mrmoor/cti-corpus-raw · Datasets at Hugging Face

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One of the more prolific actors that we track - referred to as TA505 - is responsible for the largest malicious spam campaigns we have ever observed , distributing instances of the Dridex banking Trojan , Locky ransomware , Jaff ransomware , The Trick banking Trojan , and several others in very high volumes .
Because TA505 is such a significant part of the email threat landscape , this blog provides a retrospective on the shifting malware , payloads , and campaigns associated with this actor .
We examine their use malware such as Jaff , Bart , and Rockloader that appear to be exclusive to this group as well as more widely distributed malware like Dridex and Pony .
Where possible , we detail the affiliate models with which they are involved and outline the current state of TA505 campaigns .
The infographic in Figure 1 traces the earliest known dates on which TA505 began distributing particular malware strains , beginning with Dridex in 2014 and most recently when they elevated GlobeImposter and Philadelphia from small , regionally targeted ransomware variants to global threats .
Of note is TA505 ’s use of the Necurs botnet to drive their massive spam campaigns .
As we saw in both 2016 and 2017 , disruptions to Necurs went hand-in-hand with quiet periods from TA505 .
When the botnet came back online , TA505 campaigns quickly returned , usually at even greater scale than before the disruption .
The following is a more detailed description of the malware and notable campaign attributes associated with TA505 .
The now infamous Dridex banking Trojan can trace much of its DNA to Cridex and Bugat .
Dridex itself appeared shortly after the Zeus banking Trojan was taken down .
It was originally documented on July 25 , 2014 ( or June 22 , 2014 , according to Kaspersky ) and the first campaign we observed in which TA505 distributed Dridex occurred three days later on July 28 .
Although a number of actors have distributed Dridex , TA505 operates multiple affiliate IDs , including what appears to be the earliest recorded affiliate , botnet ID 125 .
These early campaigns were distributed via the Lerspeng downloader while later campaigns occasionally used Pony or Andromeda as intermediate loaders to distribute various instances of Dridex .
Although TA505 initially distributed Dridex botnet ID 125 , they were observed using botnet ID 220 in March 2015 and botnet ID 223 in December of that year .
Later , they were also associated with botnet IDs 7200 and 7500 .
These botnets generally target the following regions :125: UK , US , and Canada 220: UK and Australia 223: Germany 7200: UK 7500: Australia .
TA505 continued distributing Dridex through early June 2017 using a range of email attachments .
Most recently these included PDF attachments with embedded Microsoft Word documents bearing malicious macros that call PowerShell commands that install Dridex .
However , because of the length of time for which the group has been distributing Dridex , distribution mechanisms trace the state of the art for the last two years of email campaigns with techniques ranging from straight macro documents to a variety of zipped scripts .
In October 2015 , we observed several campaigns in which TA505 targeted Japanese and UK organizations with the Shifu banking Trojan .
Shifu is relatively common in Japan but was a new addition to TA505 ’s toolbox .
It appears that they introduced Shifu after high-profile law enforcement actions impacted Dridex distribution .
However , TA505 was also among the first actors to return to high-volume Dridex distribution this same month , even as they demonstrated their ability to diversify and deliver threats beyond Dridex .
As with many of their other campaigns , TA505 delivered Shifu through macro laden Microsoft Office document attachments .
TA505 introduced Locky ransomware in February 2016 .
After alternating for over four months with Dridex , Locky became the payload of choice for TA505 , eclipsing earlier campaigns in terms of volume and reach .
TA505 stopped distributing Dridex in July 2016 , relying almost exclusively on Locky through December of that year .
Like Dridex , Locky is also distributed in an affiliate model ; TA505 exclusively distributes Locky Affid=3 .
Low-volume campaigns distributed Dridex during much of 2015 Moderate volumes of Dridex appeared from the end of 2015 through February 2016 ; it is worth noting that these “ moderate volume ” campaigns were , at the time , the largest campaigns ever observed .
Alternating Dridex and Locky campaigns of varying volumes appeared through May 2016 .
A lull in June 2016 associated with a disruption in the Necurs botnet ; TA505 is heavily reliant on this massive botnet to send out high-volume malicious spam campaigns and disappearances of TA505 activity frequently accompany disruptions in Necurs .
Extremely high-volume campaigns distributing Locky exclusively in July 2016 , consistently delivering tens of millions of messages .
Another lull in November 2016 saw the complete absence of Locky and Dridex , while high-volume campaigns reappeared in December , albeit at lower volumes than during the Q3 2016 peak .
An expected break following the 2016-2017 winter holidays turned into an unexplained three-month hiatus for TA505 .
