mrmoor/cti-corpus-raw · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Suckfly spent more time attacking the government networks compared to all but one of the commercial targets .
Additionally , one of the two government organizations had the highest infection rate of the Indian targets .
Figure 1 shows the infection rate for each of the targets .
Indian government org #2 is responsible for implementing network software for different ministries and departments within India 's central government .
The high infection rate for this target is likely because of its access to technology and information related to other Indian government organizations .
Suckfly 's attacks on government organizations that provide information technology services to other government branches is not limited to India .
It has conducted attacks on similar organizations in Saudi Arabia , likely because of the access that those organizations have .
Suckfly 's targets are displayed in figure 2 by their industry , which provides a clearer view of the group ’s operations .
Most of the group 's attacks are focused on government or technology related companies and organizations .
One of the attacks we investigated provided detailed insight into how Suckfly conducts its operations .
In 2015 , Suckfly conducted a multistage attack between April 22 and May 4 against an e-commerce organization based in India .
Similar to its other attacks , Suckfly used the Nidiran back door along with a number of hacktools to infect the victim 's internal hosts .
The tools and malware used in this breach were also signed with stolen digital certificates .
Suckfly 's first step was to identify a user to target so the attackers could attempt their initial breach into the e-commerce company 's internal network .
We don't have hard evidence of how Suckfly obtained information on the targeted user , but we did find a large open-source presence on the initial target .
The target 's job function , corporate email address , information on work related projects , and publicly accessible personal blog could all be freely found online .
On April 22 , 2015 , Suckfly exploited a vulnerability on the targeted employee 's operating system ( Windows ) that allowed the attackers to bypass the User Account Control and install the Nidiran back door to provide access for their attack .
While we know the attackers used a custom dropper to install the back door , we do not know the delivery vector .
Based on the amount of open-source information available on the target , it is feasible that a spear-phishing email may have been used .
After the attackers successfully exploited the employee ’s system , they gained access to the e-commerce company 's internal network .
We found evidence that Suckfly used hacktools to move latterly and escalate privileges .
To do this the attackers used a signed credential-dumping tool to obtain the victim 's account credentials .
With the account credentials , the attackers were able to access the victim 's account and navigate the internal corporate network as though they were the employee .
On April 27 , the attackers scanned the corporate internal network for hosts with ports 8080 , 5900 , and 40 open .
Ports 8080 and 5900 are common ports used with legitimate protocols , but can be abused by attackers when they are not secured .
It isn't clear why the attackers scanned for hosts with port 40 open because there isn't a common protocol assigned to this port .
Based on Suckfly scanning for common ports , it ’s clear that the group was looking to expand its foothold on the e-commerce company 's internal network .
The attackers ’ final step was to exfiltrate data off the victim ’s network and onto Suckfly ’s infrastructure .
While we know that the attackers used the Nidiran back door to steal information about the compromised organization , we do not know if Suckfly was successful in stealing other information .
These steps were taken over a 13-day period , but only on specific days .
While tracking what days of the week Suckfly used its hacktools , we discovered that the group was only active Monday through Friday .
There was no activity from the group on weekends .
We were able to determine this because the attackers ’ hacktools are command line driven and can provide insight into when the operators are behind keyboards actively working .
Figure 4 shows the attackers ’ activity levels throughout the week .
Suckfly made its malware difficult to analyze to prevent their operations from being detected .
However , we were able to successfully analyze Suckfly malware samples and extract some of the communications between the Nidiran back door and the Suckfly command and control ( C&C ) domains .
We analyzed the dropper , which is an executable that contains the following three files :dllhost.exe : The main host for the .dll file .
iviewers.dll : Used to load encrypted payloads and then decrypt them .
msfled : The encrypted payload .
All three files are required for the malware to run correctly .
Once the malware has been executed , it checks to see if it has a connection to the internet before running .
