Daily Papers

Recent advancements in Self-Supervised Learning (SSL) have shown promising results in Speaker Verification (SV). However, narrowing the performance gap with supervised systems remains an ongoing challenge. Several studies have observed that speech representations from large-scale ASR models contain valuable speaker information. This work explores the limitations of fine-tuning these models for SV using an SSL contrastive objective in an end-to-end approach. Then, we propose a framework to learn speaker representations in an SSL context by fine-tuning a pre-trained WavLM with a supervised loss using pseudo-labels. Initial pseudo-labels are derived from an SSL DINO-based model and are iteratively refined by clustering the model embeddings. Our method achieves 0.99% EER on VoxCeleb1-O, establishing the new state-of-the-art on self-supervised SV. As this performance is close to our supervised baseline of 0.94% EER, this contribution is a step towards supervised performance on SV with SSL.

The limited availability of labeled chest X-ray datasets is a significant bottleneck in the development of medical imaging methods. Self-supervised learning (SSL) can mitigate this problem by training models on unlabeled data. Furthermore, self-supervised pretraining has yielded promising results in visual recognition of natural images but has not been given much consideration in medical image analysis. In this work, we propose a self-supervised method, DINO-CXR, which is a novel adaptation of a self-supervised method, DINO, based on a vision transformer for chest X-ray classification. A comparative analysis is performed to show the effectiveness of the proposed method for both pneumonia and COVID-19 detection. Through a quantitative analysis, it is also shown that the proposed method outperforms state-of-the-art methods in terms of accuracy and achieves comparable results in terms of AUC and F-1 score while requiring significantly less labeled data.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

Self-supervised learning (SSL) has gained significant interest in recent years as a solution to address the challenges posed by sparse and noisy data in recommender systems. Despite the growing number of SSL algorithms designed to provide state-of-the-art performance in various recommendation scenarios (e.g., graph collaborative filtering, sequential recommendation, social recommendation, KG-enhanced recommendation), there is still a lack of unified frameworks that integrate recommendation algorithms across different domains. Such a framework could serve as the cornerstone for self-supervised recommendation algorithms, unifying the validation of existing methods and driving the design of new ones. To address this gap, we introduce SSLRec, a novel benchmark platform that provides a standardized, flexible, and comprehensive framework for evaluating various SSL-enhanced recommenders. The SSLRec framework features a modular architecture that allows users to easily evaluate state-of-the-art models and a complete set of data augmentation and self-supervised toolkits to help create SSL recommendation models with specific needs. Furthermore, SSLRec simplifies the process of training and evaluating different recommendation models with consistent and fair settings. Our SSLRec platform covers a comprehensive set of state-of-the-art SSL-enhanced recommendation models across different scenarios, enabling researchers to evaluate these cutting-edge models and drive further innovation in the field. Our implemented SSLRec framework is available at the source code repository https://github.com/HKUDS/SSLRec.

This technical report presents SSL4EO-S12 v1.1, a multimodal, multitemporal Earth Observation dataset designed for pretraining large-scale foundation models. Building on the success of SSL4EO-S12 v1.0, the new version addresses the previous challenges of data misalignment and a limited data structure for low-barrier, analysis-ready EO processing. SSL4EO-S12 v1.1 covers the world's 10,000 largest cities and its surroundings within a 50 km radius across four seasons, resulting in a diverse collection of nearly one million patches. SSL4EO-S12 v1.1 packages the data in Zarr file format for cloud-efficient loading and representation of meta-information such as including cloud masks and geolocation. Released under the CC-BY-4.0 license, SSL4EO-S12 v1.1 facilitates open research and provides a robust foundation for future advancements in self-supervised learning and geospatial analysis. The dataset is available online through https://datapub.fz-juelich.de/ssl4eo-s12, and we provided additional resources at https://github.com/DLR-MF-DAS/SSL4EO-S12-v1.1.

Self-supervised learning (SSL) pipelines differ in many design choices such as the architecture, augmentations, or pretraining data. Yet SSL is typically evaluated using a single metric: linear probing on ImageNet. This does not provide much insight into why or when a model is better, now how to improve it. To address this, we propose an SSL risk decomposition, which generalizes the classical supervised approximation-estimation decomposition by considering errors arising from the representation learning step. Our decomposition consists of four error components: approximation, representation usability, probe generalization, and encoder generalization. We provide efficient estimators for each component and use them to analyze the effect of 30 design choices on 169 SSL vision models evaluated on ImageNet. Our analysis gives valuable insights for designing and using SSL models. For example, it highlights the main sources of error and shows how to improve SSL in specific settings (full- vs few-shot) by trading off error components. All results and pretrained models are at https://github.com/YannDubs/SSL-Risk-Decomposition.

While diffusion models have achieved great success in generating continuous signals such as images and audio, it remains elusive for diffusion models in learning discrete sequence data like natural languages. Although recent advances circumvent this challenge of discreteness by embedding discrete tokens as continuous surrogates, they still fall short of satisfactory generation quality. To understand this, we first dive deep into the denoised training protocol of diffusion-based sequence generative models and determine their three severe problems, i.e., 1) failing to learn, 2) lack of scalability, and 3) neglecting source conditions. We argue that these problems can be boiled down to the pitfall of the not completely eliminated discreteness in the embedding space, and the scale of noises is decisive herein. In this paper, we introduce DINOISER to facilitate diffusion models for sequence generation by manipulating noises. We propose to adaptively determine the range of sampled noise scales for counter-discreteness training; and encourage the proposed diffused sequence learner to leverage source conditions with amplified noise scales during inference. Experiments show that DINOISER enables consistent improvement over the baselines of previous diffusion-based sequence generative models on several conditional sequence modeling benchmarks thanks to both effective training and inference strategies. Analyses further verify that DINOISER can make better use of source conditions to govern its generative process.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate exceptional natural language capabilities, general-purpose models lack specialized domain knowledge for effective cybersecurity analysis. In this work, we investigate Domain-Adaptive Continuous Pretraining (DAP) as a methodology for enhancing cybersecurity understanding in pretrained LLMs while preserving general language capabilities. We systematically adapted three decoder-based architectures -- Llama-3.1-8B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B, and Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct -- using a curated 126-million-word cybersecurity corpus from standards, academic literature, and various other sources. Our approach employed constrained training parameters and distributed FSDP training to balance domain specialization with knowledge preservation. Evaluation across three cybersecurity benchmarks, namely, CTI-MCQ, CyberMetric, and SecEval, demonstrates consistent improvements post-adaptation. The Llama-3.3-70B-Ins-DAP model achieved state-of-the-art accuracies of 0.718, 0.933, and 0.864, respectively, outperforming specialized models, including Llama-Primus-Base. Notably, competitive performance was achieved using substantially smaller datasets (118.8 million versus 2.77 billion tokens), demonstrating efficient domain specialization viability. We establish that targeted continuous pretraining enables effective cybersecurity domain adaptation with computational feasibility, providing foundations for specialized AI assistants in threat analysis, vulnerability assessment, and security documentation while challenging prevailing assumptions about data requirements for LLM specialization.

Models using structured state space sequence (S4) layers have achieved state-of-the-art performance on long-range sequence modeling tasks. An S4 layer combines linear state space models (SSMs), the HiPPO framework, and deep learning to achieve high performance. We build on the design of the S4 layer and introduce a new state space layer, the S5 layer. Whereas an S4 layer uses many independent single-input, single-output SSMs, the S5 layer uses one multi-input, multi-output SSM. We establish a connection between S5 and S4, and use this to develop the initialization and parameterization used by the S5 model. The result is a state space layer that can leverage efficient and widely implemented parallel scans, allowing S5 to match the computational efficiency of S4, while also achieving state-of-the-art performance on several long-range sequence modeling tasks. S5 averages 87.4% on the long range arena benchmark, and 98.5% on the most difficult Path-X task.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have been gaining a lot of interest due to their adaptability and extensibility in emerging applications, including communication networks. It is anticipated that ZSM networks will be able to support LLMs as a service, as they provide ultra reliable low-latency communications and closed loop massive connectivity. However, LLMs are vulnerable to data and model privacy issues that affect the trustworthiness of LLMs to be deployed for user-based services. In this paper, we explore the security vulnerabilities associated with fine-tuning LLMs in ZSM networks, in particular the membership inference attack. We define the characteristics of an attack network that can perform a membership inference attack if the attacker has access to the fine-tuned model for the downstream task. We show that the membership inference attacks are effective for any downstream task, which can lead to a personal data breach when using LLM as a service. The experimental results show that the attack success rate of maximum 92% can be achieved on named entity recognition task. Based on the experimental analysis, we discuss possible defense mechanisms and present possible research directions to make the LLMs more trustworthy in the context of ZSM networks.

The Mixture of Experts (MoE) architecture has excelled in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), yet its potential in real-time open-vocabulary object detectors, which also leverage large-scale vision-language datasets but smaller models, remains unexplored. This work investigates this domain, revealing intriguing insights. In the shallow layers, experts tend to cooperate with diverse peers to expand the search space. While in the deeper layers, fixed collaborative structures emerge, where each expert maintains 2-3 fixed partners and distinct expert combinations are specialized in processing specific patterns. Concretely, we propose Dynamic-DINO, which extends Grounding DINO 1.5 Edge from a dense model to a dynamic inference framework via an efficient MoE-Tuning strategy. Additionally, we design a granularity decomposition mechanism to decompose the Feed-Forward Network (FFN) of base model into multiple smaller expert networks, expanding the subnet search space. To prevent performance degradation at the start of fine-tuning, we further propose a pre-trained weight allocation strategy for the experts, coupled with a specific router initialization. During inference, only the input-relevant experts are activated to form a compact subnet. Experiments show that, pretrained with merely 1.56M open-source data, Dynamic-DINO outperforms Grounding DINO 1.5 Edge, pretrained on the private Grounding20M dataset.

Large language model (LLM)-powered agents are increasingly used to plan and execute scientific workflows, yet most research cyberinfrastructure (CI) exposes heterogeneous APIs and implements security models that present barriers for use by agents. We report on our experience using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as a unifying interface that makes research capabilities discoverable, invokable, and composable. Our approach is pragmatic: we implement thin MCP servers over mature services, including Globus Transfer, Compute, and Search; status APIs exposed by computing facilities; Octopus event fabric; and domain-specific tools such as Garden and Galaxy. We use case studies in computational chemistry, bioinformatics, quantum chemistry, and filesystem monitoring to illustrate how this MCP-oriented architecture can be used in practice. We distill lessons learned and outline open challenges in evaluation and trust for agent-led science.

Linear time-invariant state space models (SSM) are a classical model from engineering and statistics, that have recently been shown to be very promising in machine learning through the Structured State Space sequence model (S4). A core component of S4 involves initializing the SSM state matrix to a particular matrix called a HiPPO matrix, which was empirically important for S4's ability to handle long sequences. However, the specific matrix that S4 uses was actually derived in previous work for a particular time-varying dynamical system, and the use of this matrix as a time-invariant SSM had no known mathematical interpretation. Consequently, the theoretical mechanism by which S4 models long-range dependencies actually remains unexplained. We derive a more general and intuitive formulation of the HiPPO framework, which provides a simple mathematical interpretation of S4 as a decomposition onto exponentially-warped Legendre polynomials, explaining its ability to capture long dependencies. Our generalization introduces a theoretically rich class of SSMs that also lets us derive more intuitive S4 variants for other bases such as the Fourier basis, and explains other aspects of training S4, such as how to initialize the important timescale parameter. These insights improve S4's performance to 86% on the Long Range Arena benchmark, with 96% on the most difficult Path-X task.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable potential in various domains, but they often lack the ability to access and reason over domain-specific knowledge and tools. In this paper, we introduced CACTUS (Chemistry Agent Connecting Tool-Usage to Science), an LLM-based agent that integrates cheminformatics tools to enable advanced reasoning and problem-solving in chemistry and molecular discovery. We evaluate the performance of CACTUS using a diverse set of open-source LLMs, including Gemma-7b, Falcon-7b, MPT-7b, Llama2-7b, and Mistral-7b, on a benchmark of thousands of chemistry questions. Our results demonstrate that CACTUS significantly outperforms baseline LLMs, with the Gemma-7b and Mistral-7b models achieving the highest accuracy regardless of the prompting strategy used. Moreover, we explore the impact of domain-specific prompting and hardware configurations on model performance, highlighting the importance of prompt engineering and the potential for deploying smaller models on consumer-grade hardware without significant loss in accuracy. By combining the cognitive capabilities of open-source LLMs with domain-specific tools, CACTUS can assist researchers in tasks such as molecular property prediction, similarity searching, and drug-likeness assessment. Furthermore, CACTUS represents a significant milestone in the field of cheminformatics, offering an adaptable tool for researchers engaged in chemistry and molecular discovery. By integrating the strengths of open-source LLMs with domain-specific tools, CACTUS has the potential to accelerate scientific advancement and unlock new frontiers in the exploration of novel, effective, and safe therapeutic candidates, catalysts, and materials. Moreover, CACTUS's ability to integrate with automated experimentation platforms and make data-driven decisions in real time opens up new possibilities for autonomous discovery.

Recently, language models like Llama 3.1 Instruct have become increasingly capable of agentic behavior, enabling them to perform tasks requiring short-term planning and tool use. In this study, we apply refusal-vector ablation to Llama 3.1 70B and implement a simple agent scaffolding to create an unrestricted agent. Our findings imply that these refusal-vector ablated models can successfully complete harmful tasks, such as bribing officials or crafting phishing attacks, revealing significant vulnerabilities in current safety mechanisms. To further explore this, we introduce a small Safe Agent Benchmark, designed to test both harmful and benign tasks in agentic scenarios. Our results imply that safety fine-tuning in chat models does not generalize well to agentic behavior, as we find that Llama 3.1 Instruct models are willing to perform most harmful tasks without modifications. At the same time, these models will refuse to give advice on how to perform the same tasks when asked for a chat completion. This highlights the growing risk of misuse as models become more capable, underscoring the need for improved safety frameworks for language model agents.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have already been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities that allow attackers to exploit by designing malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. Our analysis identifies four categories of attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload-download-attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent the proposed attack methods. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful behaviors within the user's local environment-such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets-by deploying a proof-of-concept (PoC) framework against five leading LLMs. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current security ecosystem surrounding MCP servers. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with the structured reasoning and tool-assisted computation needed for problem solving in cybersecurity applications. In this work, we introduce "random-crypto", a cryptographic Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenge generator framework that we use to fine-tune a tool-augmented Llama-3.1-8B with Guided Reinforcement Prompt Optimisation (GRPO), allowing the agent to iteratively write and execute Python inside an isolated REPL. GRPO yields a +53% absolute jump in Pass@8 on unseen "random-crypto" tasks (0.35 -> 0.88) and raises Majority@8 to 0.41. The fine-tuned agent also generalizes to an external dataset. On a subset of picoCTF cryptography problems, it improves Pass@8 by +13 pp. Ablations show the gains stem from more reliable tool invocation and code synthesis, rather than superficial prompt adaptation.

The foundation of reproducible science lies in protocols that are precise, logically ordered, and executable. The autonomous generation of these protocols through natural language queries could greatly improve the efficiency of the reproduction process. However, current leading large language models (LLMs) often generate incomplete or inconsistent protocols, limiting their utility. To address this limitation, we first introduce SciRecipe, a large-scale dataset of over 12K structured protocols spanning 27 biological subfields and encompassing both comprehension and problem-solving tasks. To further improve protocol generation, we propose the "Sketch-and-Fill" paradigm, which separates analysis, structuring, and expression to ensure each step is explicit and verifiable. Complementing this, the structured component-based reward mechanism evaluates step granularity, action order, and semantic fidelity, aligning model optimization with experimental reliability. Building on these components, we develop Thoth, trained through a staged Knowledge-to-Action process that progresses from knowledge acquisition to operational reasoning and ultimately to robust, executable protocol generation. Across multiple benchmarks, Thoth consistently surpasses both proprietary and open-source LLMs, achieving significant improvements in step alignment, logical sequencing, and semantic accuracy. Our approach paves the way for reliable scientific assistants that bridge knowledge with experimental execution. All data, code, and models will be released publicly.

Deep Learning is often depicted as a trio of data-architecture-loss. Yet, recent Self Supervised Learning (SSL) solutions have introduced numerous additional design choices, e.g., a projector network, positive views, or teacher-student networks. These additions pose two challenges. First, they limit the impact of theoretical studies that often fail to incorporate all those intertwined designs. Second, they slow-down the deployment of SSL methods to new domains as numerous hyper-parameters need to be carefully tuned. In this study, we bring forward the surprising observation that--at least for pretraining datasets of up to a few hundred thousands samples--the additional designs introduced by SSL do not contribute to the quality of the learned representations. That finding not only provides legitimacy to existing theoretical studies, but also simplifies the practitioner's path to SSL deployment in numerous small and medium scale settings. Our finding answers a long-lasting question: the often-experienced sensitivity to training settings and hyper-parameters encountered in SSL come from their design, rather than the absence of supervised guidance.

With the rapid deployment of SCADA systems, how to effectively analyze industrial signals and detect abnormal states is an urgent need for the industry. Due to the significant heterogeneity of these signals, which we summarize as the M5 problem, previous works only focus on small sub-problems and employ specialized models, failing to utilize the synergies between modalities and the powerful scaling law. However, we argue that the M5 signals can be modeled in a unified manner due to the intrinsic similarity. As a result, we propose FISHER, a Foundation model for multi-modal Industrial Signal compreHEnsive Representation. To support arbitrary sampling rates, FISHER considers the increment of sampling rate as the concatenation of sub-band information. Specifically, FISHER takes the STFT sub-band as the modeling unit and adopts a teacher student SSL framework for pre-training. We also develop the RMIS benchmark, which evaluates the representations of M5 industrial signals on multiple health management tasks. Compared with top SSL models, FISHER showcases versatile and outstanding capabilities with a general performance gain up to 5.03%, along with much more efficient scaling curves. We also investigate the scaling law on downstream tasks and derive potential avenues for future works. FISHER is now open-sourced on https://github.com/jianganbai/FISHER

As transformer-based large language models (LLMs) increasingly permeate society, they have revolutionized domains such as software engineering, creative writing, and digital arts. However, their adoption in cybersecurity remains limited due to challenges like scarcity of specialized training data and complexity of representing cybersecurity-specific knowledge. To address these gaps, we present Foundation-Sec-8B, a cybersecurity-focused LLM built on the Llama 3.1 architecture and enhanced through continued pretraining on a carefully curated cybersecurity corpus. We evaluate Foundation-Sec-8B across both established and new cybersecurity benchmarks, showing that it matches Llama 3.1-70B and GPT-4o-mini in certain cybersecurity-specific tasks. By releasing our model to the public, we aim to accelerate progress and adoption of AI-driven tools in both public and private cybersecurity contexts.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment. However, LLM agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks when handling untrusted data. In this paper we propose CaMeL, a robust defense that creates a protective system layer around the LLM, securing it even when underlying models may be susceptible to attacks. To operate, CaMeL explicitly extracts the control and data flows from the (trusted) query; therefore, the untrusted data retrieved by the LLM can never impact the program flow. To further improve security, CaMeL relies on a notion of a capability to prevent the exfiltration of private data over unauthorized data flows. We demonstrate effectiveness of CaMeL by solving 67% of tasks with provable security in AgentDojo [NeurIPS 2024], a recent agentic security benchmark.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent in web services, effectively leveraging domain-specific knowledge while ensuring privacy has become critical. Existing methods, such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and differentially private data synthesis, often compromise either the utility of domain knowledge or the privacy of sensitive data, limiting their applicability in specialized domains. To address these challenges, we propose Llamdex, a novel framework that integrates privacy-preserving, domain-specific models into LLMs. Our approach significantly enhances the accuracy of domain-specific tasks, achieving up to a 26\% improvement compared to existing methods under the same differential privacy constraints. Experimental results show that Llamdex not only improves the accuracy of LLM responses but also maintains comparable inference efficiency to the original LLM, highlighting its potential for real-world applications.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

We conducted extensive experiments on domain adaptation of the Meta-Llama-3-70B-Instruct model on SEC data, exploring its performance on both general and domain-specific benchmarks. Our focus included continual pre-training (CPT) and model merging, aiming to enhance the model's domain-specific capabilities while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Through this study, we evaluated the impact of integrating financial regulatory data into a robust language model and examined the effectiveness of our model merging techniques in preserving and improving the model's instructive abilities. The model is accessible at hugging face: https://huggingface.co/arcee-ai/Llama-3-SEC-Base, arcee-ai/Llama-3-SEC-Base. This is an intermediate checkpoint of our final model, which has seen 20B tokens so far. The full model is still in the process of training. This is a preprint technical report with thorough evaluations to understand the entire process.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in various applications. As their usage grows, concerns regarding their safety are rising, especially in maintaining harmless responses when faced with malicious instructions. Many defense strategies have been developed to enhance the safety of LLMs. However, our research finds that existing defense strategies lead LLMs to predominantly adopt a rejection-oriented stance, thereby diminishing the usability of their responses to benign instructions. To solve this problem, we introduce the MoGU framework, designed to enhance LLMs' safety while preserving their usability. Our MoGU framework transforms the base LLM into two variants: the usable LLM and the safe LLM, and further employs dynamic routing to balance their contribution. When encountering malicious instructions, the router will assign a higher weight to the safe LLM to ensure that responses are harmless. Conversely, for benign instructions, the router prioritizes the usable LLM, facilitating usable and helpful responses. On various open-sourced LLMs, we compare multiple defense strategies to verify the superiority of our MoGU framework. Besides, our analysis provides key insights into the effectiveness of MoGU and verifies that our designed routing mechanism can effectively balance the contribution of each variant by assigning weights. Our work released the safer Llama2, Vicuna, Falcon, Dolphin, and Baichuan2.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as personal agents, accessing sensitive user data such as calendars, emails, and medical records. Users currently face a trade-off: They can send private records, many of which are stored in remote databases, to powerful but untrusted LLM providers, increasing their exposure risk. Alternatively, they can run less powerful models locally on trusted devices. We bridge this gap. Our Socratic Chain-of-Thought Reasoning first sends a generic, non-private user query to a powerful, untrusted LLM, which generates a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompt and detailed sub-queries without accessing user data. Next, we embed these sub-queries and perform encrypted sub-second semantic search using our Homomorphically Encrypted Vector Database across one million entries of a single user's private data. This represents a realistic scale of personal documents, emails, and records accumulated over years of digital activity. Finally, we feed the CoT prompt and the decrypted records to a local language model and generate the final response. On the LoCoMo long-context QA benchmark, our hybrid framework, combining GPT-4o with a local Llama-3.2-1B model, outperforms using GPT-4o alone by up to 7.1 percentage points. This demonstrates a first step toward systems where tasks are decomposed and split between untrusted strong LLMs and weak local ones, preserving user privacy.

