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|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
8,399
| 1,165,570
| 28,678
|
2AC
|
CP-States
|
1AC---Solvency
|
No civil war.
|
Patrick ’11(Stewart; James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) Program at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), author of Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security; 4/15/11; “Why failed states shouldn’t be our biggest national security fear”; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-failed-states-shouldnt-be-our-biggest-national-security-fear/2011/04/11/AFqWmjkD_story.html; Washington Post; accessed 6/7/17)
|
Patrick ’11
| 20,698
| 91
| 8,408
| 1
|
392
| 648,483
| 12,655
| null | null |
1
|
Their imposition of India and Pakistan as threat as a nation is a practice of racial reductionism that exports and solidifies an inherently bloodstained hierarchy in international order, rooted in its colonial past.
|
Mathur ’18:
Ritu Mathur, 2018 (By Ritu Mathur, on 16 September, 2018. Accessed online June 24, 2019. “Techno-Racial dynamics of denial & difference in weapons control.” Ritu Mathur is at Department of Political Science at the University of Texas at San Antonio, in San Antonio, Texas. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02185377.2018.1515640)--
|
Mathur ’18:
| 66,632
| 86
| 1,943
| 0
|
8,704
| 649,024
| 12,685
| null | null |
2
|
Their imposition of India and Pakistan as threat as a nation is a practice of racial reductionism that exports and solidifies an inherently bloodstained hierarchy in international order, rooted in its colonial past.
|
Mathur ’18:
Ritu Mathur, 2018 (By Ritu Mathur, on 16 September, 2018. Accessed online June 24, 2019. “Techno-Racial dynamics of denial & difference in weapons control.” Ritu Mathur is at Department of Political Science at the University of Texas at San Antonio, in San Antonio, Texas. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02185377.2018.1515640)--
|
Mathur ’18:
| 66,632
| 86
| 1,943
| 0
|
8,960
| 224,863
| 2,892
|
Kritik Toolbox Supplement – BFHHR
|
IR kritiks/realism/heg
|
at: liberalism bad
|
Their K of “liberalism” is asinine – they collapse a core difference between neoconservative militarism and liberalism
|
Arkedis 11 [Jim, director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute and a principal fellow of the Truman National Security Project "Not All Interventions Are The Same" March 28, Foreign Policy]
|
Arkedis 11
| 76,656
| 31
| 9,979
| 1
|
9,009
| 279,771
| 3,525
|
aff answers – critical geopolitics k
|
impact answers
|
2ac liberalism good
|
Their K of “liberalism” is asinine – they collapse a core difference between neoconservative militarism and liberalism
|
Arkedis 11 [Jim, director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute and a principal fellow of the Truman National Security Project "Not All Interventions Are The Same" March 28, Foreign Policy]
|
Arkedis 11
| 76,656
| 31
| 9,994
| 1
|
9,020
| 324,441
| 4,150
|
foucault kritik
|
aff answers
|
at: heg k
|
Their K of “liberalism” is asinine – they collapse a core difference between neoconservative militarism and liberalism
|
Arkedis 11 [Jim, director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute and a principal fellow of the Truman National Security Project "Not All Interventions Are The Same" March 28, Foreign Policy]
|
Arkedis 11
| 76,656
| 31
| 9,979
| 1
|
2,209
| 69,772
| 1,090
|
Aff — Weed
|
Adv — Federalism
|
2AC — Coop Fed Key
|
Medicaid funding is key to prevent emerging diseases--- No regulation will demolish sustaining virus outbreaks
|
Candace Gibson 17, Staff Attorney, “How Per Capita Caps Harm the Prevention and Treatment of New Viruses”, http://www.healthlaw.org/issues/medicaid/health-reform-and-medicaid/how-per-capita-caps-harm-the-prevention-treatment-of-new-viruses#.W2DrPtJKjIU)//JR1
|
Gibson 17
| 48,809
| 6
| 706
| 1
|
6,676
| 803,055
| 18,782
|
1NR
|
Afghanistan
|
Nuclear Terror Impact---2NC
|
Drug eradication causes militants to shift to nuclear material smuggling---causes attacks on the U.S.
|
Vanda Felbab-Brown 9, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, 10/1/9, “Transnational Drug Enterprises: Threats to Global Stability and U.S. National Security,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2009/10/01-drug-enterprises-felbabbrown
|
Felbab-Brown 9
| 440,878
| 6
| 4,402
| 1
|
3,968
| 764,074
| 17,850
|
1NR
|
Politics
|
Winners Win
|
Own author concedes that Obama only gets momentum if he “win” on an issue where the public mood is changing – Overreaching with an unpopular issue empirically triggers backlash
|
Hirsh, 13 — Chief correspondent (2/7/2013, Michael, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital; The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207))
|
Hirsh, 13
| 23,293
| 350
| 2,334
| 0
|
5,542
| 480,474
| 6,195
|
1NC
|
UN Advantage
|
1NC --- No Solvency
|
Standing, weak enforcement, and constant challenges
|
Bryson et al 17 – Professor at Hertie School in Berlin, PhD from MIT (2001), Post-Doctoral Fellowship at Harvard (2002); Professor of Law at the University of Iowa, J.D. from Yale (2009), PhD from NYU (2017); Senior Research Fellow at Wolfson College, Senior Associate at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, former Senior Advisor in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the U.S. Department of State
Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis, and Thomas D. Grant, “Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons,” Artificial Intelligence and Law 25, September 08, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9
|
Bryson et al 17
| 14,056
| 66
| 3,188
| 0
|
701
| 478,993
| 6,174
|
1NC
|
Case
|
1NC --- Rights of Nature Fail
|
Standing, weak enforcement, and constant challenges
|
Bryson et al 17 – Professor at Hertie School in Berlin, PhD from MIT (2001), Post-Doctoral Fellowship at Harvard (2002); Professor of Law at the University of Iowa, J.D. from Yale (2009), PhD from NYU (2017); Senior Research Fellow at Wolfson College, Senior Associate at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, former Senior Advisor in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the U.S. Department of State
Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis, and Thomas D. Grant, “Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons,” Artificial Intelligence and Law 25, September 08, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9
|
Bryson et al 17
| 14,056
| 66
| 3,188
| 0
|
6,034
| 105,341
| 1,508
| null |
Links
|
Arms Sales help R&D
|
Buyers pay for non-recurring research, development, test, and evaluation costs
|
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 16. “RECOUPMENT OF NONRECURRING COSTS (NCs) ON SALES OF U.S. ITEMS.” https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2016-title32-vol1/pdf/CFR-2016-title32-vol1-part165.pdf(//JTR).
|
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 16. .
| 72,420
| 1
| 4,720
| 0
|
7,297
| 43,542
| 766
| null |
Case
|
--XT—No Internal Link
|
Specifically true regarding deference to agency constructions – The key question is liberal v. conservative
|
Beermann 10 – Law Professor, Boston U
Jack M. Beermann, Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why it Can and Should Be Overruled, Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Feb. 2010), https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1519&context=faculty_scholarship
|
Beermann 10
| 30,084
| 11
| 6,644
| 0
|
3,647
| 549,856
| 8,027
|
1NC Loyola Quarters
|
Pandemics
|
1NC---AT: Disease
|
Lockdowns solve their impact. We read yellow.
|
Kim 21, Kiseong, et al. "Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading." Applied Sciences 11.7 (2021): 2997. (Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; R&D Center)//Re-cut by Elmer
|
Kim 21
| 19,827
| 127
| 19,496
| 1
|
3,661
| 541,789
| 7,600
|
Case
|
Pandemics
|
Hacking
|
Lockdowns solve their impact. We read yellow.