If the connection test is successful , the malware runs and attempts to communicate with the C&C domain over ports 443 and 8443 .
In the samples we analyzed we found the port and C&C information encrypted and hardcoded into the Nidiran malware itself .
The key for the RC4 encryption in this sample is the hardcoded string “ h0le ” .
Once the cookie data is decoded , Suckfly has the network name , hostname , IP address , and the victim 's operating system information .
Information about the C&C infrastructure identified in our analysis of Suckfly activity can be seen in Table 1 .
Domain Registration IP address Registration dateaux.robertstockdill.com [email protected] Unknown April 1 , 2014 .
ssl.2upgrades.com [email protected] 176.58.96.234 July 5 , 2014 .
bss.pvtcdn.com [email protected] 106.184.1.38 May 19 , 2015 .
ssl.microsoft-security-center.com Whoisguard Unknown July 20 ,[email protected] 133.242.134.121 August 18 , 2014 .
fli.fedora-dns-update.com Whoisguard Unknown Unknown .
Suckfly targeted one of India ’s largest e-commerce companies , a major Indian shipping company , one of India ’s largest financial organizations , and an IT firm that provides support for India ’s largest stock exchange .
All of these targets are large corporations that play a major role in India ’s economy .
By targeting all of these organizations together , Suckfly could have had a much larger impact on India and its economy .
While we don't know the motivations behind the attacks , the targeted commercial organizations , along with the targeted government organizations , may point in this direction .
Suckfly has the resources to develop malware , purchase infrastructure , and conduct targeted attacks for years while staying off the radar of security organizations .
During this time they were able to steal digital certificates from South Korean companies and launch attacks against Indian and Saudi Arabian government organizations .
There is no evidence that Suckfly gained any benefits from attacking the government organizations , but someone else may have benefited from these attacks .
The nature of the Suckfly attacks suggests that it is unlikely that the threat group orchestrated these attacks on their own .
We believe that Suckfly will continue to target organizations in India and similar organizations in other countries in order to provide economic insight to the organization behind Suckfly 's operations .
THE DUKES 7 YEARS OF RUSSIAN CYBERESPIONAGE .
TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE DUKES .
PINCHDUKE : First known activity November 2008 , Most recent known activity Summer 2010 , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Known toolset components Multiple loaders , Information stealer .
The PinchDuke toolset consists of multiple loaders and a core information stealer Trojan .
The loaders associated with the PinchDuke toolset have also been observed being used with CosmicDuke .
The PinchDuke information stealer gathers system configuration information , steals user credentials , and collects user files from the compromised host transferring these via HTTP (S ) to a C&C server .
We believe PinchDuke ’s credential stealing functionality is based on the source code of the Pinch credential stealing malware ( also known as LdPinch ) that was developed in the early 2000s and has later been openly distributed on underground forums .
Credentials targeted by PinchDuke include ones associated with the following software or services : The Bat! , Yahoo! , Mail.ru , Passport.Net , Google Talk , Netscape Navigator , Mozilla Firefox , Mozilla Thunderbird , Internet Explorer , Microsoft Outlook , WinInet Credential Cache , Lightweight Directory Access Protocol ( LDAP ) .
PinchDuke will also search for files that have been created within a predefined timeframe and whose file extension is present in a predefined list .
As a curiosity , most PinchDuke samples contain a Russian language error message : “ There is an error in the module ’s name ! The length of the data section name must be 4 bytes ” .
GEMINIDUKE : First known activity January 2009 , Most recent known activity December 2012 , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Known toolset components Loader , Information stealer , Multiple persistence components .
The GeminiDuke toolset consists of a core information stealer , a loader and multiple persistencerelated components .
Unlike CosmicDuke and PinchDuke , GeminiDuke primarily collects information on the victim computer ’s configuration .
The collected details include : Local user accounts , Network settings , Internet proxy settings , Installed drivers , Running processes , Programs previously executed by users , Programs and services configured to automatically run at startup , Values of environment variables , Files and folders present in any users home folder , Files and folders present in any users My Documents , Programs installed to the Program Files folder , Recently accessed files , folders and programs .
