conform to publiclyknown Russian foreign policy and security policy interests .

Even though the Dukes appear to have targeted governments all over the world , we are unaware of them ever targeting the Russian government .

While absence of evidence is not evidence of absence , it is an interesting detail to note .

Threat Actor Profile : TA505 , From Dridex to GlobeImposter .

Proofpoint researchers track a wide range of threat actors involved in both financially motivated cybercrime and state-sponsored actions .