Large-scale Dridex and Locky campaigns returned in Q2 2017 , although none reached the volumes we observed in mid-2016 .
Later campaigns saw new attachment types , even as Dridex and Locky payloads remained largely unchanged .
Locky distribution ceased in June and July but returned in August with volumes rivaling the peaks of 2016 .
TA505 turned to URLs in early August 2017 to distribute Locky , finally eschewing the document or zipped script attachments that have characterized the majority of their Locky campaigns since February 2016 ; most of these URLs linked to malicious documents and scripts .
By later August , TA505 had turned back to large attachment campaigns , primarily distributing various zipped scripts that downloaded Locky .
The group continued this pattern with occasional URL campaigns and attached HTML files bearing malicious links .
TA505 first introduced Rockloader in April 2016 as an intermediate loader for Locky .
At that time , Rockloader was the initial payload downloaded by malicious attached JavaScript files .
Once Rockloader was installed , it downloaded Locky and , in some cases , Pony and Kegotip .
Pony is another loader with information stealing capabilities while Kegotip is an credential and email address harvesting malware strain that would appear in a small number of TA505 campaigns the following year as the primary payload .
Bart ransomware appeared for exactly one day on June 24 , 2016 .
It was a secondary payload downloaded by Rockloader , the initial payload in a large email campaign using zipped JavaScript attachments .
The Bart ransom screen was visually similar to Locky ’s but Bart had one important distinction : it could encrypt files without contacting a command and control server .
However , we have not seen Bart since , suggesting that this was either an experiment or that the ransomware did not function as expected for TA505 .
TA505 briefly distributed the Kegotip information stealer in April 2017 .
Across two campaigns of several million messages each , the actor used both macro laden Microsoft Word documents and zipped VBScript attachments to install the Trojan on potential victim PCs .
Kegotip is an infostealer ( credentials and email addresses ) used to facilitate other crimeware activities .
It steals credentials from various FTP clients , Outlook , and Internet Explorer .
It also will gather email addresses scraped from files stored on the computer .
This information can be used to facilitate future spam campaigns by the perpetrator or may be sold to other actors .
TA505 introduced Jaff ransomware in May 2017 .
Jaff was not dramatically different from other ransomware strains .
The payment portal was initially similar to the one used by Locky and Bart .
It was primarily notable for its high-volume campaigns and its association with TA505 , given the actor ’s propensity for massive campaigns and ability to dominate the email landscape .
Jaff appeared in multi-million message campaigns for roughly a month and then promptly disappeared as soon as a decryptor was released in mid-June 2017 .
The Trick , also known as Trickbot , is another banking Trojan that TA505 first began distributing in June of 2017 , although we have observed The Trick in the wild since fall 2016 , usually in regionally targeted campaigns .
It is generally considered a descendant of the Dyreza banking Trojan and features mutliple modules .
The main bot is responsible for persistence , the downloading of additional modules , loading affiliate payloads , and loading updates for the malware .
As with much of the malware distributed by TA505 , The Trick has appeared in frequent , high-volume campaigns .
The campaigns used a mix of attached zipped scripts ( WSF , VBS ) , malicious Microsoft Office documents ( Word , Excel ) , HTML attachments , password-protected Microsoft Word documents , links to malicious JavaScript , and other vectors .
The last TA505 campaigns featuring The Trick appeared in mid-September 2017 with payloads alternating between Locky and The Trick .
Philadelphia ransomware has been circulating since September 2016 .
It first attracted our attention in April of this year when we observed an actor customizing the malware for use in highly targeted campaigns .
In a brief stint , TA505 distributed it in one large campaign in July , but we have not seen them use it since .
GlobeImposter is another ransomware strain that saw relatively small-scale distribution until TA505 began including it in malicious spam campaigns at the end of July 2017 .
TA505 primarily distributed GlobeImposter in zipped script attachments through the beginning of September 2017 .
Again , GlobeImposter is not particularly innovative but TA505 elevated the ransomware from a regional variant to a major landscape feature during roughly six weeks of large campaigns .
TA505 is arguably one of the most significant financially motivated threat actors because of the extraordinary volumes of messages they send .
The variety of malware delivered by the group also demonstrates their deep connections to the underground malware scene .
At the time of writing , Locky ransomware remains their malware of choice , even as the group continues to experiment with a variety of additional malware .
