mrmoor/cti-corpus-raw · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 1 38.9k
Hopefully this analysis has been helpful in understanding how truly connected some of these infrastructures can be and how with a little digging , you can uncover a substantial amount of operationally useful indicators to protect you and yours .
The Full Shamoon : How the Devastating Malware Was Inserted Into NetworksResearchers from the IBM X-Force Incident Response and Intelligence Services ( IRIS ) team identified a missing link in the operations of a threat actor involved in recent Shamoon malware attacks against Gulf state organizations .
These attacks , which occurred in November 2016 and January 2017 , reportedly affected thousands of computers across multiple government and civil organizations in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in Gulf states .
Shamoon is designed to destroy computer hard drives by wiping the master boot record ( MBR ) and data irretrievably , unlike ransomware , which holds the data hostage for a fee .
Through their recent investigations , our forensics analysts pinpointed the initial compromise vector and post-compromise operations that led to the deployment of the destructive Shamoon malware on targeted infrastructures .
It ’s worth mentioning that , according to X-Force IRIS , the initial compromise took place weeks before the actual Shamoon deployment and activation were launched .
Since Shamoon incidents feature the infiltration and escalation stages of targeted attacks , X-Force IRIS responders sought out the attackers ’ entry point .
Their findings pointed to what appears to be the initial point of compromise the attackers used : a document containing a malicious macro that , when approved to execute , enabled C2 communications to the attacker ’s server and remote shell via PowerShell .
The document was not the only one discovered in the recent attack waves .
X-Force IRIS researchers had been tracking earlier activity associated with similar malicious , PowerShell-laden documents themed as resumes and human resources documents , some of which related to organizations in Saudi Arabia .
This research identified several bouts of offensive activity that occurred in the past few months , which revealed similar operational methods in which the attackers served malicious documents and other malware executables from web servers to their targets to establish an initial foothold in the network .
Although Shamoon was previously documented in research blogs , the specific network compromise methods leading to the attacks have remained unclear in the reported cases .
X-Force IRIS researchers studied Shamoon ’s attack life cycle and observed its tactics at Saudi-based organizations and private sector companies .
This research led them to believe that the actor using Shamoon in recent attacks relied heavily on weaponized documents built to leverage PowerShell to establish their initial network foothold and subsequent operations :Attackers send a spear phishing email to employees at the target organization .
The email contains a Microsoft Office document as an attachment .
Opening the attachment from the email invokes PowerShell and enables command line access to the compromised machine .
Attackers can now communicate with the compromised machine and remotely execute commands on it .
The attackers use their access to deploy additional tools and malware to other endpoints or escalate privileges in the network .
Attackers study the network by connecting to additional systems and locating critical servers .
The attackers deploy the Shamoon malware .
A coordinated Shamoon outbreak begins and computer hard drives across the organization are permanently wiped .
X-Force IRIS identified the below malicious document .
X-Force IRIS File name : cv_itworx.doc .
X-Force IRIS MD5 : 45b0e5a457222455384713905f886bd4 .
X-Force IRIS SHA256 : 528714aaaa4a083e72599c32c18aa146db503eee80da236b20aea11aa43bdf62 .
X-Force IRIS Hosting URL : http://mol.com-ho.me/cv_itworx.doc .
Our researchers examined the domain that hosted the first malicious file , mol.com-ho.me .
Per the domain ’s WHOIS record , an anonymized registrant registered com-ho.me in October 2016 and used it to serve malicious documents with similar macro activation features .
The following list of documents included :cv.doc : f4d18316e367a80e1005f38445421b1f .
cv_itworx.doc : 45b0e5a457222455384713905f886bd4 .
cv_mci.doc : f4d18316e367a80e1005f38445421b1f .
discount_voucher_codes.xlsm : 19cea065aa033f5bcfa94a583ae59c08 .
Health_insurance_plan.doc : ecfc0275c7a73a9c7775130ebca45b74 .
Health_insurance_registration.doc : 1b5e33e5a244d2d67d7a09c4ccf16e56 .
job_titles.doc : fa72c068361c05da65bf2117db76aaa8 .
job_titles_itworx.doc : 43fad2d62bc23ffdc6d301571135222c .
job_titles_mci.doc : ce25f1597836c28cf415394fb350ae93 .
Password_Policy.xlsm : 03ea9457bf71d51d8109e737158be888 .
These files were most likely delivered via spear phishing emails to lure employees into unwittingly launching the malicious payload .
A closer review of the file names revealed “ IT Worx ” and “ MCI ” .
A search of the name IT Worx brings up a global software professional services organization headquartered in Egypt .
MCI is Saudi Arabia ’s Ministry of Commerce and Investment .
It is possible these names were used in spear phishing emails because they would seem benign to Saudi-based employees and lure them to open the attachment .
X-Force IRIS researchers further identified that the threat actor behind the malicious documents served many of them using a URL-shortening scheme in the following pattern : briefl.ink/{a-z0-9}[5] .
File Detail : Info File name : job_titles_itworx.doc .
MD5 : 43fad2d62bc23ffdc6d301571135222c .
SHA256 : e5b643cb6ec30d0d0b458e3f2800609f260a5f15c4ac66faf4ebf384f7976df6 .
Hosting URL : http://briefl.ink/qhtma .
Passive DNS results on a communications domain associated with the Shamoon attack revealed related network infrastructure , identifying additional domains used by the threat actors .
