mrmoor/cti-corpus-raw · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 1 38.9k
ZeroT remained the primary stage 1 payload , but the stage 2 payloads varied .
One such interesting example was “ ПЛАН_РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ_ПРОЕКТА.rar ” ( SHA256 b5c208e4fb8ba255883f771d384ca85566c7be8adcf5c87114a62efb53b73fda ) .
Translated from Russian , this file is named “ PROJECT_REALIZATION_PLAN.rar ” and contains a compressed .scr executable .
This ZeroT executable communicated with the C&C domain www.kz-info.net and downloaded PlugX as well as an additionalTrojan which communicated with the www.ruvim.net C&C server .
is a payload that we do not see this group using frequently .
Another interesting ZeroT sample ( SHA256 bc2246813d7267608e1a80a04dac32da9115a15b1550b0c4842b9d6e2e7de374 ) contained the executable 0228.exe and a decoy document 0228.doc in the RAR SFX archive .
Bundling decoy documents is a common tactic by this group .
RAR SFX directives are used to display the decoy while the malicious payload is executed .
We suspect that this specific lure was copied from the news article http://www.cis.minsk.by/news.php?id=7557 .
TA459 is well-known for targeting organizations in Russia and neighboring countries .
However , their strategy , tactics , techniques , and procedures in this particular attack emphasize the importance of rigorous patching regimens for all organizations .
Even as software vulnerabilities often take a back seat to human exploits and social engineering , robust defenses must include protection at the email gateway , proactive patch management , and thoughtful end user education .
Paying attention to the details of past attacks is also an important means of preparing for future attacks .
Noting who is targeted , with what malware , and with what types of lures provide clues with which organizations can improve their security posture .
At the same time , multinational organizations like the financial services firms targeted here must be acutely aware of the threats from state-sponsored actors working with sophisticated malware to compromise users and networks .
Ongoing activity from attack groups like TA459 who consistently target individuals specializing in particular areas of research and expertise further complicate an already difficult security situation for organizations dealing with more traditional malware threats , phishing campaigns , and socially engineered threats every day .
Suckfly : Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates .
Release_Time : 2016-03-15 Report_URL : https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=62e325ae-f551-4855-b9cf-28a7d52d1534&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocumentsIn late 2015 , Symantec identified suspicious activity involving a hacking tool used in a malicious manner against one of our customers .
Normally , this is considered a low-level alert easily defeated by security software .
In this case , however , the hacktool had an unusual characteristic not typically seen with this type of file ; it was signed with a valid code-signing certificate .
Many hacktools are made for less than ethical purposes and are freely available , so this was an initial red flag , which led us to investigate further .
As our investigation continued , we soon realized this was much larger than a few hacktools .
We discovered Suckfly , an advanced threat group , conducting targeted attacks using multiple stolen certificates , as well as hacktools and custom malware .
The group had obtained the certificates through pre-attack operations before commencing targeted attacks against a number of government and commercial organizations spread across multiple continents over a two-year period .
This type of activity and the malicious use of stolen certificates emphasizes the importance of safeguarding certificates to prevent them from being used maliciously .
Suckfly has a number of hacktools and malware varieties at its disposal : Back door , Keylogger , Port scanner , Misc. tool , Exploit , Credential dumper , Privilage escalation .
The first signed hacktool we identified in late 2015 was a digitally signed brute-force server message block ( SMB ) scanner .
The organization associated with this certificate is a South Korean mobile software developer .
While we became initially curious because the hacktool was signed , we became more suspicious when we realized a mobile software developer had signed it , since this is not the type of software typically associated with a mobile application .
Based on this discovery , we began to look for other binaries signed with the South Korean mobile software developer's certificate .
This led to the discovery of three additional hacktools also signed using this certificate .
In addition to being signed with a stolen certificate , the identified hacktools had been used in suspicious activity against a US based health provider operating in India .
This evidence indicates that the certificate ’s rightful owner either misused it or it had been stolen from them .
Symantec worked with the certificate owner to confirm that the hacktool was not associated with them .
Following the trail further , we traced malicious traffic back to where it originated from and looked for additional evidence to indicate that the attacker persistently used the same infrastructure .
We discovered the activity originated from three separate IP addresses , all located in Chengdu , China .
In addition to the traffic originating from Chengdu , we identified a selection of hacktools and malware signed using nine stolen certificates .
The nine stolen certificates originated from nine different companies who are physically located close together around the central districts of Seoul , South Korea .
We don't know the exact date Suckfly stole the certificates from the South Korean organizations .
However , by analyzing the dates when we first saw the certificates paired with hacktools or malware , we can gain insight into when the certificates may have been stolen .
Figure 4 details how many times each stolen certificate was used in a given month .
The first sighting of three of the nine stolen certificates being used maliciously occurred in early 2014 .
Those three certificates were the only ones used in 2014 , making it likely that the other six were not compromised until 2015 .
All nine certificates were used maliciously in 2015 .
As noted earlier , the stolen certificates Symantec identified in this investigation were used to sign both hacking tools and malware .
Further analysis of the malware identified what looks like a custom back door .
We believe Suckfly specifically developed the back door for use in cyberespionage campaigns .
Symantec detects this threat as Backdoor.Nidiran .
Analysis of Nidiran samples determined that the back door had been updated three times since early 2014 , which fits the timeline outlined in Figure 4 .
The modifications were minor and likely performed to add capabilities and avoid detection .
While the malware is custom , it only provides the attackers with standard back door capabilities .
