mrmoor/cti-corpus-raw · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 1 38.9k
We were able to discover this particular version by diving further into connections to analytics-google.org .
Unlike newer samples , this one created a unique fileThe file was created at C:\Documents and Settings\Admin\Local Settings\Temp\sloo.exe .
In addition to this file , the sample also contacted 104.238.184.252 for the PowerShell executable .
Researchers at Palo Alto have attributed sloo.exe and related activities to threat actors of a likely Iranian state-sponsored origin which they ’ve named Magic Hound .
The group Magic Hound is linked via infrastructure and tools to the Rocket Kitten threat actor group although Palo Alto cannot confirm the extent of any relationship between the two groups .
Dell Secureworks analysts recently concluded that domains discussed in the IBM report were linked to the Iranian PuppyRAT .
In addition , Dell analysts have assessed with high-confidence these activities are attributable to Iranian state-sponsored activities .
IOCs for this version were :Shamoon2 : 07d6406036d6e06dc8019e3ade6ee7de .
Shamoon2 : 104.238.184.252 .
Shamoon2 : 5.254.100.200 Shamoon2 : URLs .
Shamoon2 : analytics-google.org : 69/checkFile.aspx .
These additional IOCs will hopefully provide more context into the ongoing threat .
The link to possible Iranian threat actors supports ongoing analysis that Shamoon2 was perpetrated by Iranian state-sponsored threat actors .
The last sample discussed may be malware-0 or at least part of the overall development and subsequent deployment of tools used to install Shamoon on Saudi systems .
Shamoon2 : 2a0df97277ddb361cecf8726df6d78ac .
Shamoon2 : 5e5ea1a67c2538dbc01df28e4ea87472 .
Shamoon2 : d30b8468d16b631cafe458fd94cc3196 .
Shamoon2 : 83be35956e5d409306a81e88a1dc89fd .
Shamoon2 : 07d6406036d6e06dc8019e3ade6ee7de .
Shamoon2 : 104.218.120.128 .
Shamoon2 : 69.87.223.26 .
Shamoon2 : 5.254.100.200 .
Shamoon2 : 45.63.10.99 .
Shamoon2 : 104.238.184.252 .
Shamoon2 : analytics-google.org : 69/checkFile.aspx .
Shamoon2 : analytics-google.org .
Shamoon2 : 69.87.223.26:8080/p .
Shamoon2 : go-microstf.com .
Shamoon2 : 69.87.223.26:8080/eiloShaegae1 .
Shamoon2 : get.adobe.go-microstf.com .
FireEye recently observed a sophisticated campaign targeting individuals within the Mongolian government .
Targeted individuals that enabled macros in a malicious Microsoft Word document may have been infected with Poison Ivy , a popular remote access tool ( RAT ) that has been used for nearly a decade for key logging , screen and video capture , file transfers , password theft , system administration , traffic relaying , and more .
The threat actors behind this attack demonstrated some interesting techniques , including :Customized evasion based on victim profile – The campaign used a publicly available technique to evade AppLocker application whitelisting applied to the targeted systems .
Fileless execution and persistence – In targeted campaigns , threat actors often attempt to avoid writing an executable to the disk to avoid detection and forensic examination .
The campaign we observed used four stages of PowerShell scripts without writing the the payloads to individual files .
Decoy documents – This campaign used PowerShell to download benign documents from the Internet and launch them in a separate Microsoft Word instance to minimize user suspicion of malicious activity .
The threat actors used social engineering to convince users to run an embedded macro in a Microsoft Word document that launched a malicious PowerShell payload .
The threat actors used two publicly available techniques , an AppLocker whitelisting bypass and a script to inject shellcode into the userinit.exe process .
The malicious payload was spread across multiple PowerShell scripts , making its execution difficult to trace .
Rather than being written to disk as individual script files , the PowerShell payloads were stored in the registry .
Targets of the campaign received Microsoft Word documents via email that claimed to contain instructions for logging into webmail or information regarding a state law proposal .
Microsoft application whitelisting solution AppLocker prevents unknown executables from running on a system .
In April 2016 , a security researcher demonstrated a way to bypass this using regsvr32.exe , a legitimate Microsoft executable permitted to execute in many AppLocker policies .
The regsvr32.exe executable can be used to download a Windows Script Component file ( SCT file ) by passing the URL of the SCT file as an argument .
This technique bypasses AppLocker restrictions and permits the execution of code within the SCT file .
In the decrypted shellcode , we also observed content and configuration related to Poison Ivy .
Correlating these bytes to the standard configuration of Poison Ivy , we can observe the following :Active setup : StubPath .
Encryption/Decryption key : version2013 .
Mutex name : 20160509 .
Although Poison Ivy has been a proven threat for some time , the delivery mechanism for this backdoor uses recent publicly available techniques that differ from previously observed campaigns .
Through the use of PowerShell and publicly available security control bypasses and scripts , most steps in the attack are performed exclusively in memory and leave few forensic artifacts on a compromised host .
FireEye HX Exploit Guard is a behavior-based solution that is not affected by the tricks used here .
It detects and blocks this threat at the initial level of the attack cycle when the malicious macro attempts to invoke the first stage PowerShell payload .
Alert : HIDDEN COBRA - North Korea 's DDoSThis joint Technical Alert ( TA ) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) .
This alert provides technical details on the tools and infrastructure used by cyber actors of the North Korean government to target the media , aerospace , financial , and critical infrastructure sectors in the United States and globally .
Working with U.S. Government partners , DHS and FBI identified Internet Protocol ( IP ) addresses associated with a malware variant , known as DeltaCharlie , used to manage North Korea 's distributed denial-of-service ( DDoS ) botnet infrastructure .