Domain Name : Spoofed Site ntg-sa.com The domain ntg-sa.com appears to spoof the legit domain ntg.sa.com associated with the Namer Trading Group .
Per their webpage , NTG “ was established primarily to cater the growing demands of Petrochemicals waste management within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ” .
maps-modon.club : The maps-modon.club domain appears to spoof maps.modon.gov.sa , which is associated with the Saudi Industrial Property Authority , an organization “ responsible for the development of industrial cities with integrated infrastructure and services ” .
X-Force IRIS discovered that the threat actor was hosting at least one malicious executable on a server hosted on ntg-sa.com .
This file duped targets into believing it was a Flash player installer that would drop a Windows batch to invoke PowerShell into the same C2 communications .
Analysis of one of the threat actor ’s documents found that if the macro executes , it launches two separate PowerShell Scripts .
The first one executes a PowerShell script served from http://139.59.46.154:3485/eiloShaegae1 .
The host is possibly related to attacks that served the Pupy RAT , a publicly available cross-platform remote access tool .
The second script calls VirtualAlloc to create a buffer , uses memset to load Metasploit-related shellcode into that buffer and executes it through CreateThread .
Metasploit is an open source framework popular as a tool for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine .
The shellcode performs a DWORD XOR of 4 bytes at an offset from the beginning of the shellcode that changes the code to create a loop so the XOR continues 0x57 times .
If this execution is successful , it creates a buffer using VirtualAlloc and calls InternetReadFile in a loop until all the file contents are retrieved from http://45.76.128.165:4443/0w0O6 .
This is then returned as a string to PowerShell , which calls invoke-expression ( iex ) on it , indicating that the expected payload is PowerShell .
Of note , the macro contained a DownloadFile() function that would use URLDownloadToFileA , but this was never actually used .
Based on observations associated with the malicious document , we observed subsequent shell sessions probably associated with’s Meterpreter that enabled deployment of additional tools and malware preceding deployment of three Shamoon-related files : ntertmgr32.exe , ntertmgr64.exe and vdsk911.sys .
Although the complete list of Shamoon ’s victims is not public , Bloomberg reported that in one case , thousands of computers were destroyed at the headquarters of Saudi ’s General Authority of Civil Aviation , erasing critical data and bringing operations to a halt for several days .
The recent activity X-Force IRIS is seeing from the Shamoon attackers has so far been detected in two waves , but those are likely to subside following the public attention the cases have garnered since late 2016 .
Saudi Arabia released a warning to local organizations about the Shamoon malware , alerting about potential attacks and advising organizations to prepare .
Additional Insights on Shamoon2 .
IBM analysts recently unveiled a first look at how threat actors may have placed Shamoon2 malware on systems in Saudi Arabia .
Researchers showcased a potential malware lifecycle which started with spear phishing and eventually led to the deployment of the disk-wiping malware known as Shamoon .
Their research showcased a set of downloaders and domains that could potentially lead to a more extensive malware distribution campaign .
While researching elements in the IBM report , ASERT discovered additional malicious domains , IP addresses , and artifacts .
The basic functionality of the new documents and their PowerShell components matched what was previously disclosed .
For more information on the overall capabilities of the malware , please review IBM 's ongoing research .
It is our hope that by providing additional indicators , end-point investigators and network defenders will be able to discover and mitigate more Shamoon2 related compromises .
The following new samples were likely delivered via similar spear phishing campaigns as described in IBM 's research .
All three shared the same IPs and URLs , also provided below .
These samples were located by pivoting on document attributes .
In this case , a sample from the IBM report indicated the document author ‘ gerry.knight ’ which led us to the following three additional samples .
spear phishing : 2a0df97277ddb361cecf8726df6d78ac 5e5ea1a67c2538dbc01df28e4ea87472 d30b8468d16b631cafe458fd94cc3196 .
spear phishing : 104.218.120.128 .
spear phishing : 69.87.223.26 .
spear phishing : 5.254.100.200 .
spear phishing : analytics-google.org : 69/checkFile.aspx .
spear phishing : analytics-google.org .
spear phishing : 69.87.223.26:8080/p .
From the previous samples , we performed a passive DNS lookup on the IPs .
We found get.adobe.go-microstf.com hosted at 104.218.120.128 around the time this campaign was ongoing , November 2016 .
Researching the domain go-microstf.com , hosted at 45.63.10.99 , revealed yet another iteration of malicious executables .
In this case , a URL used to download the PowerShell component shared a naming convention found in the IBM report , http://69.87.223.26:8080/eiloShaegae1 and connected to the IP address used by the previous three samples .
The following are IOCs related to this domain :83be35956e5d409306a81e88a1dc89fd .
45.63.10.99 .
69.87.223.26 .
URLs go-microstf.com .
69.87.223.26:8080/eiloShaegae1 .
go-microstf.com/checkfile.aspx .
The domain go-microstf.com was originally set up to spoof Google Analytics login page .
Finally , research yielded a relatively unique sample .
This particular iteration was submitted to VirusTotal on September 16 , 2016 .
The majority of samples analyzed to date were submitted no earlier than mid-October , with most being submitted in January 2017 or later .

