mrmoor/cti-corpus-raw · Datasets at Hugging Face

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The group did change the contents of the spear-phishing emails they sent , but they didn’t switch to a new email format ; instead , they reverted to the same efaxthemed format that they had previously employed , even to the point of reusing the exact same decoy document that they had used in the CozyDuke campaign a year earlier ( July 2014 ) .
This once more highlights two crucial behavioral elements of the Dukes group .
Firstly , as with the MiniDuke campaigns of February 2013 and CosmicDuke campaigns in the summer of 2014 , again the group clearly prioritized the continuation of their operations over maintaining stealth .
Secondly , it underlines their boldness , arrogance and self-confidence ; they are clearly confident in both their ability to compromise their targets even when their tools and techniques are already publicly known , and critically , they appear to be extremely confident in their ability to act with impunity .
2015 : Continuing surgical strikes with CosmicDuke .
In addition to the notably overt and large-scale campaigns with CozyDuke and CloudDuke , the Dukes also continued to engage in more covert , surgical campaigns using CosmicDuke .
The latest of these campaigns that we are aware of occurred during the spring and early summer of 2015 .
As their infection vectors , these campaigns used malicious documents exploiting recently fixed vulnerabilities .
Two of these campaigns were detailed in separate blog posts by the Polish security company Prevenity , who said that both campaigns targeted Polish entities with spear- phishing emails containing malicious attachments with relevant Polish language names .
A third , similar , CosmicDuke campaign was observed presumably targeting Georgian entities since it used an attachment with a Georgian-language name that translates to “ NATO consolidates control of the Black Sea.docx ” .
Based on this , we do not believe that the Dukes are replacing their covert and targeted campaigns with the overt and opportunistic CozyDuke and CloudDuke style of campaigns .
Instead , we believe that they are simply expanding their activities by adding new tools and techniques .
A XENOTIME to Remember : Veles in the Wild .
FireEye recently published a blog covering the tactics , techniques , and procedures ( TTPs ) for the “ TRITON actor ” when preparing to deploy the TRITON / TRISIS malware framework in 2017 .
Overall , the post does a commendable job in making public findings previously only privately shared ( presumably by FireEye , and in several reports I authored for my employer , Dragos ) to threat intelligence customers .
As such , the blog continues to push forward the narrative of how ICS attacks are enabled through prepositioning and initial intrusion operations – an item I have discussed at length .
Yet one point of confusion in the blog comes at the very start : referring to the entity responsible for TRITON as the “ TRITON actor ” .
This seems confusing as FireEye earlier publicly declared the “ TRITON actor ” as a discrete entity , linked to a Russian research institution , and christened it as “ TEMP.Veles ” .
In the 2018 public posting announcing TEMP.Veles , FireEye researchers noted that the institute in question at least supported TEMP.Veles activity in deploying TRITON , with subsequent public presentations at Cyberwarcon and the Kaspersky Lab sponsored Security Analyst Summit essentially linking TRITON and the research institute ( and therefore TEMP.Veles ) as one in the same .
Yet the most-recent posting covering TTPs from initial access through prerequisites to enable final delivery of effects on target ( deploying TRITON / TRISIS ) avoids the use of the TEMP.Veles term entirely .
In subsequent discussion , FireEye personnel indicate that there was not “ an avalanche of evidence to substantiate ” anything more than “ TRITON actor ” – summing matters by indicating this term “ is the best we ’ve got for the public for now ” .
Meanwhile , parallel work at Dragos ( my employer , where I have performed significant work on the activity described above ) uncovered similar conclusions concerning TTPs and behaviors , for both the 2017 event and subsequent activity in other industrial sectors .
Utilizing Diamond Model methodology for characterizing activity by behaviors attached to victims , we began tracking TRITON / TRISIS and immediate enabling activity as a distinct activity group ( collection of behaviors , infrastructure , and victimology ) designated XENOTIME .
Based on information gained from discussion with the initial TRITON / TRISIS responders and subsequent work on follow-on activity by this entity , Dragos developed a comprehensive ( public ) picture of adversary activity roughly matching FireEye ’s analysis published in April 2019 , described in various media .
At this stage , we have two similar , parallel constructions of events – the how behind the immediate deployment and execution of TRITON / TRISIS – yet dramatically different responses in terms of attribution and labeling .
Since late 2018 , based upon the most-recent posting , FireEye appears to have “ walked back ” the previously-used terminology of TEMP.Veles and instead refers rather cryptically to the “ TRITON actor ” , while Dragos leveraged identified behaviors to consistently refer to an activity group , XENOTIME .
Given that both organizations appear to describe similar ( if not identical ) activity , any reasonable person could ( and should ) ask – why the inconsistency in naming and identification .
Aside from the competitive vendor naming landscape ( which I am not a fan of in cases on direct overlap , but which has more to say for itself when different methodologies are employed around similar observations ) , the distinction between FireEye and Dragos ’ approaches with respect to the “ TRITON actor ” comes down to fundamental philosophical differences in methodology .
As wonderfully described in a recent public posting , FireEye adheres to a naming convention based upon extensive data collection and activity comparison , designed to yield the identification of a discrete , identifiable entity responsible for a given collection of activity .