|
Kim 21, Kiseong, et al. "Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading." Applied Sciences 11.7 (2021): 2997. (Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; R&D Center)//Re-cut by Elmer
|
Kim 21
| 19,827
| 127
| 19,496
| 1
|
2,718
| 2,837,947
| 89,955
|
VNA AC V3
|
Part 4 is Framework
|
Subpoint D is the Impact
|
moral uncertainty thousands of years of philosophical debate without resolution proves some degree moral uncertainty
| null | null | 1,202,554
| 1
| null | 1
|
3,729
| 3,467,256
| 115,514
|
1NC
| null |
1NC – Natives
|
The counterplan competes – National health insurance is by definition universal – that means it covers everyone
|
Medical Dictionary 9
|
Medical Dictionary 9
| 1,438,091
| 28
| 341
| 0
|
2,427
| 3,474,425
| 115,454
|
1NR
|
deportation da
|
AT: Won’t use
|
The counterplan competes – National health insurance is by definition universal – that means it covers everyone
|
Medical Dictionary 9
|
Medical Dictionary 9
| 1,438,091
| 28
| 294
| 0
|
6,242
| 409,033
| 5,273
|
Social Services Trade-Off Disadvantage
| null |
Link – Ocean Exploration (2/2)
|
(__) Congress is trying to CUT funding for ocean research and exploration now – the plan would reverse that
|
Kollipara, news reporter for Science Magazine, 2014
|
Kollipara 14
| 235,781
| 6
| 2,599
| 0
|
6,827
| 3,443,225
| 114,672
|
Econ
| null |
1NC
|
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
7,152
| 657,740
| 13,120
|
1NC
|
Sustainability
| null |
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
7,155
| 3,438,681
| 114,673
|
Certainty
| null | null |
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
7,156
| 3,445,173
| 114,771
|
Econ
| null | null |
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
7,157
| 3,677,633
| 122,919
| null |
natgas
|
1nc econ resil
|
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
7,162
| 820,104
| 19,498
|
Case
|
regionalism
|
1nc econ d
|
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
7,178
| 820,375
| 19,509
|
Case
|
Reform
|
1nc econ d
|
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
7,196
| 3,447,113
| 114,769
|
Sustainability
| null | null |
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15 the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
7,199
| 3,449,912
| 114,842
|
Econ Adv
| null |
1NC
|
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
7,200
| 3,450,608
| 114,845
|
Prices
| null | null |
Econ resilient – empirics
|
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
|
Kohn 15
| 49,508
| 54
| 789
| 1
|
5,690
| 3,668,003
| 122,608
|
1AC
| null |
1
|
Interdependence and financial institutions increase the risk of escalation
|
James 14 (Harold James, Professor of history at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School who specializes in European economic history, 7/2/14, “Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?,” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/)
|
James 14
| 53,936
| 345
| 6,254
| 1
|
6,259
| 3,751,490
| 124,790
|
1AC Rd 3 Fullerton
| null |
Adv—Economy
|
Interdependence and financial institutions increase the risk of escalation
|
James 14 (Harold James, Professor of history at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School who specializes in European economic history, 7/2/14, “Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?,” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/)
|
James 14
| 53,936
| 345
| 6,254
| 1
|
6,264
| 3,754,525
| 124,796
| null |
Adv—Economy
| null |
Interdependence and financial institutions increase the risk of escalation
|
James 14 (Harold James, Professor of history at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School who specializes in European economic history, 7/2/14, “Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?,” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/)
|
James 14
| 53,936
| 345
| 6,254
| 1
|
1,182
| 3,662,137
| 122,534
|
1AC
|
1
| null |
Interdependence and financial institutions increase the risk of escalation
|
James 14 (Harold James, Professor of history at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School who specializes in European economic history, 7/2/14, “Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?,” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/)
|
James 14
| 53,936
| 345
| 6,254
| 1
|
4,731
| 2,730,834
| 86,795
|
2NC
|
1NC
|
T
|
Annual baselines are highly misleading – looking to percentages is a more holistic and accurate understanding of sales
|
Arad, 18 - Shimon Arad is a retired colonel of the Israeli Defense Forces (Shimon, “TRUMP’S ARMS EXPORTS POLICY: DEBUNKING KEY ASSUMPTIONS” War on the Rocks, 9/28, https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/trumps-arms-exports-policy-debunking-key-assumptions/
|
Arad, 18 -
| 1,177,278
| 6
| 1,893
| 1
|
4,734
| 2,732,814
| 86,722
|
2NC
| null |
T
|
Annual baselines are highly misleading – looking to percentages is a more holistic and accurate understanding of sales
|
Arad, 18 - Shimon Arad is a retired colonel of the Israeli Defense Forces (Shimon, “TRUMP’S ARMS EXPORTS POLICY: DEBUNKING KEY ASSUMPTIONS” War on the Rocks, 9/28, https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/trumps-arms-exports-policy-debunking-key-assumptions/
|
Arad, 18 -
| 1,177,278
| 6
| 1,893
| 1
|
9,069
| 175,992
| 2,296
| null |
Aff
|
AT: Dem turn
|
A democratic China would be more aggressive
|
Jan Hornat 12, (Jan Hornat is a researcher in the Department of American Studies at Charles University in Prague., ), 11-23-2012, "Chinese Democracy Is No Goal", National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinese-democracy-no-goal-7761?page=0%2C1, TJ-TD
|
Hornat 12
| 117,342
| 5
| 5,118
| 1
|
9,464
| 115,191
| 1,649
| null |
Internals/Impacts
|
AT: No Escalation
|
Even if the US and China don’t have a shooting war, the impact is still extinction
|
Klare 2019 - Five College Professor of Program in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in AmherstMichael, "War With China? It’s Already Under Way," Feb 19, americanempireproject.com/blog/war-with-china/
|
Klare 2019
| 76,442
| 12
| 2,125
| 1
|
7,324
| 3,114,986
| 101,596
| null |
base
|
Lashout DA – Base Link – A2: Brands
|
Base backlash now – legal troubles, indicted advisers, scandals and Russia
|
Their ev for reference. MSU + Blue
| null | 382,765
| 65
| 2,816
| 0
|
3,868
| 900,539
| 21,877
| null |
1NC
|
GSC
|
No hypersonics impact
|
Raitasalo, 19
(Lt. Col. Jyri Raitasalo, military professor of war studies at the Finnish National Defence University. [Hypersonic Weapons are No Game-Changer, 1-5-2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-game-changer-40632)
|
Raitasalo, 19
| 10,768
| 22
| 5,309
| 1
|
6,937
| 1,679,682
| 50,045
| null |
1NC
|
Adv---Elites
|
3---No encirclement---enlargement is nowhere close to threatening Russia
|
Marten 20 – Kimberly Marten is a professor and department chair of Political Science @ Barnard
(Kimberly Marten, “NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia,” 2020, International Politics, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00233-9)
|
Marten 20
| 7,122
| 74
| 3,222
| 1
|
6,941
| 1,680,655
| 50,065
|
1NC---Kentucky---Round 1
|
1NC
|
Adv---Elites
|
3---No encirclement---enlargement is nowhere close to threatening Russia
|
Marten 20 – Kimberly Marten is a professor and department chair of Political Science @ Barnard
(Kimberly Marten, “NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia,” 2020, International Politics, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00233-9)
|
Marten 20
| 7,122
| 74
| 3,222
| 1
|
9,139
| 3,801,851
| 126,423
|
2nc
|
XT 1NC Links
|
2nc – hostile rise inevitable
|
Prefer our evidence – multiple Chinese actions confirm the hostile rise thesis:
| null | null | 1,566,234
| 1
| null | 0
|
9,190
| 257,726
| 3,238
|
2NC Extensions
|
Links:
|
Link – Cybersecurity
|
US India cyber relations all time low because of scandal and distrust – engagement with China makes India angry because of historical Chinese espionage. 2012 and 13 are filled with examples of China hacking into Indian military and critical infrastructure. ie South China Seas and Indian military.
Curtis, 14
| null |
Curtis, 14
| 167,287
| 1
| null | 0
|
4,432
| 2,192,032
| 67,357
| null |
Case
|
Adv 1
|
Landmines aren’t LAWs.
|
CRS 12/1 Congressional Reseach Service, updated December 1, 2020 Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11150.pdf SM
|
CRS 12/1
| 7,523
| 1,163
| 1,112
| 0
|
6,852
| 437,218
| 5,593
|
Immigration Politics – Cal 2013 – Starter Packet
|
Impacts
|
Mexico Impact – 1st Line
|
Extinction
|
Corsi ‘5
|
Corsi ‘5
| 276,388
| 6
| 2,924
| 1
|
8,253
| 478,112
| 6,156
|
***NAFTA Good***
|
Drug Trafficking Scenario
|
2AC
|
Extinction
|
Corsi, 5 [Jerome. PhD in Poli Sci from Harvard, Expert in Politically-Motivated Violence. Atomic Iran, Pg 176-8//JVOSS]
|
Jerome. PhD in Poli Sci from Harvard, Expert in Politically-Motivated Violence. Atomic Iran, Pg 176-8//JVOSS]
| 276,388
| 6
| 2,813
| 1
|
8,254
| 479,393
| 6,175
|
Immigration Politics – Cal 2013 – Starter Packet
|
Impacts
|
Mexico Impact – 1st Line
|
Extinction
|
Corsi ‘5
| null | 276,388
| 6
| 2,924
| 1
|
8,256
| 480,653
| 6,194
|
Pemex Bad
| null |
1NC Narco-Terrorism DA
|
Extinction
|
Corsi, 5 [Jerome. PhD in Poli Sci from Harvard, Expert in Politically-Motivated Violence. Atomic Iran, Pg 176-8//JVOSS]
|
Corsi, 5 [ 176-8//JVOSS]
| 276,388
| 6
| 2,813
| 1
|
4,631
| 477,907
| 6,156
|
***NAFTA Bad***
|
Drug Trafficking Scenario
|
1NC
|
Extinction
|
Corsi, 5 [Jerome. PhD in Poli Sci from Harvard, Expert in Politically-Motivated Violence. Atomic Iran, Pg 176-8//JVOSS]
|
Jerome. PhD in Poli Sci from Harvard, Expert in Politically-Motivated Violence. Atomic Iran, Pg 176-8//JVOSS]
| 276,388
| 6
| 2,813
| 1
|
6,721
| 137,530
| 1,869
|
Neg
|
Advantage Links
|
Link – China Epistemology
|
Furthermore, traditional China studies are epistemologically bankrupt – they rely on a neoliberal “with us or against us” mentality which shuts down debate and ensures an academic cloister – reject their scenarios
|
Vukovich ‘13 (Daniel F Vukovich, associate professor of the humanities at the University of Hong Kong, PhD in English from the University of Illinois, 2013, “China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C.”, pp 13-17, ableist language modified)
|
Vukovich ‘13
| 91,395
| 1
| 13,123
| 0
|
5,314
| 158,303
| 2,098
|
Aff Answers to Dems Win Good
|
Uniqueness Answers – AT – Dems Win Now
|
Non-Unique – GOP Wins Senate – Dem Senators Ticket-Splitting
|
Dems won’t get Senate majority – key Senators are ticket-splitting
|
Kilgore, New York Magazine, political columnist, 6-30-18
(Ed, 6-30-18, New York Magazine, “Senate Democrats Are Fighting Some Brutal Trends in the Midterms”, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/06/senate-democrats-are-fighting-brutal-trends-in-the-midterms.html, accessed 7/10/18, GDI-JG)
|
Kilgore, New York Magazine, political columnist, 6-30-18
| 105,247
| 4
| 3,360
| 1
|
3,287
| 1,198,013
| 29,283
|
2NC
|
PIC
|
AT: 2AC 1
|
“Resource” representations entrenches eco crisis
|
Luke 3 [Timothy; 8/9/2003; Distinguished Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute; "View of Timothy Luke: Eco-Managerialism," Aurora Online, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91] |Trip|
|
Luke 3
| 32,505
| 22
| 11,674
| 0
|
1,062
| 2,911,307
| 93,842
| null | null |
DA: Allied Prolif – East Asia (2:15)
|
South Korea and Japan go nuclear, multiplicatively increasing risks of war, specifically with China and NK
|
Karako 18 Thomas Karako is a senior fellow in the international security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. [When Allies Get Nervous, 2-2-2018, https://www.weeklystandard.com/thomas-karako/when-allies-get-nervous]//BPS
|
Karako 18
| 25,999
| 86
| 12,047
| 1
|
3,109
| 3,203,898
| 103,725
|
Aff v Cal Berkley FG
|
1AR
|
Deterrence
|
Our impacts are highly probable – even if nuclear weapons are stabilizing once they are acquired, statistical analysis proves the process of acquisition and development makes preemptive conflict 5 times more likely.