This alert contains indicators of compromise ( IOCs ) , malware descriptions , network signatures , and host-based rules to help network defenders detect activity conducted by the NorthThe U.S. Government refers to the malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA .
For more information related to HIDDEN COBRA activity , go to https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra .
If users or administrators detect the custom tools indicative of HIDDEN COBRA , these tools should be immediately flagged , reported to the DHS National Cybersecurity Communications and Integration Center ( NCCIC ) or the FBI Cyber Watch ( CyWatch ) , and given highest priority for enhanced mitigation .
This alert identifiesaddresses linked to systems infected with DeltaCharlie malware and provides descriptions of the malware and associated malware signatures .
DHS and FBI are distributing theseaddresses to enable network defense activities and reduce exposure to the DDoS command-and-control network .
FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using theaddresses for further network exploitation .
This alert includes technical indicators related to specific North Korean government cyber operations and provides suggested response actions to those indicators , recommended mitigation techniques , and information on reporting incidents to the U.S. Government .
On August 23 , 2017 , DHS published a Malware Analysis Report ( MAR-10132963 ) that examines malware functionality to provide detailed code analysis and insight into specific tactics , techniques , and procedures ( TTPs ) observed in the malware .
Since 2009 , HIDDEN COBRA actors have leveraged their capabilities to target and compromise a range of victims ; some intrusions have resulted in the Exfiltration of data while others have been disruptive in nature .
Commercial reporting has referred to this activity as Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace .
DHS and FBI assess that HIDDEN COBRA actors will continue to use cyber operations to advance their government 's military and strategic objectives .
Cyber analysts are encouraged to review the information provided in this alert to detect signs of malicious network activity .
Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS, keyloggers , remote access tools ( RATs ) , and wiper malware .
Variants of malware and tools used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include Destover , Wild, and Hangman .
DHS has previously released Alert TA14-353A , which contains additional details on the use of a server message block ( SMB ) worm tool employed by these actors .
Further research is needed to understand the full breadth of this group 's cyber capabilities .
In particular , DHS recommends that more research should be conducted on the North Korean cyber activity that has been reported by cybersecurity and threat research firms .
HIDDEN COBRA actors commonly target systems running older , unsupported versions of Microsoft operating systems .
The multiple vulnerabilities in these older systems provide cyber actors many targets for exploitation .
These actors have also used Adobe Flash player vulnerabilities to gain initial entry into users' environments .
HIDDEN COBRA is known to use vulnerabilities affecting various applications .
These vulnerabilities include :CVE-2015-6585 : Hangul Word Processor Vulnerability .
CVE-2015-8651 : Adobe Flash Player 18.0.0.324 and 19.x Vulnerability .
CVE-2016-0034 : Microsoft Silverlight 5.1.41212.0 Vulnerability .
CVE-2016-1019 : Adobe Flash Player 21.0.0.197 Vulnerability .
CVE-2016-4117 : Adobe Flash Player 21.0.0.226 Vulnerability .
DHS recommends that organizations upgrade these applications to the latest version and patch level .
If Adobe Flash or Microsoft Silverlight is no longer required , DHS recommends that those applications be removed from systems .
The IOCs provided with this alert includeaddresses determined to be part of the HIDDEN COBRA botnet infrastructure , identified as DeltaCharlie .
The DeltaCharlie DDoS bot was originally reported by Novetta in their 2016 Operation Blockbuster Malware Report .
This malware has used theaddresses identified in the accompanying .csv and .stix files as both source and destination IPs .
In some instances , the malware may have been present on victims' networks for a significant period .
DeltaCharlie is a DDoS tool used by HIDDEN COBRA actors , and is referenced and detailed in Novetta 's Operation Blockbuster Destructive Malware report .
The information related to DeltaCharlie from the Operation Blockbuster Destructive Malware report should be viewed in conjunction with theaddresses listed in the .csv and .stix files provided within this alert .
DeltaCharlie is a DDoS tool capable of launching Domain Name System ( DNS ) attacks , Network Time Protocol ( NTP ) attacks , and Carrier Grade NAT ( CGN ) attacks .
The malware operates on victims' systems as a svchost-based service and is capable of downloading executables , changing its own configuration , updating its own binaries , terminating its own processes , and activating and terminating denial-of-service attacks .
HIDDEN COBRA IOCs related to DeltaCharlie are provided within the accompanying .csv and .stix files of this alert .
DHS and FBI recommend that network administrators review theaddresses , file hashes , network signatures , and YARA rules provided , and add the IPs to their watchlist to determine whether malicious activity has been observed within their organization .
When reviewing network perimeter logs for theaddresses , organizations may find numerous instances of theseaddresses attempting to connect to their systems .
Upon reviewing the traffic from theseaddresses , system owners may find that some traffic corresponds to malicious activity and some to legitimate activity .
System owners are also advised to run the YARA tool on any system they suspect to have been targeted by HIDDEN COBRA actors .
This section contains network signatures and host-based rules that can be used to detect malicious activity associated with HIDDEN COBRA actors .
Although created using a comprehensive vetting process , the possibility of false positives always remains .
These signatures and rules should be used to supplement analysis and should not be used as a sole source of attributing this activity to HIDDEN COBRA actors .