As is common for malware , the GeminiDuke infostealer uses a mutex to ensure that only one instance of itself is running at a time .
What is less common is that the name used for the mutex is often a timestamp .
We believe these timestamps to be generated during the compilation of GeminiDuke from the local time of the computer being used .
Comparing the GeminiDuke compilation timestamps , which always reference the time in the UTC+0 timezone , with the local time timestamps used as mutex names , and adjusting for the presumed timezone difference , we note that all of the mutex names reference a time and date that is within seconds of the respective sample ’s compilation timestamp .
Additionally , the apparent timezone of the timestamps in all of the GeminiDuke samples compiled during the winter is UTC+3 , while for samples compiled during the summer , it is UTC+4 .
The observed timezones correspond to the pre-2011 definition of Moscow Standard Time ( MSK ) , which was UTC+3 during the winter and UTC+4 during the summer .
In 2011 MSK stopped following Daylight Saving Time ( DST ) and was set to UTC+4 year-round , then reset to UTC +3 yearround in 2014 .
Some of the observed GeminiDuke samples that used timestamps as mutex names were compiled while MSK still respected DST and for these samples , the timestamps perfectly align with MSK as it was defined at the time .
However , GeminiDuke samples compiled after MSK was altered still vary the timezone between UTC+3 in the winter and UTC+4 during the summer .
While computers using Microsoft Windows automatically adjust for DST , changes in timezone definitions require that an update to Windows be installed .
We therefore believe that the Dukes group simply failed to update the computer they were using to compile GeminiDuke samples , so that the timestamps seen in later samples still appear to follow the old definition of Moscow Standard Time .
The GeminiDuke infostealer has occasionally been wrapped with a loader that appears to be unique to GeminiDuke and has never been observed being used with any of the other Duke toolsets .
GeminiDuke also occasionally embeds additional executables that attempt to achieve persistence on the victim computer .
These persistence components appear to be uniquely customized for use with GeminiDuke , but they use many of the same techniques as CosmicDuke persistence components .
COSMICDUKE : First known activity January 2010 , Most recent known activity Summer 2015 , Other names Tinybaron , BotgenStudios , NemesisGemina , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , FTP , WebDav , Known toolset components Information stealer , Multiple loaders , Privilege escalation component , Multiple persistence components .
The CosmicDuke toolset is designed around a main information stealer component .
This information stealer is augmented by a variety of components that the toolset operators may selectively include with the main component to provide additional functionalities , such as multiple methods of establishing persistence , as well as modules that attempt to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities in order to execute CosmicDuke with higher privileges .
CosmicDuke ’s information stealing functionality includes : Keylogging , Taking screenshots , Stealing clipboard contents , Stealing user files with file extensions that match a predefined list , Exporting the users cryptographic certificates including private keys , Collecting user credentials , including passwords , for a variety of popular chat and email programs as well as from web browsers CosmicDuke may use HTTP , HTTPS , FTP or WebDav to exfiltrate the collected data to a hardcoded C&C server .
While we believe CosmicDuke to be an entirely custom- written toolset with no direct sharing of code with other Duke toolsets , the high-level ways in which many of its features have been implemented appear to be shared with other members of the Duke arsenal .
Specifically , the techniques CosmicDuke uses to extract user credentials from targeted software and to detect the presence of analysis tools appear to be based on the techniques used by PinchDuke .
Likewise , many of CosmicDuke ’s persistence components use techniques also used by components associated with GeminiDuke and CozyDuke .
In all of these cases , the techniques are the same , but the code itself has been altered to work with the toolset in question , leading to small differences in the final implementation .
A few of the CosmicDuke samples we discovered also included components that attempt to exploit either of the publicly known CVE-2010-0232 or CVE-2010- 4398 privilege escalation vulnerabilities .
In the case of CVE-2010-0232 , the exploit appears to be based directly on the proof of concept code published by security researcher Tavis Ormandy when he disclosed the vulnerability .
We believe that the exploit for CVE- 2010-4398 was also based on a publicly available proof of concept .
In addition to often embedding persistence or privilege escalation components , CosmicDuke has occasionally embedded PinchDuke , GeminiDuke , or MiniDuke components .