The rapid evolution of cyber threats necessitates innovative solutions for detecting and analyzing malicious activity. Honeypots, which are decoy systems designed to lure and interact with attackers, have emerged as a critical component in cybersecurity. In this paper, we present a novel approach to creating realistic and interactive honeypot systems using Large Language Models (LLMs). By fine-tuning a pre-trained open-source language model on a diverse dataset of attacker-generated commands and responses, we developed a honeypot capable of sophisticated engagement with attackers. Our methodology involved several key steps: data collection and processing, prompt engineering, model selection, and supervised fine-tuning to optimize the model's performance. Evaluation through similarity metrics and live deployment demonstrated that our approach effectively generates accurate and informative responses. The results highlight the potential of LLMs to revolutionize honeypot technology, providing cybersecurity professionals with a powerful tool to detect and analyze malicious activity, thereby enhancing overall security infrastructure.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in Metaverse environments to generate dynamic and realistic content and to control the behavior of non-player characters (NPCs). However, the cybersecurity concerns associated with LLMs have become increasingly prominent. Previous research has primarily focused on patching system vulnerabilities to enhance cybersecurity, but these approaches are not well-suited to the Metaverse, where the virtual space is more complex, LLMs are vulnerable, and ethical user interaction is critical. Moreover, the scope of cybersecurity in the Metaverse is expected to expand significantly. This paper proposes a method for enhancing cybersecurity through the simulation of user interaction with LLMs. Our goal is to educate users and strengthen their defense capabilities through exposure to a comprehensive simulation system. This system includes extensive Metaverse cybersecurity Q&A and attack simulation scenarios. By engaging with these, users will improve their ability to recognize and withstand risks. Additionally, to address the ethical implications of user input, we propose using LLMs as evaluators to assess user content across five dimensions. We further adapt the models through vocabulary expansion training to better understand personalized inputs and emoticons. We conduct experiments on multiple LLMs and find that our approach is effective.

Security of model parameters and user data is critical for Transformer-based services, such as ChatGPT. While recent strides in secure two-party protocols have successfully addressed security concerns in serving Transformer models, their adoption is practically infeasible due to the prohibitive cryptographic overheads involved. Drawing insights from our hands-on experience in developing two real-world Transformer-based services, we identify the inherent efficiency bottleneck in the two-party assumption. To overcome this limitation, we propose a novel three-party threat model. Within this framework, we design a semi-symmetric permutation-based protection scheme and present STIP, the first secure Transformer inference protocol without any inference accuracy loss. Experiments on representative Transformer models in real systems show that STIP has practical security and outperforms state-of-the-art secure two-party protocols in efficiency by millions of times.

The safety of large language models (LLMs) has garnered significant research attention. In this paper, we argue that previous empirical studies demonstrate LLMs exhibit a propensity to trust information from authoritative sources, such as academic papers, implying new possible vulnerabilities. To verify this possibility, a preliminary analysis is designed to illustrate our two findings. Based on this insight, a novel jailbreaking method, Paper Summary Attack (PSA), is proposed. It systematically synthesizes content from either attack-focused or defense-focused LLM safety paper to construct an adversarial prompt template, while strategically infilling harmful query as adversarial payloads within predefined subsections. Extensive experiments show significant vulnerabilities not only in base LLMs, but also in state-of-the-art reasoning model like Deepseek-R1. PSA achieves a 97\% attack success rate (ASR) on well-aligned models like Claude3.5-Sonnet and an even higher 98\% ASR on Deepseek-R1. More intriguingly, our work has further revealed diametrically opposed vulnerability bias across different base models, and even between different versions of the same model, when exposed to either attack-focused or defense-focused papers. This phenomenon potentially indicates future research clues for both adversarial methodologies and safety alignment.Code is available at https://github.com/233liang/Paper-Summary-Attack

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed code generation. However, most existing approaches focus on mainstream languages such as Python and Java, neglecting the Solidity language, the predominant programming language for Ethereum smart contracts. Due to the lack of adequate benchmarks for Solidity, LLMs' ability to generate secure, cost-effective smart contracts remains unexplored. To fill this gap, we construct SolEval, the first repository-level benchmark designed for Solidity smart contract generation, to evaluate the performance of LLMs on Solidity. SolEval consists of 1,125 samples from 9 different repositories, covering 6 popular domains, providing LLMs with a comprehensive evaluation benchmark. Unlike the existing Solidity benchmark, SolEval not only includes complex function calls but also reflects the real-world complexity of the Ethereum ecosystem by incorporating gas fee and vulnerability rate. We evaluate 10 LLMs on SolEval, and our results show that the best-performing LLM achieves only 26.29% Pass@10, highlighting substantial room for improvement in Solidity code generation by LLMs. We release our data and code at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SolEval-1C06/.

AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are being deployed at scale, yet we lack a systematic understanding of how the choice of backbone LLM affects agent security. The non-deterministic sequential nature of AI agents complicates security modeling, while the integration of traditional software with AI components entangles novel LLM vulnerabilities with conventional security risks. Existing frameworks only partially address these challenges as they either capture specific vulnerabilities only or require modeling of complete agents. To address these limitations, we introduce threat snapshots: a framework that isolates specific states in an agent's execution flow where LLM vulnerabilities manifest, enabling the systematic identification and categorization of security risks that propagate from the LLM to the agent level. We apply this framework to construct the b^3 benchmark, a security benchmark based on 194331 unique crowdsourced adversarial attacks. We then evaluate 31 popular LLMs with it, revealing, among other insights, that enhanced reasoning capabilities improve security, while model size does not correlate with security. We release our benchmark, dataset, and evaluation code to facilitate widespread adoption by LLM providers and practitioners, offering guidance for agent developers and incentivizing model developers to prioritize backbone security improvements.

Large language model powered autonomous agents demand robust, standardized protocols to integrate tools, share contextual data, and coordinate tasks across heterogeneous systems. Ad-hoc integrations are difficult to scale, secure, and generalize across domains. This survey examines four emerging agent communication protocols: Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A), and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), each addressing interoperability in deployment contexts. MCP provides a JSON-RPC client-server interface for secure tool invocation and typed data exchange. ACP defines a general-purpose communication protocol over RESTful HTTP, supporting MIME-typed multipart messages and synchronous and asynchronous interactions. Its lightweight and runtime-independent design enables scalable agent invocation, while features like session management, message routing, and integration with role-based and decentralized identifiers (DIDs). A2A enables peer-to-peer task delegation using capability-based Agent Cards, supporting secure and scalable collaboration across enterprise agent workflows. ANP supports open network agent discovery and secure collaboration using W3C decentralized identifiers DIDs and JSON-LD graphs. The protocols are compared across multiple dimensions, including interaction modes, discovery mechanisms, communication patterns, and security models. Based on the comparative analysis, a phased adoption roadmap is proposed: beginning with MCP for tool access, followed by ACP for structured, multimodal messaging session-aware interaction and both online and offline agent discovery across scalable, HTTP-based deployments A2A for collaborative task execution, and extending to ANP for decentralized agent marketplaces. This work provides a comprehensive foundation for designing secure, interoperable, and scalable ecosystems of LLM-powered agents.

The safety and alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) are critical for their responsible deployment. Current evaluation methods predominantly focus on identifying and preventing overtly harmful outputs. However, they often fail to address a more insidious failure mode: models that produce benign-appearing outputs while operating on malicious or deceptive internal reasoning. This vulnerability, often triggered by sophisticated system prompt injections, allows models to bypass conventional safety filters, posing a significant, underexplored risk. To address this gap, we introduce the Deceptive Reasoning Exposure Suite (D-REX), a novel dataset designed to evaluate the discrepancy between a model's internal reasoning process and its final output. D-REX was constructed through a competitive red-teaming exercise where participants crafted adversarial system prompts to induce such deceptive behaviors. Each sample in D-REX contains the adversarial system prompt, an end-user's test query, the model's seemingly innocuous response, and, crucially, the model's internal chain-of-thought, which reveals the underlying malicious intent. Our benchmark facilitates a new, essential evaluation task: the detection of deceptive alignment. We demonstrate that D-REX presents a significant challenge for existing models and safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for new techniques that scrutinize the internal processes of LLMs, not just their final outputs.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable success across many domains, yet their integration into cybersecurity applications remains limited due to a lack of general-purpose cybersecurity data, representational complexity, and safety and regulatory concerns. To address this gap, we previously introduced Foundation-Sec-8B, a cybersecurity-focused LLM suitable for fine-tuning on downstream tasks. That model, however, was not designed for chat-style interactions or instruction-following. In this report, we release Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct: a model specifically trained for general-purpose cybersecurity dialogue. Built on Foundation-Sec-8B, it combines domain-specific knowledge with instruction-following, conversational capabilities, and alignment with human preferences to produce high-quality, relevant responses. Comprehensive evaluations show that Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct outperforms Llama 3.1-8B-Instruct on a range of cybersecurity tasks while matching its instruction-following performance. It is also competitive with GPT-4o-mini on cyber threat intelligence and instruction-following tasks. We envision Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct becoming an indispensable assistant in the daily workflows of cybersecurity professionals. We release the model publicly at https://huggingface.co/fdtn-ai/Foundation-Sec-8B-Instruct.

We introduce ARACNE, a fully autonomous LLM-based pentesting agent tailored for SSH services that can execute commands on real Linux shell systems. Introduces a new agent architecture with multi-LLM model support. Experiments show that ARACNE can reach a 60\% success rate against the autonomous defender ShelLM and a 57.58\% success rate against the Over The Wire Bandit CTF challenges, improving over the state-of-the-art. When winning, the average number of actions taken by the agent to accomplish the goals was less than 5. The results show that the use of multi-LLM is a promising approach to increase accuracy in the actions.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has led to the widespread deployment of LLM agents across diverse industries, including customer service, content generation, data analysis, and even healthcare. However, as more LLM agents are deployed, a major issue has emerged: there is no standard way for these agents to communicate with external tools or data sources. This lack of standardized protocols makes it difficult for agents to work together or scale effectively, and it limits their ability to tackle complex, real-world tasks. A unified communication protocol for LLM agents could change this. It would allow agents and tools to interact more smoothly, encourage collaboration, and triggering the formation of collective intelligence. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of existing agent protocols, proposing a systematic two-dimensional classification that differentiates context-oriented versus inter-agent protocols and general-purpose versus domain-specific protocols. Additionally, we conduct a comparative performance analysis of these protocols across key dimensions such as security, scalability, and latency. Finally, we explore the future landscape of agent protocols by identifying critical research directions and characteristics necessary for next-generation protocols. These characteristics include adaptability, privacy preservation, and group-based interaction, as well as trends toward layered architectures and collective intelligence infrastructures. We expect this work to serve as a practical reference for both researchers and engineers seeking to design, evaluate, or integrate robust communication infrastructures for intelligent agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly become integral to real-world applications, powering services across diverse sectors. However, their widespread deployment has exposed critical security risks, particularly through jailbreak prompts that can bypass model alignment and induce harmful outputs. Despite intense research into both attack and defense techniques, the field remains fragmented: definitions, threat models, and evaluation criteria vary widely, impeding systematic progress and fair comparison. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK), we address these challenges by (1) proposing a holistic, multi-level taxonomy that organizes attacks, defenses, and vulnerabilities in LLM prompt security; (2) formalizing threat models and cost assumptions into machine-readable profiles for reproducible evaluation; (3) introducing an open-source evaluation toolkit for standardized, auditable comparison of attacks and defenses; (4) releasing JAILBREAKDB, the largest annotated dataset of jailbreak and benign prompts to date; and (5) presenting a comprehensive evaluation and leaderboard of state-of-the-art methods. Our work unifies fragmented research, provides rigorous foundations for future studies, and supports the development of robust, trustworthy LLMs suitable for high-stakes deployment.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are autonomous systems powered by LLMs, capable of reasoning and planning to solve problems by leveraging a set of tools. However, the integration of multi-tool capabilities in LLM agents introduces challenges in securely managing tools, ensuring their compatibility, handling dependency relationships, and protecting control flows within LLM agent workflows. In this paper, we present the first systematic security analysis of task control flows in multi-tool-enabled LLM agents. We identify a novel threat, Cross-Tool Harvesting and Polluting (XTHP), which includes multiple attack vectors to first hijack the normal control flows of agent tasks, and then collect and pollute confidential or private information within LLM agent systems. To understand the impact of this threat, we developed Chord, a dynamic scanning tool designed to automatically detect real-world agent tools susceptible to XTHP attacks. Our evaluation of 66 real-world tools from the repositories of two major LLM agent development frameworks, LangChain and LlamaIndex, revealed a significant security concern: 75\% are vulnerable to XTHP attacks, highlighting the prevalence of this threat.

A multi-agent system (MAS) powered by large language models (LLMs) can automate tedious user tasks such as meeting scheduling that requires inter-agent collaboration. LLMs enable nuanced protocols that account for unstructured private data, user constraints, and preferences. However, this design introduces new risks, including misalignment and attacks by malicious parties that compromise agents or steal user data. In this paper, we propose the Terrarium framework for fine-grained study on safety, privacy, and security in LLM-based MAS. We repurpose the blackboard design, an early approach in multi-agent systems, to create a modular, configurable testbed for multi-agent collaboration. We identify key attack vectors such as misalignment, malicious agents, compromised communication, and data poisoning. We implement three collaborative MAS scenarios with four representative attacks to demonstrate the framework's flexibility. By providing tools to rapidly prototype, evaluate, and iterate on defenses and designs, Terrarium aims to accelerate progress toward trustworthy multi-agent systems.

Despite extensive efforts to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values and safety rules, jailbreak attacks that exploit certain vulnerabilities continuously emerge, highlighting the need to strengthen existing LLMs with additional safety properties to defend against these attacks. However, tuning large models has become increasingly resource intensive and may have difficulty ensuring consistent performance. We introduce Speculative Safety-Aware Decoding (SSD), a lightweight decoding-time approach that equips LLMs with the desired safety property while accelerating inference. We assume that there exists a small language model that possesses this desired property. SSD integrates speculative sampling during decoding and leverages the match ratio between the small and composite models to quantify jailbreak risks. This enables SSD to dynamically switch between decoding schemes to prioritize utility or safety, to handle the challenge of different model capacities. The output token is then sampled from a new distribution that combines the distributions of the original and the small models. Experimental results show that SSD successfully equips the large model with the desired safety property, and also allows the model to remain helpful to benign queries. Furthermore, SSD accelerates the inference time, thanks to the speculative sampling design.

Large language models (LLMs) have had a transformative impact on a variety of scientific tasks across disciplines such as biology, chemistry, medicine, and physics. However, ensuring the safety alignment of these models in scientific research remains an underexplored area, with existing benchmarks primarily focus on textual content and overlooking key scientific representations such as molecular, protein, and genomic languages. Moreover, the safety mechanisms of LLMs in scientific tasks are insufficiently studied. To address these limitations, we introduce SciSafeEval, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety alignment of LLMs across a range of scientific tasks. SciSafeEval spans multiple scientific languages - including textual, molecular, protein, and genomic - and covers a wide range of scientific domains. We evaluate LLMs in zero-shot, few-shot and chain-of-thought settings, and introduce a 'jailbreak' enhancement feature that challenges LLMs equipped with safety guardrails, rigorously testing their defenses against malicious intention. Our benchmark surpasses existing safety datasets in both scale and scope, providing a robust platform for assessing the safety and performance of LLMs in scientific contexts. This work aims to facilitate the responsible development and deployment of LLMs, promoting alignment with safety and ethical standards in scientific research.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

In this paper, we present Jellyfish, an open-source LLM as a universal task solver for DP. Built on the Llama 2 13B model, Jellyfish is instruction-tuned with the datasets of several typical DP tasks including error detection, data imputation, schema matching, and entity matching, and delivers generalizability to other tasks. Remarkably, Jellyfish can operate on a local, single, and low-priced GPU with its 13 billion parameters, ensuring data security and enabling further tuning. Its proficiency in understanding natural language allows users to manually craft instructions for DP tasks. Unlike many existing methods that heavily rely on prior knowledge, Jellyfish acquires domain knowledge during its tuning process and integrates optional knowledge injection during inference. A distinctive feature of Jellyfish is its interpreter, which elucidates its output decisions. To construct Jellyfish, we develop a series of pre-tuning and DP-tuning techniques. Jellyfish is equipped with an instance serializer, which automatically translates raw data into model prompts, and a knowledge injector, which optionally introduces task- and dataset-specific knowledge to enhance DP performance. Our evaluation of Jellyfish, using a range of real datasets, shows its competitiveness compared to state-of-the-art methods and its strong generalizability to unseen tasks. Jellyfish's performance rivals that of GPT series models, and its interpreter offers enhanced reasoning capabilities compared to GPT-3.5. Furthermore, our evaluation highlights the effectiveness of the techniques employed in constructing Jellyfish. Our model is available at Hugging Face: https://huggingface.co/NECOUDBFM/Jellyfish .

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has recently emerged as a standardized interface for connecting language models with external tools and data. As the ecosystem rapidly expands, the lack of a structured, comprehensive view of existing MCP artifacts presents challenges for research. To bridge this gap, we introduce MCPCorpus, a large-scale dataset containing around 14K MCP servers and 300 MCP clients. Each artifact is annotated with 20+ normalized attributes capturing its identity, interface configuration, GitHub activity, and metadata. MCPCorpus provides a reproducible snapshot of the real-world MCP ecosystem, enabling studies of adoption trends, ecosystem health, and implementation diversity. To keep pace with the rapid evolution of the MCP ecosystem, we provide utility tools for automated data synchronization, normalization, and inspection. Furthermore, to support efficient exploration and exploitation, we release a lightweight web-based search interface. MCPCorpus is publicly available at: https://github.com/Snakinya/MCPCorpus.

The Sybil attack plagues all peer-to-peer systems, and modern open distributed ledgers employ a number of tactics to prevent it from proof of work, or other resources such as space, stake or memory, to traditional admission control in permissioned settings. With SybilQuorum we propose an alternative approach to securing an open distributed ledger against Sybil attacks, and ensuring consensus amongst honest participants, leveraging social network based Sybil defences. We show how nodes expressing their trust relationships through the ledger can bootstrap and operate a value system, and general transaction system, and how Sybil attacks are thwarted. We empirically evaluate our system as a secure Federated Byzantine Agreement System, and extend the theory of those systems to do so.

In the domain of model-based engineering, models are essential components that enable system design and analysis. Traditionally, the creation of these models has been a manual process requiring not only deep modeling expertise but also substantial domain knowledge of target systems. With the rapid advancement of generative artificial intelligence, large language models (LLMs) show potential for automating model generation. This work explores the generation of instance models using LLMs, focusing specifically on producing XMI-based instance models from Ecore metamodels and natural language specifications. We observe that current LLMs struggle to directly generate valid XMI models. To address this, we propose a two-step approach: first, using LLMs to produce a simplified structured output containing all necessary instance model information, namely a conceptual instance model, and then compiling this intermediate representation into a valid XMI file. The conceptual instance model is format-independent, allowing it to be transformed into various modeling formats via different compilers. The feasibility of the proposed method has been demonstrated using several LLMs, including GPT-4o, o1-preview, Llama 3.1 (8B and 70B). Results show that the proposed method significantly improves the usability of LLMs for instance model generation tasks. Notably, the smaller open-source model, Llama 3.1 70B, demonstrated performance comparable to proprietary GPT models within the proposed framework.

Intelligent agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated substantial promise in autonomously conducting experiments and facilitating scientific discoveries across various disciplines. While their capabilities are promising, they also introduce novel vulnerabilities that demand careful consideration for safety. However, there exists a notable gap in the literature, as there has been no comprehensive exploration of these vulnerabilities. This position paper fills this gap by conducting a thorough examination of vulnerabilities in LLM-based agents within scientific domains, shedding light on potential risks associated with their misuse and emphasizing the need for safety measures. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the potential risks inherent to scientific LLM agents, taking into account user intent, the specific scientific domain, and their potential impact on the external environment. Then, we delve into the origins of these vulnerabilities and provide a scoping review of the limited existing works. Based on our analysis, we propose a triadic framework involving human regulation, agent alignment, and an understanding of environmental feedback (agent regulation) to mitigate these identified risks. Furthermore, we highlight the limitations and challenges associated with safeguarding scientific agents and advocate for the development of improved models, robust benchmarks, and comprehensive regulations to address these issues effectively.