This technique is precise and praiseworthy – yet at the same time , appears so rigorous as to impose limitations on the ability to dynamically adjust and adapt to emerging adversary activity .
( Or for that matter , even categorize otherwise well-known historical actors operating to the present day , such as Turla .
) FireEye ’s methodology may have particular limitations in instances where adversaries ( such as XENOTIME and presumably TEMP.Veles ) rely upon extensive use of publicly-available , commonly-used tools with limited amounts of customization .
In such cases , utilizing purely technical approaches for differentiation ( an issue I lightly touched on in a recent post ) becomes problematic , especially when trying to define attribution to specific , “ who-based ” entities ( such as a Russian research institute ) .
My understanding is FireEye labels entities where definitive attribution is not yet possible with the “ TEMP ” moniker ( hence , TEMP.Veles ) – yet in this case FireEye developed and deployed the label , then appeared to move away from it in subsequent reporting .
Based on the public blog post – which also indicated that FireEye is responding to an intrusion at a second facility featuring the same or similar observations – this is presumably not for lack of evidence , yet the “ downgrade ” occurs all the same .
In comparison , XENOTIME was defined based on principles of infrastructure ( compromised third-party infrastructure and various networks associated with several Russian research institutions ) , capabilities ( publicly- and commercially-available tools with varying levels of customization ) and targeting ( an issue not meant for discussion in this blog ) .
In personally responding to several incidents across multiple industry sectors since early 2018 matching TTPs from the TRITON / TRISIS event , these items proved consistent and supported the creation of the XENOTIME activity group .
This naming decision was founded upon the underlying methodology described in the Diamond Model of intrusion analysis .
As such , this decision does not necessarily refer to a specific institution , but rather a collection of observations and behaviors observed across multiple , similarly-situated victims .
Of note , this methodology of naming abstracts away the “ who ” element – XENOTIME may represent a single discrete entity ( such as a Russian research institution ) or several entities working in coordination in a roughly repeatable , similar manner across multiple events .
Ultimately , the epistemic foundation of the behavior-based naming approach makes this irrelevant for tracking ( and labeling for convenience sake ) observations .
Much like the observers watching the shadows of objects cast upon the wall of the cave , these two definitions ( XENOTIME and TEMP.Veles , both presumably referring to “ the TRITON actor ” ) describe the same phenomena , yet at the same time appear different .
This question of perception and accuracy rests upon the underlying epistemic framework and the goal conceived for that framework in defining an adversary : FireEye ’s methodology follows a deductive approach requiring the collection of significant evidence over time to yield a conclusion that will be necessary given the premises ( the totality of evidence suggests APTxx ) ; the Dragos approach instead seeks an inductive approach , where premises may all be true but the conclusion need not necessarily follow from them given changes in premises over time or other observations not contained within the set ( thus , identified behaviors strongly suggests an activity group , defined as X ) .
From an external analysts ’ point of view , the wonder is , which is superior to the other .
And my answer for this is : neither is perfect , but both are useful – depending upon your goals and objectives .
But rather than trying to pursue some comparison between the two for identification of superiority ( an approach that will result in unproductive argument and social media warring ) , the point of this post is to highlight the distinctions between these approaches and how – in the case of “ the TRITON actor ” – they result in noticeably different conclusions from similar datasets .
One reason for the distinction may be differences in evidence , as FireEye ’s public reporting notes two distinct events of which they are aware of and have responded to related to “ the TRITON actor ” while Dragos has been engaged several instances – thus , Dragos would possess more evidence to cement the definition of an activity group , while FireEye ’s data collection-centric approach would require far more observations to yield an “ APT ” .
Yet irrespective of this , it is confusing why the previously-declared “ TEMP ” category was walked back as this has led to not small amount of confusion – in both technical and non-technical audiences – as to just what FireEye ’s blog post refers .
Thus respected journalists ( at least by me ) conflate the “ TRITON actor is active at another site ” with “ TRITON malware was identified at another site ” .
In this case , we ’re seeing a definite problem with the overly-conservative naming approach used as it engenders confusion in a significant subset of the intended audience .
While some may dismiss adversary or activity naming as so much marketing , having a distinct label for something allows for clearer communication and more accurate discussion .
Furthermore , conflating adversaries with tools , since tools can be repurposed or used by other entities than those first observed deploying them , leads to further potential confusion as the “ X actor ” is quickly compressed in the minds of some to refer to any and all instantiations of tool “ X ” .
Overall , the discussion above may appear so much splitting of hairs or determining how many angels can dance on the head of a pin – yet given the communicative impacts behind different naming and labeling conventions , this exploration seems not merely useful but necessary .
Understanding the “ how ” and “ why ” behind different entity classifications of similar ( or even the same ) activity allows us to move beyond the dismissive approach of “ everyone has their names for marketing purposes ” to a more productive mindset that grasps the fundamental methodologies that ( should ) drive these decisions .
