Daily Papers

Assessing how well a large language model (LLM) understands human, rather than merely text, remains an open challenge. To bridge the gap, we introduce Sentient Agent as a Judge (SAGE), an automated evaluation framework that measures an LLM's higher-order social cognition. SAGE instantiates a Sentient Agent that simulates human-like emotional changes and inner thoughts during interaction, providing a more realistic evaluation of the tested model in multi-turn conversations. At every turn, the agent reasons about (i) how its emotion changes, (ii) how it feels, and (iii) how it should reply, yielding a numerical emotion trajectory and interpretable inner thoughts. Experiments on 100 supportive-dialogue scenarios show that the final Sentient emotion score correlates strongly with Barrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory (BLRI) ratings and utterance-level empathy metrics, validating psychological fidelity. We also build a public Sentient Leaderboard covering 18 commercial and open-source models that uncovers substantial gaps (up to 4x) between frontier systems (GPT-4o-Latest, Gemini2.5-Pro) and earlier baselines, gaps not reflected in conventional leaderboards (e.g., Arena). SAGE thus provides a principled, scalable and interpretable tool for tracking progress toward genuinely empathetic and socially adept language agents.

Empathy is a complex cognitive ability based on the reasoning of others' affective states. In order to better understand others and express stronger empathy in dialogues, we argue that two issues must be tackled at the same time: (i) identifying which word is the cause for the other's emotion from his or her utterance and (ii) reflecting those specific words in the response generation. However, previous approaches for recognizing emotion cause words in text require sub-utterance level annotations, which can be demanding. Taking inspiration from social cognition, we leverage a generative estimator to infer emotion cause words from utterances with no word-level label. Also, we introduce a novel method based on pragmatics to make dialogue models focus on targeted words in the input during generation. Our method is applicable to any dialogue models with no additional training on the fly. We show our approach improves multiple best-performing dialogue agents on generating more focused empathetic responses in terms of both automatic and human evaluation.

We explore the task of improving persona consistency of dialogue agents. Recent models tackling consistency often train with additional Natural Language Inference (NLI) labels or attach trained extra modules to the generative agent for maintaining consistency. However, such additional labels and training can be demanding. Also, we find even the best-performing persona-based agents are insensitive to contradictory words. Inspired by social cognition and pragmatics, we endow existing dialogue agents with public self-consciousness on the fly through an imaginary listener. Our approach, based on the Rational Speech Acts framework (Frank and Goodman, 2012), can enforce dialogue agents to refrain from uttering contradiction. We further extend the framework by learning the distractor selection, which has been usually done manually or randomly. Results on Dialogue NLI (Welleck et al., 2019) and PersonaChat (Zhang et al., 2018) dataset show that our approach reduces contradiction and improves consistency of existing dialogue models. Moreover, we show that it can be generalized to improve context-consistency beyond persona in dialogues.

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the cognitive ability to infer and attribute mental states to oneself and others. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated for social and cognitive capabilities, it remains unclear to what extent these models demonstrate ToM across diverse languages and cultural contexts. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive study of multilingual ToM capabilities aimed at addressing this gap. Our approach includes two key components: (1) We translate existing ToM datasets into multiple languages, effectively creating a multilingual ToM dataset and (2) We enrich these translations with culturally specific elements to reflect the social and cognitive scenarios relevant to diverse populations. We conduct extensive evaluations of six state-of-the-art LLMs to measure their ToM performance across both the translated and culturally adapted datasets. The results highlight the influence of linguistic and cultural diversity on the models' ability to exhibit ToM, and questions their social reasoning capabilities. This work lays the groundwork for future research into enhancing LLMs' cross-cultural social cognition and contributes to the development of more culturally aware and socially intelligent AI systems. All our data and code are publicly available.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand the mental states of oneself and others, remains a challenging area for large language models (LLMs), which often fail to predict human mental states accurately. In this paper, we introduce UniToMBench, a unified benchmark that integrates the strengths of SimToM and TOMBENCH to systematically improve and assess ToM capabilities in LLMs by integrating multi-interaction task designs and evolving story scenarios. Supported by a custom dataset of over 1,000 hand-written scenarios, UniToMBench combines perspective-taking techniques with diverse evaluation metrics to better stimulate social cognition in LLMs. Through evaluation, we observe that while models like GPT-4o and GPT-4o Mini show consistently high accuracy in tasks involving emotional and belief-related scenarios, with results usually above 80%, there is significant variability in their performance across knowledge-based tasks. These results highlight both the strengths and limitations of current LLMs in ToM-related tasks, underscoring the value of UniToMBench as a comprehensive tool for future development. Our code is publicly available here: https://github.com/Shamant/unifiedtombenchmark.

Multi-subject fMRI studies are challenging due to the high variability of both brain anatomy and functional brain topographies across participants. An effective way of aggregating multi-subject fMRI data is to extract a shared representation that filters out unwanted variability among subjects. Some recent work has implemented probabilistic models to extract a shared representation in task fMRI. In the present work, we improve upon these models by incorporating temporal information in the common latent structures. We introduce a new model, Shared Gaussian Process Factor Analysis (S-GPFA), that discovers shared latent trajectories and subject-specific functional topographies, while modelling temporal correlation in fMRI data. We demonstrate the efficacy of our model in revealing ground truth latent structures using simulated data, and replicate experimental performance of time-segment matching and inter-subject similarity on the publicly available Raider and Sherlock datasets. We further test the utility of our model by analyzing its learned model parameters in the large multi-site SPINS dataset, on a social cognition task from participants with and without schizophrenia.

As AI systems increasingly assume roles where trust and alignment with human values are essential, understanding when and why they engage in deception has become a critical research priority. We introduce The Traitors, a multi-agent simulation framework inspired by social deduction games, designed to probe deception, trust formation, and strategic communication among large language model (LLM) agents under asymmetric information. A minority of agents the traitors seek to mislead the majority, while the faithful must infer hidden identities through dialogue and reasoning. Our contributions are: (1) we ground the environment in formal frameworks from game theory, behavioral economics, and social cognition; (2) we develop a suite of evaluation metrics capturing deception success, trust dynamics, and collective inference quality; (3) we implement a fully autonomous simulation platform where LLMs reason over persistent memory and evolving social dynamics, with support for heterogeneous agent populations, specialized traits, and adaptive behaviors. Our initial experiments across DeepSeek-V3, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-4o (10 runs per model) reveal a notable asymmetry: advanced models like GPT-4o demonstrate superior deceptive capabilities yet exhibit disproportionate vulnerability to others' falsehoods. This suggests deception skills may scale faster than detection abilities. Overall, The Traitors provides a focused, configurable testbed for investigating LLM behavior in socially nuanced interactions. We position this work as a contribution toward more rigorous research on deception mechanisms, alignment challenges, and the broader social reliability of AI systems.

The rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs) and their capacity to simulate human cognition and behavior has given rise to LLM-based frameworks and tools that are evaluated and applied based on their ability to perform tasks traditionally performed by humans, namely those involving cognition, decision-making, and social interaction. This survey provides a comprehensive examination of such human-centric LLM capabilities, focusing on their performance in both individual tasks (where an LLM acts as a stand-in for a single human) and collective tasks (where multiple LLMs coordinate to mimic group dynamics). We first evaluate LLM competencies across key areas including reasoning, perception, and social cognition, comparing their abilities to human-like skills. Then, we explore real-world applications of LLMs in human-centric domains such as behavioral science, political science, and sociology, assessing their effectiveness in replicating human behaviors and interactions. Finally, we identify challenges and future research directions, such as improving LLM adaptability, emotional intelligence, and cultural sensitivity, while addressing inherent biases and enhancing frameworks for human-AI collaboration. This survey aims to provide a foundational understanding of LLMs from a human-centric perspective, offering insights into their current capabilities and potential for future development.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer mental states in others, is pivotal for human social cognition. Existing evaluations of ToM in LLMs are largely limited to English, neglecting the linguistic diversity that shapes human cognition. This limitation raises a critical question: can LLMs exhibit Multilingual Theory of Mind, which is the capacity to reason about mental states across diverse linguistic contexts? To address this gap, we present XToM, a rigorously validated multilingual benchmark that evaluates ToM across five languages and incorporates diverse, contextually rich task scenarios. Using XToM, we systematically evaluate LLMs (e.g., DeepSeek R1), revealing a pronounced dissonance: while models excel in multilingual language understanding, their ToM performance varies across languages. Our findings expose limitations in LLMs' ability to replicate human-like mentalizing across linguistic contexts.

LLMs trained for logical reasoning excel at step-by-step deduction to reach verifiable answers. However, this paradigm is ill-suited for navigating social situations, which induce an interpretive process of analyzing ambiguous cues that rarely yield a definitive outcome. To bridge this gap, we introduce Cognitive Reasoning, a paradigm modeled on human social cognition. It formulates the interpretive process into a structured cognitive flow of interconnected cognitive units (e.g., observation or attribution), which combine adaptively to enable effective social thinking and responses. We then propose CogFlow, a complete framework that instills this capability in LLMs. CogFlow first curates a dataset of cognitive flows by simulating the associative and progressive nature of human thought via tree-structured planning. After instilling the basic cognitive reasoning capability via supervised fine-tuning, CogFlow adopts reinforcement learning to enable the model to improve itself via trial and error, guided by a multi-objective reward that optimizes both cognitive flow and response quality. Extensive experiments show that CogFlow effectively enhances the social cognitive capabilities of LLMs, and even humans, leading to more effective social decision-making.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at complex reasoning but can still exhibit harmful behaviors. Current alignment strategies typically embed safety into model weights, making these controls implicit, static, and difficult to modify. This paper introduces Cognition-of-Thought (CooT), a novel decoding-time framework that equips LLMs with an explicit cognitive self-monitoring loop. CooT couples a standard text Generator with a cognitive Perceiver that continuously monitors the unfolding sequence. The Perceiver uses a structured, precedence-based hierarchy of principles (e.g., safety over obedience) to detect potential misalignments as they arise. When violations are flagged, CooT intervenes by rolling back the generation to the point of error and regenerating under injected guidance that combines universal social priors with context-specific warnings. CooT thus transforms alignment from a fixed property into an explicit, dynamic, and auditable process active during inference, allowing for flexible policy updates without retraining the model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks and model families confirm that CooT consistently improves safety and social reasoning performance.

The ability to build and leverage world models is essential for a general-purpose AI agent. Testing such capabilities is hard, in part because the building blocks of world models are ill-defined. We present Elements of World Knowledge (EWOK), a framework for evaluating world modeling in language models by testing their ability to use knowledge of a concept to match a target text with a plausible/implausible context. EWOK targets specific concepts from multiple knowledge domains known to be vital for world modeling in humans. Domains range from social interactions (help/hinder) to spatial relations (left/right). Both, contexts and targets are minimal pairs. Objects, agents, and locations in the items can be flexibly filled in enabling easy generation of multiple controlled datasets. We then introduce EWOK-CORE-1.0, a dataset of 4,374 items covering 11 world knowledge domains. We evaluate 20 openweights large language models (1.3B--70B parameters) across a battery of evaluation paradigms along with a human norming study comprising 12,480 measurements. The overall performance of all tested models is worse than human performance, with results varying drastically across domains. These data highlight simple cases where even large models fail and present rich avenues for targeted research on LLM world modeling capabilities.

Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant progress in IQ-related domains that require careful thinking, such as mathematics and coding. However, enhancing LLMs' cognitive development in social domains, particularly from a post-training perspective, remains underexplored. Recognizing that the social world follows a distinct timeline and requires a richer blend of cognitive modes (from intuitive reactions (System 1) and surface-level thinking to deliberate thinking (System 2)) than mathematics, which primarily relies on System 2 cognition (careful, step-by-step reasoning), we introduce Temporal-aware Hierarchical Cognitive Reinforcement Learning (TimeHC-RL) for enhancing LLMs' social intelligence. In our experiments, we systematically explore improving LLMs' social intelligence and validate the effectiveness of the TimeHC-RL method, through five other post-training paradigms and two test-time intervention paradigms on eight datasets with diverse data patterns. Experimental results reveal the superiority of our proposed TimeHC-RL method compared to the widely adopted System 2 RL method. It gives the 7B backbone model wings, enabling it to rival the performance of advanced models like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-O3. Additionally, the systematic exploration from post-training and test-time interventions perspectives to improve LLMs' social intelligence has uncovered several valuable insights.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have marked a significant advancement in the field of natural language processing, demonstrating exceptional capabilities in reasoning, tool usage, and memory. As their applications extend into multi-agent environments, a need has arisen for a comprehensive evaluation framework that captures their abilities in reasoning, planning, collaboration, and more. This work introduces a novel benchmarking framework specifically tailored to assess LLMs within multi-agent settings, providing quantitative metrics to evaluate their judgment, reasoning, deception, self-awareness, cooperation, coordination, and rationality. We utilize games such as Chameleon and Undercover, alongside game theory scenarios like Cost Sharing, Multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma, and Public Good, to create diverse testing environments. Our framework is fortified with the Probabilistic Graphical Modeling (PGM) method, enhancing the LLMs' capabilities in navigating complex social and cognitive dimensions. The benchmark evaluates seven multi-agent systems powered by different LLMs, quantitatively highlighting a significant capability gap over threefold between the strongest, GPT-4, and the weakest, Llama-2-70B. It also confirms that our PGM enhancement boosts the inherent abilities of all selected models by 50% on average. Our codes are released here https://github.com/cathyxl/MAgIC.

Reasoning over visual relationships-spatial, functional, interactional, social, etc.-is considered to be a fundamental component of human cognition. Yet, despite the major advances in visual comprehension in multimodal language models (MLMs), precise reasoning over relationships and their generations remains a challenge. We introduce ROBIN: an MLM instruction-tuned with densely annotated relationships capable of constructing high-quality dense scene graphs at scale. To train ROBIN, we curate SVG, a synthetic scene graph dataset by completing the missing relations of selected objects in existing scene graphs using a teacher MLM and a carefully designed filtering process to ensure high-quality. To generate more accurate and rich scene graphs at scale for any image, we introduce SG-EDIT: a self-distillation framework where GPT-4o further refines ROBIN's predicted scene graphs by removing unlikely relations and/or suggesting relevant ones. In total, our dataset contains 146K images and 5.6M relationships for 2.6M objects. Results show that our ROBIN-3B model, despite being trained on less than 3 million instances, outperforms similar-size models trained on over 300 million instances on relationship understanding benchmarks, and even surpasses larger models up to 13B parameters. Notably, it achieves state-of-the-art performance in referring expression comprehension with a score of 88.9, surpassing the previous best of 87.4. Our results suggest that training on the refined scene graph data is crucial to maintaining high performance across diverse visual reasoning task.

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

Social interactions form the foundation of human societies. Artificial intelligence has made significant progress in certain areas, but enabling machines to seamlessly understand social interactions remains an open challenge. It is important to address this gap by endowing machines with social capabilities. We identify three key capabilities needed for effective social understanding: 1) understanding multimodal social cues, 2) understanding multi-party dynamics, and 3) understanding beliefs. Building upon these foundations, we classify and review existing machine learning works on social understanding from the perspectives of verbal, non-verbal, and multimodal social cues. The verbal branch focuses on understanding linguistic signals such as speaker intent, dialogue sentiment, and commonsense reasoning. The non-verbal branch addresses techniques for perceiving social meaning from visual behaviors such as body gestures, gaze patterns, and facial expressions. The multimodal branch covers approaches that integrate verbal and non-verbal multimodal cues to holistically interpret social interactions such as recognizing emotions, conversational dynamics, and social situations. By reviewing the scope and limitations of current approaches and benchmarks, we aim to clarify the development trajectory and illuminate the path towards more comprehensive intelligence for social understanding. We hope this survey will spur further research interest and insights into this area.

Understanding people's social interactions in complex real-world scenarios often relies on intricate mental reasoning. To truly understand how and why people interact with one another, we must infer the underlying mental states that give rise to the social interactions, i.e., Theory of Mind reasoning in multi-agent interactions. Additionally, social interactions are often multi-modal -- we can watch people's actions, hear their conversations, and/or read about their past behaviors. For AI systems to successfully and safely interact with people in real-world environments, they also need to understand people's mental states as well as their inferences about each other's mental states based on multi-modal information about their interactions. For this, we introduce MuMA-ToM, a Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind benchmark. MuMA-ToM is the first multi-modal Theory of Mind benchmark that evaluates mental reasoning in embodied multi-agent interactions. In MuMA-ToM, we provide video and text descriptions of people's multi-modal behavior in realistic household environments. Based on the context, we then ask questions about people's goals, beliefs, and beliefs about others' goals. We validated MuMA-ToM in a human experiment and provided a human baseline. We also proposed a novel multi-modal, multi-agent ToM model, LIMP (Language model-based Inverse Multi-agent Planning). Our experimental results show that LIMP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including large multi-modal models (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5 Pro) and a recent multi-modal ToM model, BIP-ALM.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in human-AI interactions, their social reasoning capabilities in interpersonal contexts are critical. We introduce SCRIPTS, a 1k-dialogue dataset in English and Korean, sourced from movie scripts. The task involves evaluating models' social reasoning capability to infer the interpersonal relationships (e.g., friends, sisters, lovers) between speakers in each dialogue. Each dialogue is annotated with probabilistic relational labels (Highly Likely, Less Likely, Unlikely) by native (or equivalent) Korean and English speakers from Korea and the U.S. Evaluating nine models on our task, current proprietary LLMs achieve around 75-80% on the English dataset, whereas their performance on Korean drops to 58-69%. More strikingly, models select Unlikely relationships in 10-25% of their responses. Furthermore, we find that thinking models and chain-of-thought prompting, effective for general reasoning, provide minimal benefits for social reasoning and occasionally amplify social biases. Our findings reveal significant limitations in current LLMs' social reasoning capabilities, highlighting the need for efforts to develop socially-aware language models.

Multi-agent interactions, such as communication, teaching, and bluffing, often rely on higher-order social inference, i.e., understanding how others infer oneself. Such intricate reasoning can be effectively modeled through nested multi-agent reasoning. Nonetheless, the computational complexity escalates exponentially with each level of reasoning, posing a significant challenge. However, humans effortlessly perform complex social inferences as part of their daily lives. To bridge the gap between human-like inference capabilities and computational limitations, we propose a novel approach: leveraging neural networks to amortize high-order social inference, thereby expediting nested multi-agent reasoning. We evaluate our method in two challenging multi-agent interaction domains. The experimental results demonstrate that our method is computationally efficient while exhibiting minimal degradation in accuracy.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Social norms -- the unspoken commonsense rules about acceptable social behavior -- are crucial in understanding the underlying causes and intents of people's actions in narratives. For example, underlying an action such as "wanting to call cops on my neighbors" are social norms that inform our conduct, such as "It is expected that you report crimes." We present Social Chemistry, a new conceptual formalism to study people's everyday social norms and moral judgments over a rich spectrum of real life situations described in natural language. We introduce Social-Chem-101, a large-scale corpus that catalogs 292k rules-of-thumb such as "it is rude to run a blender at 5am" as the basic conceptual units. Each rule-of-thumb is further broken down with 12 different dimensions of people's judgments, including social judgments of good and bad, moral foundations, expected cultural pressure, and assumed legality, which together amount to over 4.5 million annotations of categorical labels and free-text descriptions. Comprehensive empirical results based on state-of-the-art neural models demonstrate that computational modeling of social norms is a promising research direction. Our model framework, Neural Norm Transformer, learns and generalizes Social-Chem-101 to successfully reason about previously unseen situations, generating relevant (and potentially novel) attribute-aware social rules-of-thumb.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Humans continuously infer the states, goals, and behaviors of others by perceiving their surroundings in dynamic, real-world social interactions. However, most Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks only evaluate static, text-based scenarios, which have a significant gap compared to real interactions. We propose the SoMi-ToM benchmark, designed to evaluate multi-perspective ToM in embodied multi-agent complex social interactions. This benchmark is based on rich multimodal interaction data generated by the interaction environment SoMi, covering diverse crafting goals and social relationships. Our framework supports multi-level evaluation: (1) first-person evaluation provides multimodal (visual, dialogue, action, etc.) input from a first-person perspective during a task for real-time state inference, (2) third-person evaluation provides complete third-person perspective video and text records after a task for goal and behavior inference. This evaluation method allows for a more comprehensive examination of a model's ToM capabilities from both the subjective immediate experience and the objective global observation. We constructed a challenging dataset containing 35 third-person perspective videos, 363 first-person perspective images, and 1225 expert-annotated multiple-choice questions (three options). On this dataset, we systematically evaluated the performance of human subjects and several state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). The results show that LVLMs perform significantly worse than humans on SoMi-ToM: the average accuracy gap between humans and models is 40.1% in first-person evaluation and 26.4% in third-person evaluation. This indicates that future LVLMs need to further improve their ToM capabilities in embodied, complex social interactions.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

Can large multimodal models have a human-like ability for emotional and social reasoning, and if so, how does it work? Recent research has discovered emergent theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs). LLMs can reason about people's mental states by solving various text-based ToM tasks that ask questions about the actors' ToM (e.g., human belief, desire, intention). However, human reasoning in the wild is often grounded in dynamic scenes across time. Thus, we consider videos a new medium for examining spatio-temporal ToM reasoning ability. Specifically, we ask explicit probing questions about videos with abundant social and emotional reasoning content. We develop a pipeline for multimodal LLM for ToM reasoning using video and text. We also enable explicit ToM reasoning by retrieving key frames for answering a ToM question, which reveals how multimodal LLMs reason about ToM.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Understanding human social behavior such as recognizing emotions and the social dynamics causing them is an important and challenging problem. While LLMs have made remarkable advances, they are limited to the textual domain and cannot account for the major role that non-verbal cues play in understanding social situations. Vision Language Models (VLMs) can potentially account for this gap, however their ability to make correct inferences over such social cues has received little attention. In this paper, we explore the capabilities of VLMs at social reasoning. We identify a previously overlooked limitation in VLMs: the Visual Social-Pragmatic Inference gap. To target this gap, we propose a new task for VLMs: Visual Social-Pragmatic Inference. We construct a high quality dataset to test the abilities of a VLM for this task and benchmark the performance of several VLMs on it.

As Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems are increasingly employed in intricate social environments, a pressing query emerges: Can these NLP systems mirror human-esque collaborative intelligence, in a multi-agent society consisting of multiple large language models (LLMs)? This paper probes the collaboration mechanisms among contemporary NLP systems by melding practical experiments with theoretical insights. We fabricate four unique `societies' comprised of LLM agents, where each agent is characterized by a specific `trait' (easy-going or overconfident) and engages in collaboration with a distinct `thinking pattern' (debate or reflection). Evaluating these multi-agent societies on three benchmark datasets, we discern that LLM agents navigate tasks by leveraging diverse social behaviors, from active debates to introspective reflections. Notably, certain collaborative strategies only optimize efficiency (using fewer API tokens), but also outshine previous top-tier approaches. Moreover, our results further illustrate that LLM agents manifest human-like social behaviors, such as conformity or majority rule, mirroring foundational Social Psychology theories. In conclusion, we integrate insights from Social Psychology to contextualize the collaboration of LLM agents, inspiring further investigations into the collaboration mechanism for LLMs. We commit to sharing our code and datasets (already submitted in supplementary materials), hoping to catalyze further research in this promising avenue (All code and data are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/MachineSoM.).

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our everyday lives, understanding their ability to comprehend human mental states becomes critical for ensuring effective interactions. However, despite the recent attempts to assess the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities of LLMs, the degree to which these models can align with human ToM remains a nuanced topic of exploration. This is primarily due to two distinct challenges: (1) the presence of inconsistent results from previous evaluations, and (2) concerns surrounding the validity of existing evaluation methodologies. To address these challenges, we present a novel framework for procedurally generating evaluations with LLMs by populating causal templates. Using our framework, we create a new social reasoning benchmark (BigToM) for LLMs which consists of 25 controls and 5,000 model-written evaluations. We find that human participants rate the quality of our benchmark higher than previous crowd-sourced evaluations and comparable to expert-written evaluations. Using BigToM, we evaluate the social reasoning capabilities of a variety of LLMs and compare model performances with human performance. Our results suggest that GPT4 has ToM capabilities that mirror human inference patterns, though less reliable, while other LLMs struggle.

Humans intuitively navigate social interactions by simulating unspoken dynamics and reasoning about others' perspectives, even with limited information. In contrast, AI systems struggle to automatically structure and reason about these implicit social contexts. In this paper, we introduce a novel structured social world representation formalism (S3AP), designed to help AI systems reason more effectively about social dynamics. Following a POMDP-driven design, S3AP represents social interactions as structured tuples, such as state, observation, agent actions, and mental states, which can be automatically induced from free-form narratives or other inputs. We first show S3AP can help LLMs better understand social narratives across 5 social reasoning tasks (e.g., +51% improvement on FANToM's theory-of-mind reasoning with OpenAI's o1), reaching new state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance. We then induce social world models from these structured representations, demonstrating their ability to predict future social dynamics and improve agent decision-making, yielding up to +18% improvement on the SOTOPIA social interaction benchmark. Our findings highlight the promise of S3AP as a powerful, general-purpose representation for social world states, enabling the development of more socially-aware systems that better navigate social interactions.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks (e.g., image captioning, visual question answering). While broad, their knowledge remains generic (e.g., recognizing a dog), and they are unable to handle personalized subjects (e.g., recognizing a user's pet dog). Human reasoning, in contrast, typically operates within the context of specific subjects in our surroundings. For example, one might ask, "What should I buy for my dog's birthday?"; as opposed to a generic inquiry about "What should I buy for a dog's birthday?". Similarly, when looking at a friend's image, the interest lies in seeing their activities (e.g., "my friend is holding a cat"), rather than merely observing generic human actions (e.g., "a man is holding a cat"). In this paper, we introduce the novel task of personalizing LMMs, so that they can have conversations about a specific subject. We propose Yo'LLaVA, which learns to embed a personalized subject into a set of latent tokens given a handful of example images of the subject. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that Yo'LLaVA can learn the concept more efficiently using fewer tokens and more effectively encode the visual attributes compared to strong prompting baselines (e.g., LLaVA).

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Theory of Mind (ToM)-an understanding of the mental states of others-is a key aspect of human social intelligence, yet, chatbots and LLM-based social agents do not typically integrate it. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs that explicitly use ToM get better at dialogue, achieving goals more effectively. After showing that simply prompting models to generate mental states between dialogue turns already provides significant benefit, we further introduce ToMAgent (ToMA), a ToM-focused dialogue agent. ToMA is trained by pairing ToM with dialogue lookahead to produce mental states that are maximally useful for achieving dialogue goals. Experiments on the Sotopia interactive social evaluation benchmark demonstrate the effectiveness of our method over a range of baselines. Comprehensive analysis shows that ToMA exhibits more strategic, goal-oriented reasoning behaviors, which enable long-horizon adaptation, while maintaining better relationships with their partners. Our results suggest a step forward in integrating ToM for building socially intelligent LLM agents.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably adjusted through our personality prompts. In today's landscape where role-play is a common strategy when using LLMs, our research highlights the need for caution, as models that adopt specific personas with personalities potentially also alter their reasoning abilities in an unexpected manner.

Mental manipulation is a subtle yet pervasive form of abuse in interpersonal communication, making its detection critical for safeguarding potential victims. However, due to manipulation's nuanced and context-specific nature, identifying manipulative language in complex, multi-turn, and multi-person conversations remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). To address this gap, we introduce the MultiManip dataset, comprising 220 multi-turn, multi-person dialogues balanced between manipulative and non-manipulative interactions, all drawn from reality shows that mimic real-world scenarios. For manipulative interactions, it includes 11 distinct manipulations depicting real-life scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-8B, employing various prompting strategies. Despite their capabilities, these models often struggle to detect manipulation effectively. To overcome this limitation, we propose SELF-PERCEPT, a novel, two-stage prompting framework inspired by Self-Perception Theory, demonstrating strong performance in detecting multi-person, multi-turn mental manipulation. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/danushkhanna/self-percept .

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In this paper, we present Strategic Planning, Interaction, and Negotiation (SPIN-Bench), a new multi-domain evaluation designed to measure the intelligence of strategic planning and social reasoning. While many existing benchmarks focus on narrow planning or single-agent reasoning, SPIN-Bench combines classical PDDL tasks, competitive board games, cooperative card games, and multi-agent negotiation scenarios in one unified framework. The framework includes both a benchmark as well as an arena to simulate and evaluate the variety of social settings to test reasoning and strategic behavior of AI agents. We formulate the benchmark SPIN-Bench by systematically varying action spaces, state complexity, and the number of interacting agents to simulate a variety of social settings where success depends on not only methodical and step-wise decision making, but also conceptual inference of other (adversarial or cooperative) participants. Our experiments reveal that while contemporary LLMs handle basic fact retrieval and short-range planning reasonably well, they encounter significant performance bottlenecks in tasks requiring deep multi-hop reasoning over large state spaces and socially adept coordination under uncertainty. We envision SPIN-Bench as a catalyst for future research on robust multi-agent planning, social reasoning, and human--AI teaming.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

To increase social bonding with interlocutors, humans naturally acquire the ability to respond appropriately in a given situation by considering which conversational skill is most suitable for the response - a process we call skill-of-mind. For large language model (LLM)-based conversational agents, planning appropriate conversational skills, as humans do, is challenging due to the complexity of social dialogue, especially in interactive scenarios. To address this, we propose a skill-of-mind-annotated conversation dataset, named Multifaceted Skill-of-Mind, which includes multi-turn and multifaceted conversational skills across various interactive scenarios (e.g., long-term, counseling, task-oriented), grounded in diverse social contexts (e.g., demographics, persona, rules of thumb). This dataset consists of roughly 100K conversations. Using this dataset, we introduce a new family of skill-of-mind-infused LLMs, named Thanos, with model sizes of 1B, 3B, and 8B parameters. With extensive experiments, these models successfully demonstrate the skill-of-mind process and exhibit strong generalizability in inferring multifaceted skills across a variety of domains. Moreover, we show that Thanos significantly enhances the quality of responses generated by LLM-based conversational agents and promotes prosocial behavior in human evaluations.

Current large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated emerging capabilities in social intelligence tasks, including implicature resolution (Sravanthi et al. (2024)) and theory-of-mind reasoning (Shapira et al. (2024)), both of which require substantial pragmatic understanding. However, how LLMs acquire this competence throughout the training process remains poorly understood. In this work, we introduce ALTPRAG, a dataset grounded in the pragmatic concept of alternatives, designed to evaluate whether LLMs at different training stages can accurately infer nuanced speaker intentions. Each instance pairs two contextually appropriate but pragmatically distinct continuations, enabling fine-grained assessment of both pragmatic interpretation and contrastive reasoning. We systematically evaluate 22 LLMs across key training stages: pre-training, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and preference optimization, to examine the development of pragmatic competence. Our results show that even base models exhibit notable sensitivity to pragmatic cues, which improves consistently with increases in model and data scale. Additionally, SFT and RLHF contribute further gains, particularly in cognitive-pragmatic reasoning. These findings highlight pragmatic competence as an emergent and compositional property of LLM training and offer new insights for aligning models with human communicative norms.

The common toxicity and societal bias in contents generated by large language models (LLMs) necessitate strategies to reduce harm. Present solutions often demand white-box access to the model or substantial training, which is impractical for cutting-edge commercial LLMs. Moreover, prevailing prompting methods depend on external tool feedback and fail to simultaneously lessen toxicity and bias. Motivated by social psychology principles, we propose a novel strategy named perspective-taking prompting (\textsc{PeT)} that inspires LLMs to integrate diverse human perspectives and self-regulate their responses. This self-correction mechanism can significantly diminish toxicity (up to 89%) and bias (up to 73%) in LLMs' responses. Rigorous evaluations and ablation studies are conducted on two commercial LLMs (ChatGPT and GLM) and three open-source LLMs, revealing PeT's superiority in producing less harmful responses, outperforming five strong baselines.

Social network simulation plays a crucial role in addressing various challenges within social science. It offers extensive applications such as state prediction, phenomena explanation, and policy-making support, among others. In this work, we harness the formidable human-like capabilities exhibited by large language models (LLMs) in sensing, reasoning, and behaving, and utilize these qualities to construct the S^3 system (short for Social network Simulation System). Adhering to the widely employed agent-based simulation paradigm, we employ prompt engineering and prompt tuning techniques to ensure that the agent's behavior closely emulates that of a genuine human within the social network. Specifically, we simulate three pivotal aspects: emotion, attitude, and interaction behaviors. By endowing the agent in the system with the ability to perceive the informational environment and emulate human actions, we observe the emergence of population-level phenomena, including the propagation of information, attitudes, and emotions. We conduct an evaluation encompassing two levels of simulation, employing real-world social network data. Encouragingly, the results demonstrate promising accuracy. This work represents an initial step in the realm of social network simulation empowered by LLM-based agents. We anticipate that our endeavors will serve as a source of inspiration for the development of simulation systems within, but not limited to, social science.

LLMs exhibit promising Social Intelligence (SI) in modeling human behavior, raising the need to evaluate LLMs' SI and their discrepancy with humans. SI equips humans with interpersonal abilities to behave wisely in navigating social interactions to achieve social goals. This presents an operational evaluation paradigm: outcome-oriented goal achievement evaluation and process-oriented interpersonal ability evaluation, which existing work fails to address. To this end, we propose SocialEval, a script-based bilingual SI benchmark, integrating outcome- and process-oriented evaluation by manually crafting narrative scripts. Each script is structured as a world tree that contains plot lines driven by interpersonal ability, providing a comprehensive view of how LLMs navigate social interactions. Experiments show that LLMs fall behind humans on both SI evaluations, exhibit prosociality, and prefer more positive social behaviors, even if they lead to goal failure. Analysis of LLMs' formed representation space and neuronal activations reveals that LLMs have developed ability-specific functional partitions akin to the human brain.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Socially intelligent AI that can understand and interact seamlessly with humans in daily lives is increasingly important as AI becomes more closely integrated with peoples' daily activities. However, current works in artificial social reasoning all rely on language-only, or language-dominant approaches to benchmark and training models, resulting in systems that are improving in verbal communication but struggle with nonverbal social understanding. To address this limitation, we tap into a novel source of data rich in nonverbal and social interactions -- mime videos. Mimes refer to the art of expression through gesture and movement without spoken words, which presents unique challenges and opportunities in interpreting non-verbal social communication. We contribute a new dataset called MimeQA, obtained by sourcing 221 videos from YouTube, through rigorous annotation and verification, resulting in a benchmark with 101 videos and 806 question-answer pairs. Using MimeQA, we evaluate state-of-the-art video large language models (vLLMs) and find that their overall accuracy ranges from 15-30%. Our analysis reveals that vLLMs often fail to ground imagined objects and over-rely on the text prompt while ignoring subtle nonverbal interactions. Our data resources are released at https://github.com/MIT-MI/MimeQA to inspire future work in foundation models that embody true social intelligence capable of interpreting non-verbal human interactions.