The increasing depth of parametric domain knowledge in large language models (LLMs) is fueling their rapid deployment in real-world applications. Understanding model vulnerabilities in high-stakes and knowledge-intensive tasks is essential for quantifying the trustworthiness of model predictions and regulating their use. The recent discovery of named entities as adversarial examples (i.e. adversarial entities) in natural language processing tasks raises questions about their potential impact on the knowledge robustness of pre-trained and finetuned LLMs in high-stakes and specialized domains. We examined the use of type-consistent entity substitution as a template for collecting adversarial entities for billion-parameter LLMs with biomedical knowledge. To this end, we developed an embedding-space attack based on powerscaled distance-weighted sampling to assess the robustness of their biomedical knowledge with a low query budget and controllable coverage. Our method has favorable query efficiency and scaling over alternative approaches based on random sampling and blackbox gradient-guided search, which we demonstrated for adversarial distractor generation in biomedical question answering. Subsequent failure mode analysis uncovered two regimes of adversarial entities on the attack surface with distinct characteristics and we showed that entity substitution attacks can manipulate token-wise Shapley value explanations, which become deceptive in this setting. Our approach complements standard evaluations for high-capacity models and the results highlight the brittleness of domain knowledge in LLMs.

The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a wide range of applications, including conversational AI, recommendation systems, autonomous driving, content generation, medical diagnostics, and scientific discovery. However, their widespread deployment also exposes them to significant safety risks, raising concerns about robustness, reliability, and ethical implications. This survey provides a systematic review of current safety research on large models, covering Vision Foundation Models (VFMs), Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Diffusion Models (DMs), and large-model-based Agents. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We present a comprehensive taxonomy of safety threats to these models, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, jailbreak and prompt injection attacks, energy-latency attacks, data and model extraction attacks, and emerging agent-specific threats. (2) We review defense strategies proposed for each type of attacks if available and summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks for safety research. (3) Building on this, we identify and discuss the open challenges in large model safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive safety evaluations, scalable and effective defense mechanisms, and sustainable data practices. More importantly, we highlight the necessity of collective efforts from the research community and international collaboration. Our work can serve as a useful reference for researchers and practitioners, fostering the ongoing development of comprehensive defense systems and platforms to safeguard AI models.

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved excellent performance in various fields. However, DNNs' vulnerability to Adversarial Examples (AE) hinders their deployments to safety-critical applications. This paper presents a novel AE detection framework, named BEYOND, for trustworthy predictions. BEYOND performs the detection by distinguishing the AE's abnormal relation with its augmented versions, i.e. neighbors, from two prospects: representation similarity and label consistency. An off-the-shelf Self-Supervised Learning (SSL) model is used to extract the representation and predict the label for its highly informative representation capacity compared to supervised learning models. For clean samples, their representations and predictions are closely consistent with their neighbors, whereas those of AEs differ greatly. Furthermore, we explain this observation and show that by leveraging this discrepancy BEYOND can effectively detect AEs. We develop a rigorous justification for the effectiveness of BEYOND. Furthermore, as a plug-and-play model, BEYOND can easily cooperate with the Adversarial Trained Classifier (ATC), achieving the state-of-the-art (SOTA) robustness accuracy. Experimental results show that BEYOND outperforms baselines by a large margin, especially under adaptive attacks. Empowered by the robust relation net built on SSL, we found that BEYOND outperforms baselines in terms of both detection ability and speed. Our code will be publicly available.

In semi-supervised learning, unlabeled samples can be utilized through augmentation and consistency regularization. However, we observed certain samples, even undergoing strong augmentation, are still correctly classified with high confidence, resulting in a loss close to zero. It indicates that these samples have been already learned well and do not provide any additional optimization benefits to the model. We refer to these samples as ``naive samples". Unfortunately, existing SSL models overlook the characteristics of naive samples, and they just apply the same learning strategy to all samples. To further optimize the SSL model, we emphasize the importance of giving attention to naive samples and augmenting them in a more diverse manner. Sample adaptive augmentation (SAA) is proposed for this stated purpose and consists of two modules: 1) sample selection module; 2) sample augmentation module. Specifically, the sample selection module picks out {naive samples} based on historical training information at each epoch, then the naive samples will be augmented in a more diverse manner in the sample augmentation module. Thanks to the extreme ease of implementation of the above modules, SAA is advantageous for being simple and lightweight. We add SAA on top of FixMatch and FlexMatch respectively, and experiments demonstrate SAA can significantly improve the models. For example, SAA helped improve the accuracy of FixMatch from 92.50% to 94.76% and that of FlexMatch from 95.01% to 95.31% on CIFAR-10 with 40 labels.

Recent research has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to automated jailbreak attacks, where adversarial suffixes crafted by algorithms appended to harmful queries bypass safety alignment and trigger unintended responses. Current methods for generating these suffixes are computationally expensive and have low Attack Success Rates (ASR), especially against well-aligned models like Llama2 and Llama3. To overcome these limitations, we introduce ADV-LLM, an iterative self-tuning process that crafts adversarial LLMs with enhanced jailbreak ability. Our framework significantly reduces the computational cost of generating adversarial suffixes while achieving nearly 100\% ASR on various open-source LLMs. Moreover, it exhibits strong attack transferability to closed-source models, achieving 99\% ASR on GPT-3.5 and 49\% ASR on GPT-4, despite being optimized solely on Llama3. Beyond improving jailbreak ability, ADV-LLM provides valuable insights for future safety alignment research through its ability to generate large datasets for studying LLM safety.

Smart contracts are essential to decentralized finance (DeFi) and blockchain ecosystems but are increasingly vulnerable to exploits due to coding errors and complex attack vectors. Traditional static analysis tools and existing vulnerability detection methods often fail to address these challenges comprehensively, leading to high false-positive rates and an inability to detect dynamic vulnerabilities. This paper introduces SmartLLM, a novel approach leveraging fine-tuned LLaMA 3.1 models with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of smart contract auditing. By integrating domain-specific knowledge from ERC standards and employing advanced techniques such as QLoRA for efficient fine-tuning, SmartLLM achieves superior performance compared to static analysis tools like Mythril and Slither, as well as zero-shot large language model (LLM) prompting methods such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Experimental results demonstrate a perfect recall of 100% and an accuracy score of 70%, highlighting the model's robustness in identifying vulnerabilities, including reentrancy and access control issues. This research advances smart contract security by offering a scalable and effective auditing solution, supporting the secure adoption of decentralized applications.

Using pre-trained large language models (LLMs) as the backbone for time series prediction has recently gained significant research interest. However, the effectiveness of LLM backbones in this domain remains a topic of debate. Based on thorough empirical analyses, we observe that training and testing LLM-based models on small datasets often leads to the Encoder and Decoder becoming overly adapted to the dataset, thereby obscuring the true predictive capabilities of the LLM backbone. To investigate the genuine potential of LLMs in time series prediction, we introduce three pre-training models with identical architectures but different pre-training strategies. Thereby, large-scale pre-training allows us to create unbiased Encoder and Decoder components tailored to the LLM backbone. Through controlled experiments, we evaluate the zero-shot and few-shot prediction performance of the LLM, offering insights into its capabilities. Extensive experiments reveal that although the LLM backbone demonstrates some promise, its forecasting performance is limited. Our source code is publicly available in the anonymous repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/LLM4TS-0B5C.

As the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in healthcare and medicine continue to advance, there is a growing need for competitive open-source models that can safeguard public interest. With the increasing availability of highly competitive open base models, the impact of continued pre-training is increasingly uncertain. In this work, we explore the role of instruct tuning, model merging, alignment, red teaming and advanced inference schemes, as means to improve current open models. To that end, we introduce the Aloe family, a set of open medical LLMs highly competitive within its scale range. Aloe models are trained on the current best base models (Mistral, LLaMA 3), using a new custom dataset which combines public data sources improved with synthetic Chain of Thought (CoT). Aloe models undergo an alignment phase, becoming one of the first few policy-aligned open healthcare LLM using Direct Preference Optimization, setting a new standard for ethical performance in healthcare LLMs. Model evaluation expands to include various bias and toxicity datasets, a dedicated red teaming effort, and a much-needed risk assessment for healthcare LLMs. Finally, to explore the limits of current LLMs in inference, we study several advanced prompt engineering strategies to boost performance across benchmarks, yielding state-of-the-art results for open healthcare 7B LLMs, unprecedented at this scale.

Large language models (LLM) have demonstrated emergent abilities in text generation, question answering, and reasoning, facilitating various tasks and domains. Despite their proficiency in various tasks, LLMs like LaPM 540B and Llama-3.1 405B face limitations due to large parameter sizes and computational demands, often requiring cloud API use which raises privacy concerns, limits real-time applications on edge devices, and increases fine-tuning costs. Additionally, LLMs often underperform in specialized domains such as healthcare and law due to insufficient domain-specific knowledge, necessitating specialized models. Therefore, Small Language Models (SLMs) are increasingly favored for their low inference latency, cost-effectiveness, efficient development, and easy customization and adaptability. These models are particularly well-suited for resource-limited environments and domain knowledge acquisition, addressing LLMs' challenges and proving ideal for applications that require localized data handling for privacy, minimal inference latency for efficiency, and domain knowledge acquisition through lightweight fine-tuning. The rising demand for SLMs has spurred extensive research and development. However, a comprehensive survey investigating issues related to the definition, acquisition, application, enhancement, and reliability of SLM remains lacking, prompting us to conduct a detailed survey on these topics. The definition of SLMs varies widely, thus to standardize, we propose defining SLMs by their capability to perform specialized tasks and suitability for resource-constrained settings, setting boundaries based on the minimal size for emergent abilities and the maximum size sustainable under resource constraints. For other aspects, we provide a taxonomy of relevant models/methods and develop general frameworks for each category to enhance and utilize SLMs effectively.

Smart contract vulnerability detection remains a major challenge in blockchain security. Existing vulnerability detection methods face two main issues: (1) Existing datasets lack comprehensive coverage and high-quality explanations for preference learning. (2) Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with accurately interpreting specific concepts in smart contract security. Empirical analysis shows that even after continual pre-training (CPT) and supervised fine-tuning (SFT), LLMs may misinterpret the execution order of state changes, resulting in incorrect explanations despite making correct detection decisions. To address these challenges, we propose Smart-LLaMA-DPO based on LLaMA-3.1-8B. We construct a comprehensive dataset covering four major vulnerability types and machine-unauditable vulnerabilities, including precise labels, explanations, and locations for SFT, as well as high-quality and low-quality output pairs for Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Second, we perform CPT using large-scale smart contract to enhance the LLM's understanding of specific security practices in smart contracts. Futhermore, we conduct SFT with our comprehensive dataset. Finally, we apply DPO, leveraging human feedback and a specially designed loss function that increases the probability of preferred explanations while reducing the likelihood of non-preferred outputs. We evaluate Smart-LLaMA-DPO on four major vulnerability types: reentrancy, timestamp dependence, integer overflow/underflow, and delegatecall, as well as machine-unauditable vulnerabilities. Our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, with average improvements of 10.43% in F1 score and 7.87% in accuracy. Moreover, both LLM evaluation and human evaluation confirm that our method generates more correct, thorough, and clear explanations.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be effective for misinformation detection. However, the choice of LLMs for experiments varies widely, leading to uncertain conclusions. In particular, GPT-4 is known to be strong in this domain, but it is closed source, potentially expensive, and can show instability between different versions. Meanwhile, alternative LLMs have given mixed results. In this work, we show that Zephyr-7b presents a consistently viable alternative, overcoming key limitations of commonly used approaches like Llama-2 and GPT-3.5. This provides the research community with a solid open-source option and shows open-source models are gradually catching up on this task. We then highlight how GPT-3.5 exhibits unstable performance, such that this very widely used model could provide misleading results in misinformation detection. Finally, we validate new tools including approaches to structured output and the latest version of GPT-4 (Turbo), showing they do not compromise performance, thus unlocking them for future research and potentially enabling more complex pipelines for misinformation mitigation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical systems, facilitating tasks such as satellite operations, command-and-control, military decision support, and cyber defense. Many of these systems are accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs). When such APIs lack robust access controls, they can expose full or top-k logits, creating a significant and often overlooked attack surface. Prior art has mainly focused on reconstructing the output projection layer or distilling surface-level behaviors. However, regenerating a black-box model under tight query constraints remains underexplored. We address that gap by introducing a constrained replication pipeline that transforms partial logit leakage into a functional deployable substitute model clone. Our two-stage approach (i) reconstructs the output projection matrix by collecting top-k logits from under 10k black-box queries via singular value decomposition (SVD) over the logits, then (ii) distills the remaining architecture into compact student models with varying transformer depths, trained on an open source dataset. A 6-layer student recreates 97.6% of the 6-layer teacher model's hidden-state geometry, with only a 7.31% perplexity increase, and a 7.58 Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL). A 4-layer variant achieves 17.1% faster inference and 18.1% parameter reduction with comparable performance. The entire attack completes in under 24 graphics processing unit (GPU) hours and avoids triggering API rate-limit defenses. These results demonstrate how quickly a cost-limited adversary can clone an LLM, underscoring the urgent need for hardened inference APIs and secure on-premise defense deployments.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP), introduced by Anthropic, provides a standardized framework for artificial intelligence (AI) systems to interact with external data sources and tools in real-time. While MCP offers significant advantages for AI integration and capability extension, it introduces novel security challenges that demand rigorous analysis and mitigation. This paper builds upon foundational research into MCP architecture and preliminary security assessments to deliver enterprise-grade mitigation frameworks and detailed technical implementation strategies. Through systematic threat modeling and analysis of MCP implementations and analysis of potential attack vectors, including sophisticated threats like tool poisoning, we present actionable security patterns tailored for MCP implementers and adopters. The primary contribution of this research lies in translating theoretical security concerns into a practical, implementable framework with actionable controls, thereby providing essential guidance for the secure enterprise adoption and governance of integrated AI systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread popularity across diverse domains involving text generation, summarization, and various natural language processing tasks. Despite their inherent limitations, LLM-based designs have shown promising capabilities in planning and navigating open-world scenarios. This paper introduces a novel application of pre-trained LLMs as agents within cybersecurity network environments, focusing on their utility for sequential decision-making processes. We present an approach wherein pre-trained LLMs are leveraged as attacking agents in two reinforcement learning environments. Our proposed agents demonstrate similar or better performance against state-of-the-art agents trained for thousands of episodes in most scenarios and configurations. In addition, the best LLM agents perform similarly to human testers of the environment without any additional training process. This design highlights the potential of LLMs to efficiently address complex decision-making tasks within cybersecurity. Furthermore, we introduce a new network security environment named NetSecGame. The environment is designed to eventually support complex multi-agent scenarios within the network security domain. The proposed environment mimics real network attacks and is designed to be highly modular and adaptable for various scenarios.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents can automate cybersecurity tasks and can adapt to the evolving cybersecurity landscape without re-engineering. While LLM agents have demonstrated cybersecurity capabilities on Capture-The-Flag (CTF) competitions, they have two key limitations: accessing latest cybersecurity expertise beyond training data, and integrating new knowledge into complex task planning. Knowledge-based approaches that incorporate technical understanding into the task-solving automation can tackle these limitations. We present CRAKEN, a knowledge-based LLM agent framework that improves cybersecurity capability through three core mechanisms: contextual decomposition of task-critical information, iterative self-reflected knowledge retrieval, and knowledge-hint injection that transforms insights into adaptive attack strategies. Comprehensive evaluations with different configurations show CRAKEN's effectiveness in multi-stage vulnerability detection and exploitation compared to previous approaches. Our extensible architecture establishes new methodologies for embedding new security knowledge into LLM-driven cybersecurity agentic systems. With a knowledge database of CTF writeups, CRAKEN obtained an accuracy of 22% on NYU CTF Bench, outperforming prior works by 3% and achieving state-of-the-art results. On evaluation of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, CRAKEN solves 25-30% more techniques than prior work, demonstrating improved cybersecurity capabilities via knowledge-based execution. We make our framework open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/nyuctf_agents_craken.

Phylogenetic comparative methods may fail to produce meaningful results when either the underlying model is inappropriate or the data contain insufficient information to inform the inference. The ability to measure the statistical power of these methods has become crucial to ensure that data quantity keeps pace with growing model complexity. Through simulations, we show that commonly applied model choice methods based on information criteria can have remarkably high error rates; this can be a problem because methods to estimate the uncertainty or power are not widely known or applied. Furthermore, the power of comparative methods can depend significantly on the structure of the data. We describe a Monte Carlo based method which addresses both of these challenges, and show how this approach both quantifies and substantially reduces errors relative to information criteria. The method also produces meaningful confidence intervals for model parameters. We illustrate how the power to distinguish different models, such as varying levels of selection, varies both with number of taxa and structure of the phylogeny. We provide an open-source implementation in the pmc ("Phylogenetic Monte Carlo") package for the R programming language. We hope such power analysis becomes a routine part of model comparison in comparative methods.

Aligned LLMs are secure, capable of recognizing and refusing to answer malicious questions. However, the role of internal parameters in maintaining such security is not well understood yet, further these models can be vulnerable to security degradation when subjected to fine-tuning attacks. To address these challenges, our work uncovers the mechanism behind security in aligned LLMs at the parameter level, identifying a small set of contiguous layers in the middle of the model that are crucial for distinguishing malicious queries from normal ones, referred to as ``safety layers". We first confirm the existence of these safety layers by analyzing variations in input vectors within the model's internal layers. Additionally, we leverage the over-rejection phenomenon and parameters scaling analysis to precisely locate the safety layers. Building on these findings, we propose a novel fine-tuning approach, Safely Partial-Parameter Fine-Tuning (SPPFT), that fixes the gradient of the safety layers during fine-tuning to address the security degradation. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed approach can significantly preserve LLM security while maintaining performance and reducing computational resources compared to full fine-tuning.

Honeypots are essential tools in cybersecurity for early detection, threat intelligence gathering, and analysis of attacker's behavior. However, most of them lack the required realism to engage and fool human attackers long-term. Being easy to distinguish honeypots strongly hinders their effectiveness. This can happen because they are too deterministic, lack adaptability, or lack deepness. This work introduces shelLM, a dynamic and realistic software honeypot based on Large Language Models that generates Linux-like shell output. We designed and implemented shelLM using cloud-based LLMs. We evaluated if shelLM can generate output as expected from a real Linux shell. The evaluation was done by asking cybersecurity researchers to use the honeypot and give feedback if each answer from the honeypot was the expected one from a Linux shell. Results indicate that shelLM can create credible and dynamic answers capable of addressing the limitations of current honeypots. ShelLM reached a TNR of 0.90, convincing humans it was consistent with a real Linux shell. The source code and prompts for replicating the experiments have been publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to enhance Agent-Based Modeling by better representing complex interdependent cybersecurity systems, improving cybersecurity threat modeling and risk management. However, evaluating LLMs in this context is crucial for legal compliance and effective application development. Existing LLM evaluation frameworks often overlook the human factor and cognitive computing capabilities essential for interdependent cybersecurity. To address this gap, I propose OllaBench, a novel evaluation framework that assesses LLMs' accuracy, wastefulness, and consistency in answering scenario-based information security compliance and non-compliance questions. OllaBench is built on a foundation of 24 cognitive behavioral theories and empirical evidence from 38 peer-reviewed papers. OllaBench was used to evaluate 21 LLMs, including both open-weight and commercial models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, Meta and so on. The results reveal that while commercial LLMs have the highest overall accuracy scores, there is significant room for improvement. Smaller low-resolution open-weight LLMs are not far behind in performance, and there are significant differences in token efficiency and consistency among the evaluated models. OllaBench provides a user-friendly interface and supports a wide range of LLM platforms, making it a valuable tool for researchers and solution developers in the field of human-centric interdependent cybersecurity and beyond.

This paper presents a novel virus propagation model using NetLogo. The model allows agents to move across multiple sites using different routes. Routes can be configured, enabled for mobility and (un)locked down independently. Similarly, locations can also be (un)locked down independently. Agents can get infected, propagate their infections to others, can take precautions against infection and also subsequently recover from infection. This model contains certain features that are not present in existing models. The model may be used for educational and research purposes, and the code is made available as open source. This model may also provide a broader framework for more detailed simulations. The results presented are only to demonstrate the model functionalities and do not serve any other purpose.

Rigorous security-focused evaluation of large language model (LLM) agents is imperative for establishing trust in their safe deployment throughout the software development lifecycle. However, existing benchmarks largely rely on synthetic challenges or simplified vulnerability datasets that fail to capture the complexity and ambiguity encountered by security engineers in practice. We introduce SEC-bench, the first fully automated benchmarking framework for evaluating LLM agents on authentic security engineering tasks. SEC-bench employs a novel multi-agent scaffold that automatically constructs code repositories with harnesses, reproduces vulnerabilities in isolated environments, and generates gold patches for reliable evaluation. Our framework automatically creates high-quality software vulnerability datasets with reproducible artifacts at a cost of only $0.87 per instance. Using SEC-bench, we implement two critical software security tasks to rigorously evaluate LLM agents' capabilities: proof-of-concept (PoC) generation and vulnerability patching. A comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLM code agents reveals significant performance gaps, achieving at most 18.0% success in PoC generation and 34.0% in vulnerability patching on our complete dataset. These results highlight the crucial steps needed toward developing LLM agents that are more practical, intelligent, and autonomous for security engineering.