|
Sobek et al 12 (David Sobek Louisiana State University Dennis M. Foster Virginia Military Institute and Samuel B. Robison Louisiana State University. Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945–2001, International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 149–162
Conventional wisdom holds that the possession of nuclear weapons offers states security from a number of international threats. In particular, the possession of nuclear weapons insulates a state from challenges to its most salient concerns (such as territorial integrity). While ultimately beneficial to proliferators, the path to nuclear status is generally neither instantaneous nor undetectable. As such, it behooves states that wish to challenge proliferators to realize their political goals sooner rather than later. Proliferators, on the other hand, have an incentive to delay the resolution of the contentious issue until the deployment of their nuclear weapons. In this article, we use this set of interacting incentives as a point of departure in delineating a theory of the relationship between the nuclear proliferation process and the frequency with which proliferators are targeted in conventional militarized conflicts. Though much previous scholarship has been devoted to this question, we believe that extant views have focused too narrowly on one subset of that relationship: the preemptive employment of conventional capabilities by status quo powers in order to physically disable or destroy proliferators’ nascent nuclear programs. In developing a broader treatment of the strategic interaction between states, we posit that the various stages of deterrent nuclear proliferation are best conceived of as sequential steps in a bargaining process over preexisting disputes that were instrumental in spurring proliferators to consider nuclear options. As such, we contend that the primary rationale for status quo states’ conventional targeting of proliferators should derive not from the desire to physically disrupt nuclear development (which is, at best, a difficult task), but from the desire to reach favorable conclusions to underlying disputes before the deployment of nuclear weapons drastically complicates the issue. The effect of nuclear proliferation on conventional targeting is tested quantitatively by looking at states in four different stages of the proliferation process: no program, exploration, pursuit, and acquisition (Singh and Way 2004). In general, the results of our analyses show that as states move from no program to exploration and then to pursuit, the odds that that they become the target of a militarized interstate dispute (or MID; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) increase rather steadily. Once actual acquisition is achieved, however, the risk of being targeted decreases. These results are most robust when looking at disputes over territory (which arguably represent conflicts over the most salient interest of states) and territorial disputes that lead to at least one fatality. Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Coercion Why Do States Proliferate, and How Should Proliferators be Treated? From the Soviet acquisition of nuclear capabilities in the late 1940s to the North Korean detonation of a nuclear device in 2006, scholars have debated myriad aspects of the nuclear proliferation issue. Of greatest preliminary interest to the current study are two interrelated topics that have garnered much attention in these debates: the reasons why states would decide to develop or acquire nuclear weapons in the first place, and how proliferation attempts have been⁄should be addressed by status quo powers. Perhaps not surprisingly, the most regularly expounded answers to the first question revolve around issues of deterrence. To wit, the acquisition of a viable nuclear option is conceived of by many scholars as affording states greater capacities to secure their most vital interests through the threat of nuclear usage (Waltz 1979, 1990; Huth 1990; Davis 1993; Huth and Russett 1993). Though the utility of a nuclear deterrent has most often been addressed in the context of high-level crisis bargaining between second-strike-capable powers (Schelling 1960; Beres 1981; Jervis 1984; Powell 1990), several works indicate that the possession of even a small number of usable nuclear weapons might deter even second-strike-capable adversaries from taking actions in contravention of the proliferator’s interests (Freedman 1981; Sagan and Waltz 1995; Morgan 2003; for a more nuanced view, see Cimbala 1995). In a general sense, the logic of nuclear deterrence stipulates that nuclear weapons possession, either by assuring mutual destruction or by threatening the imposition of high costs, can preclude or minimize efforts by any adversary to coerce proliferators on important issues. Though critics have posed challenges to this logic from several different perspectives (for example, Russett 1983; Evron 1984; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1991; Posen 1992; Paul 1994, 1995; Sagan and Waltz 1995; Kraig 1999; Tannenwald 2006), we assume its general applicability for the purposes of this paper.1 From the perspective of nuclear deterrence, it would seem that the degree and type of threat perceived by states, and the current capacities of those states to safeguard against those threats, are crucial determinants of most decisions to proliferate. Specifically, nuclear weapons development⁄ procurement for deterrent purposes appears to be an attractive decision when (i) serious threats to extremely important state interests are clear and present and (ii) when the methods traditionally used to counter these threats (for example, increases in conventional forces; alliance formation, especially with a nuclear power) are impractical or impossible (for example, Bunn and Timerbaev 1993; Roberts 1993).2 Indeed, with the exception of the initial nuclearization efforts in the context of World War II, one can quite reasonably argue that the overwhelming majority of proliferators have decided to pursue nuclear programs precisely because of this security quandary (Nacht 1981). Perhaps the most comprehensive exposition of these dual impetuses for deterrent proliferation is found in the literature on ‘‘pariah’’ states. Prominent in Harkavy’s (1981:136) definition of ‘‘pariahtude’’ are an inability to match the conventional military power of an opposing state or coalition, ‘‘objectively poor diplomatic leverage,’’ and being in a position where one’s ‘‘national origins and legitimacy—or present constitutional status—is widely questioned… that is, its present national status, within its own defined borders, is at issue.’’3 Given such conditions, Harkavy (1981:138) claims that ‘‘the not unexpected result may be recourse to an ‘equalizer’—the nuclear equivalent of a pistol for a scrawny man in a menacing neighborhood.’’ Likewise, Quester (1979:544) notes that nuclear weapons possession can ‘‘serve a real purpose’’ by allowing states ‘‘whose very existence is threatened by the possibility of armed attack from its neighbors’’ to shed their pariah status. Moreover, Quester (1981) indicates that pariah status is not a necessary condition for proliferation; as was the case for the Soviet Union, proliferation might be an attractive option for even diplomatically and conventionally powerful states to ‘‘equalize’’ against nuclear rivals who wish to fundamentally alter aspects of that state’s regime or territorial status. If a central impetus for the acquisition of nuclear weapons is to deter others in the midst of a serious conflict of interest and an inability to address deterrence needs through other means, how have ⁄should states that are opposed to that acquisition act to counter it?4 Since deterrent proliferators generally fall into the ‘‘demand-pull’’ category in Dunn’s (1978) previously noted dichotomy (in 1 ), nuclear acquisition is viewed as more of a necessity than a luxury; as such, urgent and effective measures might be necessary to terminate—or convince them to unilaterally terminate—their proliferation efforts. According to Schneider (1994:216), potentially the most useful means to terminate acquisition efforts once begun are (i) the prevention of access to nuclear technology; (ii) the provision of alternatives to nuclear weapons; and (iii) the use of military force. Each of these counter-proliferation strategies involves inherent trade-offs regarding effectiveness and cost. In terms of the denial of resources, export controls on weapons-grade materials and technology used to develop weapons, either through international agreements or through bilateral trade sanctions, are likely useful. While such measures can prolong the process of weapons development (thereby allowing time for diplomacy and the formulation of punitive measures), they are unlikely to stop very determined proliferators from achieving nuclear status in the long run (as was evident in, for instance, the North Korean case). The provision of alternatives, a demand-side amelioration, includes the expansion or threatened withdrawal of alliances, non-aggression treaties and assurances, conventional arms transfers, or other ‘‘positive sanctions’’ (Martin 2002). Such alternatives, however, often contravene other important aspects of offering states’ diplomatic portfolios; more specifically, assuming that at least one other state is staunchly opposed to some aspect of the proliferator’s policy, regime, or territorial status, these measures are unlikely to be acceptable to aggrieved parties. Finally, military efforts to prevent or terminate nuclear weapons development efforts can be employed. Though some scholars discuss the possibility of nuclear preemption in response to proliferation (for example, Harkavy 1981; Berkowitz 1985), the majority of work on the likelihood of force usage as a proliferation response focuses on the destruction or termination of nuclear programs via the conventional targeting of nuclear technology and infrastructure. This literature posits that the use or threat of conventional force can be effective by making the decision to continue weapons programs prohibitively costly, eliminating threatening arsenals, strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and⁄ or sending a clear deterrent message to other would-be proliferators (Sagan 1995; Feaver and Niou 1996; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl 1997). The employment of this strategy is fraught with considerable risks and costs. Attacks can produce significant collateral damage, which might outrage the international community. Support for preemption is only likely to be solid if the proliferator has not been dissuaded from proliferating by other means and is immediately and directly threatening something of great interest to a potential attacker (Quester 1981). Also, since tactical surprise is difficult to achieve and targeting intelligence difficult to gather, conventional attacks are unlikely to affect total destruction of all materiel, which would subsequently lead to the survival of the program and the redoubling of proliferation efforts on the part of the target (Schneider 1994).5 Finally, the diplomatic environment and the state of both the proliferator’s nuclear program and conventional arsenal have important ramifications for destructive preemption decisions. If a proliferator is closely allied with a nuclear-capable state, if its program has already produced usable nuclear devices, or