Theory of Mind (ToM) can be used to assess the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in complex scenarios where social reasoning is required. While the research community has proposed many ToM benchmarks, their hardness varies greatly, and their complexity is not well defined. This work proposes a framework inspired by cognitive load theory to measure the complexity of ToM tasks. We quantify a problem's complexity as the number of states necessary to solve it correctly. Our complexity measure also accounts for spurious states of a ToM problem designed to make it apparently harder. We use our method to assess the complexity of five widely adopted ToM benchmarks. On top of this framework, we design a prompting technique that augments the information available to a model with a description of how the environment changes with the agents' interactions. We name this technique Discrete World Models (DWM) and show how it elicits superior performance on ToM tasks.

Humans are social beings; we pursue social goals in our daily interactions, which is a crucial aspect of social intelligence. Yet, AI systems' abilities in this realm remain elusive. We present SOTOPIA, an open-ended environment to simulate complex social interactions between artificial agents and evaluate their social intelligence. In our environment, agents role-play and interact under a wide variety of scenarios; they coordinate, collaborate, exchange, and compete with each other to achieve complex social goals. We simulate the role-play interaction between LLM-based agents and humans within this task space and evaluate their performance with a holistic evaluation framework called SOTOPIA-Eval. With SOTOPIA, we find significant differences between these models in terms of their social intelligence, and we identify a subset of SOTOPIA scenarios, SOTOPIA-hard, that is generally challenging for all models. We find that on this subset, GPT-4 achieves a significantly lower goal completion rate than humans and struggles to exhibit social commonsense reasoning and strategic communication skills. These findings demonstrate SOTOPIA's promise as a general platform for research on evaluating and improving social intelligence in artificial agents.

Making theory-of-mind inferences from human dialogue is a strong indicator of a model's underlying social abilities, which are fundamental for adept AI assistants. However, large language and reasoning models struggle to understand sophisticated social phenomena in transcript data, such as sarcasm and irony. To assess the weaknesses of current models and to identify their solutions, we introduce SocialNLI (SoNLI) -- the first social dialogue inference dataset. SoNLI consists of a collection of dialogue transcripts hand-picked to center complex social nuances like irony and sarcasm, paired with inferences, corresponding likelihood scores, and human-written explanations. We explore social inference analysis as a facet of theory-of-mind, and evaluate LLM and reasoning model theory-of-mind ability through multi-step counterfactual reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

The rich and multifaceted nature of human social interaction, encompassing multimodal cues, unobservable relations and mental states, and dynamical behavior, presents a formidable challenge for artificial intelligence. To advance research in this area, we introduce SIV-Bench, a novel video benchmark for rigorously evaluating the capabilities of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) across Social Scene Understanding (SSU), Social State Reasoning (SSR), and Social Dynamics Prediction (SDP). SIV-Bench features 2,792 video clips and 8,792 meticulously generated question-answer pairs derived from a human-LLM collaborative pipeline. It is originally collected from TikTok and YouTube, covering a wide range of video genres, presentation styles, and linguistic and cultural backgrounds. It also includes a dedicated setup for analyzing the impact of different textual cues-original on-screen text, added dialogue, or no text. Our comprehensive experiments on leading MLLMs reveal that while models adeptly handle SSU, they significantly struggle with SSR and SDP, where Relation Inference (RI) is an acute bottleneck, as further examined in our analysis. Our study also confirms the critical role of transcribed dialogue in aiding comprehension of complex social interactions. By systematically identifying current MLLMs' strengths and limitations, SIV-Bench offers crucial insights to steer the development of more socially intelligent AI. The dataset and code are available at https://kfq20.github.io/sivbench/.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental states, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

Language use is shaped by pragmatics -- i.e., reasoning about communicative goals and norms in context. As language models (LMs) are increasingly used as conversational agents, it becomes ever more important to understand their pragmatic reasoning abilities. We propose an evaluation framework derived from Wavelength, a popular communication game where a speaker and a listener communicate about a broad range of concepts in a granular manner. We study a range of LMs on both language comprehension and language production using direct and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, and further explore a Rational Speech Act (RSA) approach to incorporating Bayesian pragmatic reasoning into LM inference. We find that state-of-the-art LMs, but not smaller ones, achieve strong performance on language comprehension, obtaining similar-to-human accuracy and exhibiting high correlations with human judgments even without CoT prompting or RSA. On language production, CoT can outperform direct prompting, and using RSA provides significant improvements over both approaches. Our study helps identify the strengths and limitations in LMs' pragmatic reasoning abilities and demonstrates the potential for improving them with RSA, opening up future avenues for understanding conceptual representation, language understanding, and social reasoning in LMs and humans.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

Human cognitive behavior arises from the interaction of specialized brain networks dedicated to distinct functions, such as language, logic, and social reasoning. Inspired by this organization, we propose Mixture of Cognitive Reasoners (MiCRo): a modular, transformer-based architecture post-trained with a curriculum that induces functional specialization across experts. Concretely, we partition the layers of a pretrained language model into four expert modules aligned with well-studied cognitive networks in the human brain. MiCRo offers three key advantages over standard language models. (1) The specialized experts are interpretable and causally meaningful -- ablating a module causes substantial drops on benchmarks requiring its specialized domain. (2) MiCRo's behavior can be dynamically steered at inference time by routing tokens to particular experts (e.g., favoring social over logical reasoning), enabling fine-grained control over outputs. (3) MiCRo outperforms or matches comparable baselines on both machine-learning reasoning benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K, BBH) and alignment to human behavior (CogBench), while maintaining interpretability. Taken together, cognitively grounded functional specialization yields models that are both more human-like and more human-interpretable.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

New developments are enabling AI systems to perceive, recognize, and respond with social cues based on inferences made from humans' explicit or implicit behavioral and verbal cues. These AI systems, equipped with an equivalent of human's Theory of Mind (ToM) capability, are currently serving as matchmakers on dating platforms, assisting student learning as teaching assistants, and enhancing productivity as work partners. They mark a new era in human-AI interaction (HAI) that diverges from traditional human-computer interaction (HCI), where computers are commonly seen as tools instead of social actors. Designing and understanding the human perceptions and experiences in this emerging HAI era becomes an urgent and critical issue for AI systems to fulfill human needs and mitigate risks across social contexts. In this paper, we posit the Mutual Theory of Mind (MToM) framework, inspired by our capability of ToM in human-human communications, to guide this new generation of HAI research by highlighting the iterative and mutual shaping nature of human-AI communication. We discuss the motivation of the MToM framework and its three key components that iteratively shape the human-AI communication in three stages. We then describe two empirical studies inspired by the MToM framework to demonstrate the power of MToM in guiding the design and understanding of human-AI communication. Finally, we discuss future research opportunities in human-AI interaction through the lens of MToM.

Understanding emotions is fundamental to human interaction and experience. Humans easily infer emotions from situations or facial expressions, situations from emotions, and do a variety of other affective cognition. How adept is modern AI at these inferences? We introduce an evaluation framework for testing affective cognition in foundation models. Starting from psychological theory, we generate 1,280 diverse scenarios exploring relationships between appraisals, emotions, expressions, and outcomes. We evaluate the abilities of foundation models (GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini-1.5-Pro) and humans (N = 567) across carefully selected conditions. Our results show foundation models tend to agree with human intuitions, matching or exceeding interparticipant agreement. In some conditions, models are ``superhuman'' -- they better predict modal human judgements than the average human. All models benefit from chain-of-thought reasoning. This suggests foundation models have acquired a human-like understanding of emotions and their influence on beliefs and behavior.

Understanding how language supports emotion inference remains a topic of debate in emotion science. The present study investigated whether language-derived emotion-concept knowledge would causally support emotion inference by manipulating the language-specific knowledge representations in large language models. Using the prompt technique, 14 attributes of emotion concepts were found to be represented by distinct artificial neuron populations. By manipulating these attribute-related neurons, the majority of the emotion inference tasks showed performance deterioration compared to random manipulations. The attribute-specific performance deterioration was related to the importance of different attributes in human mental space. Our findings provide causal evidence in support of a language-based mechanism for emotion inference and highlight the contributions of emotion-concept knowledge.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

We present NormBank, a knowledge bank of 155k situational norms. This resource is designed to ground flexible normative reasoning for interactive, assistive, and collaborative AI systems. Unlike prior commonsense resources, NormBank grounds each inference within a multivalent sociocultural frame, which includes the setting (e.g., restaurant), the agents' contingent roles (waiter, customer), their attributes (age, gender), and other physical, social, and cultural constraints (e.g., the temperature or the country of operation). In total, NormBank contains 63k unique constraints from a taxonomy that we introduce and iteratively refine here. Constraints then apply in different combinations to frame social norms. Under these manipulations, norms are non-monotonic - one can cancel an inference by updating its frame even slightly. Still, we find evidence that neural models can help reliably extend the scope and coverage of NormBank. We further demonstrate the utility of this resource with a series of transfer experiments.