TRITON Attribution : Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers .
In a previous blog post we detailed the TRITON intrusion that impacted industrial control systems ( ICS ) at a critical infrastructure facility .
We now track this activity set as TEMP.Veles .
In this blog post we provide additional information linking TEMP.Veles and their activity surrounding the TRITON intrusion to a Russian government-owned research institute .
FireEye Intelligence assesses with high confidence that intrusion activity that led to deployment of TRITON was supported by the Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics ( CNIIHM ; a.k.a. ЦНИИХМ ) , a Russian government-owned technical research institution located in Moscow .
The following factors supporting this assessment are further detailed in this post .
We present as much public information as possible to support this assessment , but withheld sensitive information that further contributes to our high confidence assessment .
FireEye uncovered malware development activity that is very likely supporting TEMP.Veles activity .
This includes testing multiple versions of malicious software , some of which were used by TEMP.Veles during the TRITON intrusion .
Investigation of this testing activity reveals multiple independent ties to Russia , CNIIHM , and a specific person in Moscow .
This person ’s online activity shows significant links to CNIIHM .
An IP address registered to CNIIHM has been employed by TEMP.Veles for multiple purposes , including monitoring open-source coverage of TRITON , network reconnaissance , and malicious activity in support of the TRITON intrusion .
Behavior patterns observed in TEMP.Veles activity are consistent with the Moscow time zone , where CNIIHM is located .
We judge that CNIIHM likely possesses the necessary institutional knowledge and personnel to assist in the orchestration and development of TRITON and TEMP.Veles operations .
While we cannot rule out the possibility that one or more CNIIHM employees could have conducted TEMP.Veles activity without their employer ’s approval , the details shared in this post demonstrate that this explanation is less plausible than TEMP.Veles operating with the support of the institute .
During our investigation of TEMP.Veles activity , we found multiple unique tools that the group deployed in the target environment .
Some of these same tools , identified by hash , were evaluated in a malware testing environment by a single user .
Malware Testing Environment Tied to TEMP.Veles .
We identified a malware testing environment that we assess with high confidence was used to refine some TEMP.Veles tools .
At times , the use of this malware testing environment correlates to in-network activities of TEMP.Veles , demonstrating direct operational support for intrusion activity .
Four files tested in 2014 are based on the open-source project , cryptcat .
Analysis of these cryptcat binaries indicates that the actor continually modified them to decrease AV detection rates .
One of these files was deployed in a TEMP.Veles target ’s network .
The compiled version with the least detections was later re-tested in 2017 and deployed less than a week later during TEMP.Veles activities in the target environment .
TEMP.Veles ’ lateral movement activities used a publicly-available PowerShell based tool , WMImplant .
On multiple dates in 2017 , TEMP.Veles struggled to execute this utility on multiple victim systems , potentially due to AV detection .
Soon after , the customized utility was again evaluated in the malware testing environment .
The following day , TEMP.Veles again tried the utility on a compromised system .
The user has been active in the malware testing environment since at least 2013 , testing customized versions of multiple open-source frameworks , including Metasploit , Cobalt Strike , PowerSploit , and other projects .
The user ’s development patterns appear to pay particular attention to AV evasion and alternative code execution techniques .
Custom payloads utilized by TEMP.Veles in investigations conducted by Mandiant are typically weaponized versions of legitimate open-source software , retrofitted with code used for command and control .
Testing , Malware Artifacts , and Malicious Activity Suggests Tie to CNIIHM .
Multiple factors suggest that this activity is Russian in origin and associated with CNIIHM .
A PDB path contained in a tested file contained a string that appears to be a unique handle or user name .
This moniker is linked to a Russia based person active in Russian information security communities since at least 2011 .
The handle has been credited with vulnerability research contributions to the Russian version of Hacker Magazine ( хакер ) .
According to a now-defunct social media profile , the same individual was a professor at CNIIHM , which is located near Nagatinskaya Street in the Nagatino-Sadovniki district of Moscow .
Another profile using the handle on a Russian social network currently shows multiple photos of the user in proximity to Moscow for the entire history of the profile .
Suspected TEMP.Veles incidents include malicious activity originating from 87.245.143.140 , which is registered to CNIIHM .
This IP address has been used to monitor open-source coverage of TRITON , heightening the probability of an interest by unknown subjects , originating from this network , in TEMP.Veles related activities .
It also has engaged in network reconnaissance against targets of interest to TEMP.Veles .
The IP address has been tied to additional malicious activity in support of the TRITON intrusion .
Multiple files have Cyrillic names and artifacts .
Adversary behavioral artifacts further suggest the TEMP.Veles operators are based in Moscow , lending some further support to the scenario that CNIIHM , a Russian research organization in Moscow , has been involved in TEMP.Veles activity .
We identified file creation times for numerous files that TEMP.Veles created during lateral movement on a target ’s network .
These file creation times conform to a work schedule typical of an actor operating within a UTC+3 time zone supporting a proximity to Moscow .