The history of TA505 is instructive because they: Have proven to be highly adaptable , shifting techniques and malware frequently to “ follow the money ” , while largely sticking to successful strategies where possible Are flexible , using largely interchangeable components , innovating where necessary on the malware front and using off-the-shelf malware where possible Operate at massive scale , consistently driving global trends in malware distribution and message volume .
Each of these elements makes TA505 a magnifying lens through which to consider the framework employed by many modern threat actors .
Such a framework typically consists of five elements :Actor : The attacker organization ; real humans driven by various motivations -- In the case of TA505 , the motivations are financial .
Vector : The delivery mechanism ; email via attacker-controlled or leased spam botnet -- Necurs for TA505 -- remains a dominant vector , and certainly the vector of choice for this actor .
Hoster : The sites hosting malware ; if malware is not directly attached to email , then macro enabled documents , malicious scripts , or exploit kits will pull payloads from these servers .
TA505 almost exclusively hosts malware in this way , although they vary the means of installing their final payloads on victim machines .
Payload : The malware ; software that will enable the attacker to make use of ( control , exfiltrate data from , or download more software to ) the target computer .
For TA505 , the payloads have shifted over the years and months of their activity , but their sending and hosting infrastructure make these changes relatively simple to implement .
C&C : The command and control channel that serves to relay commands between the installed malware and attackers .
TA505 operates a variety of C&C servers , allowing it to be resilient in the case of takedowns , sinkholes , and other defensive operations .
This framework enables attackers to operate in robust , horizontally segmented ecosystems , specializing in developing certain parts of the framework , and selling or leasing to others ; such frameworks are resistant to takedowns and individual component failures .
But such frameworks also increase attackers' detection surface , that is , their susceptibility to discovery .
In the case of TA505 , while most elements of the framework are well-developed , their reliance on the Necurs botnet for the sending high-volume malicious spam - a key component of the Vector element above - appears to be their Achilles heel .
A XENOTIME to Remember : Veles in the Wild .
Release_Time : 2019-12-04Report_URL : https://pylos.co/2019/04/12/a-xenotime-to-remember-veles-in-the-wild/“ When I use a word , ” Humpty Dumpty said , in rather a scornful tone , “ it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less. ” – Through the Looking Glass , Lewis Carroll FireEye recently published a blog covering the tactics , techniques , and procedures ( TTPs ) for the “ TRITON actor ” when preparing to deploy themalware framework in 2017 .
Overall , the post does a commendable job in making public findings previously only privately shared ( presumably by FireEye , and in several reports I authored for my employer , Dragos ) to threat intelligence customers .
As such , the blog continues to push forward the narrative of how ICS attacks are enabled through prepositioning and initial intrusion operations – an item I have discussed at length .
Yet one point of confusion in the blog comes at the very start : referring to the entity responsible for TRITON as the “ TRITON actor ” .
This seems confusing as FireEye earlier publicly declared the “ TRITON actor ” as a discrete entity , linked to a Russian research institution , and christened it as “ TEMP.Veles ” .
In the 2018 public posting announcing TEMP.Veles , FireEye researchers noted that the institute in question at least supported TEMP.Veles activity in deploying TRITON , with subsequent public presentations at Cyberwarcon and the Kaspersky Lab sponsored Security Analyst Summit essentially linking TRITON and the research institute ( and therefore TEMP.Veles ) as one in the same .
Yet the most-recent posting covering TTPs from initial access through prerequisites to enable final delivery of effects on target ( deploying) avoids the use of the TEMP.Veles term entirely .
In subsequent discussion , FireEye personnel indicate that there was not “ an avalanche of evidence to substantiate ” anything more than “ TRITON actor ” – summing matters by indicating this term “ is the best we ’ve got for the public for now ” .
Meanwhile , parallel work at Dragos ( my employer , where I have performed significant work on the activity described above ) uncovered similar conclusions concerning TTPs and behaviors , for both the 2017 event and subsequent activity in other industrial sectors .
Utilizing Diamond Model methodology for characterizing activity by behaviors attached to victims , we began trackingand immediate enabling activity as a distinct activity group ( collection of behaviors , infrastructure , and victimology ) designated XENOTIME .
Based on information gained from discussion with the initialresponders and subsequent work on follow-on activity by this entity , Dragos developed a comprehensive ( public ) picture of adversary activity roughly matching FireEye ’s analysis published in April 2019 , described in various media .