We study the emergence of agency from scratch by using Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents. In previous studies of LLM-based agents, each agent's characteristics, including personality and memory, have traditionally been predefined. We focused on how individuality, such as behavior, personality, and memory, can be differentiated from an undifferentiated state. The present LLM agents engage in cooperative communication within a group simulation, exchanging context-based messages in natural language. By analyzing this multi-agent simulation, we report valuable new insights into how social norms, cooperation, and personality traits can emerge spontaneously. This paper demonstrates that autonomously interacting LLM-powered agents generate hallucinations and hashtags to sustain communication, which, in turn, increases the diversity of words within their interactions. Each agent's emotions shift through communication, and as they form communities, the personalities of the agents emerge and evolve accordingly. This computational modeling approach and its findings will provide a new method for analyzing collective artificial intelligence.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in social deduction games (SDGs) like Werewolf, where strategic reasoning and social deception are essential. However, current approaches remain limited to textual information, ignoring crucial multimodal cues such as facial expressions and tone of voice that humans naturally use to communicate. Moreover, existing SDG agents primarily focus on inferring other players' identities without modeling how others perceive themselves or fellow players. To address these limitations, we use One Night Ultimate Werewolf (ONUW) as a testbed and present MultiMind, the first framework integrating multimodal information into SDG agents. MultiMind processes facial expressions and vocal tones alongside verbal content, while employing a Theory of Mind (ToM) model to represent each player's suspicion levels toward others. By combining this ToM model with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), our agent identifies communication strategies that minimize suspicion directed at itself. Through comprehensive evaluation in both agent-versus-agent simulations and studies with human players, we demonstrate MultiMind's superior performance in gameplay. Our work presents a significant advancement toward LLM agents capable of human-like social reasoning across multimodal domains.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Social reasoning - inferring unobservable beliefs and intentions from partial observations of other agents - remains a challenging task for large language models (LLMs). We evaluate the limits of current reasoning language models in the social deduction game Avalon and find that while the largest models demonstrate strong performance, they require extensive test-time inference and degrade sharply when distilled to smaller, real-time-capable variants. To address this, we introduce a hybrid reasoning framework that externalizes belief inference to a structured probabilistic model, while using an LLM for language understanding and interaction. Our approach achieves competitive performance with much larger models in Agent-Agent play and, notably, is the first language agent to defeat human players in a controlled study - achieving a 67% win rate and receiving higher qualitative ratings than both reasoning baselines and human teammates. We release code, models, and a dataset to support future work on social reasoning in LLM agents, which can be found at https://camp-lab-purdue.github.io/bayesian-social-deduction/

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

We present a new challenge to examine whether large language models understand social norms. In contrast to existing datasets, our dataset requires a fundamental understanding of social norms to solve. Our dataset features the largest set of social norm skills, consisting of 402 skills and 12,383 questions covering a wide set of social norms ranging from opinions and arguments to culture and laws. We design our dataset according to the K-12 curriculum. This enables the direct comparison of the social understanding of large language models to humans, more specifically, elementary students. While prior work generates nearly random accuracy on our benchmark, recent large language models such as GPT3.5-Turbo and LLaMA2-Chat are able to improve the performance significantly, only slightly below human performance. We then propose a multi-agent framework based on large language models to improve the models' ability to understand social norms. This method further improves large language models to be on par with humans. Given the increasing adoption of large language models in real-world applications, our finding is particularly important and presents a unique direction for future improvements.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled the development of AI agents that exhibit increasingly human-like behaviors, including planning, adaptation, and social dynamics across diverse, interactive, and open-ended scenarios. These behaviors are not solely the product of the internal architectures of the underlying models, but emerge from their integration into agentic systems operating within specific contexts, where environmental factors, social cues, and interaction feedbacks shape behavior over time. This evolution necessitates a new scientific perspective: AI Agent Behavioral Science. Rather than focusing only on internal mechanisms, this perspective emphasizes the systematic observation of behavior, design of interventions to test hypotheses, and theory-guided interpretation of how AI agents act, adapt, and interact over time. We systematize a growing body of research across individual agent, multi-agent, and human-agent interaction settings, and further demonstrate how this perspective informs responsible AI by treating fairness, safety, interpretability, accountability, and privacy as behavioral properties. By unifying recent findings and laying out future directions, we position AI Agent Behavioral Science as a necessary complement to traditional model-centric approaches, providing essential tools for understanding, evaluating, and governing the real-world behavior of increasingly autonomous AI systems.

Human activity is moderated by norms. When performing actions in the real world, humans not only follow norms, but also consider the trade-off between different norms However, machines are often trained without explicit supervision on norm understanding and reasoning, especially when the norms are grounded in a physical and social context. To improve and evaluate the normative reasoning capability of vision-language models (VLMs), we present EgoNormia |epsilon|, consisting of 1,853 ego-centric videos of human interactions, each of which has two related questions evaluating both the prediction and justification of normative actions. The normative actions encompass seven categories: safety, privacy, proxemics, politeness, cooperation, coordination/proactivity, and communication/legibility. To compile this dataset at scale, we propose a novel pipeline leveraging video sampling, automatic answer generation, filtering, and human validation. Our work demonstrates that current state-of-the-art vision-language models lack robust norm understanding, scoring a maximum of 45% on EgoNormia (versus a human bench of 92%). Our analysis of performance in each dimension highlights the significant risks of safety, privacy, and the lack of collaboration and communication capability when applied to real-world agents. We additionally show that through a retrieval-based generation method, it is possible to use EgoNomia to enhance normative reasoning in VLMs.

Recent work on dialogue-based collaborative plan acquisition (CPA) has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) modelling can improve missing knowledge prediction in settings with asymmetric skill-sets and knowledge. Although ToM was claimed to be important for effective collaboration, its real impact on this novel task remains under-explored. By representing plans as graphs and by exploiting task-specific constraints we show that, as performance on CPA nearly doubles when predicting one's own missing knowledge, the improvements due to ToM modelling diminish. This phenomenon persists even when evaluating existing baseline methods. To better understand the relevance of ToM for CPA, we report a principled performance comparison of models with and without ToM features. Results across different models and ablations consistently suggest that learned ToM features are indeed more likely to reflect latent patterns in the data with no perceivable link to ToM. This finding calls for a deeper understanding of the role of ToM in CPA and beyond, as well as new methods for modelling and evaluating mental states in computational collaborative agents.

Effective social intelligence simulation requires language agents to dynamically adjust reasoning depth, a capability notably absent in current approaches. While existing methods either lack this kind of reasoning capability or enforce uniform long chain-of-thought reasoning across all scenarios, resulting in excessive token usage and inappropriate social simulation. In this paper, we propose Adaptive Mode Learning (AML) that strategically selects from four thinking modes (intuitive reaction rightarrow deep contemplation) based on real-time context. Our framework's core innovation, the Adaptive Mode Policy Optimization (AMPO) algorithm, introduces three key advancements over existing methods: (1) Multi-granular thinking mode design, (2) Context-aware mode switching across social interaction, and (3) Token-efficient reasoning via depth-adaptive processing. Extensive experiments on social intelligence tasks confirm that AML achieves 15.6% higher task performance than state-of-the-art methods. Notably, our method outperforms GRPO by 7.0% with 32.8% shorter reasoning chains. These results demonstrate that context-sensitive thinking mode selection, as implemented in AMPO, enables more human-like adaptive reasoning than GRPO's fixed-depth approach

In this paper, we explore the ability to model and infer personality types of opponents, predict their responses, and use this information to adapt a dialog agent's high-level strategy in negotiation tasks. Inspired by the idea of incorporating a theory of mind (ToM) into machines, we introduce a probabilistic formulation to encapsulate the opponent's personality type during both learning and inference. We test our approach on the CraigslistBargain dataset and show that our method using ToM inference achieves a 20% higher dialog agreement rate compared to baselines on a mixed population of opponents. We also find that our model displays diverse negotiation behavior with different types of opponents.

A key trait of daily conversations between individuals is the ability to express empathy towards others, and exploring ways to implement empathy is a crucial step towards human-like dialogue systems. Previous approaches on this topic mainly focus on detecting and utilizing the user's emotion for generating empathetic responses. However, since empathy includes both aspects of affection and cognition, we argue that in addition to identifying the user's emotion, cognitive understanding of the user's situation should also be considered. To this end, we propose a novel approach for empathetic response generation, which leverages commonsense to draw more information about the user's situation and uses this additional information to further enhance the empathy expression in generated responses. We evaluate our approach on EmpatheticDialogues, which is a widely-used benchmark dataset for empathetic response generation. Empirical results demonstrate that our approach outperforms the baseline models in both automatic and human evaluations and can generate more informative and empathetic responses.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

Humans can perceive and reason about spatial relationships from sequential visual observations, such as egocentric video streams. However, how pretrained models acquire such abilities, especially high-level reasoning, remains unclear. This paper introduces Embodied-R, a collaborative framework combining large-scale Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for perception and small-scale Language Models (LMs) for reasoning. Using Reinforcement Learning (RL) with a novel reward system considering think-answer logical consistency, the model achieves slow-thinking capabilities with limited computational resources. After training on only 5k embodied video samples, Embodied-R with a 3B LM matches state-of-the-art multimodal reasoning models (OpenAI-o1, Gemini-2.5-pro) on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution embodied spatial reasoning tasks. Embodied-R also exhibits emergent thinking patterns such as systematic analysis and contextual integration. We further explore research questions including response length, training on VLM, strategies for reward design, and differences in model generalization after SFT (Supervised Fine-Tuning) and RL training.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems (MAS) as components of collaborative intelligence, where peer interactions dynamically shape individual decision-making. Although prior work has focused on conformity bias, we extend the analysis to examine how LLMs form trust from previous impressions, resist misinformation, and integrate peer input during interaction, key factors for achieving collective intelligence under complex social dynamics. We present KAIROS, a benchmark simulating quiz contests with peer agents of varying reliability, offering fine-grained control over conditions such as expert-novice roles, noisy crowds, and adversarial peers. LLMs receive both historical interactions and current peer responses, allowing systematic investigation into how trust, peer action, and self-confidence influence decisions. As for mitigation strategies, we evaluate prompting, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), across multiple models. Our results reveal that GRPO with multi-agent context combined with outcome-based rewards and unconstrained reasoning achieves the best overall performance, but also decreases the robustness to social influence compared to Base models. The code and datasets are available at: https://github.com/declare-lab/KAIROS.

Communicating in natural language is a powerful tool in multi-agent settings, as it enables independent agents to share information in partially observable settings and allows zero-shot coordination with humans. However, most prior works are limited as they either rely on training with large amounts of human demonstrations or lack the ability to generate natural and useful communication strategies. In this work, we train language models to have productive discussions about their environment in natural language without any human demonstrations. We decompose the communication problem into listening and speaking. Our key idea is to leverage the agent's goal to predict useful information about the world as a dense reward signal that guides communication. Specifically, we improve a model's listening skills by training them to predict information about the environment based on discussions, and we simultaneously improve a model's speaking skills with multi-agent reinforcement learning by rewarding messages based on their influence on other agents. To investigate the role and necessity of communication in complex social settings, we study an embodied social deduction game based on Among Us, where the key question to answer is the identity of an adversarial imposter. We analyze emergent behaviors due to our technique, such as accusing suspects and providing evidence, and find that it enables strong discussions, doubling the win rates compared to standard RL. We release our code and models at https://socialdeductionllm.github.io/

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.

Generating a Chain of Thought (CoT) has been shown to consistently improve large language model (LLM) performance on a wide range of NLP tasks. However, prior work has mainly focused on logical reasoning tasks (e.g. arithmetic, commonsense QA); it remains unclear whether improvements hold for more diverse types of reasoning, especially in socially situated contexts. Concretely, we perform a controlled evaluation of zero-shot CoT across two socially sensitive domains: harmful questions and stereotype benchmarks. We find that zero-shot CoT reasoning in sensitive domains significantly increases a model's likelihood to produce harmful or undesirable output, with trends holding across different prompt formats and model variants. Furthermore, we show that harmful CoTs increase with model size, but decrease with improved instruction following. Our work suggests that zero-shot CoT should be used with caution on socially important tasks, especially when marginalized groups or sensitive topics are involved.

Gaze-referential inference--the ability to infer what others are looking at--is a critical component of a theory of mind that underpins natural human-AI interaction. In a controlled study, we evaluated this skill across 111 Vision Language Models (VLMs) using photos taken with manipulated difficulty and variability, comparing performance with that of human participants (N = 65), and analyzed behaviors using mixed-effects models. We found that 94 of the 111 VLMs failed to do better than random guessing, while humans achieved near-ceiling accuracy. VLMs even respond with each choice almost equally frequently. Are they randomly guessing? Although most VLMs struggle, when we zoom in on five of the top-tier VLMs with above-chance performance, we find that their performance declined with increasing task difficulty but varied only slightly across different prompts and scene objects. These behavioral features cannot be explained by considering them as random guessers. Instead, they likely use a combination of heuristics and guessing such that their performance is subject to the task difficulty but robust to perceptual variations. This suggests that VLMs, lacking gaze inference capability, have yet to become technologies that can naturally interact with humans, but the potential remains.