The group did change the contents of the spear-phishing emails they sent , but they didn’t switch to a new email format ; instead , they reverted to the same efaxthemed format that they had previously employed , even to the point of reusing the exact same decoy document that they had used in the CozyDuke campaign a year earlier ( July 2014 ) .

This once more highlights two crucial behavioral elements of the Dukes group .

Firstly , as with the MiniDuke campaigns of February 2013 and CosmicDuke campaigns in the summer of 2014 , again the group clearly prioritized the continuation of their operations over maintaining stealth .

Secondly , it underlines their boldness , arrogance and self-confidence ; they are clearly confident in both their ability to compromise their targets even when their tools and techniques are already publicly known , and critically , they appear to be extremely confident in their ability to act with impunity .

2015 : Continuing surgical strikes with CosmicDuke .

In addition to the notably overt and large-scale campaigns with CozyDuke and CloudDuke , the Dukes also continued to engage in more covert , surgical campaigns using CosmicDuke .

The latest of these campaigns that we are aware of occurred during the spring and early summer of 2015 .

As their infection vectors , these campaigns used malicious documents exploiting recently fixed vulnerabilities .

Two of these campaigns were detailed in separate blog posts by the Polish security company Prevenity , who said that both campaigns targeted Polish entities with spear- phishing emails containing malicious attachments with relevant Polish language names .

A third , similar , CosmicDuke campaign was observed presumably targeting Georgian entities since it used an attachment with a Georgian-language name that translates to “ NATO consolidates control of the Black Sea.docx ” .

Based on this , we do not believe that the Dukes are replacing their covert and targeted campaigns with the overt and opportunistic CozyDuke and CloudDuke style of campaigns .

Instead , we believe that they are simply expanding their activities by adding new tools and techniques .

A XENOTIME to Remember : Veles in the Wild .

FireEye recently published a blog covering the tactics , techniques , and procedures ( TTPs ) for the “ TRITON actor ” when preparing to deploy the TRITON / TRISIS malware framework in 2017 .

Overall , the post does a commendable job in making public findings previously only privately shared ( presumably by FireEye , and in several reports I authored for my employer , Dragos ) to threat intelligence customers .