if its conventional power is comparable to that of the attacker, destructive preemption will likely elicit a costly retaliatory response (Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; Feaver and Niou 1996). In sum, given these potential pitfalls, the aggregate theoretical contributions of the literature indicate that efforts to disrupt deterrent nuclear proliferation efforts through conventional force should be extremely rare.6 Such efforts are likely viable only against conventionally weak, risk-acceptant ‘‘enemy’’ states that are diplomatically isolated, that pose an immediate threat to others, that have small and geographically concentrated nuclear programs, and that have yet to cross the nuclear deployment threshold. Put differently, such strategies are likely to bear fruit only against a small subset of pariah states that are relatively close to producing a nuclear weapon (and are thus relatively easy to target and unlikely to be dissuaded from their efforts) but that cannot currently conduct effective nuclear or conventional retaliatory responses. While the forgoing literature provides compelling arguments regarding the rarity of destructive preemption, we believe that it offers an incomplete picture of the likelihood that proliferators will be targeted for conventional militarized conflict. Generally, the literature offers insights on when force will be used to destroy nuclear materiel or technology; it does not speak in a systematic way to whether nuclear proliferation efforts affect the general probability that any ‘‘type’’ of conventional force (aimed at destroying nuclear arsenals or otherwise) will be used against proliferators. In this section, we argue that proliferation indeed affects that general probability in several predictable and significant ways. We agree with previous work that (i) nuclear programs have most often been developed to provide a deterrent against enemy infringement upon crucial state issues (for example, Morgan 2003), and that (ii) nuclear proliferation is best conceived of as a process, and not a discrete achievement (Feaver and Niou 1996). As discussed earlier, given (i), the decision to commence deterrent proliferation efforts is likely taken in response to perceived imminent threat. This means that most proliferation does not occur in an ‘‘issues vacuum’’; there already exists an identifiable conflict of interest—which has perhaps already led to conventional militarized conflict (see 5 )—between the proliferator and another state or states. By these lights, all diplomatic and military efforts made by both sides should be viewed as attempts to improve bargaining positions vis-a`-vis adversaries regarding the underlying conflict of interest. Contextualized in this way, proliferation efforts serve as a warning to opposing states that the terms of bargaining over the disputed issue(s) will change in an unfavorable way at some future point. Specifi- cally, if and when the proliferator achieves nuclear possession, opposing states’ capacities to uphold or change the status quo within acceptable levels of cost are likely to diminish significantly. It would thus seem that the physical destruction of nascent nuclear programs is not the only incentive for opponents to engage in conventional conflict with a proliferator: physical force can also be a useful means by which to achieve a favorable outcome to the disputed issue underlying the proliferators’ efforts before nuclear acquisition drastically shifts the balance of power between the two sides. This view of proliferation efforts as setting an ‘‘expiration date’’7 on the prevailing bargaining terms finds an analogue in the aggressive behavior of warring parties who are likely to be disadvantaged by an imminent or predetermined cessation of hostilities. Clapham (1998) details how internationally led negotiation efforts intent on the ultimate construction of a power-sharing arrangement between Hutu and Tutsi factions in Rwanda afforded the interahamwe and other Hutu extremist groups the opportunity to pursue their preferred policy of exclusive control through genocide. Similar increases in violence on the part of potentially disadvantaged parties were apparent in the period prior to the long-awaited 1991 Bicesse Accords ceasefire in Angola (Bishop 1999). Again, however, as described above, proliferation is most realistically viewed as a process. Singh and Way (2004) claim that this process involves three phases: initial exploration activities, followed by efforts to actively pursue weapons development, and culminating in the completion and⁄ or test detonation of a nuclear device. According to the literature on conventional preventive destruction, force usage is most useful and least costly (and is thus only likely to be observed) at the active pursuit stage, and only given that the proliferator is a weaker enemy with a program that can be incapacitated with relative ease. We believe that the logic underlying this conclusion is somewhat applicable to predicting the likelihood of the general use of conventional force against proliferators. However, by broadening the analysis beyond the mere attempt to destroy existing materiel and technology, we are able to provide a more comprehensive set of expectations about the relative probability of targeting at each stage. At the exploration stage, conventional force usage does not make much sense when an opponent’s primary objective is destructive preemption; most notably, there are likely very few or no ‘‘hard targets’’ to strike at this stage. If, however, conventional force is employed as a general bargaining tool whose utility is not confined to mere destruction, then the precision of destructive efforts is not the only conventional targeting concern for opponents. Instead, given that the mere act of exploring acquisition feasibility credibly signals a potential proliferator’s intention to solidify its own future bargaining position, forceful efforts by opposing states to try to resolve the issue before acquisition are likely more attractive than if no proliferation efforts had been undertaken. These considerations lead us to our first general hypothesis. Hypothesis 1a: States that are exploring nuclear weapons are more at risk of being targeted in a conventional militarized dispute than non-proliferating states At the active pursuit stage, one can assume that previous efforts to dissuade proliferators have been unsuccessful and that acquisition is much more likely to become a reality. In light of the heightened sense of urgency that would accompany this state of affairs, there are compelling reasons to believe that the probability of conventional force usage is relatively great. First, as noted in the destructive preemption literature, we are more likely to observe efforts to militarily target existing capabilities, as ‘‘hard targets’’ begin to take shape during the acquisition 7 Similar views have been expressed by Miller (1993). 152 Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict stage. Moreover, in line with our bargaining process expectations, it is probable that opponents will redouble their conventional military efforts to reach a favorable settlement to the issue before acquisition. Put differently, active pursuit serves as a strong signal that the ‘‘expiration date’’ on the current bargaining environment is nigh. Overall, since the active pursuit of weapons decreases an opponent’s estimates of the risks and costs of preemptive destruction and increases the urgency with which it seeks to obtain the bargaining benefits of any conventional military action, we predict that targeting is more likely to be observed against nuclear ‘‘pursuers’’ than both non-proliferators and nuclear ‘‘explorers.’’ Hypothesis 1b: States that are actively pursuing nuclear weapons are more at risk of being targeted in a conventional militarized dispute than exploring and nonproliferating states. Finally, at the possession⁄ detonation stage, the proverbial ‘‘ship’’ has sailed; the bargaining environment has been dramatically changed. At this point, given the threat of nuclear retaliation (the credibility of which is enhanced by the costliness of the overall process to the proliferator), the potential retaliatory costs of any type of conventional force usage, including destructive preemption, are likely to be considerably higher. Illustratively, Kapur (2007:42) argues: Nuclear weapons… change the military relationship between a weak state and its stronger adversaries, altering the weak state’s behavioral incentives. Nuclear weapons do this not by increasing the weak state’s military capabilities relative to its adversaries but rather by potentially reducing the stronger state’s willingness to employ its full military might against its weaker enemy. This circumspection on the part of the stronger states results from the dangers of attacking a nuclear-armed adversary. The weaker state might respond to a conventional attack with escalation to the nuclear level, particularly if it starts to lose badly and believes its territorial integrity is at stake. We should therefore observe a drastic diminishment in conventional targeting once deployment is accomplished. The precise level of expected conventional conflict is unclear; after all, successful proliferation is not an indicator that the conflict of interest underlying proliferation has been conclusively resolved in any meaningful fashion.8 At a minimum, however, we expect that level to be significantly lower here than at the exploration or pursuit stages. Hypothesis 1c: States that acquire nuclear weapons are less at risk of being targeted in a conventional militarized dispute when compared to states at the exploration or pursuit stages of proliferation. In its effort to extend our understanding of state violence beyond the incentive to incapacitate nascent nuclear programs, the model developed here has incorporated and produced several empirical expectations regarding the complex relationship between nuclear proliferation and conventional targeting. As intimated throughout the forgoing discussion, we further believe that useful strategic delimitations can be made to these expectations. As with most other bargaining scenarios in the realm of international politics, issue salience, relative power, and preference similarity are at the heart of the proliferation–conventional targeting relationship. First, the salience of relevant issues works to determine whether or not proliferation, fraught with considerable costs as it is, becomes a logical, last-ditch choice for proliferators. Generally, only issues of critical importance are likely to lead to deterrent proliferation efforts and, by extension, to conventional targeting during the exploration and pursuit stages. As implied in the quote from Kapur (2007) above and according to many other scholars of international relations, territoriality is perhaps the most salient of contentious international issues (Hill 1945; Luard 1970; Vasquez 1993). One might thus expect the processes outlined in this section to be most evident in the context of territorial disputes. Hypothesis 2: The relationships specified in Hypotheses 1a–1c are most pronounced in disputes over territory. Second, states that hold a large conventional power advantage have the most to lose against a proliferating state. Once nuclear weapons are acquired, the superior bargaining position generated by the conventional advantage disappears. Moreover, conventionally powerful