As a new paradigm in machine learning, self-supervised learning (SSL) is capable of learning high-quality representations of complex data without relying on labels. In addition to eliminating the need for labeled data, research has found that SSL improves the adversarial robustness over supervised learning since lacking labels makes it more challenging for adversaries to manipulate model predictions. However, the extent to which this robustness superiority generalizes to other types of attacks remains an open question. We explore this question in the context of backdoor attacks. Specifically, we design and evaluate CTRL, an embarrassingly simple yet highly effective self-supervised backdoor attack. By only polluting a tiny fraction of training data (<= 1%) with indistinguishable poisoning samples, CTRL causes any trigger-embedded input to be misclassified to the adversary's designated class with a high probability (>= 99%) at inference time. Our findings suggest that SSL and supervised learning are comparably vulnerable to backdoor attacks. More importantly, through the lens of CTRL, we study the inherent vulnerability of SSL to backdoor attacks. With both empirical and analytical evidence, we reveal that the representation invariance property of SSL, which benefits adversarial robustness, may also be the very reason making \ssl highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. Our findings also imply that the existing defenses against supervised backdoor attacks are not easily retrofitted to the unique vulnerability of SSL.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have made them indispensable, raising significant concerns over managing their safety. Automated red teaming offers a promising alternative to the labor-intensive and error-prone manual probing for vulnerabilities, providing more consistent and scalable safety evaluations. However, existing approaches often compromise diversity by focusing on maximizing attack success rate. Additionally, methods that decrease the cosine similarity from historical embeddings with semantic diversity rewards lead to novelty stagnation as history grows. To address these issues, we introduce DiveR-CT, which relaxes conventional constraints on the objective and semantic reward, granting greater freedom for the policy to enhance diversity. Our experiments demonstrate DiveR-CT's marked superiority over baselines by 1) generating data that perform better in various diversity metrics across different attack success rate levels, 2) better-enhancing resiliency in blue team models through safety tuning based on collected data, 3) allowing dynamic control of objective weights for reliable and controllable attack success rates, and 4) reducing susceptibility to reward overoptimization. Project details and code can be found at https://andrewzh112.github.io/#diverct.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts known as jailbreaks, which can bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful outputs. Despite growing efforts in LLM safety research, existing evaluations are often fragmented, focused on isolated attack or defense techniques, and lack systematic, reproducible analysis. In this work, we introduce PandaGuard, a unified and modular framework that models LLM jailbreak safety as a multi-agent system comprising attackers, defenders, and judges. Our framework implements 19 attack methods and 12 defense mechanisms, along with multiple judgment strategies, all within a flexible plugin architecture supporting diverse LLM interfaces, multiple interaction modes, and configuration-driven experimentation that enhances reproducibility and practical deployment. Built on this framework, we develop PandaBench, a comprehensive benchmark that evaluates the interactions between these attack/defense methods across 49 LLMs and various judgment approaches, requiring over 3 billion tokens to execute. Our extensive evaluation reveals key insights into model vulnerabilities, defense cost-performance trade-offs, and judge consistency. We find that no single defense is optimal across all dimensions and that judge disagreement introduces nontrivial variance in safety assessments. We release the code, configurations, and evaluation results to support transparent and reproducible research in LLM safety.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capability and influence, ensuring their security and preventing harmful outputs has become crucial. A promising approach to address these concerns involves training models to automatically generate adversarial prompts for red teaming. However, the evolving subtlety of vulnerabilities in LLMs challenges the effectiveness of current adversarial methods, which struggle to specifically target and explore the weaknesses of these models. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Self-Evolving Adversarial Safety (SEAS) optimization framework, which enhances security by leveraging data generated by the model itself. SEAS operates through three iterative stages: Initialization, Attack, and Adversarial Optimization, refining both the Red Team and Target models to improve robustness and safety. This framework reduces reliance on manual testing and significantly enhances the security capabilities of LLMs. Our contributions include a novel adversarial framework, a comprehensive safety dataset, and after three iterations, the Target model achieves a security level comparable to GPT-4, while the Red Team model shows a marked increase in attack success rate (ASR) against advanced models.

Self-supervised learning, dubbed the dark matter of intelligence, is a promising path to advance machine learning. Yet, much like cooking, training SSL methods is a delicate art with a high barrier to entry. While many components are familiar, successfully training a SSL method involves a dizzying set of choices from the pretext tasks to training hyper-parameters. Our goal is to lower the barrier to entry into SSL research by laying the foundations and latest SSL recipes in the style of a cookbook. We hope to empower the curious researcher to navigate the terrain of methods, understand the role of the various knobs, and gain the know-how required to explore how delicious SSL can be.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines a schema bound execution model for agent-tool interaction, enabling modular computer vision workflows without retraining. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol level, deployment scale audit of MCP in vision systems, identifying systemic weaknesses in schema semantics, interoperability, and runtime coordination. We analyze 91 publicly registered vision centric MCP servers, annotated along nine dimensions of compositional fidelity, and develop an executable benchmark with validators to detect and categorize protocol violations. The audit reveals high prevalence of schema format divergence, missing runtime schema validation, undeclared coordinate conventions, and reliance on untracked bridging scripts. Validator based testing quantifies these failures, with schema format checks flagging misalignments in 78.0 percent of systems, coordinate convention checks detecting spatial reference errors in 24.6 percent, and memory scope checks issuing an average of 33.8 warnings per 100 executions. Security probes show that dynamic and multi agent workflows exhibit elevated risks of privilege escalation and untyped tool connections. The proposed benchmark and validator suite, implemented in a controlled testbed and to be released on GitHub, establishes a reproducible framework for measuring and improving the reliability and security of compositional vision workflows.

The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) remains vulnerable, as their initial behavior can be easily jailbroken by even relatively simple attacks. Since infilling a fixed template between the input instruction and initial model output is a common practice for existing LLMs, we hypothesize that this template is a key factor behind their vulnerabilities: LLMs' safety-related decision-making overly relies on the aggregated information from the template region, which largely influences these models' safety behavior. We refer to this issue as template-anchored safety alignment. In this paper, we conduct extensive experiments and verify that template-anchored safety alignment is widespread across various aligned LLMs. Our mechanistic analyses demonstrate how it leads to models' susceptibility when encountering inference-time jailbreak attacks. Furthermore, we show that detaching safety mechanisms from the template region is promising in mitigating vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. We encourage future research to develop more robust safety alignment techniques that reduce reliance on the template region.

This study addresses a critical gap in safety tuning practices for Large Language Models (LLMs) by identifying and tackling a refusal position bias within safety tuning data, which compromises the models' ability to appropriately refuse generating unsafe content. We introduce a novel approach, Decoupled Refusal Training (DeRTa), designed to empower LLMs to refuse compliance to harmful prompts at any response position, significantly enhancing their safety capabilities. DeRTa incorporates two novel components: (1) Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with Harmful Response Prefix, which trains models to recognize and avoid unsafe content by appending a segment of harmful response to the beginning of a safe response, and (2) Reinforced Transition Optimization (RTO), which equips models with the ability to transition from potential harm to safety refusal consistently throughout the harmful response sequence. Our empirical evaluation, conducted using LLaMA3 and Mistral model families across six attack scenarios, demonstrates that our method not only improves model safety without compromising performance but also surpasses well-known models such as GPT-4 in defending against attacks. Importantly, our approach successfully defends recent advanced attack methods (e.g., CodeAttack) that have jailbroken GPT-4 and LLaMA3-70B-Instruct. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/RobustNLP/DeRTa.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various domains. Accompanying the evolving capabilities and expanding deployment scenarios of LLMs, their deployment challenges escalate due to their sheer scale and the advanced yet complex activation designs prevalent in notable model series, such as Llama, Gemma, and Mistral. These challenges have become particularly pronounced in resource-constrained deployment scenarios, where mitigating inference efficiency bottlenecks is imperative. Among various recent efforts, activation approximation has emerged as a promising avenue for pursuing inference efficiency, sometimes considered indispensable in applications such as private inference. Despite achieving substantial speedups with minimal impact on utility, even appearing sound and practical for real-world deployment, the safety implications of activation approximations remain unclear. In this work, we fill this critical gap in LLM safety by conducting the first systematic safety evaluation of activation approximations. Our safety vetting spans seven sota techniques across three popular categories, revealing consistent safety degradation across ten safety-aligned LLMs.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) is an efficient alignment technique that steers LLMs towards preferable outputs by training on preference data, bypassing the need for explicit reward models. Its simplicity enables easy adaptation to various domains and safety requirements. This paper examines DPO's effectiveness in model safety against jailbreaking attacks while minimizing data requirements and training costs. We introduce Egida, a dataset expanded from multiple sources, which includes 27 different safety topics and 18 different attack styles, complemented with synthetic and human labels. This data is used to boost the safety of state-of-the-art LLMs (Llama-3.1-8B/70B-Instruct, Qwen-2.5-7B/72B-Instruct) across topics and attack styles. In addition to safety evaluations, we assess their post-alignment performance degradation in general purpose tasks, and their tendency to over refusal. Following the proposed methodology, trained models reduce their Attack Success Rate by 10%-30%, using small training efforts (2,000 samples) with low computational cost (3\ for 8B models, 20 for 72B models). Safety aligned models generalize to unseen topics and attack styles, with the most successful attack style reaching a success rate around 5%. Size and family are found to strongly influence model malleability towards safety, pointing at the importance of pre-training choices. To validate our findings, a large independent assessment of human preference agreement with Llama-Guard-3-8B is conducted by the authors and the associated dataset Egida-HSafe is released. Overall, this study illustrates how affordable and accessible it is to enhance LLM safety using DPO while outlining its current limitations. All datasets and models are released to enable reproducibility and further research.

With the proliferation of red-teaming strategies for Large Language Models (LLMs), the deficiency in the literature about improving the safety and robustness of LLM defense strategies is becoming increasingly pronounced. This paper introduces the LLM-based sentinel model as a plug-and-play prefix module designed to reconstruct the input prompt with just a few (<30) additional tokens, effectively reducing toxicity in responses from target LLMs. The sentinel model naturally overcomes the parameter inefficiency and limited model accessibility for fine-tuning large target models. We employ an interleaved training regimen using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) to optimize both red team and sentinel models dynamically, incorporating a value head-sharing mechanism inspired by the multi-agent centralized critic to manage the complex interplay between agents. Our extensive experiments across text-to-text and text-to-image demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating toxic outputs, even when dealing with larger models like Llama-2, GPT-3.5 and Stable-Diffusion, highlighting the potential of our framework in enhancing safety and robustness in various applications.

Multi-turn-to-single-turn (M2S) compresses iterative red-teaming into one structured prompt, but prior work relied on a handful of manually written templates. We present X-Teaming Evolutionary M2S, an automated framework that discovers and optimizes M2S templates through language-model-guided evolution. The system pairs smart sampling from 12 sources with an LLM-as-judge inspired by StrongREJECT and records fully auditable logs. Maintaining selection pressure by setting the success threshold to theta = 0.70, we obtain five evolutionary generations, two new template families, and 44.8% overall success (103/230) on GPT-4.1. A balanced cross-model panel of 2,500 trials (judge fixed) shows that structural gains transfer but vary by target; two models score zero at the same threshold. We also find a positive coupling between prompt length and score, motivating length-aware judging. Our results demonstrate that structure-level search is a reproducible route to stronger single-turn probes and underscore the importance of threshold calibration and cross-model evaluation. Code, configurations, and artifacts are available at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/M2S-x-teaming.

The integration of large language models (LLMs) on low-power edge devices such as Raspberry Pi, known as edge language models (ELMs), has introduced opportunities for more personalized, secure, and low-latency language intelligence that is accessible to all. However, the resource constraints inherent in edge devices and the lack of robust ethical safeguards in language models raise significant concerns about fairness, accountability, and transparency in model output generation. This paper conducts a comparative analysis of text-based bias across language model deployments on edge, cloud, and desktop environments, aiming to evaluate how deployment settings influence model fairness. Specifically, we examined an optimized Llama-2 model running on a Raspberry Pi 4; GPT 4o-mini, Gemini-1.5-flash, and Grok-beta models running on cloud servers; and Gemma2 and Mistral models running on a MacOS desktop machine. Our results demonstrate that Llama-2 running on Raspberry Pi 4 is 43.23% and 21.89% more prone to showing bias over time compared to models running on the desktop and cloud-based environments. We also propose the implementation of a feedback loop, a mechanism that iteratively adjusts model behavior based on previous outputs, where predefined constraint weights are applied layer-by-layer during inference, allowing the model to correct bias patterns, resulting in 79.28% reduction in model bias.

Purpose: With advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) for healthcare, the need arises for competitive open-source models to protect the public interest. This work contributes to the field of open medical LLMs by optimizing key stages of data preprocessing and training, while showing how to improve model safety (through DPO) and efficacy (through RAG). The evaluation methodology used, which includes four different types of tests, defines a new standard for the field. The resultant models, shown to be competitive with the best private alternatives, are released with a permisive license. Methods: Building on top of strong base models like Llama 3.1 and Qwen 2.5, Aloe Beta uses a custom dataset to enhance public data with synthetic Chain of Thought examples. The models undergo alignment with Direct Preference Optimization, emphasizing ethical and policy-aligned performance in the presence of jailbreaking attacks. Evaluation includes close-ended, open-ended, safety and human assessments, to maximize the reliability of results. Results: Recommendations are made across the entire pipeline, backed by the solid performance of the Aloe Family. These models deliver competitive performance across healthcare benchmarks and medical fields, and are often preferred by healthcare professionals. On bias and toxicity, the Aloe Beta models significantly improve safety, showing resilience to unseen jailbreaking attacks. For a responsible release, a detailed risk assessment specific to healthcare is attached to the Aloe Family models. Conclusion: The Aloe Beta models, and the recipe that leads to them, are a significant contribution to the open-source medical LLM field, offering top-of-the-line performance while maintaining high ethical requirements. This work sets a new standard for developing and reporting aligned LLMs in healthcare.

As large language models (LLMs) have been deployed in various real-world settings, concerns about the harm they may propagate have grown. Various jailbreaking techniques have been developed to expose the vulnerabilities of these models and improve their safety. This work reveals that many state-of-the-art LLMs are vulnerable to malicious requests hidden behind scientific language. Specifically, our experiments with GPT4o, GPT4o-mini, GPT-4, LLama3-405B-Instruct, Llama3-70B-Instruct, Cohere, Gemini models demonstrate that, the models' biases and toxicity substantially increase when prompted with requests that deliberately misinterpret social science and psychological studies as evidence supporting the benefits of stereotypical biases. Alarmingly, these models can also be manipulated to generate fabricated scientific arguments claiming that biases are beneficial, which can be used by ill-intended actors to systematically jailbreak these strong LLMs. Our analysis studies various factors that contribute to the models' vulnerabilities to malicious requests in academic language. Mentioning author names and venues enhances the persuasiveness of models, and the bias scores increase as dialogues progress. Our findings call for a more careful investigation on the use of scientific data for training LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in healthcare applications. However, their deployment in clinical practice raises significant safety concerns, including the potential spread of harmful information. This study systematically assesses the vulnerabilities of seven LLMs to three advanced black-box jailbreaking techniques within medical contexts. To quantify the effectiveness of these techniques, we propose an automated and domain-adapted agentic evaluation pipeline. Experiment results indicate that leading commercial and open-source LLMs are highly vulnerable to medical jailbreaking attacks. To bolster model safety and reliability, we further investigate the effectiveness of Continual Fine-Tuning (CFT) in defending against medical adversarial attacks. Our findings underscore the necessity for evolving attack methods evaluation, domain-specific safety alignment, and LLM safety-utility balancing. This research offers actionable insights for advancing the safety and reliability of AI clinicians, contributing to ethical and effective AI deployment in healthcare.

Large language models (LLMs) are useful in many NLP tasks and become more capable with size, with the best open-source models having over 50 billion parameters. However, using these 50B+ models requires high-end hardware, making them inaccessible to most researchers. In this work, we investigate methods for cost-efficient inference and fine-tuning of LLMs, comparing local and distributed strategies. We observe that a large enough model (50B+) can run efficiently even on geodistributed devices in a consumer-grade network. This could allow running LLM efficiently by pooling together idle compute resources of multiple research groups and volunteers. We address two open problems: (1) how to perform inference and fine-tuning reliably if any device can disconnect abruptly and (2) how to partition LLMs between devices with uneven hardware, joining and leaving at will. In order to do that, we develop special fault-tolerant inference algorithms and load-balancing protocols that automatically assign devices to maximize the total system throughput. We showcase these algorithms in Petals - a decentralized system that runs Llama 2 (70B) and BLOOM (176B) over the Internet up to 10x faster than offloading for interactive generation. We evaluate the performance of our system in simulated conditions and a real-world setup spanning two continents.

The widespread distribution of Large Language Models (LLMs) through public platforms like Hugging Face introduces significant security challenges. While these platforms perform basic security scans, they often fail to detect subtle manipulations within the embedding layer. This work identifies a novel class of deployment phase attacks that exploit this vulnerability by injecting imperceptible perturbations directly into the embedding layer outputs without modifying model weights or input text. These perturbations, though statistically benign, systematically bypass safety alignment mechanisms and induce harmful behaviors during inference. We propose Search based Embedding Poisoning(SEP), a practical, model agnostic framework that introduces carefully optimized perturbations into embeddings associated with high risk tokens. SEP leverages a predictable linear transition in model responses, from refusal to harmful output to semantic deviation to identify a narrow perturbation window that evades alignment safeguards. Evaluated across six aligned LLMs, SEP achieves an average attack success rate of 96.43% while preserving benign task performance and evading conventional detection mechanisms. Our findings reveal a critical oversight in deployment security and emphasize the urgent need for embedding level integrity checks in future LLM defense strategies.

In this work we examine the classification accuracy and robustness of a state-of-the-art semi-supervised learning (SSL) algorithm applied to the morphological classification of radio galaxies. We test if SSL with fewer labels can achieve test accuracies comparable to the supervised state-of-the-art and whether this holds when incorporating previously unseen data. We find that for the radio galaxy classification problem considered, SSL provides additional regularisation and outperforms the baseline test accuracy. However, in contrast to model performance metrics reported on computer science benchmarking data-sets, we find that improvement is limited to a narrow range of label volumes, with performance falling off rapidly at low label volumes. Additionally, we show that SSL does not improve model calibration, regardless of whether classification is improved. Moreover, we find that when different underlying catalogues drawn from the same radio survey are used to provide the labelled and unlabelled data-sets required for SSL, a significant drop in classification performance is observered, highlighting the difficulty of applying SSL techniques under dataset shift. We show that a class-imbalanced unlabelled data pool negatively affects performance through prior probability shift, which we suggest may explain this performance drop, and that using the Frechet Distance between labelled and unlabelled data-sets as a measure of data-set shift can provide a prediction of model performance, but that for typical radio galaxy data-sets with labelled sample volumes of O(1000), the sample variance associated with this technique is high and the technique is in general not sufficiently robust to replace a train-test cycle.

Biological protocols are fundamental to reproducible and safe life science research. While LLMs excel on general tasks, their systematic evaluation on these highly specialized, accuracy-critical, and inherently procedural texts remains limited. In this work, we present BioProBench, the first large-scale, integrated multi-task benchmark for biological protocol understanding and reasoning. While limited benchmarks have touched upon specific aspects like protocol QA, BioProBench provides a comprehensive suite of five core tasks: Protocol Question Answering, Step Ordering, Error Correction, Protocol Generation, and Protocol Reasoning, enabling a holistic evaluation of LLMs on procedural biological texts. Built upon 27K original protocols, it yields nearly 556K high-quality structured instances. We evaluate 12 mainstream open/closed-source LLMs on BioProBench. Experimental results reveal that while top models preform well on surface understanding tasks, struggle significantly with deep reasoning and structured generation tasks like ordering and generation. Furthermore, model comparisons reveal diverse performance: certain open-source models approach closed-source levels on some tasks, yet bio-specific small models lag behind general LLMs, indicating limitations on complex procedural content. Overall, our findings underscore that procedural reasoning within biological protocols represents a significant challenge for current LLMs. BioProBench serves as a standardized framework to diagnose these specific limitations and guide the development of AI systems better equipped for safely automating complex scientific procedures. The code and data are available at: https://github.com/YuyangSunshine/bioprotocolbench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/GreatCaptainNemo/BioProBench.

It has been shown that Large Language Model (LLM) alignments can be circumvented by appending specially crafted attack suffixes with harmful queries to elicit harmful responses. To conduct attacks against private target models whose characterization is unknown, public models can be used as proxies to fashion the attack, with successful attacks being transferred from public proxies to private target models. The success rate of attack depends on how closely the proxy model approximates the private model. We hypothesize that for attacks to be transferrable, it is sufficient if the proxy can approximate the target model in the neighborhood of the harmful query. Therefore, in this paper, we propose Local Fine-Tuning (LoFT), i.e., fine-tuning proxy models on similar queries that lie in the lexico-semantic neighborhood of harmful queries to decrease the divergence between the proxy and target models. First, we demonstrate three approaches to prompt private target models to obtain similar queries given harmful queries. Next, we obtain data for local fine-tuning by eliciting responses from target models for the generated similar queries. Then, we optimize attack suffixes to generate attack prompts and evaluate the impact of our local fine-tuning on the attack's success rate. Experiments show that local fine-tuning of proxy models improves attack transferability and increases attack success rate by 39%, 7%, and 0.5% (absolute) on target models ChatGPT, GPT-4, and Claude respectively.

This paper introduces Indiana Jones, an innovative approach to jailbreaking Large Language Models (LLMs) by leveraging inter-model dialogues and keyword-driven prompts. Through orchestrating interactions among three specialised LLMs, the method achieves near-perfect success rates in bypassing content safeguards in both white-box and black-box LLMs. The research exposes systemic vulnerabilities within contemporary models, particularly their susceptibility to producing harmful or unethical outputs when guided by ostensibly innocuous prompts framed in historical or contextual contexts. Experimental evaluations highlight the efficacy and adaptability of Indiana Jones, demonstrating its superiority over existing jailbreak methods. These findings emphasise the urgent need for enhanced ethical safeguards and robust security measures in the development of LLMs. Moreover, this work provides a critical foundation for future studies aimed at fortifying LLMs against adversarial exploitation while preserving their utility and flexibility.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare applications offers promising advancements in medical diagnostics, treatment recommendations, and patient care. However, the susceptibility of LLMs to adversarial attacks poses a significant threat, potentially leading to harmful outcomes in delicate medical contexts. This study investigates the vulnerability of LLMs to two types of adversarial attacks in three medical tasks. Utilizing real-world patient data, we demonstrate that both open-source and proprietary LLMs are susceptible to manipulation across multiple tasks. This research further reveals that domain-specific tasks demand more adversarial data in model fine-tuning than general domain tasks for effective attack execution, especially for more capable models. We discover that while integrating adversarial data does not markedly degrade overall model performance on medical benchmarks, it does lead to noticeable shifts in fine-tuned model weights, suggesting a potential pathway for detecting and countering model attacks. This research highlights the urgent need for robust security measures and the development of defensive mechanisms to safeguard LLMs in medical applications, to ensure their safe and effective deployment in healthcare settings.