One of the more prolific actors that we track - referred to as TA505 - is responsible for the largest malicious spam campaigns we have ever observed , distributing instances of the Dridex banking Trojan , Locky ransomware , Jaff ransomware , The Trick banking Trojan , and several others in very high volumes .

Because TA505 is such a significant part of the email threat landscape , this blog provides a retrospective on the shifting malware , payloads , and campaigns associated with this actor .

We examine their use malware such as Jaff , Bart , and Rockloader that appear to be exclusive to this group as well as more widely distributed malware like Dridex and Pony .

Where possible , we detail the affiliate models with which they are involved and outline the current state of TA505 campaigns .

The infographic in Figure 1 traces the earliest known dates on which TA505 began distributing particular malware strains , beginning with Dridex in 2014 and most recently when they elevated GlobeImposter and Philadelphia from small , regionally targeted ransomware variants to global threats .

Of note is TA505 ’s use of the Necurs botnet to drive their massive spam campaigns .

As we saw in both 2016 and 2017 , disruptions to Necurs went hand-in-hand with quiet periods from TA505 .

When the botnet came back online , TA505 campaigns quickly returned , usually at even greater scale than before the disruption .

The following is a more detailed description of the malware and notable campaign attributes associated with TA505 .

The now infamous Dridex banking Trojan can trace much of its DNA to Cridex and Bugat .

Dridex itself appeared shortly after the Zeus banking Trojan was taken down .

It was originally documented on July 25 , 2014 ( or June 22 , 2014 , according to Kaspersky ) and the first campaign we observed in which TA505 distributed Dridex occurred three days later on July 28 .

Although a number of actors have distributed Dridex , TA505 operates multiple affiliate IDs , including what appears to be the earliest recorded affiliate , botnet ID 125 .

These early campaigns were distributed via the Lerspeng downloader while later campaigns occasionally used Pony or Andromeda as intermediate loaders to distribute various instances of Dridex .

Although TA505 initially distributed Dridex botnet ID 125 , they were observed using botnet ID 220 in March 2015 and botnet ID 223 in December of that year .

Later , they were also associated with botnet IDs 7200 and 7500 .

These botnets generally target the following regions :125: UK , US , and Canada 220: UK and Australia 223: Germany 7200: UK 7500: Australia .

TA505 continued distributing Dridex through early June 2017 using a range of email attachments .

Most recently these included PDF attachments with embedded Microsoft Word documents bearing malicious macros that call PowerShell commands that install Dridex .

However , because of the length of time for which the group has been distributing Dridex , distribution mechanisms trace the state of the art for the last two years of email campaigns with techniques ranging from straight macro documents to a variety of zipped scripts .

In October 2015 , we observed several campaigns in which TA505 targeted Japanese and UK organizations with the Shifu banking Trojan .

Shifu is relatively common in Japan but was a new addition to TA505 ’s toolbox .

It appears that they introduced Shifu after high-profile law enforcement actions impacted Dridex distribution .

However , TA505 was also among the first actors to return to high-volume Dridex distribution this same month , even as they demonstrated their ability to diversify and deliver threats beyond Dridex .

As with many of their other campaigns , TA505 delivered Shifu through macro laden Microsoft Office document attachments .

TA505 introduced Locky ransomware in February 2016 .

After alternating for over four months with Dridex , Locky became the payload of choice for TA505 , eclipsing earlier campaigns in terms of volume and reach .

TA505 stopped distributing Dridex in July 2016 , relying almost exclusively on Locky through December of that year .

Like Dridex , Locky is also distributed in an affiliate model ; TA505 exclusively distributes Locky Affid=3 .

Low-volume campaigns distributed Dridex during much of 2015 Moderate volumes of Dridex appeared from the end of 2015 through February 2016 ; it is worth noting that these “ moderate volume ” campaigns were , at the time , the largest campaigns ever observed .

Alternating Dridex and Locky campaigns of varying volumes appeared through May 2016 .

A lull in June 2016 associated with a disruption in the Necurs botnet ; TA505 is heavily reliant on this massive botnet to send out high-volume malicious spam campaigns and disappearances of TA505 activity frequently accompany disruptions in Necurs .

Extremely high-volume campaigns distributing Locky exclusively in July 2016 , consistently delivering tens of millions of messages .

Another lull in November 2016 saw the complete absence of Locky and Dridex , while high-volume campaigns reappeared in December , albeit at lower volumes than during the Q3 2016 peak .