states are most likely to attack states attempting to acquire nuclear weapons; the closer the proliferating state comes toward acquisition, the more intense the bargaining incentive to act. Lastly, a large conventional power advantage increases the likelihood of targeting simply because it diminishes the likelihood of an effective and costly conventional response by proliferating targets. Hypothesis 3: The relationships specified in Hypotheses 1a–1c are most pronounced when opponents hold a large conventional advantage over proliferators. Finally, a similarity in preferences between potential proliferators and other states decreases both the probability of proliferation and the likelihood that bargaining over a decision to explore nuclear options will turn violent, even if the decision itself is unpopular. Conversely, severe preference dissimilarity increases the likely conventional costs of proliferation, 8 As such, we remain agnostic at this point about whether nuclear weapons possession invites greater conventional targeting than making no efforts to proliferate. As our findings clarify this relationship, we revisit the issue (in the context of extant literature) in our concluding section. David Sobek, Dennis M. Foster and Samuel B. Robison 153 but (as noted) also a potential proliferator’s risk acceptance, which mitigates the deterrent effect of those conventional costs and thus makes the general use of conventional force against the proliferator more likely. Hypothesis 4: The relationships specified in Hypotheses 1a–1c are most pronounced between enemies. We explore our hypotheses through quantitative, cross-national tests of our various hypotheses. The unit of analysis for these tests is the directed dyad year. This structures the data to look at the directed interaction of states in each year between 1944 and 2000. So each pair of states which is included every year has two lines in the data set to account for targeted actions. For example, the data set contains the United States versus North Korea in 1990 and North Korea versus the United States in 1990. This structure allows one to determine the directionality of militarized behaviors, that is, to say US violence toward North Korea in 1990 and North Korean violence toward the United States in 1990. In other words, rather than simply looking at the onset of a conflict (non-directed dyadic analyses), directed dyadic analysis can determine who initiated the conflict. The dependent variable then codes the actions of the ‘‘challenger’’ that are directed toward the ‘‘target.’’ Thus, if the United States initiated a conflict against North Korea in 1990, it would be coded as an initiation (a value of 1) in the US versus North Korean dyad for 1990. In contrast, the North Korean versus US 1990 dyad would not have an initiation coded (a value of 0). The models examine three separate dependent variables. The first (and broadest) is simply the initiation of a MID by the challenger against the target (coded 1 if initiation occurred and 0 otherwise).9 Commensurate with Hypothesis 2, the second dependent variable examines only MIDs over territory; thus, when the challenger initiates a militarized dispute over territory against a target, the variable is coded 1, and it is coded 0 in all other cases. Finally, to gauge the effects of proliferation on conflict over extremely salient issues that involve the use of deadly force, we examine disputes over territory that lead to fatalities. This dependent variable is coded 1 when the challenger initiates a conflict over territory that leads to at least 1 battlerelated death and in all other cases the variable is coded as 0. In the formulation of our key independent variables (to test Hypotheses 1a–1c), it is critical to understand where states fall on the ‘‘ladder’’ of proliferation. Our coding of nuclear weapons programs follows from Singh and Way (2004:866), who classify states along a continuum ranging from ‘‘absolutely no effort or interest’’ to ‘‘possessing a vast nuclear arsenal.’’10 States are categorized into the first stage of ‘‘no interest or effort whatsoever’’ regarding the development of nuclear weapons either at the point prior to a state entering into the second stage of ‘‘nuclearness,’’ via ‘‘exploration of weapons’’ discussed below, or at the point following a state’s decision to completely rescind earlier attempts at developing nuclear capabilities. To be categorized into the second stage (‘‘exploration of weapons’’), evidence must indicate that, in a given state, either ‘‘political authorization to explore the [nuclear weapons] option’’ had been given or linkages of ‘‘research to defense agencies that would oversee any potential weapons development’’ existed (Singh and Way 2004:867). Countries are included in this category from the first year that such evidence is available until it becomes clear that these states have either ceased exploration of weapons or moved to the next stage. States are coded as being in the third stage, ‘‘pursuit of weapons,’’ from the first year of their initial efforts at actually achieving nuclear capabilities until the date that they abandon these efforts or achieve these capabilities. To be listed in this category, states would have had to go beyond simply exploring nuclear power (encompassed by the second stage), which would be evidenced by ‘‘a political decision by cabinet-level officials, movement toward weaponization, or the development of single-use, dedicated technology.’’ The fourth and final stage, representing ‘‘first explosion⁄ assembly of weapons,’’ is classi- fied by Singh and Way (2004:866) as the most ‘‘reliable and accurate measure of nuclear proliferation.’’ A state is coded as being in this category from the first year within which either the first explosion of a nuclear weapon takes place, or following evidence that a state has possession of a functional nuclear weapon. The models employed here use the Singh and Way (2004) categories to create a series of dummy variables for the nuclear weapons program of the targeted state. In particular, No Program is coded as 1 if a target state has no nuclear weapons program and 0 otherwise. Exploration is coded as 1 in those years where a target state has started to explore nuclear weapons and 0 otherwise. Pursuit is coded as 1 when a target state is actively pursuing nuclear weapons and 0 otherwise. Finally, Acquisition is coded as 1 when (and after) a target state has obtained nuclear weapons, and 0 otherwise. In the tables, we use ‘‘No Program’’ as the excluded category.11 Several of our models also examine how long a state has been at a particular rung on the ladder of proliferation. These measures (Years of Exploration, Years of Pursuit, and Years of Acquisition) are numerical count variables, starting at 1 in the first year a state reaches the respective category. Once a state changes to another category, the count is started at the new level, and the count falls to zero in the previous category. In regard to our remaining hypotheses, relative state power has often been argued as critical to understanding why states enter into conflict. For this research, we rely on the Correlates of War’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC score) to measure the power of an individual state in each year. The CINC uses six components to measure the short-, medium-, and long-term power of a state (military personnel, military expenditure, energy use per capita, iron⁄steel production, urban population, and total population). For each of the six components a state’s share of the global total is calculated and then these six shares are averaged to determine the CINC score. CINC can then theoretically vary from 0 (a state has no power) to 1 (a state has all of the power in the international system). In our base models, we use the CINC score to control for two ways in which power matters. The variable Balance of Forces is the higher CINC score in the dyad divided by the sum of the higher and lower CINC score. This essentially measures the share of the dyadic power held by the more powerful state, where 1 indicates complete power preponderance and 0.5 indicates complete parity. Previous research has generally found that power preponderance is more peaceful than parity. Aside from the balance of forces, we include the Initiator’s Advantage. This variable is simply the challenger’s CINC score divided by the challenger’s and target’s CINC score. The variable theoretically ranges from 1 (challenger has all of the power in the dyad) to 0 (challenger has none of the power in the dyad). One would expect that challengers with more power (relative to the target) would have a higher probability of initiating conflicts. In additional models, we will test Hypothesis 3 by interacting the initiator’s advantage variable with the proliferation status measures. We also selectively employ a measure of preference similarity between states to determine the extent to which they are ‘‘friends’’ or ‘‘enemies’’. The variable Preference Similarity is the s-score (Signorino and Ritter 1999), which captures the similarity of alliance portfolios and ranges from 1 (complete similarity) to )1 (complete dissimilarity). While the previous literature has yet to settle on a single measure of preference similarity, it seems that one based on alliance patterns is most appropriate for studying the effect of proliferation where alliance commitments appear quite important. Specifically, we will test Hypothesis 4 by interacting this preference similarity variable with the proliferation status measures. We also include several control variables in our analyses. Regime type variables are employed to control for the likelihood that democratic dyads are less likely to engage in militarized conflicts. In most non-directed dyadic analysis, the models include a measure that looks at the lower of the two dyadic democracies scores.12 This ‘‘weak link’’ measure assumes that a dyad can only be as democratic as its least democratic member (for example, Russett and Oneal 2001). This variable (labeled Low Democracy in our models) can range from )10 (both states completely autocratic) to +10 (both states completely democratic). A negative coefficient provides support for the democratic peace in that it demonstrates that the more democratic the dyad, the lower the likelihood that a challenger would initiate a MID. Finally, states that share a border are generally more likely to have the ‘‘opportunity’’ to engage in militarized disputes, as geographic proximity increases the ease with which states militarily target one another and the frequency with which states interact. Indeed, Hensel’s (2000) review of the territorial conflict literature reveals that territory is widely regarded as both a facilitator of international conflict (with geographic proximity translating into interaction and power-projection opportunity) and an important source of international conflict (with territorial possession at the heart of many contentious scenarios). While our use of territorial disputes as a dependent variable focuses on the latter influence for the purposes of testing Hypothesis 2, we include an independent variable to control for the effects of the former. In our models, Contiguity is coded as 1 for the dyads that contain a pair of states that share a land border, and all other dyads are coded as 0. Results In general, Table 1 provides rather solid evidence for Hypotheses 1a–1c and Hypothesis 2. In particular, states that