Suckfly delivered Nidiran through a strategic web compromise .
Specifically , the threat group used a specially crafted web page to deliver an exploit for the Microsoft Windows OLE Remote Code Execution Vulnerability ( CVE-2014-6332 ) , which affects specific versions of Microsoft Windows .
This exploit is triggered when a potential victim browses to a malicious page using Internet Explorer , which can allow the attacker to execute code with the same privileges as the currently logged-in user .
Once exploit has been achieved , Nidiran is delivered through a self-extracting executable that extracts the components to a .tmp folder after it has been executed .
The threat then executes “ svchost.exe ” , a PE file , which is actually a clean tool known as OLEVIEW.EXE .
The executable will then load iviewers.dll , which is normally a clean , legitimate file .
Attackers have been known to distribute malicious files masquerading as the legitimate iviewers.dll file and then use DLL load hijacking to execute the malicious code and infect the computer .
This technique is associated with themalware and is frequently used in China based cyberespionage activity .
Suckfly isn’t the only attack group to use certificates to sign malware but they may be the most prolific collectors of them .
After all , Stuxnet , widely regarded as the world ’s first known cyberweapon , was signed using stolen certificates from companies based in Taiwan with dates much earlier than Suckfly .
Other cyberespionage groups , including Black Vine and Hidden Lynx , have also used stolen certificates in their campaigns .
In April 2013 , a third-party vendor published a report about a cyberespionage group using custom malware and stolen certificates in their operations .
The report documented an advanced threat group they attributed to China .
Symantec tracks the group behind this activity as Blackfly and detects the malware they use as Backdoor.Winnti .
The Blackfly attacks share some similarities with the more recent Suckfly attacks .
Blackfly began with a campaign to steal certificates , which were later used to sign malware used in targeted attacks .
The certificates Blackfly stole were also from South Korean companies , primarily in the video game and software development industry .
Another similarity is that Suckfly stole a certificate from Company D ( see Figure 4 ) less than two years after Blackfly had stolen a certificate from the same company .
While the stolen certificates were different , and stolen in separate instances , they were both used with custom malware in targeted attacks originating from China .
Signing malware with code-signing certificates is becoming more common , as seen in this investigation and the other attacks we have discussed .
Attackers are taking the time and effort to steal certificates because it is becoming necessary to gain a foothold on a targeted computer .
Attempts to sign malware with code-signing certificates have become more common as the Internet and security systems have moved towards a more trust and reputation oriented model .
This means that untrusted software may not be allowed to run unless it is signed .
As we noted in our previous research on the Apple threat landscape , some operating systems , such as Mac OS X , are configured by default to only allow applications to run if they have been signed with a valid certificate , meaning they are trusted .
However , using valid code-signing certificates stolen from organizations with a positive reputation can allow attackers to piggyback on that company ’s trust , making it easier to slip by these defenses and gain access to targeted computers .
Suckfly paints a stark picture of where cyberattack groups and cybercriminals are focusing their attentions .
Our investigation shines a light on an often unknown and seedier secret life of code-signing certificates , which is completely unknown to their owners .
The implications of this study shows that certificate owners need to keep a careful eye on them to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands .
It is important to give certificates the protection they need so they can't be used maliciously .
The certificates are only as secure as the safeguards that organizations put around them .
Once a certificate has been compromised , so has the reputation of the organization who signed it .
An organization whose certificate has been stolen and used to sign malware will always be associated with that activity .
Symantec monitors for this type of activity to help prevent organizations from being tied to malicious actions undertaken with their stolen certificates .
During the course of this investigation , we ensured that all certificates compromised by Suckfly were revoked and the affected companies notified .
Over the past few years , we have seen a number of advanced threats and cybercrime groups who have stolen code-signing certificates .
In all of the cases involving an advanced threat , the certificates were used to disguise malware as a legitimate file or application .
File hashes :05edd53508c55b9dd64129e944662c0d 1cf5ce3e3ea310b0f7ce72a94659ff54 352eede25c74775e6102a095fb49da8c 3b595d3e63537da654de29dd01793059 4709395fb143c212891138b98460e958 50f4464d0fc20d1932a12484a1db4342 96c317b0b1b14aadfb5a20a03771f85f ba7b1392b799c8761349e7728c2656dd de5057e579be9e3c53e50f97a9b1832b e7d92039ffc2f07496fe7657d982c80f e864f32151d6afd0a3491f432c2bb7a2 .
usv0503.iqservs-jp.com aux.robertstockdill.com fli.fedora-dns-update.com bss.pvtcdn.com ssl.microsoft-security-center.com ssl.2upgrades.com 133.242.134.121 fli.fedora-dns-update.com .
Indian organizations targeted in Suckfly attacks .
In March 2016 , Symantec published a blog on Suckfly , an advanced cyberespionage group that conducted attacks against a number of South Korean organizations to steal digital certificates .
Since then we have identified a number of attacks over a two-year period , beginning in April 2014 , which we attribute to Suckfly .
The attacks targeted high-profile targets , including government and commercial organizations .
These attacks occurred in several different countries , but our investigation revealed that the primary targets were individuals and organizations primarily located in India .
While there have been several Suckfly campaigns that infected organizations with the group ’s custom malware Backdoor.Nidiran , the Indian targets show a greater amount of post-infection activity than targets in other regions .
This suggests that these attacks were part of a planned operation against specific targets in India .
The first known Suckfly campaign began in April of 2014 .
During our investigation of the campaign , we identified a number of global targets across several industries who were attacked in 2015 .
Many of the targets we identified were well known commercial organizations located in India .
These organizations included :One of India 's largest financial organizations A large e-commerce company The e-commerce company 's primary shipping vendor One of India 's top five IT firms A United States healthcare provider 's Indian business unit Two government organizations .