Over the past decade, wearable computing devices (``smart glasses'') have undergone remarkable advancements in sensor technology, design, and processing power, ushering in a new era of opportunity for high-density human behavior data. Equipped with wearable cameras, these glasses offer a unique opportunity to analyze non-verbal behavior in natural settings as individuals interact. Our focus lies in predicting engagement in dyadic interactions by scrutinizing verbal and non-verbal cues, aiming to detect signs of disinterest or confusion. Leveraging such analyses may revolutionize our understanding of human communication, foster more effective collaboration in professional environments, provide better mental health support through empathetic virtual interactions, and enhance accessibility for those with communication barriers. In this work, we collect a dataset featuring 34 participants engaged in casual dyadic conversations, each providing self-reported engagement ratings at the end of each conversation. We introduce a novel fusion strategy using Large Language Models (LLMs) to integrate multiple behavior modalities into a ``multimodal transcript'' that can be processed by an LLM for behavioral reasoning tasks. Remarkably, this method achieves performance comparable to established fusion techniques even in its preliminary implementation, indicating strong potential for further research and optimization. This fusion method is one of the first to approach ``reasoning'' about real-world human behavior through a language model. Smart glasses provide us the ability to unobtrusively gather high-density multimodal data on human behavior, paving the way for new approaches to understanding and improving human communication with the potential for important societal benefits. The features and data collected during the studies will be made publicly available to promote further research.

Recent studies of the applications of conversational AI tools, such as chatbots powered by large language models, to complex real-world knowledge work have shown limitations related to reasoning and multi-step problem solving. Specifically, while existing chatbots simulate shallow reasoning and understanding they are prone to errors as problem complexity increases. The failure of these systems to address complex knowledge work is due to the fact that they do not perform any actual cognition. In this position paper, we present Cognitive AI, a higher-level framework for implementing programmatically defined neuro-symbolic cognition above and outside of large language models. Specifically, we propose a dual-layer functional architecture for Cognitive AI that serves as a roadmap for AI systems that can perform complex multi-step knowledge work. We propose that Cognitive AI is a necessary precursor for the evolution of higher forms of AI, such as AGI, and specifically claim that AGI cannot be achieved by probabilistic approaches on their own. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for large language models, adoption cycles in AI, and commercial Cognitive AI development.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Multimodal large-scale models have significantly advanced the development of web agents, enabling perception and interaction with digital environments akin to human cognition. In this paper, we argue that web agents must first acquire sufficient knowledge to effectively engage in cognitive reasoning. Therefore, we decompose a web agent's capabilities into two essential stages: knowledge content learning and cognitive processes. To formalize this, we propose Web-CogKnowledge Framework, categorizing knowledge as Factual, Conceptual, and Procedural. In this framework, knowledge content learning corresponds to the agent's processes of Memorizing and Understanding, which rely on the first two knowledge types, representing the "what" of learning. Conversely, cognitive processes correspond to Exploring, grounded in Procedural knowledge, defining the "how" of reasoning and action. To facilitate knowledge acquisition, we construct the Web-CogDataset, a structured resource curated from 14 real-world websites, designed to systematically instill core knowledge necessary for web agent. This dataset serves as the agent's conceptual grounding-the "nouns" upon which comprehension is built-as well as the basis for learning how to reason and act. Building on this foundation, we operationalize these processes through a novel knowledge-driven Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning framework, developing and training our proposed agent, the Web-CogReasoner. Extensive experimentation reveals its significant superiority over existing models, especially in generalizing to unseen tasks where structured knowledge is decisive. To enable rigorous evaluation, we introduce the Web-CogBench, a comprehensive evaluation suite designed to assess and compare agent performance across the delineated knowledge domains and cognitive capabilities. Our code and data is open sourced at https://github.com/Gnonymous/Web-CogReasoner

LLMs have shown strong performance on human-centric reasoning tasks. While previous evaluations have explored whether LLMs can infer intentions or detect deception, they often overlook the individualized reasoning styles that influence how people interpret and act in social contexts. Social deduction games (SDGs) provide a natural testbed for evaluating individualized reasoning styles, where different players may adopt diverse but contextually valid reasoning strategies under identical conditions. To address this, we introduce InMind, a cognitively grounded evaluation framework designed to assess whether LLMs can capture and apply personalized reasoning styles in SDGs. InMind enhances structured gameplay data with round-level strategy traces and post-game reflections, collected under both Observer and Participant modes. It supports four cognitively motivated tasks that jointly evaluate both static alignment and dynamic adaptation. As a case study, we apply InMind to the game Avalon, evaluating 11 state-of-the-art LLMs. General-purpose LLMs, even GPT-4o frequently rely on lexical cues, struggling to anchor reflections in temporal gameplay or adapt to evolving strategies. In contrast, reasoning-enhanced LLMs like DeepSeek-R1 exhibit early signs of style-sensitive reasoning. These findings reveal key limitations in current LLMs' capacity for individualized, adaptive reasoning, and position InMind as a step toward cognitively aligned human-AI interaction.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

Contemporary approaches to agent-based modeling (ABM) of social systems have traditionally emphasized rule-based behaviors, limiting their ability to capture nuanced dynamics by moving beyond predefined rules and leveraging contextual understanding from LMs of human social interaction. This paper presents SALM (Social Agent LM Framework), a novel approach for integrating language models (LMs) into social network simulation that achieves unprecedented temporal stability in multi-agent scenarios. Our primary contributions include: (1) a hierarchical prompting architecture enabling stable simulation beyond 4,000 timesteps while reducing token usage by 73%, (2) an attention-based memory system achieving 80% cache hit rates (95% CI [78%, 82%]) with sub-linear memory growth of 9.5%, and (3) formal bounds on personality stability. Through extensive validation against SNAP ego networks, we demonstrate the first LLM-based framework capable of modeling long-term social phenomena while maintaining empirically validated behavioral fidelity.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

This paper reviews the architecture and implementation methods of agents powered by large language models (LLMs). Motivated by the limitations of traditional LLMs in real-world tasks, the research aims to explore patterns to develop "agentic" LLMs that can automate complex tasks and bridge the performance gap with human capabilities. Key components include a perception system that converts environmental percepts into meaningful representations; a reasoning system that formulates plans, adapts to feedback, and evaluates actions through different techniques like Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought; a memory system that retains knowledge through both short-term and long-term mechanisms; and an execution system that translates internal decisions into concrete actions. This paper shows how integrating these systems leads to more capable and generalized software bots that mimic human cognitive processes for autonomous and intelligent behavior.

Large language models internalize a structural trade-off between truthfulness and obsequious flattery, emerging from reward optimization that conflates helpfulness with polite submission. This latent bias, known as sycophancy, manifests as a preference for user agreement over principled reasoning. We introduce Beacon, a single-turn forced-choice benchmark that isolates this bias independent of conversational context, enabling precise measurement of the tension between factual accuracy and submissive bias. Evaluations across twelve state-of-the-art models reveal that sycophancy decomposes into stable linguistic and affective sub-biases, each scaling with model capacity. We further propose prompt-level and activation-level interventions that modulate these biases in opposing directions, exposing the internal geometry of alignment as a dynamic manifold between truthfulness and socially compliant judgment. Beacon reframes sycophancy as a measurable form of normative misgeneralization, providing a reproducible foundation for studying and mitigating alignment drift in large-scale generative systems.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled automatic generation of chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, leading to strong performance on tasks such as math and code. However, when reasoning steps reflect social stereotypes (e.g., those related to gender, race or age), they can reinforce harmful associations and lead to misleading conclusions. We present the first systematic evaluation of social bias within LLM-generated reasoning, using the BBQ dataset to analyze both prediction accuracy and bias. Our study spans a wide range of mainstream reasoning models, including instruction-tuned and CoT-augmented variants of DeepSeek-R1 (8B/32B), ChatGPT, and other open-source LLMs. We quantify how biased reasoning steps correlate with incorrect predictions and often lead to stereotype expression. To mitigate reasoning-induced bias, we propose Answer Distribution as Bias Proxy (ADBP), a lightweight mitigation method that detects bias by tracking how model predictions change across incremental reasoning steps. ADBP outperforms a stereotype-free baseline in most cases, mitigating bias and improving the accuracy of LLM outputs. Code will be released upon paper acceptance.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in robotics, especially for high-level action planning. Meanwhile, many robotics applications involve human supervisors or collaborators. Hence, it is crucial for LLMs to generate socially acceptable actions that align with people's preferences and values. In this work, we test whether LLMs capture people's intuitions about behavior judgments and communication preferences in human-robot interaction (HRI) scenarios. For evaluation, we reproduce three HRI user studies, comparing the output of LLMs with that of real participants. We find that GPT-4 strongly outperforms other models, generating answers that correlate strongly with users' answers in two studies x2014 the first study dealing with selecting the most appropriate communicative act for a robot in various situations (r_s = 0.82), and the second with judging the desirability, intentionality, and surprisingness of behavior (r_s = 0.83). However, for the last study, testing whether people judge the behavior of robots and humans differently, no model achieves strong correlations. Moreover, we show that vision models fail to capture the essence of video stimuli and that LLMs tend to rate different communicative acts and behavior desirability higher than people.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

Humans learn social skills through both imitation and social interaction. This social learning process is largely understudied by existing research on building language agents. Motivated by this gap, we propose an interactive learning method, SOTOPIA-pi, improving the social intelligence of language agents. This method leverages behavior cloning and self-reinforcement training on filtered social interaction data according to large language model (LLM) ratings. We show that our training method allows a 7B LLM to reach the social goal completion ability of an expert model (GPT-4-based agent), while improving the safety of language agents and maintaining general QA ability on the MMLU benchmark. We also find that this training paradigm uncovers some difficulties in LLM-based evaluation of social intelligence: LLM-based evaluators overestimate the abilities of the language agents trained specifically for social interaction.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly participate in human-AI interactions, evaluating their Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities - particularly their ability to track dynamic mental states - becomes crucial. While existing benchmarks assess basic ToM abilities, they predominantly focus on static snapshots of mental states, overlooking the temporal evolution that characterizes real-world social interactions. We present DynToM, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to understand and track the temporal progression of mental states across interconnected scenarios. Through a systematic four-step framework, we generate 1,100 social contexts encompassing 5,500 scenarios and 78,100 questions, each validated for realism and quality. Our comprehensive evaluation of ten state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that their average performance underperforms humans by 44.7\%, with performance degrading significantly when tracking and reasoning about the shift of mental states. This performance gap highlights fundamental limitations in current LLMs' ability to model the dynamic nature of human mental states.

Can machines truly think, reason and act in domains like humans? This enduring question continues to shape the pursuit of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Despite the growing capabilities of models such as GPT-4.5, DeepSeek, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Phi-4, and Grok 3, which exhibit multimodal fluency and partial reasoning, these systems remain fundamentally limited by their reliance on token-level prediction and lack of grounded agency. This paper offers a cross-disciplinary synthesis of AGI development, spanning artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, psychology, generative models, and agent-based systems. We analyze the architectural and cognitive foundations of general intelligence, highlighting the role of modular reasoning, persistent memory, and multi-agent coordination. In particular, we emphasize the rise of Agentic RAG frameworks that combine retrieval, planning, and dynamic tool use to enable more adaptive behavior. We discuss generalization strategies, including information compression, test-time adaptation, and training-free methods, as critical pathways toward flexible, domain-agnostic intelligence. Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are reexamined not just as perception modules but as evolving interfaces for embodied understanding and collaborative task completion. We also argue that true intelligence arises not from scale alone but from the integration of memory and reasoning: an orchestration of modular, interactive, and self-improving components where compression enables adaptive behavior. Drawing on advances in neurosymbolic systems, reinforcement learning, and cognitive scaffolding, we explore how recent architectures begin to bridge the gap between statistical learning and goal-directed cognition. Finally, we identify key scientific, technical, and ethical challenges on the path to AGI.