Hopefully this analysis has been helpful in understanding how truly connected some of these infrastructures can be and how with a little digging , you can uncover a substantial amount of operationally useful indicators to protect you and yours .

The Full Shamoon : How the Devastating Malware Was Inserted Into NetworksResearchers from the IBM X-Force Incident Response and Intelligence Services ( IRIS ) team identified a missing link in the operations of a threat actor involved in recent Shamoon malware attacks against Gulf state organizations .

These attacks , which occurred in November 2016 and January 2017 , reportedly affected thousands of computers across multiple government and civil organizations in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in Gulf states .

Shamoon is designed to destroy computer hard drives by wiping the master boot record ( MBR ) and data irretrievably , unlike ransomware , which holds the data hostage for a fee .

Through their recent investigations , our forensics analysts pinpointed the initial compromise vector and post-compromise operations that led to the deployment of the destructive Shamoon malware on targeted infrastructures .

It ’s worth mentioning that , according to X-Force IRIS , the initial compromise took place weeks before the actual Shamoon deployment and activation were launched .

Since Shamoon incidents feature the infiltration and escalation stages of targeted attacks , X-Force IRIS responders sought out the attackers ’ entry point .

Their findings pointed to what appears to be the initial point of compromise the attackers used : a document containing a malicious macro that , when approved to execute , enabled C2 communications to the attacker ’s server and remote shell via PowerShell .

The document was not the only one discovered in the recent attack waves .

X-Force IRIS researchers had been tracking earlier activity associated with similar malicious , PowerShell-laden documents themed as resumes and human resources documents , some of which related to organizations in Saudi Arabia .

This research identified several bouts of offensive activity that occurred in the past few months , which revealed similar operational methods in which the attackers served malicious documents and other malware executables from web servers to their targets to establish an initial foothold in the network .

Although Shamoon was previously documented in research blogs , the specific network compromise methods leading to the attacks have remained unclear in the reported cases .

X-Force IRIS researchers studied Shamoon ’s attack life cycle and observed its tactics at Saudi-based organizations and private sector companies .