An expected break following the 2016-2017 winter holidays turned into an unexplained three-month hiatus for TA505 .

Large-scale Dridex and Locky campaigns returned in Q2 2017 , although none reached the volumes we observed in mid-2016 .

Later campaigns saw new attachment types , even as Dridex and Locky payloads remained largely unchanged .

Locky distribution ceased in June and July but returned in August with volumes rivaling the peaks of 2016 .

TA505 turned to URLs in early August 2017 to distribute Locky , finally eschewing the document or zipped script attachments that have characterized the majority of their Locky campaigns since February 2016 ; most of these URLs linked to malicious documents and scripts .

By later August , TA505 had turned back to large attachment campaigns , primarily distributing various zipped scripts that downloaded Locky .

The group continued this pattern with occasional URL campaigns and attached HTML files bearing malicious links .

TA505 first introduced Rockloader in April 2016 as an intermediate loader for Locky .

At that time , Rockloader was the initial payload downloaded by malicious attached JavaScript files .

Once Rockloader was installed , it downloaded Locky and , in some cases , Pony and Kegotip .

Pony is another loader with information stealing capabilities while Kegotip is an credential and email address harvesting malware strain that would appear in a small number of TA505 campaigns the following year as the primary payload .

Bart ransomware appeared for exactly one day on June 24 , 2016 .

It was a secondary payload downloaded by Rockloader , the initial payload in a large email campaign using zipped JavaScript attachments .

The Bart ransom screen was visually similar to Locky ’s but Bart had one important distinction : it could encrypt files without contacting a command and control server .

However , we have not seen Bart since , suggesting that this was either an experiment or that the ransomware did not function as expected for TA505 .

TA505 briefly distributed the Kegotip information stealer in April 2017 .

Across two campaigns of several million messages each , the actor used both macro laden Microsoft Word documents and zipped VBScript attachments to install the Trojan on potential victim PCs .

Kegotip is an infostealer ( credentials and email addresses ) used to facilitate other crimeware activities .

It steals credentials from various FTP clients , Outlook , and Internet Explorer .

It also will gather email addresses scraped from files stored on the computer .

This information can be used to facilitate future spam campaigns by the perpetrator or may be sold to other actors .

TA505 introduced Jaff ransomware in May 2017 .

Jaff was not dramatically different from other ransomware strains .

The payment portal was initially similar to the one used by Locky and Bart .

It was primarily notable for its high-volume campaigns and its association with TA505 , given the actor ’s propensity for massive campaigns and ability to dominate the email landscape .

Jaff appeared in multi-million message campaigns for roughly a month and then promptly disappeared as soon as a decryptor was released in mid-June 2017 .

The Trick , also known as Trickbot , is another banking Trojan that TA505 first began distributing in June of 2017 , although we have observed The Trick in the wild since fall 2016 , usually in regionally targeted campaigns .

It is generally considered a descendant of the Dyreza banking Trojan and features mutliple modules .

The main bot is responsible for persistence , the downloading of additional modules , loading affiliate payloads , and loading updates for the malware .

As with much of the malware distributed by TA505 , The Trick has appeared in frequent , high-volume campaigns .

The campaigns used a mix of attached zipped scripts ( WSF , VBS ) , malicious Microsoft Office documents ( Word , Excel ) , HTML attachments , password-protected Microsoft Word documents , links to malicious JavaScript , and other vectors .

The last TA505 campaigns featuring The Trick appeared in mid-September 2017 with payloads alternating between Locky and The Trick .

Philadelphia ransomware has been circulating since September 2016 .

It first attracted our attention in April of this year when we observed an actor customizing the malware for use in highly targeted campaigns .

In a brief stint , TA505 distributed it in one large campaign in July , but we have not seen them use it since .

GlobeImposter is another ransomware strain that saw relatively small-scale distribution until TA505 began including it in malicious spam campaigns at the end of July 2017 .

TA505 primarily distributed GlobeImposter in zipped script attachments through the beginning of September 2017 .

Again , GlobeImposter is not particularly innovative but TA505 elevated the ransomware from a regional variant to a major landscape feature during roughly six weeks of large campaigns .

TA505 is arguably one of the most significant financially motivated threat actors because of the extraordinary volumes of messages they send .

The variety of malware delivered by the group also demonstrates their deep connections to the underground malware scene .

At the time of writing , Locky ransomware remains their malware of choice , even as the group continues to experiment with a variety of additional malware .