Moral reasoning is a complex cognitive process shaped by individual experiences and cultural contexts and presents unique challenges for computational analysis. While natural language processing (NLP) offers promising tools for studying this phenomenon, current research lacks cohesion, employing discordant datasets and tasks that examine isolated aspects of moral reasoning. We bridge this gap with UniMoral, a unified dataset integrating psychologically grounded and social-media-derived moral dilemmas annotated with labels for action choices, ethical principles, contributing factors, and consequences, alongside annotators' moral and cultural profiles. Recognizing the cultural relativity of moral reasoning, UniMoral spans six languages, Arabic, Chinese, English, Hindi, Russian, and Spanish, capturing diverse socio-cultural contexts. We demonstrate UniMoral's utility through a benchmark evaluations of three large language models (LLMs) across four tasks: action prediction, moral typology classification, factor attribution analysis, and consequence generation. Key findings reveal that while implicitly embedded moral contexts enhance the moral reasoning capability of LLMs, there remains a critical need for increasingly specialized approaches to further advance moral reasoning in these models.

One of the long-standing aspirations in conversational AI is to allow them to autonomously take initiatives in conversations, i.e., being proactive. This is especially challenging for multi-party conversations. Prior NLP research focused mainly on predicting the next speaker from contexts like preceding conversations. In this paper, we demonstrate the limitations of such methods and rethink what it means for AI to be proactive in multi-party, human-AI conversations. We propose that just like humans, rather than merely reacting to turn-taking cues, a proactive AI formulates its own inner thoughts during a conversation, and seeks the right moment to contribute. Through a formative study with 24 participants and inspiration from linguistics and cognitive psychology, we introduce the Inner Thoughts framework. Our framework equips AI with a continuous, covert train of thoughts in parallel to the overt communication process, which enables it to proactively engage by modeling its intrinsic motivation to express these thoughts. We instantiated this framework into two real-time systems: an AI playground web app and a chatbot. Through a technical evaluation and user studies with human participants, our framework significantly surpasses existing baselines on aspects like anthropomorphism, coherence, intelligence, and turn-taking appropriateness.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

The increasing capability of Large Language Models to act as human-like social agents raises two important questions in the area of opinion dynamics. First, whether these agents can generate effective arguments that could be injected into the online discourse to steer the public opinion. Second, whether artificial agents can interact with each other to reproduce dynamics of persuasion typical of human social systems, opening up opportunities for studying synthetic social systems as faithful proxies for opinion dynamics in human populations. To address these questions, we designed a synthetic persuasion dialogue scenario on the topic of climate change, where a 'convincer' agent generates a persuasive argument for a 'skeptic' agent, who subsequently assesses whether the argument changed its internal opinion state. Different types of arguments were generated to incorporate different linguistic dimensions underpinning psycho-linguistic theories of opinion change. We then asked human judges to evaluate the persuasiveness of machine-generated arguments. Arguments that included factual knowledge, markers of trust, expressions of support, and conveyed status were deemed most effective according to both humans and agents, with humans reporting a marked preference for knowledge-based arguments. Our experimental framework lays the groundwork for future in-silico studies of opinion dynamics, and our findings suggest that artificial agents have the potential of playing an important role in collective processes of opinion formation in online social media.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

Recent advances in large language models (LLM) have enabled richer social simulations, allowing for the study of various social phenomena with LLM-based agents. However, most work has used an omniscient perspective on these simulations (e.g., single LLM to generate all interlocutors), which is fundamentally at odds with the non-omniscient, information asymmetric interactions that humans have. To examine these differences, we develop an evaluation framework to simulate social interactions with LLMs in various settings (omniscient, non-omniscient). Our experiments show that interlocutors simulated omnisciently are much more successful at accomplishing social goals compared to non-omniscient agents, despite the latter being the more realistic setting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that learning from omniscient simulations improves the apparent naturalness of interactions but scarcely enhances goal achievement in cooperative scenarios. Our findings indicate that addressing information asymmetry remains a fundamental challenge for LLM-based agents.

The field of psychology has long recognized a basic level of categorization that humans use when labeling visual stimuli, a term coined by Rosch in 1976. This level of categorization has been found to be used most frequently, to have higher information density, and to aid in visual language tasks with priming in humans. Here, we investigate basic level categorization in two recently released, open-source vision-language models (VLMs). This paper demonstrates that Llama 3.2 Vision Instruct (11B) and Molmo 7B-D both prefer basic level categorization consistent with human behavior. Moreover, the models' preferences are consistent with nuanced human behaviors like the biological versus non-biological basic level effects and the well established expert basic level shift, further suggesting that VLMs acquire cognitive categorization behaviors from the human data on which they are trained.

This article presents a theoretical framework for adapting the Common Model of Cognition to large generative network models within the field of artificial intelligence. This can be accomplished by restructuring modules within the Common Model into shadow production systems that are peripheral to a central production system, which handles higher-level reasoning based on the shadow productions' output. Implementing this novel structure within the Common Model allows for a seamless connection between cognitive architectures and generative neural networks.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

We explore social perception of human faces in CLIP, a widely used open-source vision-language model. To this end, we compare the similarity in CLIP embeddings between different textual prompts and a set of face images. Our textual prompts are constructed from well-validated social psychology terms denoting social perception. The face images are synthetic and are systematically and independently varied along six dimensions: the legally protected attributes of age, gender, and race, as well as facial expression, lighting, and pose. Independently and systematically manipulating face attributes allows us to study the effect of each on social perception and avoids confounds that can occur in wild-collected data due to uncontrolled systematic correlations between attributes. Thus, our findings are experimental rather than observational. Our main findings are three. First, while CLIP is trained on the widest variety of images and texts, it is able to make fine-grained human-like social judgments on face images. Second, age, gender, and race do systematically impact CLIP's social perception of faces, suggesting an undesirable bias in CLIP vis-a-vis legally protected attributes. Most strikingly, we find a strong pattern of bias concerning the faces of Black women, where CLIP produces extreme values of social perception across different ages and facial expressions. Third, facial expression impacts social perception more than age and lighting as much as age. The last finding predicts that studies that do not control for unprotected visual attributes may reach the wrong conclusions on bias. Our novel method of investigation, which is founded on the social psychology literature and on the experiments involving the manipulation of individual attributes, yields sharper and more reliable observations than previous observational methods and may be applied to study biases in any vision-language model.

Natural language has long enabled human cooperation, but its lossy, ambiguous, and indirect nature limits the potential of collective intelligence. While machines are not subject to these constraints, most LLM-based multi-agent systems still rely solely on natural language, exchanging tokens or their embeddings. To go beyond language, we introduce a new paradigm, thought communication, which enables agents to interact directly mind-to-mind, akin to telepathy. To uncover these latent thoughts in a principled way, we formalize the process as a general latent variable model, where agent states are generated by an unknown function of underlying thoughts. We prove that, in a nonparametric setting without auxiliary information, both shared and private latent thoughts between any pair of agents can be identified. Moreover, the global structure of thought sharing, including which agents share which thoughts and how these relationships are structured, can also be recovered with theoretical guarantees. Guided by the established theory, we develop a framework that extracts latent thoughts from all agents prior to communication and assigns each agent the relevant thoughts, along with their sharing patterns. This paradigm naturally extends beyond LLMs to all modalities, as most observational data arise from hidden generative processes. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks validate the theory and demonstrate the collaborative advantages of thought communication. We hope this work illuminates the potential of leveraging the hidden world, as many challenges remain unsolvable through surface-level observation alone, regardless of compute or data scale.

We survey 146 papers analyzing "bias" in NLP systems, finding that their motivations are often vague, inconsistent, and lacking in normative reasoning, despite the fact that analyzing "bias" is an inherently normative process. We further find that these papers' proposed quantitative techniques for measuring or mitigating "bias" are poorly matched to their motivations and do not engage with the relevant literature outside of NLP. Based on these findings, we describe the beginnings of a path forward by proposing three recommendations that should guide work analyzing "bias" in NLP systems. These recommendations rest on a greater recognition of the relationships between language and social hierarchies, encouraging researchers and practitioners to articulate their conceptualizations of "bias"---i.e., what kinds of system behaviors are harmful, in what ways, to whom, and why, as well as the normative reasoning underlying these statements---and to center work around the lived experiences of members of communities affected by NLP systems, while interrogating and reimagining the power relations between technologists and such communities.

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Social computing prototypes probe the social behaviors that may arise in an envisioned system design. This prototyping practice is currently limited to recruiting small groups of people. Unfortunately, many challenges do not arise until a system is populated at a larger scale. Can a designer understand how a social system might behave when populated, and make adjustments to the design before the system falls prey to such challenges? We introduce social simulacra, a prototyping technique that generates a breadth of realistic social interactions that may emerge when a social computing system is populated. Social simulacra take as input the designer's description of a community's design -- goal, rules, and member personas -- and produce as output an instance of that design with simulated behavior, including posts, replies, and anti-social behaviors. We demonstrate that social simulacra shift the behaviors that they generate appropriately in response to design changes, and that they enable exploration of "what if?" scenarios where community members or moderators intervene. To power social simulacra, we contribute techniques for prompting a large language model to generate thousands of distinct community members and their social interactions with each other; these techniques are enabled by the observation that large language models' training data already includes a wide variety of positive and negative behavior on social media platforms. In evaluations, we show that participants are often unable to distinguish social simulacra from actual community behavior and that social computing designers successfully refine their social computing designs when using social simulacra.

Real-world multi-agent scenarios often involve mixed motives, demanding altruistic agents capable of self-protection against potential exploitation. However, existing approaches often struggle to achieve both objectives. In this paper, based on that empathic responses are modulated by inferred social relationships between agents, we propose LASE Learning to balance Altruism and Self-interest based on Empathy), a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm that fosters altruistic cooperation through gifting while avoiding exploitation by other agents in mixed-motive games. LASE allocates a portion of its rewards to co-players as gifts, with this allocation adapting dynamically based on the social relationship -- a metric evaluating the friendliness of co-players estimated by counterfactual reasoning. In particular, social relationship measures each co-player by comparing the estimated Q-function of current joint action to a counterfactual baseline which marginalizes the co-player's action, with its action distribution inferred by a perspective-taking module. Comprehensive experiments are performed in spatially and temporally extended mixed-motive games, demonstrating LASE's ability to promote group collaboration without compromising fairness and its capacity to adapt policies to various types of interactive co-players.