As such , the blog continues to push forward the narrative of how ICS attacks are enabled through prepositioning and initial intrusion operations – an item I have discussed at length .

Yet one point of confusion in the blog comes at the very start : referring to the entity responsible for TRITON as the “ TRITON actor ” .

This seems confusing as FireEye earlier publicly declared the “ TRITON actor ” as a discrete entity , linked to a Russian research institution , and christened it as “ TEMP.Veles ” .

In the 2018 public posting announcing TEMP.Veles , FireEye researchers noted that the institute in question at least supported TEMP.Veles activity in deploying TRITON , with subsequent public presentations at Cyberwarcon and the Kaspersky Lab sponsored Security Analyst Summit essentially linking TRITON and the research institute ( and therefore TEMP.Veles ) as one in the same .

Yet the most-recent posting covering TTPs from initial access through prerequisites to enable final delivery of effects on target ( deploying TRITON / TRISIS ) avoids the use of the TEMP.Veles term entirely .

In subsequent discussion , FireEye personnel indicate that there was not “ an avalanche of evidence to substantiate ” anything more than “ TRITON actor ” – summing matters by indicating this term “ is the best we ’ve got for the public for now ” .

Meanwhile , parallel work at Dragos ( my employer , where I have performed significant work on the activity described above ) uncovered similar conclusions concerning TTPs and behaviors , for both the 2017 event and subsequent activity in other industrial sectors .

Utilizing Diamond Model methodology for characterizing activity by behaviors attached to victims , we began tracking TRITON / TRISIS and immediate enabling activity as a distinct activity group ( collection of behaviors , infrastructure , and victimology ) designated XENOTIME .

Based on information gained from discussion with the initial TRITON / TRISIS responders and subsequent work on follow-on activity by this entity , Dragos developed a comprehensive ( public ) picture of adversary activity roughly matching FireEye ’s analysis published in April 2019 , described in various media .

At this stage , we have two similar , parallel constructions of events – the how behind the immediate deployment and execution of TRITON / TRISIS – yet dramatically different responses in terms of attribution and labeling .

Since late 2018 , based upon the most-recent posting , FireEye appears to have “ walked back ” the previously-used terminology of TEMP.Veles and instead refers rather cryptically to the “ TRITON actor ” , while Dragos leveraged identified behaviors to consistently refer to an activity group , XENOTIME .

Given that both organizations appear to describe similar ( if not identical ) activity , any reasonable person could ( and should ) ask – why the inconsistency in naming and identification .

Aside from the competitive vendor naming landscape ( which I am not a fan of in cases on direct overlap , but which has more to say for itself when different methodologies are employed around similar observations ) , the distinction between FireEye and Dragos ’ approaches with respect to the “ TRITON actor ” comes down to fundamental philosophical differences in methodology .

As wonderfully described in a recent public posting , FireEye adheres to a naming convention based upon extensive data collection and activity comparison , designed to yield the identification of a discrete , identifiable entity responsible for a given collection of activity .

This technique is precise and praiseworthy – yet at the same time , appears so rigorous as to impose limitations on the ability to dynamically adjust and adapt to emerging adversary activity .

( Or for that matter , even categorize otherwise well-known historical actors operating to the present day , such as Turla .

) FireEye ’s methodology may have particular limitations in instances where adversaries ( such as XENOTIME and presumably TEMP.Veles ) rely upon extensive use of publicly-available , commonly-used tools with limited amounts of customization .

In such cases , utilizing purely technical approaches for differentiation ( an issue I lightly touched on in a recent post ) becomes problematic , especially when trying to define attribution to specific , “ who-based ” entities ( such as a Russian research institute ) .

My understanding is FireEye labels entities where definitive attribution is not yet possible with the “ TEMP ” moniker ( hence , TEMP.Veles ) – yet in this case FireEye developed and deployed the label , then appeared to move away from it in subsequent reporting .

Based on the public blog post – which also indicated that FireEye is responding to an intrusion at a second facility featuring the same or similar observations – this is presumably not for lack of evidence , yet the “ downgrade ” occurs all the same .

In comparison , XENOTIME was defined based on principles of infrastructure ( compromised third-party infrastructure and various networks associated with several Russian research institutions ) , capabilities ( publicly- and commercially-available tools with varying levels of customization ) and targeting ( an issue not meant for discussion in this blog ) .