Suckfly spent more time attacking the government networks compared to all but one of the commercial targets .

Additionally , one of the two government organizations had the highest infection rate of the Indian targets .

Figure 1 shows the infection rate for each of the targets .

Indian government org #2 is responsible for implementing network software for different ministries and departments within India 's central government .

The high infection rate for this target is likely because of its access to technology and information related to other Indian government organizations .

Suckfly 's attacks on government organizations that provide information technology services to other government branches is not limited to India .

It has conducted attacks on similar organizations in Saudi Arabia , likely because of the access that those organizations have .

Suckfly 's targets are displayed in figure 2 by their industry , which provides a clearer view of the group ’s operations .

Most of the group 's attacks are focused on government or technology related companies and organizations .

One of the attacks we investigated provided detailed insight into how Suckfly conducts its operations .

In 2015 , Suckfly conducted a multistage attack between April 22 and May 4 against an e-commerce organization based in India .

Similar to its other attacks , Suckfly used the Nidiran back door along with a number of hacktools to infect the victim 's internal hosts .

The tools and malware used in this breach were also signed with stolen digital certificates .

Suckfly 's first step was to identify a user to target so the attackers could attempt their initial breach into the e-commerce company 's internal network .

We don't have hard evidence of how Suckfly obtained information on the targeted user , but we did find a large open-source presence on the initial target .

The target 's job function , corporate email address , information on work related projects , and publicly accessible personal blog could all be freely found online .

On April 22 , 2015 , Suckfly exploited a vulnerability on the targeted employee 's operating system ( Windows ) that allowed the attackers to bypass the User Account Control and install the Nidiran back door to provide access for their attack .

While we know the attackers used a custom dropper to install the back door , we do not know the delivery vector .

Based on the amount of open-source information available on the target , it is feasible that a spear-phishing email may have been used .

After the attackers successfully exploited the employee ’s system , they gained access to the e-commerce company 's internal network .

We found evidence that Suckfly used hacktools to move latterly and escalate privileges .

To do this the attackers used a signed credential-dumping tool to obtain the victim 's account credentials .

With the account credentials , the attackers were able to access the victim 's account and navigate the internal corporate network as though they were the employee .

On April 27 , the attackers scanned the corporate internal network for hosts with ports 8080 , 5900 , and 40 open .

Ports 8080 and 5900 are common ports used with legitimate protocols , but can be abused by attackers when they are not secured .

It isn't clear why the attackers scanned for hosts with port 40 open because there isn't a common protocol assigned to this port .

Based on Suckfly scanning for common ports , it ’s clear that the group was looking to expand its foothold on the e-commerce company 's internal network .

The attackers ’ final step was to exfiltrate data off the victim ’s network and onto Suckfly ’s infrastructure .

While we know that the attackers used the Nidiran back door to steal information about the compromised organization , we do not know if Suckfly was successful in stealing other information .

These steps were taken over a 13-day period , but only on specific days .

While tracking what days of the week Suckfly used its hacktools , we discovered that the group was only active Monday through Friday .

There was no activity from the group on weekends .

We were able to determine this because the attackers ’ hacktools are command line driven and can provide insight into when the operators are behind keyboards actively working .

Figure 4 shows the attackers ’ activity levels throughout the week .

Suckfly made its malware difficult to analyze to prevent their operations from being detected .

However , we were able to successfully analyze Suckfly malware samples and extract some of the communications between the Nidiran back door and the Suckfly command and control ( C&C ) domains .

We analyzed the dropper , which is an executable that contains the following three files :dllhost.exe : The main host for the .dll file .

iviewers.dll : Used to load encrypted payloads and then decrypt them .

msfled : The encrypted payload .

All three files are required for the malware to run correctly .

Once the malware has been executed , it checks to see if it has a connection to the internet before running .

If the connection test is successful , the malware runs and attempts to communicate with the C&C domain over ports 443 and 8443 .

In the samples we analyzed we found the port and C&C information encrypted and hardcoded into the Nidiran malware itself .