The history of TA505 is instructive because they: Have proven to be highly adaptable , shifting techniques and malware frequently to “ follow the money ” , while largely sticking to successful strategies where possible Are flexible , using largely interchangeable components , innovating where necessary on the malware front and using off-the-shelf malware where possible Operate at massive scale , consistently driving global trends in malware distribution and message volume .

Each of these elements makes TA505 a magnifying lens through which to consider the framework employed by many modern threat actors .

Such a framework typically consists of five elements :Actor : The attacker organization ; real humans driven by various motivations -- In the case of TA505 , the motivations are financial .

Vector : The delivery mechanism ; email via attacker-controlled or leased spam botnet -- Necurs for TA505 -- remains a dominant vector , and certainly the vector of choice for this actor .

Hoster : The sites hosting malware ; if malware is not directly attached to email , then macro enabled documents , malicious scripts , or exploit kits will pull payloads from these servers .

TA505 almost exclusively hosts malware in this way , although they vary the means of installing their final payloads on victim machines .

Payload : The malware ; software that will enable the attacker to make use of ( control , exfiltrate data from , or download more software to ) the target computer .

For TA505 , the payloads have shifted over the years and months of their activity , but their sending and hosting infrastructure make these changes relatively simple to implement .

C&C : The command and control channel that serves to relay commands between the installed malware and attackers .

TA505 operates a variety of C&C servers , allowing it to be resilient in the case of takedowns , sinkholes , and other defensive operations .

This framework enables attackers to operate in robust , horizontally segmented ecosystems , specializing in developing certain parts of the framework , and selling or leasing to others ; such frameworks are resistant to takedowns and individual component failures .

But such frameworks also increase attackers' detection surface , that is , their susceptibility to discovery .

In the case of TA505 , while most elements of the framework are well-developed , their reliance on the Necurs botnet for the sending high-volume malicious spam - a key component of the Vector element above - appears to be their Achilles heel .

A XENOTIME to Remember : Veles in the Wild .

Release_Time : 2019-12-04Report_URL : https://pylos.co/2019/04/12/a-xenotime-to-remember-veles-in-the-wild/“ When I use a word , ” Humpty Dumpty said , in rather a scornful tone , “ it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less. ” – Through the Looking Glass , Lewis Carroll FireEye recently published a blog covering the tactics , techniques , and procedures ( TTPs ) for the “ TRITON actor ” when preparing to deploy themalware framework in 2017 .

Overall , the post does a commendable job in making public findings previously only privately shared ( presumably by FireEye , and in several reports I authored for my employer , Dragos ) to threat intelligence customers .

As such , the blog continues to push forward the narrative of how ICS attacks are enabled through prepositioning and initial intrusion operations – an item I have discussed at length .

Yet one point of confusion in the blog comes at the very start : referring to the entity responsible for TRITON as the “ TRITON actor ” .

This seems confusing as FireEye earlier publicly declared the “ TRITON actor ” as a discrete entity , linked to a Russian research institution , and christened it as “ TEMP.Veles ” .

In the 2018 public posting announcing TEMP.Veles , FireEye researchers noted that the institute in question at least supported TEMP.Veles activity in deploying TRITON , with subsequent public presentations at Cyberwarcon and the Kaspersky Lab sponsored Security Analyst Summit essentially linking TRITON and the research institute ( and therefore TEMP.Veles ) as one in the same .

Yet the most-recent posting covering TTPs from initial access through prerequisites to enable final delivery of effects on target ( deploying) avoids the use of the TEMP.Veles term entirely .

In subsequent discussion , FireEye personnel indicate that there was not “ an avalanche of evidence to substantiate ” anything more than “ TRITON actor ” – summing matters by indicating this term “ is the best we ’ve got for the public for now ” .

Meanwhile , parallel work at Dragos ( my employer , where I have performed significant work on the activity described above ) uncovered similar conclusions concerning TTPs and behaviors , for both the 2017 event and subsequent activity in other industrial sectors .

Utilizing Diamond Model methodology for characterizing activity by behaviors attached to victims , we began trackingand immediate enabling activity as a distinct activity group ( collection of behaviors , infrastructure , and victimology ) designated XENOTIME .

Based on information gained from discussion with the initialresponders and subsequent work on follow-on activity by this entity , Dragos developed a comprehensive ( public ) picture of adversary activity roughly matching FireEye ’s analysis published in April 2019 , described in various media .