In personally responding to several incidents across multiple industry sectors since early 2018 matching TTPs from the TRITON / TRISIS event , these items proved consistent and supported the creation of the XENOTIME activity group .

This naming decision was founded upon the underlying methodology described in the Diamond Model of intrusion analysis .

As such , this decision does not necessarily refer to a specific institution , but rather a collection of observations and behaviors observed across multiple , similarly-situated victims .

Of note , this methodology of naming abstracts away the “ who ” element – XENOTIME may represent a single discrete entity ( such as a Russian research institution ) or several entities working in coordination in a roughly repeatable , similar manner across multiple events .

Ultimately , the epistemic foundation of the behavior-based naming approach makes this irrelevant for tracking ( and labeling for convenience sake ) observations .

Much like the observers watching the shadows of objects cast upon the wall of the cave , these two definitions ( XENOTIME and TEMP.Veles , both presumably referring to “ the TRITON actor ” ) describe the same phenomena , yet at the same time appear different .

This question of perception and accuracy rests upon the underlying epistemic framework and the goal conceived for that framework in defining an adversary : FireEye ’s methodology follows a deductive approach requiring the collection of significant evidence over time to yield a conclusion that will be necessary given the premises ( the totality of evidence suggests APTxx ) ; the Dragos approach instead seeks an inductive approach , where premises may all be true but the conclusion need not necessarily follow from them given changes in premises over time or other observations not contained within the set ( thus , identified behaviors strongly suggests an activity group , defined as X ) .

From an external analysts ’ point of view , the wonder is , which is superior to the other .

And my answer for this is : neither is perfect , but both are useful – depending upon your goals and objectives .

But rather than trying to pursue some comparison between the two for identification of superiority ( an approach that will result in unproductive argument and social media warring ) , the point of this post is to highlight the distinctions between these approaches and how – in the case of “ the TRITON actor ” – they result in noticeably different conclusions from similar datasets .

One reason for the distinction may be differences in evidence , as FireEye ’s public reporting notes two distinct events of which they are aware of and have responded to related to “ the TRITON actor ” while Dragos has been engaged several instances – thus , Dragos would possess more evidence to cement the definition of an activity group , while FireEye ’s data collection-centric approach would require far more observations to yield an “ APT ” .

Yet irrespective of this , it is confusing why the previously-declared “ TEMP ” category was walked back as this has led to not small amount of confusion – in both technical and non-technical audiences – as to just what FireEye ’s blog post refers .

Thus respected journalists ( at least by me ) conflate the “ TRITON actor is active at another site ” with “ TRITON malware was identified at another site ” .

In this case , we ’re seeing a definite problem with the overly-conservative naming approach used as it engenders confusion in a significant subset of the intended audience .

While some may dismiss adversary or activity naming as so much marketing , having a distinct label for something allows for clearer communication and more accurate discussion .

Furthermore , conflating adversaries with tools , since tools can be repurposed or used by other entities than those first observed deploying them , leads to further potential confusion as the “ X actor ” is quickly compressed in the minds of some to refer to any and all instantiations of tool “ X ” .

Overall , the discussion above may appear so much splitting of hairs or determining how many angels can dance on the head of a pin – yet given the communicative impacts behind different naming and labeling conventions , this exploration seems not merely useful but necessary .

Understanding the “ how ” and “ why ” behind different entity classifications of similar ( or even the same ) activity allows us to move beyond the dismissive approach of “ everyone has their names for marketing purposes ” to a more productive mindset that grasps the fundamental methodologies that ( should ) drive these decisions .

TRITON Attribution : Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers .

In a previous blog post we detailed the TRITON intrusion that impacted industrial control systems ( ICS ) at a critical infrastructure facility .

We now track this activity set as TEMP.Veles .

In this blog post we provide additional information linking TEMP.Veles and their activity surrounding the TRITON intrusion to a Russian government-owned research institute .

FireEye Intelligence assesses with high confidence that intrusion activity that led to deployment of TRITON was supported by the Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics ( CNIIHM ; a.k.a. ЦНИИХМ ) , a Russian government-owned technical research institution located in Moscow .

The following factors supporting this assessment are further detailed in this post .