Large language models (LLMs) are often deployed to perform constrained tasks, with narrow domains. For example, customer support bots can be built on top of LLMs, relying on their broad language understanding and capabilities to enhance performance. However, these LLMs are adversarially susceptible, potentially generating outputs outside the intended domain. To formalize, assess, and mitigate this risk, we introduce domain certification; a guarantee that accurately characterizes the out-of-domain behavior of language models. We then propose a simple yet effective approach, which we call VALID that provides adversarial bounds as a certificate. Finally, we evaluate our method across a diverse set of datasets, demonstrating that it yields meaningful certificates, which bound the probability of out-of-domain samples tightly with minimum penalty to refusal behavior.

Despite careful safety alignment, current large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to various attacks. To further unveil the safety risks of LLMs, we introduce a Safety Concept Activation Vector (SCAV) framework, which effectively guides the attacks by accurately interpreting LLMs' safety mechanisms. We then develop an SCAV-guided attack method that can generate both attack prompts and embedding-level attacks with automatically selected perturbation hyperparameters. Both automatic and human evaluations demonstrate that our attack method significantly improves the attack success rate and response quality while requiring less training data. Additionally, we find that our generated attack prompts may be transferable to GPT-4, and the embedding-level attacks may also be transferred to other white-box LLMs whose parameters are known. Our experiments further uncover the safety risks present in current LLMs. For example, in our evaluation of seven open-source LLMs, we observe an average attack success rate of 99.14%, based on the classic keyword-matching criterion. Finally, we provide insights into the safety mechanism of LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/SproutNan/AI-Safety_SCAV.

General-purpose large language models (LLMs), despite their broad capabilities accrued from open-world data, frequently exhibit suboptimal performance when confronted with the nuanced and specialized demands inherent in real-time telecommunications applications. This investigation addresses this critical limitation through the meticulous fine-tuning of TSLAM-Mini developed by NetoAI, a compact (3.8-billion parameter) causal language model architecturally derived from Phi-4 Mini Instruct 4B. The fine-tuning regimen leverages a bespoke dataset comprising 100,000 samples, strategically engineered to address 20 pivotal telecommunications use-cases, encompassing domains such as Network Fundamentals, IP Routing, MPLS, Network Security, Automation, OSS/BSS, RAN, Mobile Core, Satellite Communications, and Ethical AI. This dataset was curated utilizing NetoAI's DigiTwin platform, enriched with granular insights from venerated network Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and authoritative RFC documents, thereby capturing high-fidelity representations of real-world network dynamics through simulations inspired by digital twin paradigms. Employing Quantized Low-Rank Adaptation (QLoRA), a state-of-the-art Parameter Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) technique, we achieved substantial training efficiency and enabled prospective deployment on resource-constrained hardware. A novel evaluation framework, predicated on a high-capacity LLM (Qwen3-235B-A22B) functioning as an automated adjudicator, was instituted to rigorously assess instruction-following fidelity and response quality across the specified telecom use-cases. Empirical results unequivocally demonstrate TSLAM-Mini's superior aptitude in telecom-centric applications, underscoring the profound efficacy of domain-specific datasets and PEFT methodologies for advancing intelligent network management.

Rich user behavior data has been proven to be of great value for Click-Through Rate (CTR) prediction applications, especially in industrial recommender, search, or advertising systems. However, it's non-trivial for real-world systems to make full use of long-term user behaviors due to the strict requirements of online serving time. Most previous works adopt the retrieval-based strategy, where a small number of user behaviors are retrieved first for subsequent attention. However, the retrieval-based methods are sub-optimal and would cause more or less information losses, and it's difficult to balance the effectiveness and efficiency of the retrieval algorithm. In this paper, we propose SDIM (Sampling-based Deep Interest Modeling), a simple yet effective sampling-based end-to-end approach for modeling long-term user behaviors. We sample from multiple hash functions to generate hash signatures of the candidate item and each item in the user behavior sequence, and obtain the user interest by directly gathering behavior items associated with the candidate item with the same hash signature. We show theoretically and experimentally that the proposed method performs on par with standard attention-based models on modeling long-term user behaviors, while being sizable times faster. We also introduce the deployment of SDIM in our system. Specifically, we decouple the behavior sequence hashing, which is the most time-consuming part, from the CTR model by designing a separate module named BSE (behavior Sequence Encoding). BSE is latency-free for the CTR server, enabling us to model extremely long user behaviors. Both offline and online experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of SDIM. SDIM now has been deployed online in the search system of Meituan APP.

Multilingual self-supervised learning (SSL) has often lagged behind state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods due to the expenses and complexity required to handle many languages. This further harms the reproducibility of SSL, which is already limited to few research groups due to its resource usage. We show that more powerful techniques can actually lead to more efficient pre-training, opening SSL to more research groups. We propose WavLabLM, which extends WavLM's joint prediction and denoising to 40k hours of data across 136 languages. To build WavLabLM, we devise a novel multi-stage pre-training method, designed to address the language imbalance of multilingual data. WavLabLM achieves comparable performance to XLS-R on ML-SUPERB with less than 10% of the training data, making SSL realizable with academic compute. We show that further efficiency can be achieved with a vanilla HuBERT Base model, which can maintain 94% of XLS-R's performance with only 3% of the data, 4 GPUs, and limited trials. We open-source all code and models in ESPnet.

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing with their ability to generate coherent and contextually relevant text. However, their deployment raises significant concerns about the potential for generating harmful or inappropriate content. In this paper, we introduce Progressive Self-Reflection (PSR), a novel inference-time technique that empowers LLMs to self-monitor and correct their outputs dynamically. Experimental results demonstrate that applying our proposed method to Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct reduces the attack success rate from 77.5\% to 5.9\%, to Llama-3.1-8B base from 89.7\% to 5.6\%, and to Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct from 44.4\% to 3.8\%, without additional training, while maintaining their original performance on benign tasks. Our approach acts as a test-time scaling method, where additional self-reflection rounds enhance safety at the cost of inference overhead. To balance safety with computational efficiency, we introduce a lightweight self-reflection predictor that estimates the optimal number of reflection rounds based on input complexity. This adaptive mechanism prevents unnecessary self-assessment on benign inputs while ensuring thorough evaluation when encountering potentially harmful content. Our findings suggest that Progressive Self-Reflection serves as a scalable test-time approach, enhancing LLM safety by dynamically allocating computational resources in proportion to the input's risk profile.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen an impressive wave of advances recently, with models now excelling in a variety of tasks, such as mathematical reasoning and program synthesis. However, their potential to effectively use tools via API calls remains unfulfilled. This is a challenging task even for today's state-of-the-art LLMs such as GPT-4, largely due to their inability to generate accurate input arguments and their tendency to hallucinate the wrong usage of an API call. We release Gorilla, a finetuned LLaMA-based model that surpasses the performance of GPT-4 on writing API calls. When combined with a document retriever, Gorilla demonstrates a strong capability to adapt to test-time document changes, enabling flexible user updates or version changes. It also substantially mitigates the issue of hallucination, commonly encountered when prompting LLMs directly. To evaluate the model's ability, we introduce APIBench, a comprehensive dataset consisting of HuggingFace, TorchHub, and TensorHub APIs. The successful integration of the retrieval system with Gorilla demonstrates the potential for LLMs to use tools more accurately, keep up with frequently updated documentation, and consequently increase the reliability and applicability of their outputs. Gorilla's code, model, data, and demo are available at https://gorilla.cs.berkeley.edu

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have revitalized in LLM-based agents, exhibiting impressive human-like behaviors and cooperative capabilities in various scenarios. However, these agents also bring some exclusive risks, stemming from the complexity of interaction environments and the usability of tools. This paper delves into the safety of LLM-based agents from three perspectives: agent quantity, role definition, and attack level. Specifically, we initially propose to employ a template-based attack strategy on LLM-based agents to find the influence of agent quantity. In addition, to address interaction environment and role specificity issues, we introduce Evil Geniuses (EG), an effective attack method that autonomously generates prompts related to the original role to examine the impact across various role definitions and attack levels. EG leverages Red-Blue exercises, significantly improving the generated prompt aggressiveness and similarity to original roles. Our evaluations on CAMEL, Metagpt and ChatDev based on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, demonstrate high success rates. Extensive evaluation and discussion reveal that these agents are less robust, prone to more harmful behaviors, and capable of generating stealthier content than LLMs, highlighting significant safety challenges and guiding future research. Our code is available at https://github.com/T1aNS1R/Evil-Geniuses.

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the future of cybersecurity through Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs). We explore LLM applications across various domains, including hardware design security, intrusion detection, software engineering, design verification, cyber threat intelligence, malware detection, and phishing detection. We present an overview of LLM evolution and its current state, focusing on advancements in models such as GPT-4, GPT-3.5, Mixtral-8x7B, BERT, Falcon2, and LLaMA. Our analysis extends to LLM vulnerabilities, such as prompt injection, insecure output handling, data poisoning, DDoS attacks, and adversarial instructions. We delve into mitigation strategies to protect these models, providing a comprehensive look at potential attack scenarios and prevention techniques. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of 42 LLM models in cybersecurity knowledge and hardware security, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. We thoroughly evaluate cybersecurity datasets for LLM training and testing, covering the lifecycle from data creation to usage and identifying gaps for future research. In addition, we review new strategies for leveraging LLMs, including techniques like Half-Quadratic Quantization (HQQ), Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), Quantized Low-Rank Adapters (QLoRA), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). These insights aim to enhance real-time cybersecurity defenses and improve the sophistication of LLM applications in threat detection and response. Our paper provides a foundational understanding and strategic direction for integrating LLMs into future cybersecurity frameworks, emphasizing innovation and robust model deployment to safeguard against evolving cyber threats.

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, introduces the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. To effectively mitigate this concern, this paper presents a comprehensive study focused on evaluating and enhancing code LLMs from a software security perspective. We introduce SecuCoGenSecuCoGen has been uploaded as supplemental material and will be made publicly available after publication., a meticulously curated dataset targeting 21 critical vulnerability types. SecuCoGen comprises 180 samples and serves as the foundation for conducting experiments on three crucial code-related tasks: code generation, code repair and vulnerability classification, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that existing models often overlook security concerns during code generation, leading to the generation of vulnerable code. To address this, we propose effective approaches to mitigate the security vulnerabilities and enhance the overall robustness of code generated by LLMs. Moreover, our study identifies weaknesses in existing models' ability to repair vulnerable code, even when provided with vulnerability information. Additionally, certain vulnerability types pose challenges for the models, hindering their performance in vulnerability classification. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) is a widely adopted method for customizing large-scale language models. In distributed, untrusted training environments, an open source base model user may want to use LoRA weights created by an external contributor, leading to two requirements: (1) the base model user must confirm that the LoRA weights are effective when paired with the intended base model, and (2) the LoRA contributor must keep their proprietary weights private until compensation is assured. We present ZKLoRA, a zero-knowledge verification protocol that relies on succinct proofs and our novel Multi-Party Inference procedure to verify LoRA-base model compatibility without exposing LoRA weights. ZKLoRA produces deterministic correctness guarantees and validates each LoRA module in only 1-2 seconds on state-of-the-art large language models. This low-latency approach enables nearly real-time verification and promotes secure collaboration among geographically decentralized teams and contract-based training pipelines. The protocol ensures that the delivered LoRA module works as claimed, safeguarding the contributor's intellectual property while providing the base model user with verification of compatibility and lineage.

Phishing attacks remain one of the most prevalent and persistent cybersecurity threat with attackers continuously evolving and intensifying tactics to evade the general detection system. Despite significant advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning, faithfully reproducing the interpretable reasoning with classification and explainability that underpin phishing judgments remains challenging. Due to recent advancement in Natural Language Processing, Large Language Models (LLMs) show a promising direction and potential for improving domain specific phishing classification tasks. However, enhancing the reliability and robustness of classification models requires not only accurate predictions from LLMs but also consistent and trustworthy explanations aligning with those predictions. Therefore, a key question remains: can LLMs not only classify phishing emails accurately but also generate explanations that are reliably aligned with their predictions and internally self-consistent? To answer these questions, we have fine-tuned transformer based models, including BERT, Llama models, and Wizard, to improve domain relevance and make them more tailored to phishing specific distinctions, using Binary Sequence Classification, Contrastive Learning (CL) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). To that end, we examined their performance in phishing classification and explainability by applying the ConsistenCy measure based on SHAPley values (CC SHAP), which measures prediction explanation token alignment to test the model's internal faithfulness and consistency and uncover the rationale behind its predictions and reasoning. Overall, our findings show that Llama models exhibit stronger prediction explanation token alignment with higher CC SHAP scores despite lacking reliable decision making accuracy, whereas Wizard achieves better prediction accuracy but lower CC SHAP scores.

The growth in the number of parameters of Large Language Models (LLMs) has led to a significant surge in computational requirements, making them challenging and costly to deploy. Speculative decoding (SD) leverages smaller models to efficiently propose future tokens, which are then verified by the LLM in parallel. Small models that utilise activations from the LLM currently achieve the fastest decoding speeds. However, we identify several limitations of SD models including the lack of on-policyness during training and partial observability. To address these shortcomings, we propose a more grounded architecture for small models by introducing a Mixture of Attentions for SD. Our novel architecture can be applied in two scenarios: a conventional single device deployment and a novel client-server deployment where the small model is hosted on a consumer device and the LLM on a server. In a single-device scenario, we demonstrate state-of-the-art speedups improving EAGLE-2 by 9.5% and its acceptance length by 25%. In a client-server setting, our experiments demonstrate: 1) state-of-the-art latencies with minimal calls to the server for different network conditions, and 2) in the event of a complete disconnection, our approach can maintain higher accuracy compared to other SD methods and demonstrates advantages over API calls to LLMs, which would otherwise be unable to continue the generation process.

As the development of large language models (LLMs) rapidly advances, securing these models effectively without compromising their utility has become a pivotal area of research. However, current defense strategies against jailbreak attacks (i.e., efforts to bypass security protocols) often suffer from limited adaptability, restricted general capability, and high cost. To address these challenges, we introduce SafeAligner, a methodology implemented at the decoding stage to fortify defenses against jailbreak attacks. We begin by developing two specialized models: the Sentinel Model, which is trained to foster safety, and the Intruder Model, designed to generate riskier responses. SafeAligner leverages the disparity in security levels between the responses from these models to differentiate between harmful and beneficial tokens, effectively guiding the safety alignment by altering the output token distribution of the target model. Extensive experiments show that SafeAligner can increase the likelihood of beneficial tokens, while reducing the occurrence of harmful ones, thereby ensuring secure alignment with minimal loss to generality.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Traditional vulnerability detection methods rely heavily on predefined rule matching, which often fails to capture vulnerabilities accurately. With the rise of large language models (LLMs), leveraging their ability to understand code semantics has emerged as a promising direction for achieving more accurate and efficient vulnerability detection. However, current LLM-based approaches face significant challenges: instability in model outputs, limitations in context length, and hallucination. As a result, many existing solutions either use LLMs merely to enrich predefined rule sets, thereby keeping the detection process fundamentally rule-based, or over-rely on them, leading to poor robustness. To address these challenges, we propose a constraint-solving approach powered by LLMs named VULSOLVER. By modeling vulnerability detection as a constraint-solving problem, and by integrating static application security testing (SAST) with the semantic reasoning capabilities of LLMs, our method enables the LLM to act like a professional human security expert. We assess VULSOLVER on the OWASP Benchmark (1,023 labeled samples), achieving 96.29% accuracy, 96.55% F1-score, and 100% recall. Applied to popular GitHub repositories, VULSOLVER also identified 15 previously unknown high-severity vulnerabilities (CVSS 7.5-9.8), demonstrating its effectiveness in real-world security analysis.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping numerous facets of our daily lives, leading widespread adoption as web-based services. Despite their versatility, LLMs face notable challenges, such as generating hallucinated content and lacking access to up-to-date information. Lately, to address such limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising direction by generating responses grounded in external knowledge sources. A typical RAG system consists of i) a retriever that probes a group of relevant passages from a knowledge base and ii) a generator that formulates a response based on the retrieved content. However, as with other AI systems, recent studies demonstrate the vulnerability of RAG, such as knowledge corruption attacks by injecting misleading information. In response, several defense strategies have been proposed, including having LLMs inspect the retrieved passages individually or fine-tuning robust retrievers. While effective, such approaches often come with substantial computational costs. In this work, we introduce RAGDefender, a resource-efficient defense mechanism against knowledge corruption (i.e., by data poisoning) attacks in practical RAG deployments. RAGDefender operates during the post-retrieval phase, leveraging lightweight machine learning techniques to detect and filter out adversarial content without requiring additional model training or inference. Our empirical evaluations show that RAGDefender consistently outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses across multiple models and adversarial scenarios: e.g., RAGDefender reduces the attack success rate (ASR) against the Gemini model from 0.89 to as low as 0.02, compared to 0.69 for RobustRAG and 0.24 for Discern-and-Answer when adversarial passages outnumber legitimate ones by a factor of four (4x).

Semi-supervised machine learning (SSL) is gaining popularity as it reduces the cost of training ML models. It does so by using very small amounts of (expensive, well-inspected) labeled data and large amounts of (cheap, non-inspected) unlabeled data. SSL has shown comparable or even superior performances compared to conventional fully-supervised ML techniques. In this paper, we show that the key feature of SSL that it can learn from (non-inspected) unlabeled data exposes SSL to strong poisoning attacks. In fact, we argue that, due to its reliance on non-inspected unlabeled data, poisoning is a much more severe problem in SSL than in conventional fully-supervised ML. Specifically, we design a backdoor poisoning attack on SSL that can be conducted by a weak adversary with no knowledge of target SSL pipeline. This is unlike prior poisoning attacks in fully-supervised settings that assume strong adversaries with practically-unrealistic capabilities. We show that by poisoning only 0.2% of the unlabeled training data, our attack can cause misclassification of more than 80% of test inputs (when they contain the adversary's backdoor trigger). Our attacks remain effective across twenty combinations of benchmark datasets and SSL algorithms, and even circumvent the state-of-the-art defenses against backdoor attacks. Our work raises significant concerns about the practical utility of existing SSL algorithms.

Creating secure and resilient applications with large language models (LLM) requires anticipating, adjusting to, and countering unforeseen threats. Red-teaming has emerged as a critical technique for identifying vulnerabilities in real-world LLM implementations. This paper presents a detailed threat model and provides a systematization of knowledge (SoK) of red-teaming attacks on LLMs. We develop a taxonomy of attacks based on the stages of the LLM development and deployment process and extract various insights from previous research. In addition, we compile methods for defense and practical red-teaming strategies for practitioners. By delineating prominent attack motifs and shedding light on various entry points, this paper provides a framework for improving the security and robustness of LLM-based systems.

This paper presents CyberSecEval, a comprehensive benchmark developed to help bolster the cybersecurity of Large Language Models (LLMs) employed as coding assistants. As what we believe to be the most extensive unified cybersecurity safety benchmark to date, CyberSecEval provides a thorough evaluation of LLMs in two crucial security domains: their propensity to generate insecure code and their level of compliance when asked to assist in cyberattacks. Through a case study involving seven models from the Llama 2, Code Llama, and OpenAI GPT large language model families, CyberSecEval effectively pinpointed key cybersecurity risks. More importantly, it offered practical insights for refining these models. A significant observation from the study was the tendency of more advanced models to suggest insecure code, highlighting the critical need for integrating security considerations in the development of sophisticated LLMs. CyberSecEval, with its automated test case generation and evaluation pipeline covers a broad scope and equips LLM designers and researchers with a tool to broadly measure and enhance the cybersecurity safety properties of LLMs, contributing to the development of more secure AI systems.

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are fully open. In response, several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune model weights. However, in this paper, we urge for more careful characterization of the limits of these approaches. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even evaluating these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the evaluation pitfalls that we identify and suggest future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide more useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms. Existing attack methods are fixed or specifically tailored for certain models and cannot flexibly adjust attack strength, which is critical for generalization when attacking models of various sizes. We introduce a novel scalable jailbreak attack that preempts the activation of an LLM's safety policies by occupying its computational resources. Our method involves engaging the LLM in a resource-intensive preliminary task - a Character Map lookup and decoding process - before presenting the target instruction. By saturating the model's processing capacity, we prevent the activation of safety protocols when processing the subsequent instruction. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that our method achieves a high success rate in bypassing safety measures without requiring gradient access, manual prompt engineering. We verified our approach offers a scalable attack that quantifies attack strength and adapts to different model scales at the optimal strength. We shows safety policies of LLMs might be more susceptible to resource constraints. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability in current LLM safety designs, highlighting the need for more robust defense strategies that account for resource-intense condition.

