Daily Papers

In recent years, multi-agent frameworks powered by large language models (LLMs) have advanced rapidly. Despite this progress, there is still a notable absence of benchmark datasets specifically tailored to evaluate their performance. To bridge this gap, we introduce Auto-SLURP, a benchmark dataset aimed at evaluating LLM-based multi-agent frameworks in the context of intelligent personal assistants. Auto-SLURP extends the original SLURP dataset -- initially developed for natural language understanding tasks -- by relabeling the data and integrating simulated servers and external services. This enhancement enables a comprehensive end-to-end evaluation pipeline, covering language understanding, task execution, and response generation. Our experiments demonstrate that Auto-SLURP presents a significant challenge for current state-of-the-art frameworks, highlighting that truly reliable and intelligent multi-agent personal assistants remain a work in progress. The dataset and related code are available at https://github.com/lorashen/Auto-SLURP/.

Intelligent Personal Assistant (IA), also known as Voice Assistant (VA), has become increasingly popular as a human-computer interaction mechanism. Most smartphones have built-in voice assistants that are granted high privilege, which is able to access system resources and private information. Thus, once the voice assistants are exploited by attackers, they become the stepping stones for the attackers to hack into the smartphones. Prior work shows that the voice assistant can be activated by inter-component communication mechanism, through an official Android API. However, this attack method is only effective on Google Assistant, which is the official voice assistant developed by Google. Voice assistants in other operating systems, even custom Android systems, cannot be activated by this mechanism. Prior work also shows that the attacking voice commands can be inaudible, but it requires additional instruments to launch the attack, making it unrealistic for real-world attack. We propose an attacking framework, which records the activation voice of the user, and launch the attack by playing the activation voice and attack commands via the built-in speaker. An intelligent stealthy module is designed to decide on the suitable occasion to launch the attack, preventing the attack being noticed by the user. We demonstrate proof-of-concept attacks on Google Assistant, showing the feasibility and stealthiness of the proposed attack scheme. We suggest to revise the activation logic of voice assistant to be resilient to the speaker based attack.