We present as much public information as possible to support this assessment , but withheld sensitive information that further contributes to our high confidence assessment .

FireEye uncovered malware development activity that is very likely supporting TEMP.Veles activity .

This includes testing multiple versions of malicious software , some of which were used by TEMP.Veles during the TRITON intrusion .

Investigation of this testing activity reveals multiple independent ties to Russia , CNIIHM , and a specific person in Moscow .

This person ’s online activity shows significant links to CNIIHM .

An IP address registered to CNIIHM has been employed by TEMP.Veles for multiple purposes , including monitoring open-source coverage of TRITON , network reconnaissance , and malicious activity in support of the TRITON intrusion .

Behavior patterns observed in TEMP.Veles activity are consistent with the Moscow time zone , where CNIIHM is located .

We judge that CNIIHM likely possesses the necessary institutional knowledge and personnel to assist in the orchestration and development of TRITON and TEMP.Veles operations .

While we cannot rule out the possibility that one or more CNIIHM employees could have conducted TEMP.Veles activity without their employer ’s approval , the details shared in this post demonstrate that this explanation is less plausible than TEMP.Veles operating with the support of the institute .

During our investigation of TEMP.Veles activity , we found multiple unique tools that the group deployed in the target environment .

Some of these same tools , identified by hash , were evaluated in a malware testing environment by a single user .

Malware Testing Environment Tied to TEMP.Veles .

We identified a malware testing environment that we assess with high confidence was used to refine some TEMP.Veles tools .

At times , the use of this malware testing environment correlates to in-network activities of TEMP.Veles , demonstrating direct operational support for intrusion activity .

Four files tested in 2014 are based on the open-source project , cryptcat .

Analysis of these cryptcat binaries indicates that the actor continually modified them to decrease AV detection rates .

One of these files was deployed in a TEMP.Veles target ’s network .

The compiled version with the least detections was later re-tested in 2017 and deployed less than a week later during TEMP.Veles activities in the target environment .

TEMP.Veles ’ lateral movement activities used a publicly-available PowerShell based tool , WMImplant .

On multiple dates in 2017 , TEMP.Veles struggled to execute this utility on multiple victim systems , potentially due to AV detection .

Soon after , the customized utility was again evaluated in the malware testing environment .

The following day , TEMP.Veles again tried the utility on a compromised system .

The user has been active in the malware testing environment since at least 2013 , testing customized versions of multiple open-source frameworks , including Metasploit , Cobalt Strike , PowerSploit , and other projects .

The user ’s development patterns appear to pay particular attention to AV evasion and alternative code execution techniques .

Custom payloads utilized by TEMP.Veles in investigations conducted by Mandiant are typically weaponized versions of legitimate open-source software , retrofitted with code used for command and control .

Testing , Malware Artifacts , and Malicious Activity Suggests Tie to CNIIHM .

Multiple factors suggest that this activity is Russian in origin and associated with CNIIHM .

A PDB path contained in a tested file contained a string that appears to be a unique handle or user name .

This moniker is linked to a Russia based person active in Russian information security communities since at least 2011 .

The handle has been credited with vulnerability research contributions to the Russian version of Hacker Magazine ( хакер ) .

According to a now-defunct social media profile , the same individual was a professor at CNIIHM , which is located near Nagatinskaya Street in the Nagatino-Sadovniki district of Moscow .

Another profile using the handle on a Russian social network currently shows multiple photos of the user in proximity to Moscow for the entire history of the profile .

Suspected TEMP.Veles incidents include malicious activity originating from 87.245.143.140 , which is registered to CNIIHM .

This IP address has been used to monitor open-source coverage of TRITON , heightening the probability of an interest by unknown subjects , originating from this network , in TEMP.Veles related activities .

It also has engaged in network reconnaissance against targets of interest to TEMP.Veles .

The IP address has been tied to additional malicious activity in support of the TRITON intrusion .

Multiple files have Cyrillic names and artifacts .

Adversary behavioral artifacts further suggest the TEMP.Veles operators are based in Moscow , lending some further support to the scenario that CNIIHM , a Russian research organization in Moscow , has been involved in TEMP.Veles activity .

We identified file creation times for numerous files that TEMP.Veles created during lateral movement on a target ’s network .

These file creation times conform to a work schedule typical of an actor operating within a UTC+3 time zone supporting a proximity to Moscow .