The key for the RC4 encryption in this sample is the hardcoded string “ h0le ” .

Once the cookie data is decoded , Suckfly has the network name , hostname , IP address , and the victim 's operating system information .

Information about the C&C infrastructure identified in our analysis of Suckfly activity can be seen in Table 1 .

Domain Registration IP address Registration dateaux.robertstockdill.com [email protected] Unknown April 1 , 2014 .

ssl.2upgrades.com [email protected] 176.58.96.234 July 5 , 2014 .

bss.pvtcdn.com [email protected] 106.184.1.38 May 19 , 2015 .

ssl.microsoft-security-center.com Whoisguard Unknown July 20 ,[email protected] 133.242.134.121 August 18 , 2014 .

fli.fedora-dns-update.com Whoisguard Unknown Unknown .

Suckfly targeted one of India ’s largest e-commerce companies , a major Indian shipping company , one of India ’s largest financial organizations , and an IT firm that provides support for India ’s largest stock exchange .

All of these targets are large corporations that play a major role in India ’s economy .

By targeting all of these organizations together , Suckfly could have had a much larger impact on India and its economy .

While we don't know the motivations behind the attacks , the targeted commercial organizations , along with the targeted government organizations , may point in this direction .

Suckfly has the resources to develop malware , purchase infrastructure , and conduct targeted attacks for years while staying off the radar of security organizations .

During this time they were able to steal digital certificates from South Korean companies and launch attacks against Indian and Saudi Arabian government organizations .

There is no evidence that Suckfly gained any benefits from attacking the government organizations , but someone else may have benefited from these attacks .

The nature of the Suckfly attacks suggests that it is unlikely that the threat group orchestrated these attacks on their own .

We believe that Suckfly will continue to target organizations in India and similar organizations in other countries in order to provide economic insight to the organization behind Suckfly 's operations .

THE DUKES 7 YEARS OF RUSSIAN CYBERESPIONAGE .

TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE DUKES .

PINCHDUKE : First known activity November 2008 , Most recent known activity Summer 2010 , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Known toolset components Multiple loaders , Information stealer .

The PinchDuke toolset consists of multiple loaders and a core information stealer Trojan .

The loaders associated with the PinchDuke toolset have also been observed being used with CosmicDuke .

The PinchDuke information stealer gathers system configuration information , steals user credentials , and collects user files from the compromised host transferring these via HTTP (S ) to a C&C server .

We believe PinchDuke ’s credential stealing functionality is based on the source code of the Pinch credential stealing malware ( also known as LdPinch ) that was developed in the early 2000s and has later been openly distributed on underground forums .

Credentials targeted by PinchDuke include ones associated with the following software or services : The Bat! , Yahoo! , Mail.ru , Passport.Net , Google Talk , Netscape Navigator , Mozilla Firefox , Mozilla Thunderbird , Internet Explorer , Microsoft Outlook , WinInet Credential Cache , Lightweight Directory Access Protocol ( LDAP ) .

PinchDuke will also search for files that have been created within a predefined timeframe and whose file extension is present in a predefined list .

As a curiosity , most PinchDuke samples contain a Russian language error message : “ There is an error in the module ’s name ! The length of the data section name must be 4 bytes ” .

GEMINIDUKE : First known activity January 2009 , Most recent known activity December 2012 , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , Known toolset components Loader , Information stealer , Multiple persistence components .

The GeminiDuke toolset consists of a core information stealer , a loader and multiple persistencerelated components .

Unlike CosmicDuke and PinchDuke , GeminiDuke primarily collects information on the victim computer ’s configuration .

The collected details include : Local user accounts , Network settings , Internet proxy settings , Installed drivers , Running processes , Programs previously executed by users , Programs and services configured to automatically run at startup , Values of environment variables , Files and folders present in any users home folder , Files and folders present in any users My Documents , Programs installed to the Program Files folder , Recently accessed files , folders and programs .

As is common for malware , the GeminiDuke infostealer uses a mutex to ensure that only one instance of itself is running at a time .

What is less common is that the name used for the mutex is often a timestamp .