have nuclear weapons programs are more likely to become targeted in MIDs, including those disputes over territory and territorial MIDs that result in at least one fatality. When looking at the militarized territorial disputes, we also find that the acquisition of nuclear weapons decreases the risk of being targeted relative to the pursuit stage. This relationship is marginally strongest for militarized territorial disputes that contain at least one death. Model 1 of Table 1 looks at the initiation of any type of militarized dispute by the challenger against the target. Note that the coefficients for exploration, pursuit, and acquisition are all positive and significant, indicating that states in these stages are at greater risk of being targeted than states without any type of nuclear weapons program. The results are a bit puzzling in that the movement from pursuit to acquisition does not decrease a state’s targeting risk. In fact, states that possess nuclear weapons are more likely to be targeted in a MID than any other type of state. This puzzle, however, can easily be explained when we examine militarized disputes over territory, which we argue encompasses underlying issues of the greatest salience (Model 2). As in Model 1, all stages have positive and significant coefficients, but the critical difference is that the coefficient for acquisition is substantively smaller than the coefficient for pursuit. In other words, moving from pursuit of a nuclear weapons program to the acquisition of a nuclear weapon decreases the probability that a state will be targeted in a militarized dispute over territory. To test the robustness of this result, we ran Model 2 again with pursuit as the excluded category. In this regression, the coefficient on acquisition was negative, but the p-value was only .34. Thus, the difference between acquisition and pursuit is not statistically significant. This still differs from Model 1, however, in which pursuit is the excluded category and the coefficient for acquisition is positive and significant. The difference between pursuit and acquisition is slightly larger in Model 3, which examines militarized disputes over territory that led to at least one fatality. As with Model 2, the coefficient for acquisition is substantively less than that of pursuit, but the difference again is not statistically significant. In particular, when pursuit is the excluded category, the coefficient on acquisition is negative, but the p-value is only .18 (which is marginally significant with a one-tailed test). In general, Table 1 provides some modest evidence as to the benefits of acquisition, which will be further explored in Table 2. A number of the control variables also have signifi- cant effects on targeting. All three models show that contiguous states are more dangerous and jointly democratic dyads are more peaceful (negative and significant coefficient on low democracy). Finally, power matters, but its effect changes depending on the model. In all models, power asymmetries signifi- cantly decrease the risk of initiation, but an initiator’s power advantage only seems to matter in the broadest measure of militarized disputes. We will explore this relationship further in our tests of Hypothesis 3 (Table 3). Table 2 modifies the base models by including a count variable of time spent at each ‘‘rung’’ of the proliferation ladder. Including these count variables provides a more dynamic picture of how nuclear proliferation affects the initiation of militarized con- flict. In terms of exploration, the results are similar to those found in Table 1; states exploring nuclear weapons are more likely to be targeted, regardless of the type of militarized dispute. This effect, however, is not consistent across time when looking at the initiation of a MID (Model 1). In this model, the negative and significant coefficient on years of exploration indicates that states with long-running exploration programs have a decreasing risk of being targeted. In terms of the actual pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, the results are again similar to Table 1. In all of the models in Table 2, states pursuing a nuclear weapon are at greater risk of being targeted. Unlike exploration, however, this effect does not dampen over time. In fact, the longer a state has spent pursuing a nuclear program, the greater the risk. As expected, this situation changes once a state acquires nuclear weapons. In terms of MIDs over territory (both types), the coefficient is again smaller than that of pursuit. Unlike Table 1, the decrease in the coefficient is statistically significant with p-values of .034 (Model 2) and .044 (Model 3). Despite this drop in risk, the positive coefficient in years of acquisi tion implies that the longer a state possess nuclear weapons, the greater the risk that it will become targeted. Though these results indicate some broad support for our hypotheses, what can be said about the substantive impact of proliferation status on targeting? Figure 1 plots the predicted probabilities of being targeted in a deadly MID over territory, based on the results of Model 3 in Table 2. In calculating the predicted probabilities, all variables were set to their mean values and the nuclear weapons program status was systematically varied (from no program to exploration, pursuit, and acquisition). At all stages except ‘‘No Program,’’ the hypothetical state is examined through 5 years, which highlights the effect of the years of exploration, pursuit, and acquisition variables. Figure 1 clearly shows the detrimental effects of both a nuclear weapons program and the benefits of acquisition. In particular, a state moving from no program to exploration increases their risk of being targeted in a deadly militarized dispute over territory by about 533%. The continued exploration, however, slightly decreases the risk each year ()1.6%). Moving from exploration to pursuit once again raises the odds of being targeted (10%). Unlike continued years of exploration, each year a states maintains its pursuit, the risk of being targeted climbs by about 10%. Finally, the movement from pursuit to acquisition dramatically decreases the risk of being targeted ()68%), but this benefit decreases over time as each year of continued acquisition increases the risk by about 5%
|
Sobek et al 12
| 6,594
| 30
| 6,200
| 0
|
6,538
| 3,499,422
| 116,035
|
1ar
|
Econ
|
1AR---Magnitude First
|
Collapse of the economy is inevitable due to rising health care costs---makes all of their offense inevitable---timeframe doesn’t outweigh because they assume the aff instantaneously zaps the industry---BUT no one thinks the aff would be enacted overnight---it’d be a gradual rollout---solves all economic fallout
|
Charlie Swanson 10-2, Legislative action committee chairman for Health Care for All Oregon, 10-02-17, “Medicare for All plan makes economic sense,” http://registerguard.com/rg/opinion/35993036-78/medicare-for-all-plan-makes-economic-sense.html.csp
|
Swanson 10-2,
| 1,436,309
| 82
| 1,348
| 0
|
8,010
| 3,084,051
| 100,538
|
1NC
|
Case
|
Negativity
|
*A cautious futurity is the only way to confront anti-queer violence. The aff forecloses alternative futures and dooms queer folks with a desire for better to the status quo.
|
Manalansan ‘15
Martin F. Manalansan IV - Associate Professor of all of the following at The University of Illinois: Gender and Women's Studies, Asian American Studies, Anthropology, Latin American and Caribbean Studies, LAS Global Studies, Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies, and Center for Global Studies. The author holds a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from The University of Rochester and studied philosophy, Asian Studies and anthropology at the University of the Philippines. As part of claims about futurity, the author references lived excahnges with queer trans women of color. The author also references concurring professional exchanges with David L. Eng, Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania; Gayatri Gopinath, who is an associate professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and director of Asian/Pacific/American Studies at New York University.; Roderick Ferguson, who is a professor of African American and Gender and Women's Studies in the African American Studies Department at the University of Illinois, Chicago; Chandan Reddy, who is an Associate Professor of Gender, Women & Sexuality Studies at the University of Washington; and the late José Esteban Muñoz, was an American academic in the fields of performance studies, visual culture, queer theory, cultural studies, and critical theory; “A Question from Bruno Latour” This article is part of the series Queer Futures. Fieldsights - Theorizing the Contemporary, Cultural Anthropology Online, July 21, 2015 - https://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/703-a-question-from-bruno-latour
|
Manalansan ‘15
| 94,370
| 138
| 2,637
| 0
|
1,546
| 487,360
| 6,291
|
Neg
|
Links
|
Indigenous Neolib Links
|
There’s no escape-current attempts at revolution have failed and lead to a re-subjugation of the indigenous population-only a geography-based alternative can de-politicize the underlying ethnic cleavages
|
Radcliffe, 2007 (Sarah, Professor of Latin American Geography and Fellow of Christ's College Management Committee, Centre of Latin American Studies, “Forum: Latin American Indigenous Geographies of Fear: Living in the Shadow of Racism, Lack of Development, and Antiterror Measures”, JStor, http://www.jstor.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/pdfplus/4620268.pdf?acceptTC=true&)
|
Radcliffe, 2007 (Sarah, Professor of Latin American Geography and Fellow of Christ's College Management Committee, Centre of Latin American Studies, “Forum: Latin American Indigenous Geographies of Fear: Living in the Shadow of Racism, Lack of Development, and Antiterror Measures”, JStor, http://www.jstor.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/pdfplus/4620268.pdf?acceptTC=true&)
| 301,444
| 3
| 1,746
| 0
|
4,511
| 3,840,691
| 127,706
|
MBA – r5
|
1NC
|
1NC—Economy
|
No impact
|
Drezner, 14 - IR prof at Tufts (Daniel, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession” World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, p. 123-164)
The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the
|
Drezner, 14 - IR prof at Tufts (Daniel, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession” World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, p. 123-164)
| 621,653
| 19
| 92
| 1
|
9,703
| 3,028,850
| 99,514
|
1NR
|
Flex
| null |
Terrorists have motive and means --- they don’t even need an actual bomb to cause massive impact---they’ll also attack reactors and cause meltdowns
|
Funding key
| null | 45,493
| 48
| 4,699
| 1
|
3,305
| 2,740,302
| 86,964
|
2NC
|
Russia DA
| null |
Russia’s economy is stagnating – overreliance on oil, lack of business partners, and no clear successor all prove
|
Rubin 19, (Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), The National Interest, “Why Russia's Economy Is Headed for Trouble,” January 17, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-russias-economy-headed-trouble-41872)//AH
|
Rubin 19
| 800,608
| 34
| 5,889
| 0
|
1,700
| 184,558
| 2,353
|
Case
|
Econ Adv
|
2NC – US Not Key to Global Economy
|
U.S. not key to the global economy
|
Molavi ‘11