ZeroT remained the primary stage 1 payload , but the stage 2 payloads varied .

One such interesting example was “ ПЛАН_РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ_ПРОЕКТА.rar ” ( SHA256 b5c208e4fb8ba255883f771d384ca85566c7be8adcf5c87114a62efb53b73fda ) .

Translated from Russian , this file is named “ PROJECT_REALIZATION_PLAN.rar ” and contains a compressed .scr executable .

This ZeroT executable communicated with the C&C domain www.kz-info.net and downloaded PlugX as well as an additionalTrojan which communicated with the www.ruvim.net C&C server .

is a payload that we do not see this group using frequently .

Another interesting ZeroT sample ( SHA256 bc2246813d7267608e1a80a04dac32da9115a15b1550b0c4842b9d6e2e7de374 ) contained the executable 0228.exe and a decoy document 0228.doc in the RAR SFX archive .

Bundling decoy documents is a common tactic by this group .

RAR SFX directives are used to display the decoy while the malicious payload is executed .

We suspect that this specific lure was copied from the news article http://www.cis.minsk.by/news.php?id=7557 .

TA459 is well-known for targeting organizations in Russia and neighboring countries .

However , their strategy , tactics , techniques , and procedures in this particular attack emphasize the importance of rigorous patching regimens for all organizations .

Even as software vulnerabilities often take a back seat to human exploits and social engineering , robust defenses must include protection at the email gateway , proactive patch management , and thoughtful end user education .

Paying attention to the details of past attacks is also an important means of preparing for future attacks .

Noting who is targeted , with what malware , and with what types of lures provide clues with which organizations can improve their security posture .

At the same time , multinational organizations like the financial services firms targeted here must be acutely aware of the threats from state-sponsored actors working with sophisticated malware to compromise users and networks .

Ongoing activity from attack groups like TA459 who consistently target individuals specializing in particular areas of research and expertise further complicate an already difficult security situation for organizations dealing with more traditional malware threats , phishing campaigns , and socially engineered threats every day .

Suckfly : Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates .

Release_Time : 2016-03-15 Report_URL : https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=62e325ae-f551-4855-b9cf-28a7d52d1534&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocumentsIn late 2015 , Symantec identified suspicious activity involving a hacking tool used in a malicious manner against one of our customers .