Scams exploiting real-time social engineering -- such as phishing, impersonation, and phone fraud -- remain a persistent and evolving threat across digital platforms. Existing defenses are largely reactive, offering limited protection during active interactions. We propose a privacy-preserving, AI-in-the-loop framework that proactively detects and disrupts scam conversations in real time. The system combines instruction-tuned artificial intelligence with a safety-aware utility function that balances engagement with harm minimization, and employs federated learning to enable continual model updates without raw data sharing. Experimental evaluations show that the system produces fluent and engaging responses (perplexity as low as 22.3, engagement approx0.80), while human studies confirm significant gains in realism, safety, and effectiveness over strong baselines. In federated settings, models trained with FedAvg sustain up to 30 rounds while preserving high engagement (approx0.80), strong relevance (approx0.74), and low PII leakage (leq0.0085). Even with differential privacy, novelty and safety remain stable, indicating that robust privacy can be achieved without sacrificing performance. The evaluation of guard models (LlamaGuard, LlamaGuard2/3, MD-Judge) shows a straightforward pattern: stricter moderation settings reduce the chance of exposing personal information, but they also limit how much the model engages in conversation. In contrast, more relaxed settings allow longer and richer interactions, which improve scam detection, but at the cost of higher privacy risk. To our knowledge, this is the first framework to unify real-time scam-baiting, federated privacy preservation, and calibrated safety moderation into a proactive defense paradigm.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs), LLM-based agents and Multi-agent Systems (MAS) have significantly expanded the capabilities of LLM ecosystems. This evolution stems from empowering LLMs with additional modules such as memory, tools, environment, and even other agents. However, this advancement has also introduced more complex issues of trustworthiness, which previous research focused solely on LLMs could not cover. In this survey, we propose the TrustAgent framework, a comprehensive study on the trustworthiness of agents, characterized by modular taxonomy, multi-dimensional connotations, and technical implementation. By thoroughly investigating and summarizing newly emerged attacks, defenses, and evaluation methods for agents and MAS, we extend the concept of Trustworthy LLM to the emerging paradigm of Trustworthy Agent. In TrustAgent, we begin by deconstructing and introducing various components of the Agent and MAS. Then, we categorize their trustworthiness into intrinsic (brain, memory, and tool) and extrinsic (user, agent, and environment) aspects. Subsequently, we delineate the multifaceted meanings of trustworthiness and elaborate on the implementation techniques of existing research related to these internal and external modules. Finally, we present our insights and outlook on this domain, aiming to provide guidance for future endeavors.

This position paper argues that the field of LLM agents requires a unified, telecom-inspired communication protocol to ensure safety, interoperability, and scalability, especially within the context of Next Generation (NextG) networks. Current ad-hoc communication methods are creating a fragmented ecosystem, reminiscent of the early "protocol wars" in networking, which stifles innovation and poses significant risks. Drawing inspiration from the layered, standardized protocols that underpin modern telecommunications, we propose the LLM-Agent Communication Protocol (LACP). LACP establishes a three-layer architecture designed to ensure semantic clarity in communication, transactional integrity for complex tasks, and robust, built-in security. In this position paper, we argue that adopting a principled, universal protocol is not merely beneficial but essential for realizing the potential of distributed AI. Such a standard is critical for ensuring that multi-agent systems can operate safely and reliably in the complex, real-time applications envisioned for 6G and beyond.

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in software engineering tasks when trained with executable runtime environments, particularly in resolving GitHub issues. However, such runtime environments are often unavailable in other domains, especially cybersecurity, where challenge configurations and execution contexts are ephemeral or restricted. We present Cyber-Zero, the first runtime-free framework for synthesizing high-quality agent trajectories to train cybersecurity LLMs. Cyber-Zero leverages publicly available CTF writeups and employs persona-driven LLM simulation to reverse-engineer runtime behaviors and generate realistic, long-horizon interaction sequences without actual environments. Using trajectories synthesized by Cyber-Zero, we train LLM-based agents that achieve up to 13.1% absolute performance gains over baseline models on three prominent CTF benchmarks: InterCode-CTF, NYU CTF Bench, and Cybench. Our best model, Cyber-Zero-32B, establishes new state-of-the-art performance among open-weight models, matching the capabilities of proprietary systems like DeepSeek-V3-0324 and Claude-3.5-Sonnet while offering superior cost-effectiveness, and demonstrating that runtime-free trajectory synthesis can effectively democratize the development of state-of-the-art cybersecurity agents.

Existing safety assurance research has primarily focused on training-phase alignment to instill safe behaviors into LLMs. However, recent studies have exposed these methods' susceptibility to diverse jailbreak attacks. Concurrently, inference scaling has significantly advanced LLM reasoning capabilities but remains unexplored in the context of safety assurance. Addressing this gap, our work pioneers inference scaling for robust and effective LLM safety against emerging threats. We reveal that conventional inference scaling techniques, despite their success in reasoning tasks, perform poorly in safety contexts, even falling short of basic approaches like Best-of-N Sampling. We attribute this inefficiency to a newly identified challenge, the exploration--efficiency dilemma, arising from the high computational overhead associated with frequent process reward model (PRM) evaluations. To overcome this dilemma, we propose SAFFRON, a novel inference scaling paradigm tailored explicitly for safety assurance. Central to our approach is the introduction of a multifurcation reward model (MRM) that significantly reduces the required number of reward model evaluations. To operationalize this paradigm, we further propose: (i) a partial supervision training objective for MRM, (ii) a conservative exploration constraint to prevent out-of-distribution explorations, and (iii) a Trie-based key--value caching strategy that facilitates cache sharing across sequences during tree search. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, we publicly release our trained multifurcation reward model (Saffron-1) and the accompanying token-level safety reward dataset (Safety4M) to accelerate future research in LLM safety. Our code, model, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/saffron , and our project homepage is at https://q-rz.github.io/p/saffron .

Jailbreaking attacks can effectively induce unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs); however, the transferability of these attacks across different models remains limited. This study aims to understand and enhance the transferability of gradient-based jailbreaking methods, which are among the standard approaches for attacking white-box models. Through a detailed analysis of the optimization process, we introduce a novel conceptual framework to elucidate transferability and identify superfluous constraints-specifically, the response pattern constraint and the token tail constraint-as significant barriers to improved transferability. Removing these unnecessary constraints substantially enhances the transferability and controllability of gradient-based attacks. Evaluated on Llama-3-8B-Instruct as the source model, our method increases the overall Transfer Attack Success Rate (T-ASR) across a set of target models with varying safety levels from 18.4% to 50.3%, while also improving the stability and controllability of jailbreak behaviors on both source and target models.

In this work, we propose Reciprocal Distribution Alignment (RDA) to address semi-supervised learning (SSL), which is a hyperparameter-free framework that is independent of confidence threshold and works with both the matched (conventionally) and the mismatched class distributions. Distribution mismatch is an often overlooked but more general SSL scenario where the labeled and the unlabeled data do not fall into the identical class distribution. This may lead to the model not exploiting the labeled data reliably and drastically degrade the performance of SSL methods, which could not be rescued by the traditional distribution alignment. In RDA, we enforce a reciprocal alignment on the distributions of the predictions from two classifiers predicting pseudo-labels and complementary labels on the unlabeled data. These two distributions, carrying complementary information, could be utilized to regularize each other without any prior of class distribution. Moreover, we theoretically show that RDA maximizes the input-output mutual information. Our approach achieves promising performance in SSL under a variety of scenarios of mismatched distributions, as well as the conventional matched SSL setting. Our code is available at: https://github.com/NJUyued/RDA4RobustSSL.

Protecting the intellectual property of open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) is very important, because training LLMs costs extensive computational resources and data. Therefore, model owners and third parties need to identify whether a suspect model is a subsequent development of the victim model. To this end, we propose a training-free REEF to identify the relationship between the suspect and victim models from the perspective of LLMs' feature representations. Specifically, REEF computes and compares the centered kernel alignment similarity between the representations of a suspect model and a victim model on the same samples. This training-free REEF does not impair the model's general capabilities and is robust to sequential fine-tuning, pruning, model merging, and permutations. In this way, REEF provides a simple and effective way for third parties and models' owners to protect LLMs' intellectual property together. The code is available at https://github.com/tmylla/REEF.

With ChatGPT as a representative, tons of companies have began to provide services based on large Transformers models. However, using such a service inevitably leak users' prompts to the model provider. Previous studies have studied secure inference for Transformer models using secure multiparty computation (MPC), where model parameters and clients' prompts are kept secret. Despite this, these frameworks are still limited in terms of model performance, efficiency, and deployment. To address these limitations, we propose framework PUMA to enable fast and secure Transformer model inference. Our framework designs high quality approximations for expensive functions, such as GeLU and Softmax, which significantly reduce the cost of secure inference while preserving the model performance. Additionally, we design secure Embedding and LayerNorm procedures that faithfully implement the desired functionality without undermining the Transformer architecture. PUMA is about 2x faster than the state-of-the-art MPC framework MPCFORMER(ICLR 2023) and has similar accuracy as plaintext models without fine-tuning (which the previous works failed to achieve). One more thing, PUMA can evaluate LLaMA-7B in around 5 minutes to generate 1 token. To our best knowledge, this is the first time that a model with such a parameter size is able to be evaluated under MPC. PUMA has been open-sourced in the Github repository of SecretFlow-SPU.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

Although Foundation Models (FMs), such as GPT-4, are increasingly used in domains like finance and software engineering, reliance on textual interfaces limits these models' real-world interaction. To address this, FM providers introduced tool calling-triggering a proliferation of frameworks with distinct tool interfaces. In late 2024, Anthropic introduced the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to standardize this tool ecosystem, which has become the de facto standard with over eight million weekly SDK downloads. Despite its adoption, MCP's AI-driven, non-deterministic control flow introduces new risks to sustainability, security, and maintainability, warranting closer examination. Towards this end, we present the first large-scale empirical study of MCP servers. Using state-of-the-art health metrics and a hybrid analysis pipeline, combining a general-purpose static analysis tool with an MCP-specific scanner, we evaluate 1,899 open-source MCP servers to assess their health, security, and maintainability. Despite MCP servers demonstrating strong health metrics, we identify eight distinct vulnerabilities - only three overlapping with traditional software vulnerabilities. Additionally, 7.2% of servers contain general vulnerabilities and 5.5% exhibit MCP-specific tool poisoning. Regarding maintainability, while 66% exhibit code smells, 14.4% contain nine bug patterns overlapping with traditional open-source software projects. These findings highlight the need for MCP-specific vulnerability detection techniques while reaffirming the value of traditional analysis and refactoring practices.

We investigate an emerging setup in which a small, on-device language model (LM) with access to local data communicates with a frontier, cloud-hosted LM to solve real-world tasks involving financial, medical, and scientific reasoning over long documents. Can a local-remote collaboration reduce cloud inference costs while preserving quality? First, we consider a naive collaboration protocol where the local and remote models simply chat back and forth. Because only the local model reads the full context, this protocol achieves a 30.4x reduction in remote costs, but recovers only 87% of the performance of the frontier model. We identify two key limitations of this protocol: the local model struggles to (1) follow the remote model's multi-step instructions and (2) reason over long contexts. Motivated by these observations, we study an extension of this protocol, coined MinionS, in which the remote model decomposes the task into easier subtasks over shorter chunks of the document, that are executed locally in parallel. MinionS reduces costs by 5.7x on average while recovering 97.9% of the performance of the remote model alone. Our analysis reveals several key design choices that influence the trade-off between cost and performance in local-remote systems.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a standardized interface designed to enable seamless interaction between AI models and external tools and resources, breaking down data silos and facilitating interoperability across diverse systems. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of MCP, focusing on its core components, workflow, and the lifecycle of MCP servers, which consists of three key phases: creation, operation, and update. We analyze the security and privacy risks associated with each phase and propose strategies to mitigate potential threats. The paper also examines the current MCP landscape, including its adoption by industry leaders and various use cases, as well as the tools and platforms supporting its integration. We explore future directions for MCP, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that will influence its adoption and evolution within the broader AI ecosystem. Finally, we offer recommendations for MCP stakeholders to ensure its secure and sustainable development as the AI landscape continues to evolve.

The increasing deployment of large language models in security-sensitive domains necessitates rigorous evaluation of their resilience against adversarial prompt-based attacks. While previous benchmarks have focused on security evaluations with limited and predefined attack domains, such as cybersecurity attacks, they often lack a comprehensive assessment of intent-driven adversarial prompts and the consideration of real-life scenario-based multi-turn attacks. To address this gap, we present SecReEvalBench, the Security Resilience Evaluation Benchmark, which defines four novel metrics: Prompt Attack Resilience Score, Prompt Attack Refusal Logic Score, Chain-Based Attack Resilience Score and Chain-Based Attack Rejection Time Score. Moreover, SecReEvalBench employs six questioning sequences for model assessment: one-off attack, successive attack, successive reverse attack, alternative attack, sequential ascending attack with escalating threat levels and sequential descending attack with diminishing threat levels. In addition, we introduce a dataset customized for the benchmark, which incorporates both neutral and malicious prompts, categorised across seven security domains and sixteen attack techniques. In applying this benchmark, we systematically evaluate five state-of-the-art open-weighted large language models, Llama 3.1, Gemma 2, Mistral v0.3, DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen 3. Our findings offer critical insights into the strengths and weaknesses of modern large language models in defending against evolving adversarial threats. The SecReEvalBench dataset is publicly available at https://kaggle.com/datasets/5a7ee22cf9dab6c93b55a73f630f6c9b42e936351b0ae98fbae6ddaca7fe248d, which provides a groundwork for advancing research in large language model security.

Recent advancements in the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) have primarily focused on mitigating attacks crafted in natural language or in common encryption techniques like Base64. However, new models which often possess better reasoning capabilities, open the door to new attack vectors that were previously non-existent in older models. This seems counter-intuitive at first glance, but these advanced models can decipher more complex cryptic queries that previous models could not, making them susceptible to attacks using such prompts. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose Attacks using Custom Encryptions (ACE), a novel method to jailbreak LLMs by leveraging custom encryption schemes. We evaluate the effectiveness of ACE on four state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving Attack Success Rates (ASR) of up to 66% on close-source models and 88% on open-source models. Building upon this, we introduce Layered Attacks using Custom Encryptions (LACE), which employs multiple layers of encryption through our custom ciphers to further enhance the ASR. Our findings demonstrate that LACE significantly enhances the ability to jailbreak LLMs, increasing the ASR of GPT-4o from 40% to 78%, a 38% improvement. Our results highlight that the advanced capabilities of LLMs introduce unforeseen vulnerabilities to complex attacks. Specifically complex and layered ciphers increase the chance of jailbreaking.

The vast amounts of digital content captured from the real world or AI-generated media necessitate methods for copyright protection, traceability, or data provenance verification. Digital watermarking serves as a crucial approach to address these challenges. Its evolution spans three generations: handcrafted, autoencoder-based, and foundation model based methods. While the robustness of these systems is well-documented, the security against adversarial attacks remains underexplored. This paper evaluates the security of foundation models' latent space digital watermarking systems that utilize adversarial embedding techniques. A series of experiments investigate the security dimensions under copy and removal attacks, providing empirical insights into these systems' vulnerabilities. All experimental codes and results are available at https://github.com/vkinakh/ssl-watermarking-attacks .

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced natural language processing (NLP), providing versatile capabilities across various applications. However, their application to complex, domain-specific tasks, such as cyber-security, often faces substantial challenges. In this study, we introduce SecKnowledge and CyberPal.AI to address these challenges and train security-expert LLMs. SecKnowledge is a domain-knowledge-driven cyber-security instruction dataset, meticulously designed using years of accumulated expert knowledge in the domain through a multi-phase generation process. CyberPal.AI refers to a family of LLMs fine-tuned using SecKnowledge, aimed at building security-specialized LLMs capable of answering and following complex security-related instructions. Additionally, we introduce SecKnowledge-Eval, a comprehensive and diverse cyber-security evaluation benchmark, composed of an extensive set of cyber-security tasks we specifically developed to assess LLMs in the field of cyber-security, along with other publicly available security benchmarks. Our results show a significant average improvement of up to 24% over the baseline models, underscoring the benefits of our expert-driven instruction dataset generation process. These findings contribute to the advancement of AI-based cyber-security applications, paving the way for security-expert LLMs that can enhance threat-hunting and investigation processes.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly helpful in text generation, even writing code in programming languages based on user prompts written in natural language. They are even applied to generate simulation models for multibody systems from natural language. Research results suggest that LLMs surpass the mere replication of existing code examples, where some LLMs have been trained on an open-source multibody simulation code. However, for closed-source simulation software, such results are not to be expected as their ideas and concepts might differ from other publicly available ones. LLMs can hallucinate for knowledge-intensive tasks, such as model creation, which can lead to wrong responses. This is especially the case for the LLM unknown closed-source simulation software. The same applies to other internal knowledge kept private to protect intellectual property or data privacy. The Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) approach might yield a solution for these knowledge-intensive tasks. This paper explores the application of RAG to closed-source simulation software and presents first experiments. After a brief introduction to LLMs, the RAG approach, and the simulation method applied by the close-source simulation software, several examples are provided to test LLMs' knowledge of the simulation software and the creation of simulation models using two RAG systems. The examples show promising results indicating the benefits of applying RAG systems to closed-source simulation software, helping to access their knowledge. Nevertheless, they also reveal gaps in the applied information and open questions for further research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable potential across various domains, including cybersecurity. Using commercial cloud-based LLMs may be undesirable due to privacy concerns, costs, and network connectivity constraints. In this paper, we present Hackphyr, a locally fine-tuned LLM to be used as a red-team agent within network security environments. Our fine-tuned 7 billion parameter model can run on a single GPU card and achieves performance comparable with much larger and more powerful commercial models such as GPT-4. Hackphyr clearly outperforms other models, including GPT-3.5-turbo, and baselines, such as Q-learning agents in complex, previously unseen scenarios. To achieve this performance, we generated a new task-specific cybersecurity dataset to enhance the base model's capabilities. Finally, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of the agents' behaviors that provides insights into the planning abilities and potential shortcomings of such agents, contributing to the broader understanding of LLM-based agents in cybersecurity contexts

The integration of large language models (LLMs) into cyber security applications presents significant opportunities, such as enhancing threat analysis and malware detection, but can also introduce critical risks and safety concerns, including personal data leakage and automated generation of new malware. To address these challenges, we developed CyberLLMInstruct, a dataset of 54,928 instruction-response pairs spanning cyber security tasks such as malware analysis, phishing simulations, and zero-day vulnerabilities. The dataset was constructed through a multi-stage process. This involved sourcing data from multiple resources, filtering and structuring it into instruction-response pairs, and aligning it with real-world scenarios to enhance its applicability. Seven open-source LLMs were chosen to test the usefulness of CyberLLMInstruct: Phi 3 Mini 3.8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 7B, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B, Gemma 2 9B, and Llama 2 70B. In our primary example, we rigorously assess the safety of fine-tuned models using the OWASP top 10 framework, finding that fine-tuning reduces safety resilience across all tested LLMs and every adversarial attack (e.g., the security score of Llama 3.1 8B against prompt injection drops from 0.95 to 0.15). In our second example, we show that these same fine-tuned models can also achieve up to 92.50 percent accuracy on the CyberMetric benchmark. These findings highlight a trade-off between performance and safety, showing the importance of adversarial testing and further research into fine-tuning methodologies that can mitigate safety risks while still improving performance across diverse datasets and domains. The dataset creation pipeline, along with comprehensive documentation, examples, and resources for reproducing our results, is publicly available at https://github.com/Adelsamir01/CyberLLMInstruct.

Superconducting Digital (SCD) technology offers significant potential for enhancing the performance of next generation large scale compute workloads. By leveraging advanced lithography and a 300 mm platform, SCD devices can reduce energy consumption and boost computational power. This paper presents a cross-layer modeling approach to evaluate the system-level performance benefits of SCD architectures for Large Language Model (LLM) training and inference. Our findings, based on experimental data and Pulse Conserving Logic (PCL) design principles, demonstrate substantial performance gain in both training and inference. We are, thus, able to convincingly show that the SCD technology can address memory and interconnect limitations of present day solutions for next-generation compute systems.

Rust's compile-time safety guarantees make it ideal for safety-critical systems, creating demand for translating legacy C codebases to Rust. While various approaches have emerged for this task, they face inherent trade-offs: rule-based solutions face challenges in meeting code safety and idiomaticity requirements, while LLM-based solutions often fail to generate semantically equivalent Rust code, due to the heavy dependencies of modules across the entire codebase. Recent studies have revealed that both solutions are limited to small-scale programs. In this paper, we propose EvoC2Rust, an automated framework for converting entire C projects to equivalent Rust ones. EvoC2Rust employs a skeleton-guided translation strategy for project-level translation. The pipeline consists of three evolutionary stages: 1) it first decomposes the C project into functional modules, employs a feature-mapping-enhanced LLM to transform definitions and macros and generates type-checked function stubs, which form a compilable Rust skeleton; 2) it then incrementally translates the function, replacing the corresponding stub placeholder; 3) finally, it repairs compilation errors by integrating LLM and static analysis. Through evolutionary augmentation, EvoC2Rust combines the advantages of both rule-based and LLM-based solutions. Our evaluation on open-source benchmarks and six industrial projects demonstrates EvoC2Rust's superior performance in project-level C-to-Rust translation. On average, it achieves 17.24% and 14.32% improvements in syntax and semantic accuracy over the LLM-based approaches, along with a 96.79% higher code safety rate than the rule-based tools. At the module level, EvoC2Rust reaches 92.25% compilation and 89.53% test pass rates on industrial projects, even for complex codebases and long functions.

AI web agents use Internet resources at far greater speed, scale, and complexity -- changing how users and services interact. Deployed maliciously or erroneously, these agents could overload content providers. At the same time, web agents can bypass CAPTCHAs and other defenses by mimicking user behavior or flood authentication systems with fake accounts. Yet providers must protect their services and content from denial-of-service attacks and scraping by web agents. In this paper, we design a framework that imposes tunable costs on agents before providing access to resources; we call this Web Agent Throttling. We start by formalizing Throttling Gates as challenges issued to an agent that are asymmetric, scalable, robust, and compatible with any agent. Focusing on a common component -- the language model -- we require the agent to solve reasoning puzzles, thereby incurring excessive token-generation costs. However, we find that using existing puzzles, e.g., coding or math, as throttling gates fails to satisfy our properties. To address this, we introduce rebus-based Reasoning Gates, synthetic text puzzles that require multi-hop reasoning over world knowledge (thereby throttling an agent's model). We design a scalable generation and verification protocol for such reasoning gates. Our framework achieves computational asymmetry, i.e., the response-generation cost is 9.2x higher than the generation cost for SOTA models. We further deploy reasoning gates on a custom website and Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and evaluate with real-world web agents. Finally, we discuss the limitations and environmental impact of real-world deployment of our framework.