This research led them to believe that the actor using Shamoon in recent attacks relied heavily on weaponized documents built to leverage PowerShell to establish their initial network foothold and subsequent operations :Attackers send a spear phishing email to employees at the target organization .

The email contains a Microsoft Office document as an attachment .

Opening the attachment from the email invokes PowerShell and enables command line access to the compromised machine .

Attackers can now communicate with the compromised machine and remotely execute commands on it .

The attackers use their access to deploy additional tools and malware to other endpoints or escalate privileges in the network .

Attackers study the network by connecting to additional systems and locating critical servers .

The attackers deploy the Shamoon malware .

A coordinated Shamoon outbreak begins and computer hard drives across the organization are permanently wiped .

X-Force IRIS identified the below malicious document .

X-Force IRIS File name : cv_itworx.doc .

X-Force IRIS MD5 : 45b0e5a457222455384713905f886bd4 .

X-Force IRIS SHA256 : 528714aaaa4a083e72599c32c18aa146db503eee80da236b20aea11aa43bdf62 .

X-Force IRIS Hosting URL : http://mol.com-ho.me/cv_itworx.doc .

Our researchers examined the domain that hosted the first malicious file , mol.com-ho.me .

Per the domain ’s WHOIS record , an anonymized registrant registered com-ho.me in October 2016 and used it to serve malicious documents with similar macro activation features .

The following list of documents included :cv.doc : f4d18316e367a80e1005f38445421b1f .

cv_itworx.doc : 45b0e5a457222455384713905f886bd4 .

cv_mci.doc : f4d18316e367a80e1005f38445421b1f .

discount_voucher_codes.xlsm : 19cea065aa033f5bcfa94a583ae59c08 .

Health_insurance_plan.doc : ecfc0275c7a73a9c7775130ebca45b74 .

Health_insurance_registration.doc : 1b5e33e5a244d2d67d7a09c4ccf16e56 .

job_titles.doc : fa72c068361c05da65bf2117db76aaa8 .

job_titles_itworx.doc : 43fad2d62bc23ffdc6d301571135222c .

job_titles_mci.doc : ce25f1597836c28cf415394fb350ae93 .

Password_Policy.xlsm : 03ea9457bf71d51d8109e737158be888 .

These files were most likely delivered via spear phishing emails to lure employees into unwittingly launching the malicious payload .

A closer review of the file names revealed “ IT Worx ” and “ MCI ” .

A search of the name IT Worx brings up a global software professional services organization headquartered in Egypt .

MCI is Saudi Arabia ’s Ministry of Commerce and Investment .

It is possible these names were used in spear phishing emails because they would seem benign to Saudi-based employees and lure them to open the attachment .

X-Force IRIS researchers further identified that the threat actor behind the malicious documents served many of them using a URL-shortening scheme in the following pattern : briefl.ink/{a-z0-9}[5] .

File Detail : Info File name : job_titles_itworx.doc .

MD5 : 43fad2d62bc23ffdc6d301571135222c .

SHA256 : e5b643cb6ec30d0d0b458e3f2800609f260a5f15c4ac66faf4ebf384f7976df6 .

Hosting URL : http://briefl.ink/qhtma .

Passive DNS results on a communications domain associated with the Shamoon attack revealed related network infrastructure , identifying additional domains used by the threat actors .

Domain Name : Spoofed Site ntg-sa.com The domain ntg-sa.com appears to spoof the legit domain ntg.sa.com associated with the Namer Trading Group .

Per their webpage , NTG “ was established primarily to cater the growing demands of Petrochemicals waste management within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ” .

maps-modon.club : The maps-modon.club domain appears to spoof maps.modon.gov.sa , which is associated with the Saudi Industrial Property Authority , an organization “ responsible for the development of industrial cities with integrated infrastructure and services ” .

X-Force IRIS discovered that the threat actor was hosting at least one malicious executable on a server hosted on ntg-sa.com .

This file duped targets into believing it was a Flash player installer that would drop a Windows batch to invoke PowerShell into the same C2 communications .

Analysis of one of the threat actor ’s documents found that if the macro executes , it launches two separate PowerShell Scripts .

The first one executes a PowerShell script served from http://139.59.46.154:3485/eiloShaegae1 .