Normally , this is considered a low-level alert easily defeated by security software .

In this case , however , the hacktool had an unusual characteristic not typically seen with this type of file ; it was signed with a valid code-signing certificate .

Many hacktools are made for less than ethical purposes and are freely available , so this was an initial red flag , which led us to investigate further .

As our investigation continued , we soon realized this was much larger than a few hacktools .

We discovered Suckfly , an advanced threat group , conducting targeted attacks using multiple stolen certificates , as well as hacktools and custom malware .

The group had obtained the certificates through pre-attack operations before commencing targeted attacks against a number of government and commercial organizations spread across multiple continents over a two-year period .

This type of activity and the malicious use of stolen certificates emphasizes the importance of safeguarding certificates to prevent them from being used maliciously .

Suckfly has a number of hacktools and malware varieties at its disposal : Back door , Keylogger , Port scanner , Misc. tool , Exploit , Credential dumper , Privilage escalation .

The first signed hacktool we identified in late 2015 was a digitally signed brute-force server message block ( SMB ) scanner .

The organization associated with this certificate is a South Korean mobile software developer .

While we became initially curious because the hacktool was signed , we became more suspicious when we realized a mobile software developer had signed it , since this is not the type of software typically associated with a mobile application .

Based on this discovery , we began to look for other binaries signed with the South Korean mobile software developer's certificate .

This led to the discovery of three additional hacktools also signed using this certificate .

In addition to being signed with a stolen certificate , the identified hacktools had been used in suspicious activity against a US based health provider operating in India .

This evidence indicates that the certificate ’s rightful owner either misused it or it had been stolen from them .

Symantec worked with the certificate owner to confirm that the hacktool was not associated with them .

Following the trail further , we traced malicious traffic back to where it originated from and looked for additional evidence to indicate that the attacker persistently used the same infrastructure .

We discovered the activity originated from three separate IP addresses , all located in Chengdu , China .

In addition to the traffic originating from Chengdu , we identified a selection of hacktools and malware signed using nine stolen certificates .

The nine stolen certificates originated from nine different companies who are physically located close together around the central districts of Seoul , South Korea .

We don't know the exact date Suckfly stole the certificates from the South Korean organizations .

However , by analyzing the dates when we first saw the certificates paired with hacktools or malware , we can gain insight into when the certificates may have been stolen .

Figure 4 details how many times each stolen certificate was used in a given month .

The first sighting of three of the nine stolen certificates being used maliciously occurred in early 2014 .

Those three certificates were the only ones used in 2014 , making it likely that the other six were not compromised until 2015 .

All nine certificates were used maliciously in 2015 .

As noted earlier , the stolen certificates Symantec identified in this investigation were used to sign both hacking tools and malware .

Further analysis of the malware identified what looks like a custom back door .

We believe Suckfly specifically developed the back door for use in cyberespionage campaigns .

Symantec detects this threat as Backdoor.Nidiran .

Analysis of Nidiran samples determined that the back door had been updated three times since early 2014 , which fits the timeline outlined in Figure 4 .

The modifications were minor and likely performed to add capabilities and avoid detection .

While the malware is custom , it only provides the attackers with standard back door capabilities .

Suckfly delivered Nidiran through a strategic web compromise .

Specifically , the threat group used a specially crafted web page to deliver an exploit for the Microsoft Windows OLE Remote Code Execution Vulnerability ( CVE-2014-6332 ) , which affects specific versions of Microsoft Windows .

This exploit is triggered when a potential victim browses to a malicious page using Internet Explorer , which can allow the attacker to execute code with the same privileges as the currently logged-in user .

Once exploit has been achieved , Nidiran is delivered through a self-extracting executable that extracts the components to a .tmp folder after it has been executed .

The threat then executes “ svchost.exe ” , a PE file , which is actually a clean tool known as OLEVIEW.EXE .

The executable will then load iviewers.dll , which is normally a clean , legitimate file .

Attackers have been known to distribute malicious files masquerading as the legitimate iviewers.dll file and then use DLL load hijacking to execute the malicious code and infect the computer .

This technique is associated with themalware and is frequently used in China based cyberespionage activity .

Suckfly isn’t the only attack group to use certificates to sign malware but they may be the most prolific collectors of them .

After all , Stuxnet , widely regarded as the world ’s first known cyberweapon , was signed using stolen certificates from companies based in Taiwan with dates much earlier than Suckfly .