We were able to discover this particular version by diving further into connections to analytics-google.org .

Unlike newer samples , this one created a unique fileThe file was created at C:\Documents and Settings\Admin\Local Settings\Temp\sloo.exe .

In addition to this file , the sample also contacted 104.238.184.252 for the PowerShell executable .

Researchers at Palo Alto have attributed sloo.exe and related activities to threat actors of a likely Iranian state-sponsored origin which they ’ve named Magic Hound .

The group Magic Hound is linked via infrastructure and tools to the Rocket Kitten threat actor group although Palo Alto cannot confirm the extent of any relationship between the two groups .

Dell Secureworks analysts recently concluded that domains discussed in the IBM report were linked to the Iranian PuppyRAT .

In addition , Dell analysts have assessed with high-confidence these activities are attributable to Iranian state-sponsored activities .

IOCs for this version were :Shamoon2 : 07d6406036d6e06dc8019e3ade6ee7de .

Shamoon2 : 104.238.184.252 .

Shamoon2 : 5.254.100.200 Shamoon2 : URLs .

Shamoon2 : analytics-google.org : 69/checkFile.aspx .

These additional IOCs will hopefully provide more context into the ongoing threat .

The link to possible Iranian threat actors supports ongoing analysis that Shamoon2 was perpetrated by Iranian state-sponsored threat actors .

The last sample discussed may be malware-0 or at least part of the overall development and subsequent deployment of tools used to install Shamoon on Saudi systems .

Shamoon2 : 2a0df97277ddb361cecf8726df6d78ac .

Shamoon2 : 5e5ea1a67c2538dbc01df28e4ea87472 .

Shamoon2 : d30b8468d16b631cafe458fd94cc3196 .

Shamoon2 : 83be35956e5d409306a81e88a1dc89fd .

Shamoon2 : 07d6406036d6e06dc8019e3ade6ee7de .

Shamoon2 : 104.218.120.128 .

Shamoon2 : 69.87.223.26 .

Shamoon2 : 5.254.100.200 .

Shamoon2 : 45.63.10.99 .

Shamoon2 : 104.238.184.252 .

Shamoon2 : analytics-google.org : 69/checkFile.aspx .

