new

Get trending papers in your email inbox!

Subscribe

Daily Papers

byAK and the research community

Nov 6

Alignment Quality Index (AQI) : Beyond Refusals: AQI as an Intrinsic Alignment Diagnostic via Latent Geometry, Cluster Divergence, and Layer wise Pooled Representations

Alignment is no longer a luxury, it is a necessity. As large language models (LLMs) enter high-stakes domains like education, healthcare, governance, and law, their behavior must reliably reflect human-aligned values and safety constraints. Yet current evaluations rely heavily on behavioral proxies such as refusal rates, G-Eval scores, and toxicity classifiers, all of which have critical blind spots. Aligned models are often vulnerable to jailbreaking, stochasticity of generation, and alignment faking. To address this issue, we introduce the Alignment Quality Index (AQI). This novel geometric and prompt-invariant metric empirically assesses LLM alignment by analyzing the separation of safe and unsafe activations in latent space. By combining measures such as the Davies-Bouldin Score (DBS), Dunn Index (DI), Xie-Beni Index (XBI), and Calinski-Harabasz Index (CHI) across various formulations, AQI captures clustering quality to detect hidden misalignments and jailbreak risks, even when outputs appear compliant. AQI also serves as an early warning signal for alignment faking, offering a robust, decoding invariant tool for behavior agnostic safety auditing. Additionally, we propose the LITMUS dataset to facilitate robust evaluation under these challenging conditions. Empirical tests on LITMUS across different models trained under DPO, GRPO, and RLHF conditions demonstrate AQI's correlation with external judges and ability to reveal vulnerabilities missed by refusal metrics. We make our implementation publicly available to foster future research in this area.

  • 15 authors
·
Jun 16 2

Learning Geometrically Disentangled Representations of Protein Folding Simulations

Massive molecular simulations of drug-target proteins have been used as a tool to understand disease mechanism and develop therapeutics. This work focuses on learning a generative neural network on a structural ensemble of a drug-target protein, e.g. SARS-CoV-2 Spike protein, obtained from computationally expensive molecular simulations. Model tasks involve characterizing the distinct structural fluctuations of the protein bound to various drug molecules, as well as efficient generation of protein conformations that can serve as an complement of a molecular simulation engine. Specifically, we present a geometric autoencoder framework to learn separate latent space encodings of the intrinsic and extrinsic geometries of the protein structure. For this purpose, the proposed Protein Geometric AutoEncoder (ProGAE) model is trained on the protein contact map and the orientation of the backbone bonds of the protein. Using ProGAE latent embeddings, we reconstruct and generate the conformational ensemble of a protein at or near the experimental resolution, while gaining better interpretability and controllability in term of protein structure generation from the learned latent space. Additionally, ProGAE models are transferable to a different state of the same protein or to a new protein of different size, where only the dense layer decoding from the latent representation needs to be retrained. Results show that our geometric learning-based method enjoys both accuracy and efficiency for generating complex structural variations, charting the path toward scalable and improved approaches for analyzing and enhancing high-cost simulations of drug-target proteins.

  • 5 authors
·
May 20, 2022

LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separately

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

  • 5 authors
·
Jul 15