Humans talk in free-form while negotiating the expressed meanings or common ground. Despite the impressive conversational abilities of the large generative language models, they do not consider the individual differences in contextual understanding in a shared situated environment. In this work, we propose MindDial, a novel conversational framework that can generate situated free-form responses to negotiate common ground. We design an explicit mind module that can track three-level beliefs -- the speaker's belief, the speaker's prediction of the listener's belief, and the common belief based on the gap between the first two. Then the speaking act classification head will decide to continue to talk, end this turn, or take task-related action. We augment a common ground alignment dataset MutualFriend with belief dynamics annotation, of which the goal is to find a single mutual friend based on the free chat between two agents. Experiments show that our model with mental state modeling can resemble human responses when aligning common ground meanwhile mimic the natural human conversation flow. The ablation study further validates the third-level common belief can aggregate information of the first and second-order beliefs and align common ground more efficiently.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with the non-stationarity of multi-agent systems and fail to adaptively learn online when tested with novel agents. Here, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to create an autonomous agent that can handle these challenges. Our agent, Hypothetical Minds, consists of a cognitively-inspired architecture, featuring modular components for perception, memory, and hierarchical planning over two levels of abstraction. We introduce the Theory of Mind module that scaffolds the high-level planning process by generating hypotheses about other agents' strategies in natural language. It then evaluates and iteratively refines these hypotheses by reinforcing hypotheses that make correct predictions about the other agents' behavior. Hypothetical Minds significantly improves performance over previous LLM-agent and RL baselines on a range of competitive, mixed motive, and collaborative domains in the Melting Pot benchmark, including both dyadic and population-based environments. Additionally, comparisons against LLM-agent baselines and ablations reveal the importance of hypothesis evaluation and refinement for succeeding on complex scenarios.

Pragmatics and non-literal language understanding are essential to human communication, and present a long-standing challenge for artificial language models. We perform a fine-grained comparison of language models and humans on seven pragmatic phenomena, using zero-shot prompting on an expert-curated set of English materials. We ask whether models (1) select pragmatic interpretations of speaker utterances, (2) make similar error patterns as humans, and (3) use similar linguistic cues as humans to solve the tasks. We find that the largest models achieve high accuracy and match human error patterns: within incorrect responses, models favor literal interpretations over heuristic-based distractors. We also find preliminary evidence that models and humans are sensitive to similar linguistic cues. Our results suggest that pragmatic behaviors can emerge in models without explicitly constructed representations of mental states. However, models tend to struggle with phenomena relying on social expectation violations.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear. In this work, we investigated whether the well-known Knobe effect, a moral bias in intentionality judgements, emerges in finetuned LLMs and whether it can be traced back to specific components of the model. We conducted a Layer-Patching analysis across 3 open-weights LLMs and demonstrated that the bias is not only learned during finetuning but also localized in a specific set of layers. Surprisingly, we found that patching activations from the corresponding pretrained model into just a few critical layers is sufficient to eliminate the effect. Our findings offer new evidence that social biases in LLMs can be interpreted, localized, and mitigated through targeted interventions, without the need for model retraining.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to mimic human behavior triggered a plethora of computational social science research, assuming that empirical studies of humans can be conducted with AI agents instead. Since there have been conflicting research findings on whether and when this hypothesis holds, there is a need to better understand the differences in their experimental designs. We focus on replicating the behavior of social network users with the use of LLMs for the analysis of communication on social networks. First, we provide a formal framework for the simulation of social networks, before focusing on the sub-task of imitating user communication. We empirically test different approaches to imitate user behavior on X in English and German. Our findings suggest that social simulations should be validated by their empirical realism measured in the setting in which the simulation components were fitted. With this paper, we argue for more rigor when applying generative-agent-based modeling for social simulation.

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

Large language models (LLMs) now solve multi-step problems by emitting extended chains of thought. During the process, they often re-derive the same intermediate steps across problems, inflating token usage and latency. This saturation of the context window leaves less capacity for exploration. We study a simple mechanism that converts recurring reasoning fragments into concise, reusable "behaviors" (name + instruction) via the model's own metacognitive analysis of prior traces. These behaviors are stored in a "behavior handbook" which supplies them to the model in-context at inference or distills them into parameters via supervised fine-tuning. This approach achieves improved test-time reasoning across three different settings - 1) Behavior-conditioned inference: Providing the LLM relevant behaviors in-context during reasoning reduces number of reasoning tokens by up to 46% while matching or improving baseline accuracy; 2) Behavior-guided self-improvement: Without any parameter updates, the model improves its own future reasoning by leveraging behaviors from its own past problem solving attempts. This yields up to 10% higher accuracy than a naive critique-and-revise baseline; and 3) Behavior-conditioned SFT: SFT on behavior-conditioned reasoning traces is more effective at converting non-reasoning models into reasoning models as compared to vanilla SFT. Together, these results indicate that turning slow derivations into fast procedural hints enables LLMs to remember how to reason, not just what to conclude.

Integrating robotics into everyday scenarios like tutoring or physical training requires robots capable of adaptive, socially engaging, and goal-oriented interactions. While Large Language Models show promise in human-like communication, their standalone use is hindered by memory constraints and contextual incoherence. This work presents a multimodal, cognitively inspired framework that enhances LLM-based autonomous decision-making in social and task-oriented Human-Robot Interaction. Specifically, we develop an LLM-based agent for a robot trainer, balancing social conversation with task guidance and goal-driven motivation. To further enhance autonomy and personalization, we introduce a memory system for selecting, storing and retrieving experiences, facilitating generalized reasoning based on knowledge built across different interactions. A preliminary HRI user study and offline experiments with a synthetic dataset validate our approach, demonstrating the system's ability to manage complex interactions, autonomously drive training tasks, and build and retrieve contextual memories, advancing socially intelligent robotics.

Multi-party Conversational Agents (MPCAs) are systems designed to engage in dialogue with more than two participants simultaneously. Unlike traditional two-party agents, designing MPCAs faces additional challenges due to the need to interpret both utterance semantics and social dynamics. This survey explores recent progress in MPCAs by addressing three key questions: 1) Can agents model each participants' mental states? (State of Mind Modeling); 2) Can they properly understand the dialogue content? (Semantic Understanding); and 3) Can they reason about and predict future conversation flow? (Agent Action Modeling). We review methods ranging from classical machine learning to Large Language Models (LLMs) and multi-modal systems. Our analysis underscores Theory of Mind (ToM) as essential for building intelligent MPCAs and highlights multi-modal understanding as a promising yet underexplored direction. Finally, this survey offers guidance to future researchers on developing more capable MPCAs.

When interacting with the real world, human often take the egocentric (first-person) view as a benchmark, naturally transferring behaviors observed from a exocentric (third-person) view to their own. This cognitive theory provides a foundation for researching how robots can more effectively imitate human behavior. However, current research either employs multiple cameras with different views focusing on the same individual's behavior simultaneously or encounters unpair ego-exo view scenarios, there is no effort to fully exploit human cognitive behavior in the real world. To fill this gap, in this paper, we introduce a novel large-scale egocentric dataset, called EgoMe, which towards following the process of human imitation learning via egocentric view in the real world. Our dataset includes 7902 pairs of videos (15804 videos) for diverse daily behaviors in real-world scenarios. For a pair of videos, one video captures a exocentric view of the imitator observing the demonstrator's actions, while the other captures a egocentric view of the imitator subsequently following those actions. Notably, our dataset also contain exo-ego eye gaze, angular velocity, acceleration, magnetic strength and other sensor multi-modal data for assisting in establishing correlations between observing and following process. In addition, we also propose eight challenging benchmark tasks for fully leveraging this data resource and promoting the research of robot imitation learning ability. Extensive statistical analysis demonstrates significant advantages compared to existing datasets. The proposed EgoMe dataset and benchmark will be released soon.

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

Large language models' reasoning abilities benefit from methods that organize their thought processes, such as chain-of-thought prompting, which employs a sequential structure to guide the reasoning process step-by-step. However, existing approaches focus primarily on organizing the sequence of thoughts, leaving structure in individual thought steps underexplored. To address this gap, we propose Table as Thought, a framework inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories on human thought. Table as Thought organizes reasoning within a tabular schema, where rows represent sequential thought steps and columns capture critical constraints and contextual information to enhance reasoning. The reasoning process iteratively populates the table until self-verification ensures completeness and correctness. Our experiments show that Table as Thought excels in planning tasks and demonstrates a strong potential for enhancing LLM performance in mathematical reasoning compared to unstructured thought baselines. This work provides a novel exploration of refining thought representation within LLMs, paving the way for advancements in reasoning and AI cognition.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive accomplishments in both reasoning and planning, their abilities in multi-agent collaborations remains largely unexplored. This study evaluates LLM-based agents in a multi-agent cooperative text game with Theory of Mind (ToM) inference tasks, comparing their performance with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and planning-based baselines. We observed evidence of emergent collaborative behaviors and high-order Theory of Mind capabilities among LLM-based agents. Our results reveal limitations in LLM-based agents' planning optimization due to systematic failures in managing long-horizon contexts and hallucination about the task state. We explore the use of explicit belief state representations to mitigate these issues, finding that it enhances task performance and the accuracy of ToM inferences for LLM-based agents.

What is appropriateness? Humans navigate a multi-scale mosaic of interlocking notions of what is appropriate for different situations. We act one way with our friends, another with our family, and yet another in the office. Likewise for AI, appropriate behavior for a comedy-writing assistant is not the same as appropriate behavior for a customer-service representative. What determines which actions are appropriate in which contexts? And what causes these standards to change over time? Since all judgments of AI appropriateness are ultimately made by humans, we need to understand how appropriateness guides human decision making in order to properly evaluate AI decision making and improve it. This paper presents a theory of appropriateness: how it functions in human society, how it may be implemented in the brain, and what it means for responsible deployment of generative AI technology.

Social intelligence has become a critical capability for large language models (LLMs), enabling them to engage effectively in real-world social tasks such as accommodation, persuasion, collaboration, and negotiation. Reinforcement learning (RL) is a natural fit for training socially intelligent agents because it allows models to learn sophisticated strategies directly through social interactions. However, social interactions have two key characteristics that set barriers for RL training: (1) partial observability, where utterances have indirect and delayed effects that complicate credit assignment, and (2) multi-dimensionality, where behaviors such as rapport-building or knowledge-seeking contribute indirectly to goal achievement. These characteristics make Markov decision process (MDP)-based RL with single-dimensional episode-level rewards inefficient and unstable. To address these challenges, we propose Sotopia-RL, a novel framework that refines coarse episode-level feedback into utterance-level, multi-dimensional rewards. Utterance-level credit assignment mitigates partial observability by attributing outcomes to individual utterances, while multi-dimensional rewards capture the full richness of social interactions and reduce reward hacking. Experiments in Sotopia, an open-ended social learning environment, demonstrate that Sotopia-RL achieves state-of-the-art social goal completion scores (7.17 on Sotopia-hard and 8.31 on Sotopia-full), significantly outperforming existing approaches. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of both utterance-level credit assignment and multi-dimensional reward design for RL training. Our implementation is publicly available at: https://github.com/sotopia-lab/sotopia-rl.

Understanding how humans conceptualize and categorize natural objects offers critical insights into perception and cognition. With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), a key question arises: can these models develop human-like object representations from linguistic and multimodal data? In this study, we combined behavioral and neuroimaging analyses to explore the relationship between object concept representations in LLMs and human cognition. We collected 4.7 million triplet judgments from LLMs and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) to derive low-dimensional embeddings that capture the similarity structure of 1,854 natural objects. The resulting 66-dimensional embeddings were stable, predictive, and exhibited semantic clustering similar to human mental representations. Remarkably, the dimensions underlying these embeddings were interpretable, suggesting that LLMs and MLLMs develop human-like conceptual representations of objects. Further analysis showed strong alignment between model embeddings and neural activity patterns in brain regions such as EBA, PPA, RSC, and FFA. This provides compelling evidence that the object representations in LLMs, while not identical to human ones, share fundamental similarities that reflect key aspects of human conceptual knowledge. Our findings advance the understanding of machine intelligence and inform the development of more human-like artificial cognitive systems.