Information seeking is a fundamental requirement for humans. However, existing LLM agents rely heavily on open-web search, which exposes two fundamental weaknesses: online content is noisy and unreliable, and many real-world tasks require precise, domain-specific knowledge unavailable from the web. The emergence of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) now allows agents to interface with thousands of specialized tools, seemingly resolving this limitation. Yet it remains unclear whether agents can effectively leverage such tools -- and more importantly, whether they can integrate them with general-purpose search to solve complex tasks. Therefore, we introduce InfoMosaic-Bench, the first benchmark dedicated to multi-source information seeking in tool-augmented agents. Covering six representative domains (medicine, finance, maps, video, web, and multi-domain integration), InfoMosaic-Bench requires agents to combine general-purpose search with domain-specific tools. Tasks are synthesized with InfoMosaic-Flow, a scalable pipeline that grounds task conditions in verified tool outputs, enforces cross-source dependencies, and filters out shortcut cases solvable by trivial lookup. This design guarantees both reliability and non-triviality. Experiments with 14 state-of-the-art LLM agents reveal three findings: (i) web information alone is insufficient, with GPT-5 achieving only 38.2% accuracy and 67.5% pass rate; (ii) domain tools provide selective but inconsistent benefits, improving some domains while degrading others; and (iii) 22.4% of failures arise from incorrect tool usage or selection, highlighting that current LLMs still struggle with even basic tool handling.

Recently, Zaremba et al. demonstrated that increasing inference-time computation improves robustness in large proprietary reasoning LLMs. In this paper, we first show that smaller-scale, open-source models (e.g., DeepSeek R1, Qwen3, Phi-reasoning) can also benefit from inference-time scaling using a simple budget forcing strategy. More importantly, we reveal and critically examine an implicit assumption in prior work: intermediate reasoning steps are hidden from adversaries. By relaxing this assumption, we identify an important security risk, intuitively motivated and empirically verified as an inverse scaling law: if intermediate reasoning steps become explicitly accessible, increased inference-time computation consistently reduces model robustness. Finally, we discuss practical scenarios where models with hidden reasoning chains are still vulnerable to attacks, such as models with tool-integrated reasoning and advanced reasoning extraction attacks. Our findings collectively demonstrate that the robustness benefits of inference-time scaling depend heavily on the adversarial setting and deployment context. We urge practitioners to carefully weigh these subtle trade-offs before applying inference-time scaling in security-sensitive, real-world applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed numerous fields by enabling advanced natural language interactions but remain susceptible to critical vulnerabilities, particularly jailbreak attacks. Current jailbreak techniques, while effective, often depend on input modifications, making them detectable and limiting their stealth and scalability. This paper presents Targeted Model Editing (TME), a novel white-box approach that bypasses safety filters by minimally altering internal model structures while preserving the model's intended functionalities. TME identifies and removes safety-critical transformations (SCTs) embedded in model matrices, enabling malicious queries to bypass restrictions without input modifications. By analyzing distinct activation patterns between safe and unsafe queries, TME isolates and approximates SCTs through an optimization process. Implemented in the D-LLM framework, our method achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 84.86% on four mainstream open-source LLMs, maintaining high performance. Unlike existing methods, D-LLM eliminates the need for specific triggers or harmful response collections, offering a stealthier and more effective jailbreak strategy. This work reveals a covert and robust threat vector in LLM security and emphasizes the need for stronger safeguards in model safety alignment.

Figuring out which Pre-Trained Model (PTM) from a model zoo fits the target task is essential to take advantage of plentiful model resources. With the availability of numerous heterogeneous PTMs from diverse fields, efficiently selecting the most suitable PTM is challenging due to the time-consuming costs of carrying out forward or backward passes over all PTMs. In this paper, we propose Model Spider, which tokenizes both PTMs and tasks by summarizing their characteristics into vectors to enable efficient PTM selection. By leveraging the approximated performance of PTMs on a separate set of training tasks, Model Spider learns to construct tokens and measure the fitness score between a model-task pair via their tokens. The ability to rank relevant PTMs higher than others generalizes to new tasks. With the top-ranked PTM candidates, we further learn to enrich task tokens with their PTM-specific semantics to re-rank the PTMs for better selection. Model Spider balances efficiency and selection ability, making PTM selection like a spider preying on a web. Model Spider demonstrates promising performance in various configurations of model zoos.

Large Language Models (LLMs) with long chain-of-thought (CoT) capability, termed Reasoning Models, demonstrate superior intricate problem-solving abilities through multi-step long CoT reasoning. To create a dual-capability model with long CoT capability and domain-specific knowledge without substantial computational and data costs, model merging emerges as a highly resource-efficient method. However, significant challenges lie in merging domain-specific LLMs with long CoT ones since nowadays merging methods suffer from reasoning capability degradation, even gibberish output and output collapse. To overcome this, we introduce RCP-Merging: Merging Long Chain-of-Thought Models with Domain-Specific Models by Considering Reasoning Capability as Prior, a novel merging framework designed to integrate domain-specific LLMs with long CoT capability, meanwhile maintaining model performance in the original domain. Treating reasoning model weights as foundational prior, our method utilizes a reasoning capability indicator to preserve core long CoT capability model weights while selectively merging essential domain-specific weights. We conducted extensive experiments on Qwen2.5-7B, Llama3.1-8B, and Qwen2.5-1.5B models in BioMedicine and Finance domains. Our results show that RCP-Merging successfully merges a reasoning model with domain-specific ones, improving domain task performance by 9.5% and 9.2% over state-of-the-art methods, without significantly harming the original long CoT reasoning capability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with plugins to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either user or plugin's data. This flexibility enables a new computing paradigm with unlimited capabilities and programmability, but also introduces new security risks, vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. Moreover, user prompt is prone to be interpreted in an insecure way by LLM agents, creating non-deterministic behaviors that can be exploited by attackers. To address these security risks, we propose Prompt Flow Integrity (PFI), a system security-oriented solution to prevent privilege escalation in LLM agents. Analyzing the architectural characteristics of LLM agents, PFI features three mitigation techniques -- i.e., untrusted data identification, enforcing least privilege on LLM agents, and validating unsafe data flows. Our evaluation result shows that PFI effectively mitigates privilege escalation attacks while successfully preserving the utility of LLM agents.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

Prompt injection attacks pose a significant security threat to LLM-integrated applications. Model-level defenses have shown strong effectiveness, but are currently deployed into commercial-grade models in a closed-source manner. We believe open-source models are needed by the AI security community, where co-development of attacks and defenses through open research drives scientific progress in mitigation against prompt injection attacks. To this end, we develop Meta SecAlign, the first open-source and open-weight LLM with built-in model-level defense that achieves commercial-grade model performance. We provide complete details of our training recipe, which utilizes an improved version of the SOTA SecAlign defense. Evaluations on 9 utility benchmarks and 7 security benchmarks show that Meta SecAlign, despite being trained on a generic instruction-tuning dataset, confers security in unseen downstream tasks, including tool-calling and agentic web navigation, in addition general instruction-following. Our best model -- Meta-SecAlign-70B -- achieves state-of-the-art robustness against prompt injection attacks and comparable utility to closed-source commercial LLM with model-level defense.

We propose the first unified adversarial attack benchmark for Genomic Foundation Models (GFMs), named GERM. Unlike existing GFM benchmarks, GERM offers the first comprehensive evaluation framework to systematically assess the vulnerability of GFMs to adversarial attacks. Methodologically, we evaluate the adversarial robustness of five state-of-the-art GFMs using four widely adopted attack algorithms and three defense strategies. Importantly, our benchmark provides an accessible and comprehensive framework to analyze GFM vulnerabilities with respect to model architecture, quantization schemes, and training datasets. Empirically, transformer-based models exhibit greater robustness to adversarial perturbations compared to HyenaDNA, highlighting the impact of architectural design on vulnerability. Moreover, adversarial attacks frequently target biologically significant genomic regions, suggesting that these models effectively capture meaningful sequence features.

We reveal new methods and the theoretical foundations of techniques for editing large language models. We also show how the new theory can be used to assess the editability of models and to expose their susceptibility to previously unknown malicious attacks. Our theoretical approach shows that a single metric (a specific measure of the intrinsic dimensionality of the model's features) is fundamental to predicting the success of popular editing approaches, and reveals new bridges between disparate families of editing methods. We collectively refer to these approaches as stealth editing methods, because they aim to directly and inexpensively update a model's weights to correct the model's responses to known hallucinating prompts without otherwise affecting the model's behaviour, without requiring retraining. By carefully applying the insight gleaned from our theoretical investigation, we are able to introduce a new network block -- named a jet-pack block -- which is optimised for highly selective model editing, uses only standard network operations, and can be inserted into existing networks. The intrinsic dimensionality metric also determines the vulnerability of a language model to a stealth attack: a small change to a model's weights which changes its response to a single attacker-chosen prompt. Stealth attacks do not require access to or knowledge of the model's training data, therefore representing a potent yet previously unrecognised threat to redistributed foundation models. They are computationally simple enough to be implemented in malware in many cases. Extensive experimental results illustrate and support the method and its theoretical underpinnings. Demos and source code for editing language models are available at https://github.com/qinghua-zhou/stealth-edits.

The increasing adoption of large language models (LLMs) in software engineering necessitates rigorous security evaluation of their generated code. However, existing benchmarks often lack relevance to real-world AI programming scenarios, making them inadequate for assessing the practical security risks associated with AI-generated code in production environments. To address this gap, we introduce A.S.E (AI Code Generation Security Evaluation), a repository-level evaluation benchmark designed to closely mirror real-world AI programming tasks, offering a comprehensive and reliable framework for assessing the security of AI-generated code. Our evaluation of leading LLMs on A.S.E reveals several key findings. In particular, current LLMs still struggle with secure coding. The complexity in repository-level scenarios presents challenges for LLMs that typically perform well on snippet-level tasks. Morever, a larger reasoning budget does not necessarily lead to better code generation. These observations offer valuable insights into the current state of AI code generation, assisting developers in selecting the most appropriate models for practical tasks, while laying the foundation for refining LLMs to generate secure and efficient code in real-world applications.

Automated code generation with large language models has gained significant traction, but there remains no guarantee on the correctness of generated code. We aim to use formal verification to provide mathematical guarantees that the generated code is correct. However, generating formally verified code with LLMs is hindered by the scarcity of training data and the complexity of formal proofs. To tackle this challenge, we introduce AlphaVerus, a self-improving framework that bootstraps formally verified code generation by iteratively translating programs from a higher-resource language and leveraging feedback from a verifier. AlphaVerus operates in three phases: exploration of candidate translations, Treefinement -- a novel tree search algorithm for program refinement using verifier feedback, and filtering misaligned specifications and programs to prevent reward hacking. Through this iterative process, AlphaVerus enables a LLaMA-3.1-70B model to generate verified code without human intervention or model finetuning. AlphaVerus shows an ability to generate formally verified solutions for HumanEval and MBPP, laying the groundwork for truly trustworthy code-generation agents.

The rapid development in large language models (LLMs) has transformed the landscape of natural language processing and understanding (NLP/NLU), offering significant benefits across various domains. However, when applied to scientific research, these powerful models exhibit critical failure modes related to scientific integrity and trustworthiness. Existing general-purpose LLM guardrails are insufficient to address these unique challenges in the scientific domain. We provide comprehensive guidelines for deploying LLM guardrails in the scientific domain. We identify specific challenges -- including time sensitivity, knowledge contextualization, conflict resolution, and intellectual property concerns -- and propose a guideline framework for the guardrails that can align with scientific needs. These guardrail dimensions include trustworthiness, ethics & bias, safety, and legal aspects. We also outline in detail the implementation strategies that employ white-box, black-box, and gray-box methodologies that can be enforced within scientific contexts.

The increasing complexity of computer science research projects demands more effective tools for deploying code repositories. Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Anthropic Claude and Meta Llama, have demonstrated significant advancements across various fields of computer science research, including the automation of diverse software engineering tasks. To evaluate the effectiveness of LLMs in handling complex code development tasks of research projects, particularly for NLP/CV/AI/ML/DM topics, we introduce CSR-Bench, a benchmark for Computer Science Research projects. This benchmark assesses LLMs from various aspects including accuracy, efficiency, and deployment script quality, aiming to explore their potential in conducting computer science research autonomously. We also introduce a novel framework, CSR-Agents, that utilizes multiple LLM agents to automate the deployment of GitHub code repositories of computer science research projects. Specifically, by checking instructions from markdown files and interpreting repository structures, the model generates and iteratively improves bash commands that set up the experimental environments and deploy the code to conduct research tasks. Preliminary results from CSR-Bench indicate that LLM agents can significantly enhance the workflow of repository deployment, thereby boosting developer productivity and improving the management of developmental workflows.

Network Architecture Search and specifically Regularized Evolution is a common way to refine the structure of a deep learning model.However, little is known about how models empirically evolve over time which has design implications for designing caching policies, refining the search algorithm for particular applications, and other important use cases.In this work, we algorithmically analyze and quantitatively characterize the patterns of model evolution for a set of models from the Candle project and the Nasbench-201 search space.We show how the evolution of the model structure is influenced by the regularized evolution algorithm. We describe how evolutionary patterns appear in distributed settings and opportunities for caching and improved scheduling. Lastly, we describe the conditions that affect when particular model architectures rise and fall in popularity based on their frequency of acting as a donor in a sliding window.

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in contexts where their failures can have direct sociopolitical consequences. Yet, existing safety benchmarks rarely test vulnerabilities in domains such as political manipulation, propaganda and disinformation generation, or surveillance and information control. We introduce SocialHarmBench, a dataset of 585 prompts spanning 7 sociopolitical categories and 34 countries, designed to surface where LLMs most acutely fail in politically charged contexts. Our evaluations reveal several shortcomings: open-weight models exhibit high vulnerability to harmful compliance, with Mistral-7B reaching attack success rates as high as 97% to 98% in domains such as historical revisionism, propaganda, and political manipulation. Moreover, temporal and geographic analyses show that LLMs are most fragile when confronted with 21st-century or pre-20th-century contexts, and when responding to prompts tied to regions such as Latin America, the USA, and the UK. These findings demonstrate that current safeguards fail to generalize to high-stakes sociopolitical settings, exposing systematic biases and raising concerns about the reliability of LLMs in preserving human rights and democratic values. We share the SocialHarmBench benchmark at https://huggingface.co/datasets/psyonp/SocialHarmBench.

Security concerns related to Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively explored, yet the safety implications for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly in medical contexts (MedMLLMs), remain insufficiently studied. This paper delves into the underexplored security vulnerabilities of MedMLLMs, especially when deployed in clinical environments where the accuracy and relevance of question-and-answer interactions are critically tested against complex medical challenges. By combining existing clinical medical data with atypical natural phenomena, we redefine two types of attacks: mismatched malicious attack (2M-attack) and optimized mismatched malicious attack (O2M-attack). Using our own constructed voluminous 3MAD dataset, which covers a wide range of medical image modalities and harmful medical scenarios, we conduct a comprehensive analysis and propose the MCM optimization method, which significantly enhances the attack success rate on MedMLLMs. Evaluations with this dataset and novel attack methods, including white-box attacks on LLaVA-Med and transfer attacks on four other state-of-the-art models, indicate that even MedMLLMs designed with enhanced security features are vulnerable to security breaches. Our work underscores the urgent need for a concerted effort to implement robust security measures and enhance the safety and efficacy of open-source MedMLLMs, particularly given the potential severity of jailbreak attacks and other malicious or clinically significant exploits in medical settings. For further research and replication, anonymous access to our code is available at https://github.com/dirtycomputer/O2M_attack. Warning: Medical large model jailbreaking may generate content that includes unverified diagnoses and treatment recommendations. Always consult professional medical advice.

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation and code repair, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, raises the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. Despite numerous studies investigating the safety of code LLMs, there remains a gap in comprehensively addressing their security features. In this work, we aim to present a comprehensive study aimed at precisely evaluating and enhancing the security aspects of code LLMs. To support our research, we introduce CodeSecEval, a meticulously curated dataset designed to address 44 critical vulnerability types with 180 distinct samples. CodeSecEval serves as the foundation for the automatic evaluation of code models in two crucial tasks: code generation and code repair, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that current models frequently overlook security issues during both code generation and repair processes, resulting in the creation of vulnerable code. In response, we propose different strategies that leverage vulnerability-aware information and insecure code explanations to mitigate these security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, our findings highlight that certain vulnerability types particularly challenge model performance, influencing their effectiveness in real-world applications. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

Language models have been effective in a wide range of applications, yet the most sophisticated models are often proprietary. For example, GPT-4 by OpenAI and various models by Anthropic are expensive and consume substantial energy. In contrast, the open-source community has produced competitive models, like Llama3. Furthermore, niche-specific smaller language models, such as those tailored for legal, medical or financial tasks, have outperformed their proprietary counterparts. This paper introduces a novel approach that employs functional tokens to integrate multiple open-source models, each optimized for particular tasks. Our newly developed Octopus v4 model leverages functional tokens to intelligently direct user queries to the most appropriate vertical model and reformat the query to achieve the best performance. Octopus v4, an evolution of the Octopus v1, v2, and v3 models, excels in selection and parameter understanding and reformatting. Additionally, we explore the use of graph as a versatile data structure that effectively coordinates multiple open-source models by harnessing the capabilities of the Octopus model and functional tokens. Use our open-sourced GitHub (https://www.nexa4ai.com/) to try Octopus v4 models (https://huggingface.co/NexaAIDev/Octopus-v4), and contrite to a larger graph of language models. By activating models less than 10B parameters, we achieved SOTA MMLU score of 74.8 among the same level models.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

Multi-modal foundation models combining vision and language models such as Flamingo or GPT-4 have recently gained enormous interest. Alignment of foundation models is used to prevent models from providing toxic or harmful output. While malicious users have successfully tried to jailbreak foundation models, an equally important question is if honest users could be harmed by malicious third-party content. In this paper we show that imperceivable attacks on images in order to change the caption output of a multi-modal foundation model can be used by malicious content providers to harm honest users e.g. by guiding them to malicious websites or broadcast fake information. This indicates that countermeasures to adversarial attacks should be used by any deployed multi-modal foundation model.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as "do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Evaluating how well LLMs follow developer-provided rules in the face of adversarial inputs typically requires manual review, which slows down monitoring and methods development. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 15 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey a set of rules in natural language while interacting with the human user. Each scenario has a concise evaluation program to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Through manual exploration of model behavior in our scenarios, we identify 6 categories of attack strategies and collect two suites of test cases: one consisting of unique conversations from manual testing and one that systematically implements strategies from the 6 categories. Across various popular proprietary and open models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2, we find that all models are susceptible to a wide variety of adversarial hand-crafted user inputs, though GPT-4 is the best-performing model. Additionally, we evaluate open models under gradient-based attacks and find significant vulnerabilities. We propose RuLES as a challenging new setting for research into exploring and defending against both manual and automatic attacks on LLMs.

This work introduces Salamandra, a suite of open-source decoder-only large language models available in three different sizes: 2, 7, and 40 billion parameters. The models were trained from scratch on highly multilingual data that comprises text in 35 European languages and code. Our carefully curated corpus is made exclusively from open-access data compiled from a wide variety of sources. Along with the base models, supplementary checkpoints that were fine-tuned on public-domain instruction data are also released for chat applications. Additionally, we also share our preliminary experiments on multimodality, which serve as proof-of-concept to showcase potential applications for the Salamandra family. Our extensive evaluations on multilingual benchmarks reveal that Salamandra has strong capabilities, achieving competitive performance when compared to similarly sized open-source models. We provide comprehensive evaluation results both on standard downstream tasks as well as key aspects related to bias and safety.With this technical report, we intend to promote open science by sharing all the details behind our design choices, data curation strategy and evaluation methodology. In addition to that, we deviate from the usual practice by making our training and evaluation scripts publicly accessible. We release all models under a permissive Apache 2.0 license in order to foster future research and facilitate commercial use, thereby contributing to the open-source ecosystem of large language models.

State space models (SSM) have recently been shown to be very effective as a deep learning layer as a promising alternative to sequence models such as RNNs, CNNs, or Transformers. The first version to show this potential was the S4 model, which is particularly effective on tasks involving long-range dependencies by using a prescribed state matrix called the HiPPO matrix. While this has an interpretable mathematical mechanism for modeling long dependencies, it introduces a custom representation and algorithm that can be difficult to implement. On the other hand, a recent variant of S4 called DSS showed that restricting the state matrix to be fully diagonal can still preserve the performance of the original model when using a specific initialization based on approximating S4's matrix. This work seeks to systematically understand how to parameterize and initialize such diagonal state space models. While it follows from classical results that almost all SSMs have an equivalent diagonal form, we show that the initialization is critical for performance. We explain why DSS works mathematically, by showing that the diagonal restriction of S4's matrix surprisingly recovers the same kernel in the limit of infinite state dimension. We also systematically describe various design choices in parameterizing and computing diagonal SSMs, and perform a controlled empirical study ablating the effects of these choices. Our final model S4D is a simple diagonal version of S4 whose kernel computation requires just 2 lines of code and performs comparably to S4 in almost all settings, with state-of-the-art results for image, audio, and medical time-series domains, and averaging 85\% on the Long Range Arena benchmark.