Shamoon2 : analytics-google.org .

Shamoon2 : 69.87.223.26:8080/p .

Shamoon2 : go-microstf.com .

Shamoon2 : 69.87.223.26:8080/eiloShaegae1 .

Shamoon2 : get.adobe.go-microstf.com .

FireEye recently observed a sophisticated campaign targeting individuals within the Mongolian government .

Targeted individuals that enabled macros in a malicious Microsoft Word document may have been infected with Poison Ivy , a popular remote access tool ( RAT ) that has been used for nearly a decade for key logging , screen and video capture , file transfers , password theft , system administration , traffic relaying , and more .

The threat actors behind this attack demonstrated some interesting techniques , including :Customized evasion based on victim profile – The campaign used a publicly available technique to evade AppLocker application whitelisting applied to the targeted systems .

Fileless execution and persistence – In targeted campaigns , threat actors often attempt to avoid writing an executable to the disk to avoid detection and forensic examination .

The campaign we observed used four stages of PowerShell scripts without writing the the payloads to individual files .

Decoy documents – This campaign used PowerShell to download benign documents from the Internet and launch them in a separate Microsoft Word instance to minimize user suspicion of malicious activity .

The threat actors used social engineering to convince users to run an embedded macro in a Microsoft Word document that launched a malicious PowerShell payload .

The threat actors used two publicly available techniques , an AppLocker whitelisting bypass and a script to inject shellcode into the userinit.exe process .

The malicious payload was spread across multiple PowerShell scripts , making its execution difficult to trace .

Rather than being written to disk as individual script files , the PowerShell payloads were stored in the registry .

Targets of the campaign received Microsoft Word documents via email that claimed to contain instructions for logging into webmail or information regarding a state law proposal .

Microsoft application whitelisting solution AppLocker prevents unknown executables from running on a system .

In April 2016 , a security researcher demonstrated a way to bypass this using regsvr32.exe , a legitimate Microsoft executable permitted to execute in many AppLocker policies .

The regsvr32.exe executable can be used to download a Windows Script Component file ( SCT file ) by passing the URL of the SCT file as an argument .

This technique bypasses AppLocker restrictions and permits the execution of code within the SCT file .

In the decrypted shellcode , we also observed content and configuration related to Poison Ivy .

Correlating these bytes to the standard configuration of Poison Ivy , we can observe the following :Active setup : StubPath .

Encryption/Decryption key : version2013 .

Mutex name : 20160509 .

Although Poison Ivy has been a proven threat for some time , the delivery mechanism for this backdoor uses recent publicly available techniques that differ from previously observed campaigns .

Through the use of PowerShell and publicly available security control bypasses and scripts , most steps in the attack are performed exclusively in memory and leave few forensic artifacts on a compromised host .

FireEye HX Exploit Guard is a behavior-based solution that is not affected by the tricks used here .

It detects and blocks this threat at the initial level of the attack cycle when the malicious macro attempts to invoke the first stage PowerShell payload .

Alert : HIDDEN COBRA - North Korea 's DDoSThis joint Technical Alert ( TA ) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) .

This alert provides technical details on the tools and infrastructure used by cyber actors of the North Korean government to target the media , aerospace , financial , and critical infrastructure sectors in the United States and globally .

Working with U.S. Government partners , DHS and FBI identified Internet Protocol ( IP ) addresses associated with a malware variant , known as DeltaCharlie , used to manage North Korea 's distributed denial-of-service ( DDoS ) botnet infrastructure .

This alert contains indicators of compromise ( IOCs ) , malware descriptions , network signatures , and host-based rules to help network defenders detect activity conducted by the NorthThe U.S. Government refers to the malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA .

For more information related to HIDDEN COBRA activity , go to https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra .

If users or administrators detect the custom tools indicative of HIDDEN COBRA , these tools should be immediately flagged , reported to the DHS National Cybersecurity Communications and Integration Center ( NCCIC ) or the FBI Cyber Watch ( CyWatch ) , and given highest priority for enhanced mitigation .

This alert identifiesaddresses linked to systems infected with DeltaCharlie malware and provides descriptions of the malware and associated malware signatures .

DHS and FBI are distributing theseaddresses to enable network defense activities and reduce exposure to the DDoS command-and-control network .

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using theaddresses for further network exploitation .