Afshin Molavi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the World Economic Roundtable at the New America Foundation, “US Economic Power is Part of a Healthier Global Order”, The National, 7-4, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-economic-power-is-part-of-a-healthier-global-order#full
|
Molavi ‘11
| 77,461
| 40
| 2,155
| 1
|
2,393
| 215,508
| 2,786
|
A-to the Agency Deference Advantage
|
Backlines- Financial De-Reg
|
US not key to the global economy
|
U.S. not key to the global economy
|
Molavi ‘11
Afshin Molavi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the World Economic Roundtable at the New America Foundation, “US Economic Power is Part of a Healthier Global Order”, The National, 7-4, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-economic-power-is-part-of-a-healthier-global-order#full
|
Molavi ‘11
| 77,461
| 40
| 2,155
| 1
|
1,197
| 181,082
| 2,333
|
Econ Adv - Neg
|
Backlines
|
2NC-1NR - US not key to the global economy
|
U.S. not key to the global economy
|
Molavi ‘11
Afshin Molavi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the World Economic Roundtable at the New America Foundation, “US Economic Power is Part of a Healthier Global Order”, The National, 7-4, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-economic-power-is-part-of-a-healthier-global-order#full
|
Molavi ‘11
| 77,461
| 40
| 2,155
| 1
|
1,198
| 184,284
| 2,364
|
Case
|
Economy Advantage
|
2NC — US Not Key
|
U.S. not key to the global economy
|
Molavi ‘11
Afshin Molavi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the World Economic Roundtable at the New America Foundation, “US Economic Power is Part of a Healthier Global Order”, The National, 7-4, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-economic-power-is-part-of-a-healthier-global-order#full
|
Molavi ‘11
| 77,461
| 40
| 2,155
| 1
|
2,499
| 2,947,112
| 106,805
|
1NC
|
1NC
|
1NC – Econ
|
U.S. not key to the global economy
|
Molavi ‘11 — Afshin Molavi, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins, former director of the World Economic Roundtable at the New America Foundation — an effort to re-map the global economy in the wake of the Great Recession, founder and editor of the New Silk Road Monitor— site that examines the markets, societies, cultures and politics of countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and beyond, degree from School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins, 2011 (“US Economic Power is Part of a Healthier Global Order,” The National, July 4th, Available Online at http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-economic-power-is-part-of-a-healthier-global-order#full, Accessed on 10-16-2018)
|
Molavi ‘11
| 77,461
| 40
| 2,155
| 1
|
2,514
| 3,275,342
| 106,905
|
1NC
|
Case
|
1NC – Econ
|
U.S. not key to the global economy
|
Molavi ‘11 — Afshin Molavi, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins, former director of the World Economic Roundtable at the New America Foundation — an effort to re-map the global economy in the wake of the Great Recession, founder and editor of the New Silk Road Monitor— site that examines the markets, societies, cultures and politics of countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and beyond, degree from School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins, 2011 (“US Economic Power is Part of a Healthier Global Order,” The National, July 4th, Available Online at http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-economic-power-is-part-of-a-healthier-global-order#full, Accessed on 10-16-2018)
|
Molavi ‘11
| 77,461
| 40
| 2,155
| 1
|
2,541
| 186,056
| 2,374
|
Econ Adv - Neg
|
Backlines
|
2NC-1NR - US not key to the global economy
|
U.S. not key to the global economy
|
Molavi ‘11
Afshin Molavi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the World Economic Roundtable at the New America Foundation, “US Economic Power is Part of a Healthier Global Order”, The National, 7-4, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-economic-power-is-part-of-a-healthier-global-order#full
|
Molavi ‘11
| 77,461
| 40
| 2,155
| 1
|
7,734
| 3,275,017
| 107,099
|
1NC
|
1NC
|
1NC — Economy Advantage
|
U.S. not key to the global economy
|
Molavi ‘11 — Afshin Molavi, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins, former director of the World Economic Roundtable at the New America Foundation — an effort to re-map the global economy in the wake of the Great Recession, founder and editor of the New Silk Road Monitor— site that examines the markets, societies, cultures and politics of countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and beyond, degree from School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins, 2011 (“US Economic Power is Part of a Healthier Global Order,” The National, July 4th, Available Online at http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-economic-power-is-part-of-a-healthier-global-order#full, Accessed on 10-16-2018)
|
Molavi ‘11
| 77,461
| 40
| 2,155
| 1
|
7,738
| 3,277,714
| 106,949
|
1NC
|
Case
|
1NC – Econ
|
U.S. not key to the global economy
|
Molavi ‘11 — Afshin Molavi, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins, former director of the World Economic Roundtable at the New America Foundation — an effort to re-map the global economy in the wake of the Great Recession, founder and editor of the New Silk Road Monitor— site that examines the markets, societies, cultures and politics of countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and beyond, degree from School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins, 2011 (“US Economic Power is Part of a Healthier Global Order,” The National, July 4th, Available Online at http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/us-economic-power-is-part-of-a-healthier-global-order#full, Accessed on 10-16-2018)
|
Molavi ‘11
| 77,461
| 40
| 2,155
| 1
|
105
| 3,969,974
| 134,164
|
1AR
|
ADV1
|
IL---AT: Turn---Econs of Scale (R&D)---2AC
|
No R&D synergies- CEOs deprioritize, bureaucracy stifles innovation, talent leaves- AND best case is 10 years before gains
|
Eriksson, 10 -- Arthur D. Little, an international management consulting firm
|
Eriksson, 10
| 522,997
| 15
| 3,382
| 0
|
111
| 1,037,755
| 25,112
|
2AC
|
Innovaiton
|
IL---AT: Turn---Econs of Scale (R&D)---2AC
|
No R&D synergies- CEOs deprioritize, bureaucracy stifles innovation, talent leaves- AND best case is 10 years before gains
|
Eriksson, 10 -- Arthur D. Little, an international management consulting firm
|
Eriksson, 10
| 522,997
| 15
| 3,382
| 0
|
118
| 1,096,760
| 25,835
|
1AR Rd 2 v SM
|
Business
|
1AR: AI Solves Next Pandemic
|
No R&D synergies- CEOs deprioritize, bureaucracy stifles innovation, talent leaves- AND best case is 10 years before gains
|
Eriksson, 10 -- Arthur D. Little, an international management consulting firm
|
Eriksson, 10
| 522,997
| 15
| 3,382
| 0
|
123
| 1,046,383
| 25,301
| null |
Econ
|
No Link
|
No R&D synergies- CEOs deprioritize, bureaucracy stifles innovation, talent leaves- AND best case is 10 years before gains
|
Eriksson, 10 -- Arthur D. Little, an international management consulting firm
|
Eriksson, 10
| 522,997
| 15
| 3,382
| 0
|
1,766
| 1,055,416
| 25,482
| null |
Innovation DA
|
Solvency
|
No R&D synergies- CEOs deprioritize, bureaucracy stifles innovation, talent leaves- AND best case is 10 years before gains
|
Eriksson, 10 -- Arthur D. Little, an international management consulting firm
|
Eriksson, 10
| 522,997
| 15
| 3,382
| 0
|
4,604
| 3,970,010
| 134,164
|
2AC
|
Innovation
|
IL---AT: Turn---Econs of Scale (R&D)---2AC
|
No R&D synergies- CEOs deprioritize, bureaucracy stifles innovation, talent leaves- AND best case is 10 years before gains
|
Eriksson, 10 -- Arthur D. Little, an international management consulting firm
| null | 522,997
| 15
| 3,382
| 0
|
4,432
| 3,619,999
| 120,371
|
2AC
|
K
|
2AC
|
4. Structural claims of afropessimsim are wrong
|
Marriott ‘12
David Marriott is an associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He is the author of Incognegro and On Black Men. “Black Cultural Studies” – Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory; vol 20(1): 37-66. First published online: March 29, 2012 – doi: 10.1093/ywcct/mbs003
|
Marriott ‘12
| 57,000
| 139
| 2,637
| 0
|
9,255
| 3,619,638
| 120,277
|
1AR
|
K
|
1AR - Wilderson
|
4. Structural claims of afropessimsim are wrong
|
Marriott ‘12
David Marriott is an associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He is the author of Incognegro and On Black Men. “Black Cultural Studies” – Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory; vol 20(1): 37-66. First published online: March 29, 2012 – doi: 10.1093/ywcct/mbs003
|
Marriott ‘12
| 57,000
| 139
| 2,637
| 0
|
8,426
| 2,492,176
| 80,755
|
2NC – Round 4 – ADA
|
NFU CP
|
2NC – AT: CP Links to Japan DA
|
Second --- threat of retaliation of an attack solves
|
Steve Fetter & Jon Wolfsthal 18, Fetter, Ph.D. in energy and resources from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1985 and a S.B. in physics from MIT, Associate Provost and Dean of the Graduate School. He also serves as Acting Executive Director of the Center for Advanced Study of Language. He has been a professor in the School of Public Policy since 1988, serving as dean from 2005 to 2009. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a fellow of the American Physical Society, and a recipient of the APS Joseph A. Burton Forum Award. He has been president of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs and a member of the Director of National Intelligence's Intelligence Science Board and the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee. He served as vice chairman of the Federation of American Scientists and received its Hans Bethe 'Science in the Public Service' award. He has served on several committees of the National Academy of Sciences, Wolfsthal, nonresident scholar with the Nuclear Policy Program. From 2014 to 2017, he served as special assistant to former U.S. president Barack Obama as senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council. In that post, he was the most senior White House official setting and implementing U.S. government policy on all aspects of arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear policy. Prior to that, he served as the deputy director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. From 2009 to 2012, he was the special adviser to then U.S. vice president Joe Biden for nuclear security and nonproliferation and as a director for nonproliferation on the National Security Council, “No First Use and Credible Deterrence”, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 04/09/18, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257
|
Fetter & Wolfsthal 18
| 10,451
| 673
| 881
| 0
|
4,770
| 3,941,714
| 132,442
|
1NC TOC Doubles
|
Case
|
Advantage 1
|
8. No credible scenario for extinction—outdated fringe science and well-meaning threat inflation
|
Scouras 19 (James Scouras, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, formerly served on the congressionally established Comission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, “Nuclear War as a Global Catastrophic Risk”, Cambridge Core, 9-2-2019, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-benefit-cost-analysis/article/nuclear-war-as-a-global-catastrophic-risk/EC726528F3A71ED5ED26307677960962, accessed 12-1-2019, HKR-cjh)
|
Scouras 19 -2019, HKR-cjh)
| 10,274
| 97
| 10,914
| 1
|
2,853
| 806,825
| 18,931
|
1nr
|
Link
|
No cascade
|
Even if Japan doesn’t actually get weapons --- a shift in its attitude to seriously consider will cause rapid proliferation.