We believe these timestamps to be generated during the compilation of GeminiDuke from the local time of the computer being used .

Comparing the GeminiDuke compilation timestamps , which always reference the time in the UTC+0 timezone , with the local time timestamps used as mutex names , and adjusting for the presumed timezone difference , we note that all of the mutex names reference a time and date that is within seconds of the respective sample ’s compilation timestamp .

Additionally , the apparent timezone of the timestamps in all of the GeminiDuke samples compiled during the winter is UTC+3 , while for samples compiled during the summer , it is UTC+4 .

The observed timezones correspond to the pre-2011 definition of Moscow Standard Time ( MSK ) , which was UTC+3 during the winter and UTC+4 during the summer .

In 2011 MSK stopped following Daylight Saving Time ( DST ) and was set to UTC+4 year-round , then reset to UTC +3 yearround in 2014 .

Some of the observed GeminiDuke samples that used timestamps as mutex names were compiled while MSK still respected DST and for these samples , the timestamps perfectly align with MSK as it was defined at the time .

However , GeminiDuke samples compiled after MSK was altered still vary the timezone between UTC+3 in the winter and UTC+4 during the summer .

While computers using Microsoft Windows automatically adjust for DST , changes in timezone definitions require that an update to Windows be installed .

We therefore believe that the Dukes group simply failed to update the computer they were using to compile GeminiDuke samples , so that the timestamps seen in later samples still appear to follow the old definition of Moscow Standard Time .

The GeminiDuke infostealer has occasionally been wrapped with a loader that appears to be unique to GeminiDuke and has never been observed being used with any of the other Duke toolsets .

GeminiDuke also occasionally embeds additional executables that attempt to achieve persistence on the victim computer .

These persistence components appear to be uniquely customized for use with GeminiDuke , but they use many of the same techniques as CosmicDuke persistence components .

COSMICDUKE : First known activity January 2010 , Most recent known activity Summer 2015 , Other names Tinybaron , BotgenStudios , NemesisGemina , C&C communication methods HTTP(S) , FTP , WebDav , Known toolset components Information stealer , Multiple loaders , Privilege escalation component , Multiple persistence components .

The CosmicDuke toolset is designed around a main information stealer component .

This information stealer is augmented by a variety of components that the toolset operators may selectively include with the main component to provide additional functionalities , such as multiple methods of establishing persistence , as well as modules that attempt to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities in order to execute CosmicDuke with higher privileges .

CosmicDuke ’s information stealing functionality includes : Keylogging , Taking screenshots , Stealing clipboard contents , Stealing user files with file extensions that match a predefined list , Exporting the users cryptographic certificates including private keys , Collecting user credentials , including passwords , for a variety of popular chat and email programs as well as from web browsers CosmicDuke may use HTTP , HTTPS , FTP or WebDav to exfiltrate the collected data to a hardcoded C&C server .

While we believe CosmicDuke to be an entirely custom- written toolset with no direct sharing of code with other Duke toolsets , the high-level ways in which many of its features have been implemented appear to be shared with other members of the Duke arsenal .

Specifically , the techniques CosmicDuke uses to extract user credentials from targeted software and to detect the presence of analysis tools appear to be based on the techniques used by PinchDuke .

Likewise , many of CosmicDuke ’s persistence components use techniques also used by components associated with GeminiDuke and CozyDuke .

In all of these cases , the techniques are the same , but the code itself has been altered to work with the toolset in question , leading to small differences in the final implementation .

A few of the CosmicDuke samples we discovered also included components that attempt to exploit either of the publicly known CVE-2010-0232 or CVE-2010- 4398 privilege escalation vulnerabilities .

In the case of CVE-2010-0232 , the exploit appears to be based directly on the proof of concept code published by security researcher Tavis Ormandy when he disclosed the vulnerability .

We believe that the exploit for CVE- 2010-4398 was also based on a publicly available proof of concept .

In addition to often embedding persistence or privilege escalation components , CosmicDuke has occasionally embedded PinchDuke , GeminiDuke , or MiniDuke components .