This alert includes technical indicators related to specific North Korean government cyber operations and provides suggested response actions to those indicators , recommended mitigation techniques , and information on reporting incidents to the U.S. Government .

On August 23 , 2017 , DHS published a Malware Analysis Report ( MAR-10132963 ) that examines malware functionality to provide detailed code analysis and insight into specific tactics , techniques , and procedures ( TTPs ) observed in the malware .

Since 2009 , HIDDEN COBRA actors have leveraged their capabilities to target and compromise a range of victims ; some intrusions have resulted in the Exfiltration of data while others have been disruptive in nature .

Commercial reporting has referred to this activity as Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace .

DHS and FBI assess that HIDDEN COBRA actors will continue to use cyber operations to advance their government 's military and strategic objectives .

Cyber analysts are encouraged to review the information provided in this alert to detect signs of malicious network activity .

Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS, keyloggers , remote access tools ( RATs ) , and wiper malware .

Variants of malware and tools used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include Destover , Wild, and Hangman .

DHS has previously released Alert TA14-353A , which contains additional details on the use of a server message block ( SMB ) worm tool employed by these actors .

Further research is needed to understand the full breadth of this group 's cyber capabilities .

In particular , DHS recommends that more research should be conducted on the North Korean cyber activity that has been reported by cybersecurity and threat research firms .

HIDDEN COBRA actors commonly target systems running older , unsupported versions of Microsoft operating systems .

The multiple vulnerabilities in these older systems provide cyber actors many targets for exploitation .

These actors have also used Adobe Flash player vulnerabilities to gain initial entry into users' environments .

HIDDEN COBRA is known to use vulnerabilities affecting various applications .

These vulnerabilities include :CVE-2015-6585 : Hangul Word Processor Vulnerability .

CVE-2015-8651 : Adobe Flash Player 18.0.0.324 and 19.x Vulnerability .

CVE-2016-0034 : Microsoft Silverlight 5.1.41212.0 Vulnerability .

CVE-2016-1019 : Adobe Flash Player 21.0.0.197 Vulnerability .

CVE-2016-4117 : Adobe Flash Player 21.0.0.226 Vulnerability .

DHS recommends that organizations upgrade these applications to the latest version and patch level .

If Adobe Flash or Microsoft Silverlight is no longer required , DHS recommends that those applications be removed from systems .

The IOCs provided with this alert includeaddresses determined to be part of the HIDDEN COBRA botnet infrastructure , identified as DeltaCharlie .

The DeltaCharlie DDoS bot was originally reported by Novetta in their 2016 Operation Blockbuster Malware Report .

This malware has used theaddresses identified in the accompanying .csv and .stix files as both source and destination IPs .

In some instances , the malware may have been present on victims' networks for a significant period .

DeltaCharlie is a DDoS tool used by HIDDEN COBRA actors , and is referenced and detailed in Novetta 's Operation Blockbuster Destructive Malware report .

The information related to DeltaCharlie from the Operation Blockbuster Destructive Malware report should be viewed in conjunction with theaddresses listed in the .csv and .stix files provided within this alert .

DeltaCharlie is a DDoS tool capable of launching Domain Name System ( DNS ) attacks , Network Time Protocol ( NTP ) attacks , and Carrier Grade NAT ( CGN ) attacks .

The malware operates on victims' systems as a svchost-based service and is capable of downloading executables , changing its own configuration , updating its own binaries , terminating its own processes , and activating and terminating denial-of-service attacks .

HIDDEN COBRA IOCs related to DeltaCharlie are provided within the accompanying .csv and .stix files of this alert .

DHS and FBI recommend that network administrators review theaddresses , file hashes , network signatures , and YARA rules provided , and add the IPs to their watchlist to determine whether malicious activity has been observed within their organization .

When reviewing network perimeter logs for theaddresses , organizations may find numerous instances of theseaddresses attempting to connect to their systems .

Upon reviewing the traffic from theseaddresses , system owners may find that some traffic corresponds to malicious activity and some to legitimate activity .

System owners are also advised to run the YARA tool on any system they suspect to have been targeted by HIDDEN COBRA actors .

This section contains network signatures and host-based rules that can be used to detect malicious activity associated with HIDDEN COBRA actors .

Although created using a comprehensive vetting process , the possibility of false positives always remains .

These signatures and rules should be used to supplement analysis and should not be used as a sole source of attributing this activity to HIDDEN COBRA actors .