|
Elizabeth D. Bakanic, 6/9/2008. MA International Affairs Princeton, traveled to Tokyo for a government report, conducting interviews with Japanese and U.S. government officials, nuclear experts, and academics. “The end of Japan's nuclear taboo,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo.
|
Bakanic 2008
| 162,989
| 42
| 2,495
| 1
|
9,836
| 3,208,933
| 103,757
|
2ac
|
off
|
2ac esr f/l
|
fiating trump compliance is cheating – he’s the object of the res – removes all solvency deficits without contextual literature – consult and no war planks prove abuse – moots the 1ac skewing the aff making it impossible to play the game – they’re unpredictable – they could consult any agency or country and solve every impact – kills clash and advocacy skills because they circumvent any offense – crushes fairness – vote aff
|
Wittes 17 (Benjamin Wittes 17. Editor in chief of Lawfare, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. 2017. The Disturbing Paradox of Presidential Power, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/12/the-disturbing-paradox-of-presidential-power-trump-constitution/)
|
Wittes 17
| 89,517
| 58
| 486
| 0
|
2,238
| 1,357,576
| 35,549
|
1AC
|
1AC
|
Warming
|
Aggressive action on climate change is key now, even if their defense is true
|
Paulson 6/21 (Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent, non-partisan center located at the University of Chicago, “The Coming Climate Crash,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/lessons-for-climate-change-in-the-2008-recession.html?_r=0)
|
Paulson 6/21
| 235,623
| 11
| 6,892
| 0
|
2,257
| 1,359,861
| 35,528
| null |
1AC
|
Warming
|
Aggressive action on climate change is key now, even if their defense is true
|
Paulson 6/21 (Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent, non-partisan center located at the University of Chicago, “The Coming Climate Crash,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/lessons-for-climate-change-in-the-2008-recession.html?_r=0)
|
Paulson 6/21
| 235,623
| 11
| 6,892
| 0
|
4,759
| 1,357,611
| 35,588
|
1AC Kentucky
| null |
Warming
|
Aggressive action on climate change is key now, even if their defense is true
|
Paulson 6/21 (Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent, non-partisan center located at the University of Chicago, “The Coming Climate Crash,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/lessons-for-climate-change-in-the-2008-recession.html?_r=0)
|
Paulson 6/21
| 235,623
| 11
| 6,892
| 0
|
8,616
| 1,362,360
| 35,579
|
1AC
| null |
Warming
|
Aggressive action on climate change is key now, even if their defense is true
|
Paulson 6/21 (Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent, non-partisan center located at the University of Chicago, “The Coming Climate Crash,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/lessons-for-climate-change-in-the-2008-recession.html?_r=0)
|
Paulson 6/21
| 235,623
| 11
| 6,892
| 0
|
8,630
| 1,362,492
| 35,601
|
1AC
| null |
Warming
|
Aggressive action on climate change is key now, even if their defense is true
|
Paulson 6/21 (Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent, non-partisan center located at the University of Chicago, “The Coming Climate Crash,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/lessons-for-climate-change-in-the-2008-recession.html?_r=0)
|
Paulson 6/21
| 235,623
| 11
| 6,892
| 0
|
8,821
| 1,362,850
| 35,597
|
1AC Kentucky
| null |
Warming
|
Aggressive action on climate change is key now, even if their defense is true
|
Paulson 6/21 (Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent, non-partisan center located at the University of Chicago, “The Coming Climate Crash,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/lessons-for-climate-change-in-the-2008-recession.html?_r=0)
|
Paulson 6/21
| 235,623
| 11
| 6,892
| 0
|
8,844
| 1,363,893
| 35,636
|
1AC
|
1AC
|
Warming
|
Aggressive action on climate change is key now, even if their defense is true
|
Paulson 6/21 (Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent, non-partisan center located at the University of Chicago, “The Coming Climate Crash,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/lessons-for-climate-change-in-the-2008-recession.html?_r=0)
|
Paulson 6/21
| 235,623
| 11
| 6,892
| 0
|
8,872
| 389,890
| 5,047
| null |
***1AC***
|
1AC Warming Advantage
|
Aggressive action on climate change is key now, even if their defense is true
|
Paulson 6/21 (Henry M. Paulson, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent, non-partisan center located at the University of Chicago, “The Coming Climate Crash,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/lessons-for-climate-change-in-the-2008-recession.html?_r=0)
|
Paulson 6/21
| 235,623
| 11
| 6,892
| 0
|
556
| 1,253,486
| 31,006
| null | null |
AT: BioD Impact---1NC
|
AT Disease Impact – Burnout Checks Escalation
| null | null | 590,507
| 1
| null | 1
|
3,834
| 353,050
| 4,508
| null |
Grid DA
|
2NC Link
|
Renewable energy causes grid instability.
|
J. D. Heyes January 27, 2014(Too much green energy could lead to sudden collapse of power grid http://www.naturalnews.com/043651_green_energy_power_grid_electrical_infrastructure.html#ixzz35gV3IejV)
|
Heyes 2014
| 225,045
| 2
| 1,356
| 0
|
7,406
| 3,763,944
| 125,102
|
block
|
case – grid
|
grid
|
Renewable energy causes grid instability.
|
J. D. Heyes January 27, 2014(Too much green energy could lead to sudden collapse of power grid http://www.naturalnews.com/043651_green_energy_power_grid_electrical_infrastructure.html#ixzz35gV3IejV)
|
Heyes 2014
| 225,045
| 2
| 1,356
| 0
|
6,284
| 336,775
| 4,281
|
2015-2016 Impact Defense Updates - NDI
|
Environment
|
Deforestation
|
a. Happening too fast for them to solve
|
Scienceheathen, December 13, 2012 "Deforestation Effects, Causes, And Examples: Top 10 List" scienceheathen.com/2012/12/13/deforestation-effects-causes-and-examples-top-10-list/
|
Scienceheathen 12
| 215,249
| 3
| 1,365
| 1
|
4,137
| 1,682,509
| 50,107
|
NEG Disclosure
|
1NC
|
Adv 1
|
That causes nuclear war---successful probes embolden armed confrontation.
|
Jakub J. Grygiel & A. Wess Mitchell 16 --- *Associate professor at the Catholic University of America and fellow at The Institute for Human Ecology. **American foreign policy expert and former diplomat.
[Published: 2-12-16. “Predators on the Frontier.” The American Interest. Accessible: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/12/predators-on-the-frontier/]
|
Grygiel & Mitchell 16
| 7,813
| 789
| 11,567
| 1
|
2,529
| 1,783,140
| 52,445
|
Flexible Response CP
|
1NC Russia-Only
| null |
That causes nuclear war---successful probes embolden armed confrontation.
|
Jakub J. Grygiel & A. Wess Mitchell 16 --- *Associate professor at the Catholic University of America and fellow at The Institute for Human Ecology. **American foreign policy expert and former diplomat.
[Published: 2-12-16. “Predators on the Frontier.” The American Interest. Accessible: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/12/predators-on-the-frontier/]
|
Grygiel & Mitchell 16
| 7,813
| 789
| 11,567
| 1
|
4,552
| 862,556
| 20,634
|
2AC
|
Politics
|
2AC---Link N/U
|
Crowded agenda pounds the disad – items are controversial and are high stakes for both parties
|
Tierney Sneed 9/29, Reporter, 9/29/2015, For A GOP Congress In Chaos, Things Are About To Get Way, Way Worse, TPM, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/boehner-resignation-new-chaos
|
Sneed 9/29
| 424,376
| 19
| 2,957
| 0
|
655
| 862,662
| 20,636
|
2AC
|
Shutdown DA
|
2AC---Link N/U
|
Crowded agenda pounds the disad – items are controversial and are high stakes for both parties
|
Tierney Sneed 9/29, Reporter, 9/29/2015, For A GOP Congress In Chaos, Things Are About To Get Way, Way Worse, TPM, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/boehner-resignation-new-chaos
|
Sneed 9/29
| 424,376
| 19
| 2,957
| 0
|
657
| 864,841
| 20,685
|
2AC
| null |
Politics DA
|
Crowded agenda pounds the disad – items are controversial and are high stakes for both parties
|
Tierney Sneed 9/29, Reporter, 9/29/2015, For A GOP Congress In Chaos, Things Are About To Get Way, Way Worse, TPM, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/boehner-resignation-new-chaos
|
Sneed 9/29
| 424,376
| 19
| 2,957
| 0
|
9,676
| 2,748,499
| 87,223
|
1nc
| null |
Case
|
Realism DA -- Studying war analytically helps avoid it.
|
Edelstein 10 – (2010, David, PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, “Why realists don’t go for bombs and bullets,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/21/why-realists-dont-go-for-bombs-and-bullets/)
|
Edelstein 10
| 80,995
| 121
| 3,361
| 0
|
5,428
| 2,448,456
| 79,844
|
K
| null | null |
The trope of the immigrant worker relies on a notion of productivity that is parasitic on the slave as disposable alterity and is only articulateble through the paradigm of anti-blackness
|
Tamara Nopper Asssistant Professer at The University of Pensyvlania ,2011 ["The Wages of Non-Blackness: Contemporary Immigrant Rights and Discourses of Character, Productivity, and Value “https://www.yorku.ca/intent/issue5/articles/pdfs/tamaraknopperarticle.pdf, accessed 9-27-2020] ajs
|
Tamara Nopper Asssistant Professer at The University of Pensyvlania ,2011
| 108,247
| 25
| 5,978
| 0
|
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