Other cyberespionage groups , including Black Vine and Hidden Lynx , have also used stolen certificates in their campaigns .

In April 2013 , a third-party vendor published a report about a cyberespionage group using custom malware and stolen certificates in their operations .

The report documented an advanced threat group they attributed to China .

Symantec tracks the group behind this activity as Blackfly and detects the malware they use as Backdoor.Winnti .

The Blackfly attacks share some similarities with the more recent Suckfly attacks .

Blackfly began with a campaign to steal certificates , which were later used to sign malware used in targeted attacks .

The certificates Blackfly stole were also from South Korean companies , primarily in the video game and software development industry .

Another similarity is that Suckfly stole a certificate from Company D ( see Figure 4 ) less than two years after Blackfly had stolen a certificate from the same company .

While the stolen certificates were different , and stolen in separate instances , they were both used with custom malware in targeted attacks originating from China .

Signing malware with code-signing certificates is becoming more common , as seen in this investigation and the other attacks we have discussed .

Attackers are taking the time and effort to steal certificates because it is becoming necessary to gain a foothold on a targeted computer .

Attempts to sign malware with code-signing certificates have become more common as the Internet and security systems have moved towards a more trust and reputation oriented model .

This means that untrusted software may not be allowed to run unless it is signed .

As we noted in our previous research on the Apple threat landscape , some operating systems , such as Mac OS X , are configured by default to only allow applications to run if they have been signed with a valid certificate , meaning they are trusted .

However , using valid code-signing certificates stolen from organizations with a positive reputation can allow attackers to piggyback on that company ’s trust , making it easier to slip by these defenses and gain access to targeted computers .

Suckfly paints a stark picture of where cyberattack groups and cybercriminals are focusing their attentions .

Our investigation shines a light on an often unknown and seedier secret life of code-signing certificates , which is completely unknown to their owners .

The implications of this study shows that certificate owners need to keep a careful eye on them to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands .

It is important to give certificates the protection they need so they can't be used maliciously .

The certificates are only as secure as the safeguards that organizations put around them .

Once a certificate has been compromised , so has the reputation of the organization who signed it .

An organization whose certificate has been stolen and used to sign malware will always be associated with that activity .

Symantec monitors for this type of activity to help prevent organizations from being tied to malicious actions undertaken with their stolen certificates .

During the course of this investigation , we ensured that all certificates compromised by Suckfly were revoked and the affected companies notified .

Over the past few years , we have seen a number of advanced threats and cybercrime groups who have stolen code-signing certificates .

In all of the cases involving an advanced threat , the certificates were used to disguise malware as a legitimate file or application .

File hashes :05edd53508c55b9dd64129e944662c0d 1cf5ce3e3ea310b0f7ce72a94659ff54 352eede25c74775e6102a095fb49da8c 3b595d3e63537da654de29dd01793059 4709395fb143c212891138b98460e958 50f4464d0fc20d1932a12484a1db4342 96c317b0b1b14aadfb5a20a03771f85f ba7b1392b799c8761349e7728c2656dd de5057e579be9e3c53e50f97a9b1832b e7d92039ffc2f07496fe7657d982c80f e864f32151d6afd0a3491f432c2bb7a2 .

usv0503.iqservs-jp.com aux.robertstockdill.com fli.fedora-dns-update.com bss.pvtcdn.com ssl.microsoft-security-center.com ssl.2upgrades.com 133.242.134.121 fli.fedora-dns-update.com .

Indian organizations targeted in Suckfly attacks .

In March 2016 , Symantec published a blog on Suckfly , an advanced cyberespionage group that conducted attacks against a number of South Korean organizations to steal digital certificates .

Since then we have identified a number of attacks over a two-year period , beginning in April 2014 , which we attribute to Suckfly .

The attacks targeted high-profile targets , including government and commercial organizations .

These attacks occurred in several different countries , but our investigation revealed that the primary targets were individuals and organizations primarily located in India .

While there have been several Suckfly campaigns that infected organizations with the group ’s custom malware Backdoor.Nidiran , the Indian targets show a greater amount of post-infection activity than targets in other regions .

This suggests that these attacks were part of a planned operation against specific targets in India .

The first known Suckfly campaign began in April of 2014 .

During our investigation of the campaign , we identified a number of global targets across several industries who were attacked in 2015 .

Many of the targets we identified were well known commercial organizations located in India .

These organizations included :One of India 's largest financial organizations A large e-commerce company The e-commerce company 's primary shipping vendor One of India 's top five IT firms A United States healthcare provider 's Indian business unit Two government organizations .