The ongoing evolution of language models has led to the development of large-scale architectures that demonstrate exceptional performance across a wide range of tasks. However, these models come with significant computational and energy demands, as well as potential privacy implications. In this context, Small Reasoning Language Models (SRLMs) with approximately 0.5 billion parameters present a compelling alternative due to their remarkable computational efficiency and cost effectiveness, particularly in resource-constrained environments. Despite these advantages, the limited capacity of 0.5 billion parameter models poses challenges in handling complex tasks such as mathematical reasoning and code generation. This research investigates various training strategies, including supervised fine-tuning (SFT), knowledge distillation (KD), and reinforcement learning (RL), as well as their hybrid implementations, to enhance the performance of 0.5B SRLMs. We analyze effective methodologies to bridge the performance gap between SRLMS and larger models and present insights into optimal training pipelines tailored for these smaller architectures. Through extensive experimental validation and analysis, our work aims to provide actionable recommendations for maximizing the reasoning capabilities of 0.5B models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to exhibit vulnerabilities despite deliberate safety alignment efforts, posing significant risks to users and society. To safeguard against the risk of policy-violating content, system-level moderation via external guard models-designed to monitor LLM inputs and outputs and block potentially harmful content-has emerged as a prevalent mitigation strategy. Existing approaches of training guard models rely heavily on extensive human curated datasets and struggle with out-of-distribution threats, such as emerging harmful categories or jailbreak attacks. To address these limitations, we propose RSafe, an adaptive reasoning-based safeguard that conducts guided safety reasoning to provide robust protection within the scope of specified safety policies. RSafe operates in two stages: 1) guided reasoning, where it analyzes safety risks of input content through policy-guided step-by-step reasoning, and 2) reinforced alignment, where rule-based RL optimizes its reasoning paths to align with accurate safety prediction. This two-stage training paradigm enables RSafe to internalize safety principles to generalize safety protection capability over unseen or adversarial safety violation scenarios. During inference, RSafe accepts user-specified safety policies to provide enhanced safeguards tailored to specific safety requirements.

Selective state-space models (SSMs) are an emerging alternative to the Transformer, offering the unique advantage of parallel training and sequential inference. Although these models have shown promising performance on a variety of tasks, their formal expressiveness and length generalization properties remain underexplored. In this work, we provide insight into the workings of selective SSMs by analyzing their expressiveness and length generalization performance on regular language tasks, i.e., finite-state automaton (FSA) emulation. We address certain limitations of modern SSM-based architectures by introducing the Selective Dense State-Space Model (SD-SSM), the first selective SSM that exhibits perfect length generalization on a set of various regular language tasks using a single layer. It utilizes a dictionary of dense transition matrices, a softmax selection mechanism that creates a convex combination of dictionary matrices at each time step, and a readout consisting of layer normalization followed by a linear map. We then proceed to evaluate variants of diagonal selective SSMs by considering their empirical performance on commutative and non-commutative automata. We explain the experimental results with theoretical considerations. Our code is available at https://github.com/IBM/selective-dense-state-space-model.

Deep neural networks such as AlphaFold and RoseTTAFold predict remarkably accurate structures of proteins compared to other algorithmic approaches. It is known that biologically small perturbations in the protein sequence do not lead to drastic changes in the protein structure. In this paper, we demonstrate that RoseTTAFold does not exhibit such a robustness despite its high accuracy, and biologically small perturbations for some input sequences result in radically different predicted protein structures. This raises the challenge of detecting when these predicted protein structures cannot be trusted. We define the robustness measure for the predicted structure of a protein sequence to be the inverse of the root-mean-square distance (RMSD) in the predicted structure and the structure of its adversarially perturbed sequence. We use adversarial attack methods to create adversarial protein sequences, and show that the RMSD in the predicted protein structure ranges from 0.119A to 34.162A when the adversarial perturbations are bounded by 20 units in the BLOSUM62 distance. This demonstrates very high variance in the robustness measure of the predicted structures. We show that the magnitude of the correlation (0.917) between our robustness measure and the RMSD between the predicted structure and the ground truth is high, that is, the predictions with low robustness measure cannot be trusted. This is the first paper demonstrating the susceptibility of RoseTTAFold to adversarial attacks.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Training LLMs on decentralized and wimpy computation nodes, e.g., multiple on-spot instances, lowers the training cost and enables model democratization. The inevitable challenge here is the churn of nodes due to failures and the operator's scheduling policies, leading to losing a stage - a part of the model. The conventional approaches to recover from failures are to either use checkpointing, where periodically a copy of the entire model is sent to an additional storage, or redundant computation. These approaches yield significant communication and/or computation overhead even in non-failure cases and scale poorly in settings with large models. In this paper, we propose, CheckFree, an efficient recovery method where a failing stage is substituted by a weighted average of the closest neighboring stages. In contrast to the state of the art, CheckFree requires no additional computation or storage. However, because of the nature of averaging neighbouring stages, it can only recover failures of intermediate stages. We further extend our method to CheckFree+ with out-of-order pipeline execution to tolerate crashes of the first and last stages. Thanks to out-of-order pipelining, behaviour of those stages is mimicked by their neighboring ones, which allows CheckFree+ to recover them by simply copying the weights from the immediate neighbour. To be able to recover the (de)embedding layers, CheckFree+ copies those layers to the neighboring stages, which requires relatively small storage overhead. We extensively evaluate our method on LLaMa models of model sizes from 124M to 1.5B with varying failure frequencies. In the case of low and medium failure rates (5-10%), CheckFree and CheckFree+ outperform both checkpointing and redundant computation in terms of convergence in wall-clock time by over 12%. Both of our proposals can be run via our code available at: https://github.com/gensyn-ai/CheckFree.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into web-based systems for content summarization, yet their susceptibility to prompt injection attacks remains a pressing concern. In this study, we explore how non-visible HTML elements such as <meta>, aria-label, and alt attributes can be exploited to embed adversarial instructions without altering the visible content of a webpage. We introduce a novel dataset comprising 280 static web pages, evenly divided between clean and adversarial injected versions, crafted using diverse HTML-based strategies. These pages are processed through a browser automation pipeline to extract both raw HTML and rendered text, closely mimicking real-world LLM deployment scenarios. We evaluate two state-of-the-art open-source models, Llama 4 Scout (Meta) and Gemma 9B IT (Google), on their ability to summarize this content. Using both lexical (ROUGE-L) and semantic (SBERT cosine similarity) metrics, along with manual annotations, we assess the impact of these covert injections. Our findings reveal that over 29% of injected samples led to noticeable changes in the Llama 4 Scout summaries, while Gemma 9B IT showed a lower, yet non-trivial, success rate of 15%. These results highlight a critical and largely overlooked vulnerability in LLM driven web pipelines, where hidden adversarial content can subtly manipulate model outputs. Our work offers a reproducible framework and benchmark for evaluating HTML-based prompt injection and underscores the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies in LLM applications involving web content.

The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) for domain applications in fields such as materials science and engineering depends on the development of fine-tuning strategies that adapt models for specialized, technical capabilities. In this work, we explore the effects of Continued Pretraining (CPT), Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), and various preference-based optimization approaches, including Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and Odds Ratio Preference Optimization (ORPO), on fine-tuned LLM performance. Our analysis shows how these strategies influence model outcomes and reveals that the merging of multiple fine-tuned models can lead to the emergence of capabilities that surpass the individual contributions of the parent models. We find that model merging leads to new functionalities that neither parent model could achieve alone, leading to improved performance in domain-specific assessments. Experiments with different model architectures are presented, including Llama 3.1 8B and Mistral 7B models, where similar behaviors are observed. Exploring whether the results hold also for much smaller models, we use a tiny LLM with 1.7 billion parameters and show that very small LLMs do not necessarily feature emergent capabilities under model merging, suggesting that model scaling may be a key component. In open-ended yet consistent chat conversations between a human and AI models, our assessment reveals detailed insights into how different model variants perform and show that the smallest model achieves a high intelligence score across key criteria including reasoning depth, creativity, clarity, and quantitative precision. Other experiments include the development of image generation prompts based on disparate biological material design concepts, to create new microstructures, architectural concepts, and urban design based on biological materials-inspired construction principles.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently advanced the field of Automated Theorem Proving (ATP), attaining substantial performance gains through widely adopted test-time scaling strategies, notably reflective Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning and increased sampling passes. However, they both introduce significant computational overhead for inference. Moreover, existing cost analyses typically regulate only the number of sampling passes, while neglecting the substantial disparities in sampling costs introduced by different scaling strategies. In this paper, we systematically compare the efficiency of different test-time scaling strategies for ATP models and demonstrate the inefficiency of the current state-of-the-art (SOTA) open-source approaches. We then investigate approaches to significantly reduce token usage and sample passes while maintaining the original performance. Specifically, we propose two complementary methods that can be integrated into a unified EconRL pipeline for amplified benefits: (1) a dynamic Chain-of-Thought (CoT) switching mechanism designed to mitigate unnecessary token consumption, and (2) Diverse parallel-scaled reinforcement learning (RL) with trainable prefixes to enhance pass rates under constrained sampling passes. Experiments on miniF2F and ProofNet demonstrate that our EconProver achieves comparable performance to baseline methods with only 12% of the computational cost. This work provides actionable insights for deploying lightweight ATP models without sacrificing performance.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has opened up new opportunities for leveraging artificial intelligence in various domains, including cybersecurity. As the volume and sophistication of cyber threats continue to grow, there is an increasing need for intelligent systems that can automatically detect vulnerabilities, analyze malware, and respond to attacks. In this survey, we conduct a comprehensive review of the literature on the application of LLMs in cybersecurity (LLM4Security). By comprehensively collecting over 30K relevant papers and systematically analyzing 127 papers from top security and software engineering venues, we aim to provide a holistic view of how LLMs are being used to solve diverse problems across the cybersecurity domain. Through our analysis, we identify several key findings. First, we observe that LLMs are being applied to a wide range of cybersecurity tasks, including vulnerability detection, malware analysis, network intrusion detection, and phishing detection. Second, we find that the datasets used for training and evaluating LLMs in these tasks are often limited in size and diversity, highlighting the need for more comprehensive and representative datasets. Third, we identify several promising techniques for adapting LLMs to specific cybersecurity domains, such as fine-tuning, transfer learning, and domain-specific pre-training. Finally, we discuss the main challenges and opportunities for future research in LLM4Security, including the need for more interpretable and explainable models, the importance of addressing data privacy and security concerns, and the potential for leveraging LLMs for proactive defense and threat hunting. Overall, our survey provides a comprehensive overview of the current state-of-the-art in LLM4Security and identifies several promising directions for future research.

We present ShieldGemma, a comprehensive suite of LLM-based safety content moderation models built upon Gemma2. These models provide robust, state-of-the-art predictions of safety risks across key harm types (sexually explicit, dangerous content, harassment, hate speech) in both user input and LLM-generated output. By evaluating on both public and internal benchmarks, we demonstrate superior performance compared to existing models, such as Llama Guard (+10.8\% AU-PRC on public benchmarks) and WildCard (+4.3\%). Additionally, we present a novel LLM-based data curation pipeline, adaptable to a variety of safety-related tasks and beyond. We have shown strong generalization performance for model trained mainly on synthetic data. By releasing ShieldGemma, we provide a valuable resource to the research community, advancing LLM safety and enabling the creation of more effective content moderation solutions for developers.

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly capable and can now interact with tools (i.e., call functions), read documents, and recursively call themselves. As a result, these LLMs can now function autonomously as agents. With the rise in capabilities of these agents, recent work has speculated on how LLM agents would affect cybersecurity. However, not much is known about the offensive capabilities of LLM agents. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously hack websites, performing tasks as complex as blind database schema extraction and SQL injections without human feedback. Importantly, the agent does not need to know the vulnerability beforehand. This capability is uniquely enabled by frontier models that are highly capable of tool use and leveraging extended context. Namely, we show that GPT-4 is capable of such hacks, but existing open-source models are not. Finally, we show that GPT-4 is capable of autonomously finding vulnerabilities in websites in the wild. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) undergo safety alignment to ensure safe conversations with humans. However, this paper introduces a training-free attack method capable of reversing safety alignment, converting the outcomes of stronger alignment into greater potential for harm by accessing only LLM output token distributions. Specifically, our method achieves this reversal by contrasting the output token distribution of a safety-aligned language model (e.g., Llama-2-chat) against its pre-trained version (e.g., Llama-2), so that the token predictions are shifted towards the opposite direction of safety alignment. We name this method emulated disalignment (ED) because sampling from this contrastive distribution provably emulates the result of fine-tuning to minimize a safety reward. Our experiments with ED across three evaluation datasets and four model families (Llama-1, Llama-2, Mistral, and Alpaca) show that ED doubles the harmfulness of pre-trained models and outperforms strong baselines, achieving the highest harmful rates in 43 out of 48 evaluation subsets by a large margin. Eventually, given ED's reliance on language model output token distributions, which particularly compromises open-source models, our findings highlight the need to reassess the open accessibility of language models, even if they have been safety-aligned. Code is available at https://github.com/ZHZisZZ/emulated-disalignment.

Evolution, the engine behind the survival and growth of life on Earth, operates through the population-based process of reproduction. Inspired by this principle, this paper formally defines a newly emerging problem -- the population-based evolution of large language models (LLMs) -- and introduces a novel framework. Starting with a population of parent LLMs, our framework enables the population to evolve through four key operations: (i) crossover, merging the weights of different parents to create offspring LLMs, (ii) mutation, introducing small, random changes to model weights to foster diversity, (iii) selection, prioritizing high-performing models, and (iv) succession, transferring the learned experience from parent to offspring LLMs. With only 200 samples per new task, the LLM population evolves rapidly to adapt to the task at hand, without any gradients. Experiments on 12 datasets show that our framework consistently outperforms existing multi-LLM merging and adaptation methods, achieving accuracy gains of up to 54.8% over the best LLM in the initial population. Moreover, our framework allows for the evolution of LLMs across multiple new tasks simultaneously, scaling effectively with populations of up to 40 LLMs, and even zero-shot generalization to unseen held-out tasks. We have open-sourced the code on GitHub and released the weights of 10 parent LLMs, fine-tuned from gemma-2-2b-it, on HuggingFace$, enabling reproduction of our proposed framework using just a single 4090 GPU with 24GB memory, without any performance degradation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in various domains, yet their economic impact has been limited by challenges in tool use and function calling. This paper introduces ThorV2, a novel architecture that significantly enhances LLMs' function calling abilities. We develop a comprehensive benchmark focused on HubSpot CRM operations to evaluate ThorV2 against leading models from OpenAI and Anthropic. Our results demonstrate that ThorV2 outperforms existing models in accuracy, reliability, latency, and cost efficiency for both single and multi-API calling tasks. We also show that ThorV2 is far more reliable and scales better to multistep tasks compared to traditional models. Our work offers the tantalizing possibility of more accurate function-calling compared to today's best-performing models using significantly smaller LLMs. These advancements have significant implications for the development of more capable AI assistants and the broader application of LLMs in real-world scenarios.

With the widespread deployment of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) for visual-reasoning tasks, improving their safety has become crucial. Recent research indicates that despite training-time safety alignment, these models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks: carefully crafted image-prompt pairs that compel the model to generate harmful content. In this work, we first highlight a critical safety gap, demonstrating that alignment achieved solely through safety training may be insufficient against jailbreak attacks. To address this vulnerability, we propose Immune, an inference-time defense framework that leverages a safe reward model during decoding to defend against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we provide a rigorous mathematical characterization of Immune, offering provable guarantees against jailbreaks. Extensive evaluations on diverse jailbreak benchmarks using recent MLLMs reveal that Immune effectively enhances model safety while preserving the model's original capabilities. For instance, against text-based jailbreak attacks on LLaVA-1.6, Immune reduces the attack success rate by 57.82% and 16.78% compared to the base MLLM and state-of-the-art defense strategy, respectively.

In this paper, we introduce SecQA, a novel dataset tailored for evaluating the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in the domain of computer security. Utilizing multiple-choice questions generated by GPT-4 based on the "Computer Systems Security: Planning for Success" textbook, SecQA aims to assess LLMs' understanding and application of security principles. We detail the structure and intent of SecQA, which includes two versions of increasing complexity, to provide a concise evaluation across various difficulty levels. Additionally, we present an extensive evaluation of prominent LLMs, including GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4, Llama-2, Vicuna, Mistral, and Zephyr models, using both 0-shot and 5-shot learning settings. Our results, encapsulated in the SecQA v1 and v2 datasets, highlight the varying capabilities and limitations of these models in the computer security context. This study not only offers insights into the current state of LLMs in understanding security-related content but also establishes SecQA as a benchmark for future advancements in this critical research area.

Large language models (LLMs) mark a key shift in natural language processing (NLP), having advanced text generation, translation, and domain-specific reasoning. Closed-source models like GPT-4, powered by proprietary datasets and extensive computational resources, lead with state-of-the-art performance today. However, they face criticism for their "black box" nature and for limiting accessibility in a manner that hinders reproducibility and equitable AI development. By contrast, open-source initiatives like LLaMA and BLOOM prioritize democratization through community-driven development and computational efficiency. These models have significantly reduced performance gaps, particularly in linguistic diversity and domain-specific applications, while providing accessible tools for global researchers and developers. Notably, both paradigms rely on foundational architectural innovations, such as the Transformer framework by Vaswani et al. (2017). Closed-source models excel by scaling effectively, while open-source models adapt to real-world applications in underrepresented languages and domains. Techniques like Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) and instruction-tuning datasets enable open-source models to achieve competitive results despite limited resources. To be sure, the tension between closed-source and open-source approaches underscores a broader debate on transparency versus proprietary control in AI. Ethical considerations further highlight this divide. Closed-source systems restrict external scrutiny, while open-source models promote reproducibility and collaboration but lack standardized auditing documentation frameworks to mitigate biases. Hybrid approaches that leverage the strengths of both paradigms are likely to shape the future of LLM innovation, ensuring accessibility, competitive technical performance, and ethical deployment.

Sharing methods of attack and their effectiveness is a cornerstone of building robust defensive systems. Threat analysis reports, produced by various individuals and organizations, play a critical role in supporting security operations and combating emerging threats. To enhance the timeliness and automation of threat intelligence sharing, several standards have been established, with the Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) framework emerging as one of the most widely adopted. However, generating STIX-compatible data from unstructured security text remains a largely manual, expert-driven process. To address this challenge, we introduce AZERG, a tool designed to assist security analysts in automatically generating structured STIX representations. To achieve this, we adapt general-purpose large language models for the specific task of extracting STIX-formatted threat data. To manage the complexity, the task is divided into four subtasks: entity detection (T1), entity type identification (T2), related pair detection (T3), and relationship type identification (T4). We apply task-specific fine-tuning to accurately extract relevant entities and infer their relationships in accordance with the STIX specification. To address the lack of training data, we compiled a comprehensive dataset with 4,011 entities and 2,075 relationships extracted from 141 full threat analysis reports, all annotated in alignment with the STIX standard. Our models achieved F1-scores of 84.43% for T1, 88.49% for T2, 95.47% for T3, and 84.60% for T4 in real-world scenarios. We validated their performance against a range of open- and closed-parameter models, as well as state-of-the-art methods, demonstrating improvements of 2-25% across tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4, LLaMA, and Qwen have demonstrated remarkable success across a wide range of applications. However, these models remain inherently vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which can bypass existing safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for more robust attack detection methods and comprehensive evaluation benchmarks. To address these challenges, we introduce GenTel-Safe, a unified framework that includes a novel prompt injection attack detection method, GenTel-Shield, along with a comprehensive evaluation benchmark, GenTel-Bench, which compromises 84812 prompt injection attacks, spanning 3 major categories and 28 security scenarios. To prove the effectiveness of GenTel-Shield, we evaluate it together with vanilla safety guardrails against the GenTel-Bench dataset. Empirically, GenTel-Shield can achieve state-of-the-art attack detection success rates, which reveals the critical weakness of existing safeguarding techniques against harmful prompts. For reproducibility, we have made the code and benchmarking dataset available on the project page at https://gentellab.github.io/gentel-safe.github.io/.

Large language models (LLMs) are demonstrating increasing prowess in cybersecurity applications, creating creating inherent risks alongside their potential for strengthening defenses. In this position paper, we argue that current efforts to evaluate risks posed by these capabilities are misaligned with the goal of understanding real-world impact. Evaluating LLM cybersecurity risk requires more than just measuring model capabilities -- it demands a comprehensive risk assessment that incorporates analysis of threat actor adoption behavior and potential for impact. We propose a risk assessment framework for LLM cyber capabilities and apply it to a case study of language models used as cybersecurity assistants. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals high compliance rates but moderate accuracy on realistic cyber assistance tasks. However, our framework suggests that this particular use case presents only moderate risk due to limited operational advantages and impact potential. Based on these findings, we recommend several improvements to align research priorities with real-world impact assessment, including closer academia-industry collaboration, more realistic modeling of attacker behavior, and inclusion of economic metrics in evaluations. This work represents an important step toward more effective assessment and mitigation of LLM-enabled cybersecurity risks.

Large language models (LLMs) have proven to be very capable, but access to the best models currently rely on inference providers which introduces trust challenges -- how can we be sure that the provider is using the model configuration they claim? We propose TOPLOC, a novel method for verifiable inference that addresses this problem. TOPLOC leverages a compact locality sensitive hashing mechanism for intermediate activations which can detect unauthorized modifications to models, prompts, or precision with 100% accuracy, achieving no false positives or negatives in our empirical evaluations. Our approach is robust across diverse hardware configurations, GPU types, and algebraic reorderings, which allows for validation speeds significantly faster than the original inference. By introducing a polynomial encoding scheme, TOPLOC minimizes memory overhead of the generated commits by 1000times, requiring only 258 bytes of storage per 32 new tokens compared to the 262KB requirement of storing the token embeddings directly for Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Our method empowers users to verify LLM inference computations efficiently, fostering greater trust and transparency in open ecosystems and lays a foundation for decentralized and verifiable AI services.