The host is possibly related to attacks that served the Pupy RAT , a publicly available cross-platform remote access tool .

The second script calls VirtualAlloc to create a buffer , uses memset to load Metasploit-related shellcode into that buffer and executes it through CreateThread .

Metasploit is an open source framework popular as a tool for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine .

The shellcode performs a DWORD XOR of 4 bytes at an offset from the beginning of the shellcode that changes the code to create a loop so the XOR continues 0x57 times .

If this execution is successful , it creates a buffer using VirtualAlloc and calls InternetReadFile in a loop until all the file contents are retrieved from http://45.76.128.165:4443/0w0O6 .

This is then returned as a string to PowerShell , which calls invoke-expression ( iex ) on it , indicating that the expected payload is PowerShell .

Of note , the macro contained a DownloadFile() function that would use URLDownloadToFileA , but this was never actually used .

Based on observations associated with the malicious document , we observed subsequent shell sessions probably associated with’s Meterpreter that enabled deployment of additional tools and malware preceding deployment of three Shamoon-related files : ntertmgr32.exe , ntertmgr64.exe and vdsk911.sys .

Although the complete list of Shamoon ’s victims is not public , Bloomberg reported that in one case , thousands of computers were destroyed at the headquarters of Saudi ’s General Authority of Civil Aviation , erasing critical data and bringing operations to a halt for several days .

The recent activity X-Force IRIS is seeing from the Shamoon attackers has so far been detected in two waves , but those are likely to subside following the public attention the cases have garnered since late 2016 .

Saudi Arabia released a warning to local organizations about the Shamoon malware , alerting about potential attacks and advising organizations to prepare .

Additional Insights on Shamoon2 .

IBM analysts recently unveiled a first look at how threat actors may have placed Shamoon2 malware on systems in Saudi Arabia .

Researchers showcased a potential malware lifecycle which started with spear phishing and eventually led to the deployment of the disk-wiping malware known as Shamoon .

Their research showcased a set of downloaders and domains that could potentially lead to a more extensive malware distribution campaign .

While researching elements in the IBM report , ASERT discovered additional malicious domains , IP addresses , and artifacts .

The basic functionality of the new documents and their PowerShell components matched what was previously disclosed .

For more information on the overall capabilities of the malware , please review IBM 's ongoing research .

It is our hope that by providing additional indicators , end-point investigators and network defenders will be able to discover and mitigate more Shamoon2 related compromises .

The following new samples were likely delivered via similar spear phishing campaigns as described in IBM 's research .

All three shared the same IPs and URLs , also provided below .

These samples were located by pivoting on document attributes .

In this case , a sample from the IBM report indicated the document author ‘ gerry.knight ’ which led us to the following three additional samples .

spear phishing : 2a0df97277ddb361cecf8726df6d78ac 5e5ea1a67c2538dbc01df28e4ea87472 d30b8468d16b631cafe458fd94cc3196 .

spear phishing : 104.218.120.128 .

spear phishing : 69.87.223.26 .

spear phishing : 5.254.100.200 .

spear phishing : analytics-google.org : 69/checkFile.aspx .

spear phishing : analytics-google.org .

spear phishing : 69.87.223.26:8080/p .

From the previous samples , we performed a passive DNS lookup on the IPs .

We found get.adobe.go-microstf.com hosted at 104.218.120.128 around the time this campaign was ongoing , November 2016 .

Researching the domain go-microstf.com , hosted at 45.63.10.99 , revealed yet another iteration of malicious executables .

In this case , a URL used to download the PowerShell component shared a naming convention found in the IBM report , http://69.87.223.26:8080/eiloShaegae1 and connected to the IP address used by the previous three samples .

The following are IOCs related to this domain :83be35956e5d409306a81e88a1dc89fd .

45.63.10.99 .

69.87.223.26 .

URLs go-microstf.com .

69.87.223.26:8080/eiloShaegae1 .

go-microstf.com/checkfile.aspx .

The domain go-microstf.com was originally set up to spoof Google Analytics login page .

Finally , research yielded a relatively unique sample .

This particular iteration was submitted to VirusTotal on September 16 , 2016 .

The majority of samples analyzed to date were submitted no earlier than mid-October , with most being submitted in January 2017 or later .